• ANALYSIS
Now that Annapolis is over, and the NIE report has ended any prospect of military action against Iran’s potential nuclear weapons programme, a clearer picture of Israel’s options has appeared.
It is clear from Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s behaviour and statements that he considers a major military operation in Gaza inevitable. He has been repeatedly described as depressed and distracted and the reasons have now become clear.
In order to contain the military threat from Gaza the IDF have to act. As soon as they do the peace talks will either be over, or at the very least postponed for an indefinite period. This in turn will produce two distinctly negative consequences for Barak as leader of the Labour Party and Defence Minister. The prospect of being the figure seen to have scuppered the latest peace efforts is depressing enough, but Barak will also have to face a major internal challenge from within his own party. On the domestic political front he will find it increasingly hard, if it ever were possible, to lead a peace coalition that would finally enable a two-state solution.
In effect Barak is standing astride a potentially collapsing Labour party and about to collapse peace effort, with a major operation involving substantial IDF casualties with no possible victory at the end of it as backdrop. This leaves him with very few options. His previous plan was to watch Kadima implode and pick up the electoral pieces, leading a centre-left government after elections. That prospect has receded as the weakness of his own position has made him more dependent upon Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Kadima for political survival.
But, whereas the remnant post-election Kadima could still become part of a centre-right coalition, this is not possible for Labour, as it will lead to yet another internal collapse. Barak knows, therefore, that his and Labour’s future, at the moment, lies in Kadima’s hands. He, along with most others, does not see Kadima holding its ground or increasing its representation, at the next elections, but as the operation in Gaza will lead to the collapse of the peace talks he, and the Labour Party, will have nothing to offer the electorate either. Barak is therefore faced with a difficult choice, one that is at the moment causing him deep inner conflict. His defence instinct, together with all his partners and colleagues at the Defence Ministry and in the IDF, are telling him to mount a devastating operation in Gaza. His political instincts, and many of his political colleagues, are telling him he needs to leave Gaza alone, despite the security risks, and fight tooth and nail for a political accommodation with the rival Palestinian groupings. Barak’s maxim of peace and security looks untenable. He has to choose one or the other with the most likely prospect of achieving neither.
Ehud Olmert is in a similar position but it is clear his instinct is to hold off any operation in Gaza, until such a position becomes politically untenable. He will leave containment of the deteriorating security position in Gaza to Barak, who he can blame, if necessary, for any failures. His position remains as fragile as Barak’s however. The more progress he achieves with President Abbas the more attacks will emanate from Gaza, as has been the pattern so far, and the more weak he will appear if he does nothing to respond.
This leaves Likud leader Bibi Netanyahu in an extraordinarily strong position. As the inevitable demise of the peace process unfolds in slow motion over the next few months, and the military option in Gaza is seen to fail, he can blame both Olmert for the political collapse, and Barak for the military failure. In elections Likud should be able to win both the North and the South of Israel comfortably as both areas become increasingly insecure about their future. Netanyahu can argue that the reason both the peace and the military options have failed is because of the weakness of Kadima and Labour towards the Palestinians and that only he, and his coalition, will be able to address both fronts to Israel’s advantage.
At the moment both Kadima and Labour look extraordinarily weak. Israel’s centre ground will shift to Likud over the coming months as both the political and military options are seen to fail.
This leaves Iran. It is clear Likud will be able to argue that they alone, by presenting an uncompromising position on security against, Hamas, Fatah, Hizb’allah, and Syria, will deter Iran from an attack. In reality post the NIE report, whatever Israeli coalition government is in power, will have no option but to go down the containment route alongside the next, probably Democrat, President of the United States. The only factor that could change this scenario is clear intelligence that Iran has become a nuclear weapons power and that she is preparing to attack Israel at some point in the future.
Latest figures - Mortar attacks from Gaza (2007): May 85; June 120; July 140; August 175; September 210; October 220; November 235.
Population loss from the Israeli Negev development city of Sderot: 25% over 5 years (conservative figs).
Thursday, 6 December 2007
Wednesday, 17 October 2007
Note on Israel- Syria - North Korea
Journalists get things wrong most of the time when reporting the Middle East for a simple reason: they cannot, because of their job's constraints, analyse the big picture or even the detail.
Israel attacked, and was allowed to attack, the facility in Syria because of the negotiations with North Korea, which looked as though they might founder as a result of Chinese, Russian, and North Korean obtuseness and South Korean cowardice.
Bush wanted to give them a timely reminder that however much they may be enjoying his discomfort in Iraq and Afghanistan, he still had some options available.
The historic talks between South and North Korea went well it appears. But, they only did so because the Chinese put pressure on North Korea, and they only bothered to do that because the stakes had been risen by Bush by his blessing of the strike on Syria.
Bush also mentioned proliferation three times within a week just before and after the strike.
He was reiterating to the Chinese, Russians, Iranians, and Syrians, that he was not prepared to tolerate proliferation. There were red lines.
Proliferation was a key issue in the talks with North Korea and they blatantly tried to get round any agreements they were making at the time. By bombing the Syrian facility Bush was telling the Russians and Chinese etc to get their act together and put pressure on the North Koreans to act properly.
Finally, Bush let Israel hit Syria because of his irritation with her double dealing and killing of US soldiers in Iraq, and Syria's murders in Lebanon. Allied to that he wanted both the Syrian and Iranian regimes to know that he was not afraid to pursue the military option. He is aware that they have become centres of international terrorism, that they spread and support international terrorism, and that they are seeking to strengthen themselves by providing North Korea with a haven for its nuclear technology and funds for the sale of its technology.
This also obviously applies to Iran who have been publicly stating they will sell their nuclear technology to anyone who hates America. In other words proliferation.
The hysterical pronouncements by unnamed European officials that the world was on the verge of the third world war are without foundation. The reason is simple. Regimes like those in Iran and Syria are only interested in one thing: staying in power. If they can avoid losing power they will. They might respond at some stage with an act of terrorism but they won't do anything big enough to provoke a major response. At least not as things stand. They believe they are currently winning, so why give the US Administration any excuses it may need to use the military option?
If the reports are true concerning the Pakistan-based Khan network sale of centrifuges to Syria that would explain why Israel was genuinely concerned, and why they were prepared to take the risks they did.
Israel attacked, and was allowed to attack, the facility in Syria because of the negotiations with North Korea, which looked as though they might founder as a result of Chinese, Russian, and North Korean obtuseness and South Korean cowardice.
Bush wanted to give them a timely reminder that however much they may be enjoying his discomfort in Iraq and Afghanistan, he still had some options available.
The historic talks between South and North Korea went well it appears. But, they only did so because the Chinese put pressure on North Korea, and they only bothered to do that because the stakes had been risen by Bush by his blessing of the strike on Syria.
Bush also mentioned proliferation three times within a week just before and after the strike.
He was reiterating to the Chinese, Russians, Iranians, and Syrians, that he was not prepared to tolerate proliferation. There were red lines.
Proliferation was a key issue in the talks with North Korea and they blatantly tried to get round any agreements they were making at the time. By bombing the Syrian facility Bush was telling the Russians and Chinese etc to get their act together and put pressure on the North Koreans to act properly.
Finally, Bush let Israel hit Syria because of his irritation with her double dealing and killing of US soldiers in Iraq, and Syria's murders in Lebanon. Allied to that he wanted both the Syrian and Iranian regimes to know that he was not afraid to pursue the military option. He is aware that they have become centres of international terrorism, that they spread and support international terrorism, and that they are seeking to strengthen themselves by providing North Korea with a haven for its nuclear technology and funds for the sale of its technology.
This also obviously applies to Iran who have been publicly stating they will sell their nuclear technology to anyone who hates America. In other words proliferation.
The hysterical pronouncements by unnamed European officials that the world was on the verge of the third world war are without foundation. The reason is simple. Regimes like those in Iran and Syria are only interested in one thing: staying in power. If they can avoid losing power they will. They might respond at some stage with an act of terrorism but they won't do anything big enough to provoke a major response. At least not as things stand. They believe they are currently winning, so why give the US Administration any excuses it may need to use the military option?
If the reports are true concerning the Pakistan-based Khan network sale of centrifuges to Syria that would explain why Israel was genuinely concerned, and why they were prepared to take the risks they did.
Friday, 5 October 2007
This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with:
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
Updates on this site will resume 21 October 2007
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
Updates on this site will resume 21 October 2007
19 September - 30 September 2007
In Memoriam
Professor John Doyle Klier (1944–2007)
Former Head University College London Hebrew & Jewish Studies Department
Sidney and Elizabeth Corob Professor of Modern Jewish History
Specialist and scholar of East European Jewish History
World authority on Russia's perceptions and treatment of Jews 1760-1917
Co-author with Helen Mingay ‘The Search for Anastasia: Solving the Riddle of the Lost Romanovs’
Professor John Doyle Klier (1944–2007)
Former Head University College London Hebrew & Jewish Studies Department
Sidney and Elizabeth Corob Professor of Modern Jewish History
Specialist and scholar of East European Jewish History
World authority on Russia's perceptions and treatment of Jews 1760-1917
Co-author with Helen Mingay ‘The Search for Anastasia: Solving the Riddle of the Lost Romanovs’
Thursday, 20 September 2007
Week 12 September – 19 September 2007
This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with:
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 8 Qassam missiles fell on or near Sderot this week, the second successive reduction in attacks in the last two weeks; Islamic Jihad and the Popular Resistance Committees fired 15 mortar shells on the Gaza-Israel border crossing areas, a 33% reduction on last week. Hamas had called for a cessation of shelling, especially on the border crossings during Ramadan, in an effort to ease supplies into Gaza over the festival month. Hamas repeated their appeal to cease fire to Islamic Jihad and the Popular Resistance Committees this week but have so far been met with an unfavourable response.
Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committees have confirmed they are discussing kidnapped corporal Schalit’s release with European intermediaries but blame Israel and the soldier’s parents for not doing enough to meet their demands. They also stated Egypt was likely to re-enter prisoner swap talks soon.
2· Israel declared the Gaza Strip a “hostile entity”. Israel remains legally obliged to meet Gaza’s basic humanitarian needs. Israel will not feel obliged to meet any other needs, however, and the onus will be on others to prove on a case by case basis whether it should be otherwise. The United Nations has asked Israel to reconsider or clarify its position.
It was revealed this week that medical staff in Gaza have been working a go-slow for the last month after the sacking by Hamas of Fatah-affiliated doctors from the main hospitals there. Senior medical positions are now being given to Hamas supporters only. Senior sacked Fatah-affiliated medical staff that have re-entered their hospitals have been arrested.
The last senior Fatah representative was sacked from the Religious Affairs Ministry in Gaza and Hamas paid out $12 million in salaries to 16,000 Hamas-supporting government officials in the Strip.
Hamas has stated it will not enforce the daylight Ramadan fast but its Executive Force militia has made it clear it will not tolerate open breaches of the religious practice.
For the second week running polls show a decline in support for Hamas and an increase for President Abbas and Fatah both in the West Bank and Gaza.
3· President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad have banned charity fund raising activity during Ramadan on the West Bank to prevent Hamas boosting its finances. They have also ended all payments to senior Hamas politicians and ex government ministers for continuing to support the coup in Gaza. Other Hamas legislators continue to receive their salaries.
Both Abbas and PM Fayyad continue to cast doubt on the relevance of holding the proposed November summit in Washington. The most likely date for the conference will be 19-21 November. So far Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait, have all said that the conference can serve no purpose without specific goals and timetables, and most appealed to the United States to include Syria.
Prime Minister Olmert has so far focussed on a joint statement with President Abbas on their broad goals. Any “declaration of principles” would need to pass a Cabinet vote and then be put to a vote before the Knesset.
4· The IDF’s head of Military Intelligence told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee that Hamas cells in the West Bank remain determined to carry out a large terror attack in Israel before the proposed November conference. Several IDF operations against Hamas and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine suicide cells in the West Bank continued throughout the week exposing bomb factories and their personnel.
Defence Minister Barak has said he will keep the permanent checkpoints on the West Bank for the time being but remove obstacles and barricades gradually whilst he trains mobile IDF checkpoint teams to replace them.
The release of 100 Fatah supporters for Ramadan has been delayed because the Justice Ministry and security services have not had time to check their records, and there were objections from members of the coalition government after recent breaches of amnesty by previously released prisoners.
5· PM Olmert called for peace talks with Syria without preconditions despite Syria’s “internal problems.” Binyamin Netanyahu became the first official to publicly confirm that an operation did take place against Syria two weeks ago and to signal his support for what was achieved. US officials linked the Israeli action to the presence of North Korean scientists and engineers in Syria and confirmed it was in a desert area in the northeast of the country.
The IDF resumed large-scale military manoeuvres on the Golan Heights. United Nations observers were apprised and were asked to reassure Syria there was no hostile intent. It was also reported that the Russian Ambassador to Syria had warned of an Israeli strike or operation several weeks ago but Russian Intelligence had said it would be on the Golan Heights.
6· Lebanese politicians returned this week from sojourns abroad taken both for a break and to ensure their own security. They came to take part in the country's 2-month Presidential campaign that is due to end in the candidate’s being selected by the Legislature on or by 23 November.
Antoine Ghanem, a pro-government Christian Phalangist MP, was assassinated by a car bomb two days after his homecoming. He is the 7th prominent anti-Syrian Lebanese personality to be assassinated since Syria’s alleged assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, and the 4th anti-Syrian government MP. Syria is still under UN investigation for its alleged role in the Hariri murder and a vote by the United Nations Security Council on the next stage of implementing an international tribunal is expected this month or in October.
7· Iran stated that on the regime’s “Quds Day” (12 October) when it traditionally calls for the destruction of Israel, "supporters of the Zionist regime will definitely receive the final response for their support.”
Iran apparently lost dozens of technicians in a purpose-built chemical weapons base near Halab in north Syria in July as they attempted to attach a chemical weapon onto a Scud missile resulting in the spread of sarin and mustard gas. 15 Syrian personnel also died.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· The deliberate reduction in Qassam and mortar attacks indicates the strength of Hamas control over the Gaza Strip. The reductions are due to Hamas’ desire to create calm during Ramadan as well as a measure of the genuine pressure they are under from IDF incursions and economic collapse. Nevertheless, Hamas-rule remains unchallenged. Their demand for a prisoner swap also indicates a continued desire for a political victory to bolster their position. Hamas rule through its Executive Force militia is becoming increasingly unpopular and is reflected in their 21% support rating in the latest poll. Support for Fatah has reached 50%.
· Israel’s classification of Gaza as a “hostile entity” gives her greater leeway to apply pressure to the Strip. It cannot remove Hamas from power but over time it can make Gazans think twice if they are offered a credible alternative. Unfortunately the reason many Palestinians voted for Hamas in the first instance was to rid themselves of Fatah’s corrupt and murderous rule. Only a radically reformed Fatah can offer a credible alternative to Hamas, and President Abbas has shown a singular genius for inaction in that regard.
· It is clear from statements from all “moderate” Arab governments that unless Israel can offer a reasonably speedy and detailed withdrawal plan, none can see the point of the proposed summit of 19-21 November in Washington.
The Palestinians want to return to the last negotiating positions they had reached at the Camp David peace talks of 2000, in which Jerusalem was the capital of Palestine and a land swap had been agreed.
Israel prefers a confidence-building gradualist approach that can build a strong Palestinian economy and society to act as a solid base for a stage-by-stage withdrawal with security guarantees.
The Palestinians simply don’t believe that Israel is interested in ever leaving the West Bank, and Israel does not trust Palestine to avoid becoming yet another platform for thousands of rocket launches against her.
These two positions are clearly irreconcilable and can only be bridged by the carefully organised intervention of an international force that can cater to both party’s concerns. The Arabs are right to be concerned about the lack of detail and Israel about the lack of any realistic assessment of the current security situation.
Unless the United States can address these issues and bring in a credible international force to divide the parties and ensure a smooth transition the proposed summit will either simply not occur or will produce nothing substantial. In any case no serious negotiations can occur without Syria and Hamas, and they, in turn, cannot be involved without Iran’s complicity.
Nevertheless, there are a series of meetings of the Quartet, Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for Palestine, United Nations Security Council, and the 62nd UN General Assembly this coming week that offer an opportunity to introduce more creative solutions, as well more destructive offerings, to the table.
· Binyamin Netanyahu has inadvertently confirmed the air strike on Syria. This is the second ludicrous blunder by a senior Israeli politician within a year. PM Olmert last year gave the impression Israel had nuclear weapons despite it being state policy to deny that is the case.
Olmert used the phrase “internal problems” to describe Assad’s reluctance or inability to talk peace. This was Olmert’s barbed response to President Assad’s jibe that he saw no point in talking to Olmert because he is too weak.
Iran and Russia failed to defend Syria. Iran in particular will be looking for the first opportunity to avenge the humiliation and prove the value of its strategic alliance with its Syrian ally.
Russia’s intelligence was good enough to warn Syria of an impending strike or operation, and it is clear that Russia has succeeded in penetrating Israel’s defence establishment, though still remains outside the inner circle.
It remains to be seen whether Russia’s anti-air defences were truly neutralised by Israeli jamming devices but this will only spur Syria to introduce more Russian military technology not less.
United States officials' references to North Korean technicians in Syria probably have more to do with maintaining pressure on the Chinese and Russians to enforce North Korean and Iranian compliance with United Nations resolutions on nuclear demilitarisation than whether or not North Korea had actually secreted nuclear materials in Syria. There were no secondary explosions, no complaints of chemical or other particles landing on third countries. The most likely explanation is that Israel destroyed a facility that was in the process of being built for as yet unknown purposes.
· Syria has reasserted its influence on Lebanese politics by simply liquidating its enemies. It wants a compliant President and believes it has the backing of the Pope in its efforts after recent talks in which the Papacy agreed it wanted a compromise Presidential candidate. The Lebanese Christian community is perennially divided and the Syrian regime has found it useful to use the supine papacy to help ease its passage to overall control of Lebanon. It is also a timely reminder, after Israel’s alleged violation of her air space, that Syria still considers Lebanon part of her sphere of influence.
The United Nations Security Council is about to deliberate upon Syria’s involvement in the murder of Prime Minister Hariri and several other prominent political figures. Syria could not have made a more obvious gesture of contempt towards both it and its procedures. It is correctly counting on Russian and Chinese vetoes and Iranian military might to protect it.
· Iran has threatened a stern response to all those who support Zionism by 12 October “Al Quds Day” in which it pledges its support for Palestine and the destruction of Israel.
The breach of Syria’s defences has activated the Iran-Syria mutual defence agreement in which both parties have pledged to come to each other’s aid should either be attacked.
Syria and Iran were involved in the destruction of the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie in 1988 and it should come as no surprise if a similar attempt is not made on an Israel-related target in any part of the globe.
One of the last successful Iran-Syria collaborations against a Jewish target was the 18 July 1994 bombing of the Jewish Community Centre in Buenos Aires that killed 86 and wounded 300. Due to Argentine corruption and incompetence no one was ever charged with the atrocity.
However, it is important to reiterate that western intelligence today is of a different order to previous decades, and the link to Iran and Syria will not be easily disguised. Not that that bothers Iran or Syria judging by this week's murder of Antoine Ghanem.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
__________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
________________________________________________
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 8 Qassam missiles fell on or near Sderot this week, the second successive reduction in attacks in the last two weeks; Islamic Jihad and the Popular Resistance Committees fired 15 mortar shells on the Gaza-Israel border crossing areas, a 33% reduction on last week. Hamas had called for a cessation of shelling, especially on the border crossings during Ramadan, in an effort to ease supplies into Gaza over the festival month. Hamas repeated their appeal to cease fire to Islamic Jihad and the Popular Resistance Committees this week but have so far been met with an unfavourable response.
Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committees have confirmed they are discussing kidnapped corporal Schalit’s release with European intermediaries but blame Israel and the soldier’s parents for not doing enough to meet their demands. They also stated Egypt was likely to re-enter prisoner swap talks soon.
2· Israel declared the Gaza Strip a “hostile entity”. Israel remains legally obliged to meet Gaza’s basic humanitarian needs. Israel will not feel obliged to meet any other needs, however, and the onus will be on others to prove on a case by case basis whether it should be otherwise. The United Nations has asked Israel to reconsider or clarify its position.
It was revealed this week that medical staff in Gaza have been working a go-slow for the last month after the sacking by Hamas of Fatah-affiliated doctors from the main hospitals there. Senior medical positions are now being given to Hamas supporters only. Senior sacked Fatah-affiliated medical staff that have re-entered their hospitals have been arrested.
The last senior Fatah representative was sacked from the Religious Affairs Ministry in Gaza and Hamas paid out $12 million in salaries to 16,000 Hamas-supporting government officials in the Strip.
Hamas has stated it will not enforce the daylight Ramadan fast but its Executive Force militia has made it clear it will not tolerate open breaches of the religious practice.
For the second week running polls show a decline in support for Hamas and an increase for President Abbas and Fatah both in the West Bank and Gaza.
3· President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad have banned charity fund raising activity during Ramadan on the West Bank to prevent Hamas boosting its finances. They have also ended all payments to senior Hamas politicians and ex government ministers for continuing to support the coup in Gaza. Other Hamas legislators continue to receive their salaries.
Both Abbas and PM Fayyad continue to cast doubt on the relevance of holding the proposed November summit in Washington. The most likely date for the conference will be 19-21 November. So far Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait, have all said that the conference can serve no purpose without specific goals and timetables, and most appealed to the United States to include Syria.
Prime Minister Olmert has so far focussed on a joint statement with President Abbas on their broad goals. Any “declaration of principles” would need to pass a Cabinet vote and then be put to a vote before the Knesset.
4· The IDF’s head of Military Intelligence told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee that Hamas cells in the West Bank remain determined to carry out a large terror attack in Israel before the proposed November conference. Several IDF operations against Hamas and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine suicide cells in the West Bank continued throughout the week exposing bomb factories and their personnel.
Defence Minister Barak has said he will keep the permanent checkpoints on the West Bank for the time being but remove obstacles and barricades gradually whilst he trains mobile IDF checkpoint teams to replace them.
The release of 100 Fatah supporters for Ramadan has been delayed because the Justice Ministry and security services have not had time to check their records, and there were objections from members of the coalition government after recent breaches of amnesty by previously released prisoners.
5· PM Olmert called for peace talks with Syria without preconditions despite Syria’s “internal problems.” Binyamin Netanyahu became the first official to publicly confirm that an operation did take place against Syria two weeks ago and to signal his support for what was achieved. US officials linked the Israeli action to the presence of North Korean scientists and engineers in Syria and confirmed it was in a desert area in the northeast of the country.
The IDF resumed large-scale military manoeuvres on the Golan Heights. United Nations observers were apprised and were asked to reassure Syria there was no hostile intent. It was also reported that the Russian Ambassador to Syria had warned of an Israeli strike or operation several weeks ago but Russian Intelligence had said it would be on the Golan Heights.
6· Lebanese politicians returned this week from sojourns abroad taken both for a break and to ensure their own security. They came to take part in the country's 2-month Presidential campaign that is due to end in the candidate’s being selected by the Legislature on or by 23 November.
Antoine Ghanem, a pro-government Christian Phalangist MP, was assassinated by a car bomb two days after his homecoming. He is the 7th prominent anti-Syrian Lebanese personality to be assassinated since Syria’s alleged assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, and the 4th anti-Syrian government MP. Syria is still under UN investigation for its alleged role in the Hariri murder and a vote by the United Nations Security Council on the next stage of implementing an international tribunal is expected this month or in October.
7· Iran stated that on the regime’s “Quds Day” (12 October) when it traditionally calls for the destruction of Israel, "supporters of the Zionist regime will definitely receive the final response for their support.”
Iran apparently lost dozens of technicians in a purpose-built chemical weapons base near Halab in north Syria in July as they attempted to attach a chemical weapon onto a Scud missile resulting in the spread of sarin and mustard gas. 15 Syrian personnel also died.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· The deliberate reduction in Qassam and mortar attacks indicates the strength of Hamas control over the Gaza Strip. The reductions are due to Hamas’ desire to create calm during Ramadan as well as a measure of the genuine pressure they are under from IDF incursions and economic collapse. Nevertheless, Hamas-rule remains unchallenged. Their demand for a prisoner swap also indicates a continued desire for a political victory to bolster their position. Hamas rule through its Executive Force militia is becoming increasingly unpopular and is reflected in their 21% support rating in the latest poll. Support for Fatah has reached 50%.
· Israel’s classification of Gaza as a “hostile entity” gives her greater leeway to apply pressure to the Strip. It cannot remove Hamas from power but over time it can make Gazans think twice if they are offered a credible alternative. Unfortunately the reason many Palestinians voted for Hamas in the first instance was to rid themselves of Fatah’s corrupt and murderous rule. Only a radically reformed Fatah can offer a credible alternative to Hamas, and President Abbas has shown a singular genius for inaction in that regard.
· It is clear from statements from all “moderate” Arab governments that unless Israel can offer a reasonably speedy and detailed withdrawal plan, none can see the point of the proposed summit of 19-21 November in Washington.
The Palestinians want to return to the last negotiating positions they had reached at the Camp David peace talks of 2000, in which Jerusalem was the capital of Palestine and a land swap had been agreed.
Israel prefers a confidence-building gradualist approach that can build a strong Palestinian economy and society to act as a solid base for a stage-by-stage withdrawal with security guarantees.
The Palestinians simply don’t believe that Israel is interested in ever leaving the West Bank, and Israel does not trust Palestine to avoid becoming yet another platform for thousands of rocket launches against her.
These two positions are clearly irreconcilable and can only be bridged by the carefully organised intervention of an international force that can cater to both party’s concerns. The Arabs are right to be concerned about the lack of detail and Israel about the lack of any realistic assessment of the current security situation.
Unless the United States can address these issues and bring in a credible international force to divide the parties and ensure a smooth transition the proposed summit will either simply not occur or will produce nothing substantial. In any case no serious negotiations can occur without Syria and Hamas, and they, in turn, cannot be involved without Iran’s complicity.
Nevertheless, there are a series of meetings of the Quartet, Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for Palestine, United Nations Security Council, and the 62nd UN General Assembly this coming week that offer an opportunity to introduce more creative solutions, as well more destructive offerings, to the table.
· Binyamin Netanyahu has inadvertently confirmed the air strike on Syria. This is the second ludicrous blunder by a senior Israeli politician within a year. PM Olmert last year gave the impression Israel had nuclear weapons despite it being state policy to deny that is the case.
Olmert used the phrase “internal problems” to describe Assad’s reluctance or inability to talk peace. This was Olmert’s barbed response to President Assad’s jibe that he saw no point in talking to Olmert because he is too weak.
Iran and Russia failed to defend Syria. Iran in particular will be looking for the first opportunity to avenge the humiliation and prove the value of its strategic alliance with its Syrian ally.
Russia’s intelligence was good enough to warn Syria of an impending strike or operation, and it is clear that Russia has succeeded in penetrating Israel’s defence establishment, though still remains outside the inner circle.
It remains to be seen whether Russia’s anti-air defences were truly neutralised by Israeli jamming devices but this will only spur Syria to introduce more Russian military technology not less.
United States officials' references to North Korean technicians in Syria probably have more to do with maintaining pressure on the Chinese and Russians to enforce North Korean and Iranian compliance with United Nations resolutions on nuclear demilitarisation than whether or not North Korea had actually secreted nuclear materials in Syria. There were no secondary explosions, no complaints of chemical or other particles landing on third countries. The most likely explanation is that Israel destroyed a facility that was in the process of being built for as yet unknown purposes.
· Syria has reasserted its influence on Lebanese politics by simply liquidating its enemies. It wants a compliant President and believes it has the backing of the Pope in its efforts after recent talks in which the Papacy agreed it wanted a compromise Presidential candidate. The Lebanese Christian community is perennially divided and the Syrian regime has found it useful to use the supine papacy to help ease its passage to overall control of Lebanon. It is also a timely reminder, after Israel’s alleged violation of her air space, that Syria still considers Lebanon part of her sphere of influence.
The United Nations Security Council is about to deliberate upon Syria’s involvement in the murder of Prime Minister Hariri and several other prominent political figures. Syria could not have made a more obvious gesture of contempt towards both it and its procedures. It is correctly counting on Russian and Chinese vetoes and Iranian military might to protect it.
· Iran has threatened a stern response to all those who support Zionism by 12 October “Al Quds Day” in which it pledges its support for Palestine and the destruction of Israel.
The breach of Syria’s defences has activated the Iran-Syria mutual defence agreement in which both parties have pledged to come to each other’s aid should either be attacked.
Syria and Iran were involved in the destruction of the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie in 1988 and it should come as no surprise if a similar attempt is not made on an Israel-related target in any part of the globe.
One of the last successful Iran-Syria collaborations against a Jewish target was the 18 July 1994 bombing of the Jewish Community Centre in Buenos Aires that killed 86 and wounded 300. Due to Argentine corruption and incompetence no one was ever charged with the atrocity.
However, it is important to reiterate that western intelligence today is of a different order to previous decades, and the link to Iran and Syria will not be easily disguised. Not that that bothers Iran or Syria judging by this week's murder of Antoine Ghanem.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
__________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
________________________________________________
Monday, 17 September 2007
Week 5 September – 11 September 2007
This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with:
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
In Memoriam Lilian Rosenthal
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 11 Qassam missiles landed on or near Sderot this week, an over 50% reduction on last week. A direct hit on a basic training facility for new recruits at Zikim in Israel (near the north Gaza border) wounded 69 male and female new recruits, 2 seriously. At least 22 mortar rounds fell on border crossing areas between Gaza and Israel, which led to the temporary closure of the Sufa crossing (southeast Gaza). Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for almost all the attacks. Hamas publicly approved the actions.
A joint Islamic Jihad and Fatah Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade operation to breach the Gaza fence and kidnap IDF personnel was thwarted when the truck and car carrying explosives and men were destroyed near the Kissufim crossing, central Gaza, by the IDF. The IDF destroyed 11 Qassam launchers during a regular search and destroy operation.
Confrontations between Fatah supporters and the Hamas Executive Force militia continued throughout Gaza. Hamas continued to use violence to break up all non-Hamas meetings and arrests of PLO officials were carried out for the first time accompanied by anti-PLO rhetoric. All partisan media outlets continued to castigate the other side with Hamas closing down all remaining Fatah media outlets in Gaza. Journalists continued to be routinely threatened by Hamas personnel.
Hamas called on all factions to cease mortar and other attacks on the border crossings during Ramadan. Hamas remained in complete control of Gaza.
In an unconfirmed claim Hamas stated that the leader involved in the kidnapping of corporal Schalit from Israel had been arrested by IDF forces and taken from Gaza to Israel. Hamas remained in talks with EU security officials over Schalit’s release and stated they would consider a first visit by a representative of the Red Cross to Schalit.
2· President Abbas and Palestinian Authority personnel in the West Bank continued to publicly criticise Hamas demanding they apologise for the coup in Gaza and return to the status quo ante. Fatah continued to arrest Hamas personnel, violently break up Hamas functions at West Bank Universities, and beat up journalists. A major anti-Hamas media campaign continued to focus on Hamas violence and extremism labelling the organisation “Shiites” and predicting its inevitable downfall in Gaza.
President Abbas continued to express doubts about the purpose of the proposed November regional summit in Washington. He stated he was concluding the framework for final status issues, a declaration of principles, with Prime Minister Olmert, which would then lead to an international conference during which he hoped to negotiate the details of the final status issues and a permanent peace treaty.
Abbas also visited Saudi Arabia to discuss the proposed US summit, Hamas-Fatah reconciliation, and funding.
P.A. Prime Minister Salam Fayyad said he needed the United States to agree an explicit commitment to a Palestinian state, a binding timetable, and international guarantees concerning implementation.
PA-Israel negotiating teams and joint ministerial committees have been established to facilitate the talks.
3· An alert security guard at a West Bank checkpoint averted a major suicide bombing in Tel Aviv. A young teenager was arrested and the explosives and suicide belt he was carrying on behalf of the suicide cell in Israel were destroyed. Previously security chiefs had testified to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee that Iran and Syria had ordered major terror attacks in order to sabotage the forthcoming November summit. Terror cells from Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Fatah’s Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, and the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine had all received similar instructions and were cooperating in its implementation. It is thought further funds have now been made available to all these organisations to ensure a response to Israel’s purported raid on Syria as well.
4· It was reported that the Israel Air Force bombed a target in northeastern Syria. Reports of a nuclear-related consignment from North Korea being unloaded in the last few months may be related to the dictatorship’s particularly vociferous condemnation of the purported IAF strike.
Iran and Russia expressed concern over increased tension in the region.
No explosions were recorded following the apparent strike and Syria denied anything was destroyed but stated retaliation for the alleged breach to her sovereignty would follow soon.
Turkey demanded Israel explain why empty excess fuel tanks were dumped upon its territory bordering Syria. The area that was allegedly targeted was close to the vital Euphrates-supplied Buhayrat al Assad dam.
The international reaction to the alleged operation was muted particularly as Syria refused to supply any evidence to confirm it.
5· Binyamin Netanyahu’s testimony to the Winograd Committee into the Second Lebanon War was released. He expressed surprise the Reserves were not called up, insisted that the Prime Minister was primarily responsible, not the Defence establishment, for the defence of the state, and that the PM should have relied on the National Security Council, which he had established, to offer alternative advice to that of the Defence establishment including the Minister of Defence. He also stated that only ground forces could deal with a missile threat.
6· All the major Israeli political parties held their pre New Year meetings. Labour discussed their bankruptcy and concerns over Ehud Barak’s style of leadership. Likud attempted to cover up its internal divisions with the infiltration of an extreme right-wing bloc led by Moshe Feiglin. Kadima had a large upbeat meeting focussing on the future and the expansion of its party membership.
7· It was proposed that Ami Ayalon Labour MK and former leadership candidate and ex Navy chief and Internal Security Agency (Shin Bet) head join the government as Minister Without Portfolio. He will be a member of the inner security cabinet, chair the Knesset State Control Committee, and oversee and manage the Winograd Committee’s recommendations for the Home Front made in response to the Second Lebanon War.
8· The Cabinet rejected a large-scale operation into Gaza to end the Qassam missile attacks. Defence Minister Ehud Barak stated a large-scale operation was inevitable at some stage if the attacks continued. The reasons given for not engaging the terror cells on any significant scale were:
1. The Chief of Staff did not want any large-scale operation in the south as long as the northern front remained tense.
2. Hamas, and by inference Iran and Syria, would gain politically from any such attack.
3. Nothing should be done at this stage to endanger or complicate the proposed November summit conference in Washington.
4. Everything should be done to avoid confrontation over the Holy Day period from Rosh HaShana (13 September) to Simchat Torah (5 October), which also includes Yom Kippur and Sukkot. The security forces are always at full stretch during this time as major terrorist attacks often coincide with Jewish festivals.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· The reduction in Qassam launches and the increasingly frantic media and street clashes in Gaza indicate Hamas are coming under increased pressure. Their call to halt attacks on the border crossings also indicate the economic situation is deteriorating within the Strip. Their willingness to hold talks with EU security officials and even the Red Cross about the general situation and prisoner releases is also a sign of their increased insecurity, as are their arrests of PLO members associated with Fatah, and their repeated calls for reconciliation talks in Saudi Arabia.
There is no sign they will not be able to deal with any internal threats for the foreseeable future but they are not comfortable with the increasingly sophisticated and far-reaching raids the IDF are now mounting within Gaza.
The fact they are using Islamic Jihad, the Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, and the Popular Resistance Committees as proxies for all offensive actions this week indicates they remain fearful of Israeli targeted killings of their senior membership.
Despite being on the defensive they remain securely in control in the Gaza Strip.
· The Egyptian regime is currently having problems with the Muslim Brotherhood and does not want the Brotherhood's affiliate, Hamas, to have any political successes at the moment. It is therefore not enthusiastic about releasing Schalit in a major prisoner swap, as this would give Hamas a major political boost just when it is coming under severe pressure and extracting concessions might be possible. It would rather put Hamas on the defensive leading up to the proposed November regional summit in Washington, and especially during September and October, as United Nations Security Council pressure builds on both Syria and Iran over the Hariri assassination and the breaches of UN Resolutions concerning Iran’s nuclear weapons programme. UNSC resolutions are expected on increasing sanctions against Iran, and on the next step in prosecuting the Syrian organised assassination of Lebanese PM Hariri.
· Fatah has become increasingly assertive in its rhetoric against Hamas. It has gone on the political offensive in Gaza, initiating confrontations with Hamas, and has continued to arrest and marginalize Hamas representatives in the West Bank. It is unlikely such a proactive stance would have been taken unless the PA and Israeli security forces were not working closely together in the West Bank to minimise Hamas operations there.
President Abbas’ refusal to stand for re-election has freed him to take a slightly more assertive stance against Hamas, but he knows that anything agreed in Washington this November cannot be implemented in Gaza without a Fatah-Hamas reconciliation. He may have been buoyed by recent polls, which show a marked deterioration in Hamas’ popularity even in the Gaza Strip.
Tony Blair’s personal encouragement and support for President Abbas should not be excluded from the equation, from September he will be a semi-permanent fixture in Jerusalem, and his sole focus will be on creating a Palestinian state.
· Prime Minister Fayyad’s insistence on a binding timetable and international guarantees of successful implementation of any agreement indicate a profound lack of confidence in the proposed summit. The Palestinian position is that nothing has changed since Oslo and that only severe pressure on Israel can deliver a state.
The position of Israel, the United States, and almost certainly the United Kingdom, is that a gradual process of confidence building, particularly through massive economic investment in the West Bank, managed by an efficient administration rather than patronage and cronyism will deliver a viable state.
No state will be possible without a large international force of 15-25,000 men within its borders for the foreseeable future, accompanied by the complete withdrawal of IDF forces to positions behind a realigned security barrier. An obvious indication of future failure will be the absence of an international force in any final talks.
The best that could be achieved at the proposed November summit is the first stage of a process that cannot be less than 3-5 years in duration assuming all goes well.
· The arrest of the young teenage terrorist at one of the West Bank’s checkpoints indicates how vital they are to Israel’s security. It was only one of dozens of attempts that have been foiled in the last few weeks by Hamas, Fatah’s Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, Islamic Jihad, and the quasi-Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, with Syrian and Iranian instruction and funding, to carry out attacks inside Israel.
The original motive was to sabotage the proposed November summit, but a marked increase in attempts will probably occur following the alleged IDF operation within Syrian air space. Iran will want to ensure that Israel pays a heavy price for such an incursion in order to bolster deterrence from attack of its own nuclear sites.
If Israel’s security forces are unable to deal with this new wave of attacks a much tighter clampdown on Hamas, and all other radical groups in the West Bank, will inevitably follow. A useful indicator of progress in Israel-PA cooperation will be how successful they are in stemming the tide of attempted attacks.
If frustrated, Iran and Syria will be tempted to hit Israel-related targets all over the world, but this will then expose them to the scrutiny of all anti-extremist intelligence services and any evidence they collect will be used to enforce further sanctions against the Iranian regime, and Syria’s regime will in its turn come under even greater scrutiny. It should not be forgotten that Iran and Syria played vital roles in the destruction of the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie Scotland in December 1988. Iran funded it and Syria supplied the logistical support and the PFLP-GC bomb maker before it was passed to Libya to be planted.
· It remains unclear what the target of Israel’s probable foray into Syria was. The speculation has been wild so far but assuming Israel penetrated deep into Syrian air space we can conclude:
1. Israel’s Air Force is capable of bombing targets deep inside Syria, in this case the area on the central northern border with Turkey.
2. Israel has successfully tested some of Syria’s Russian and Iranian supplied air defences and no aircraft were lost.
3. Israel gained valuable logistics and intelligence data.
4. Its pilots and all communications and technical systems personnel gained invaluable data and experience.
5. Clear political and military messages were sent to Syria and Iran:
a) If a weapons of mass destruction facility was bombed, of which there is no proof so far, then the message is that Israel will not tolerate such a facility on Syrian soil.
b) Israel can attack whatever facility she deems a threat.
c) Israel can and will penetrate whatever defence systems the Russians, Iranians, or North Koreans put up.
d) There are, and will be, costs to attacking Israel; whether directly or through proxies whether they be Hizb’allah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Fatah Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, Fatah al Islam, or the ever-reliable Syrian-Palestinian PFLP-General Command.
e) Syrian and Iranian strategic facilities are also vulnerable. The main focus of the flights appears to have been areas adjacent to Syria’s main dam.
Note that this has all been done in the past and has had no effect. 34 years of peace on the Golan was only achieved after Israel’s artillery was within range of Damascus’ suburbs in October 1973.
Thanks to the negligence and short sightedness of successive Israeli governments and Chiefs of Staff Israel cannot offer its civilian population protection from missile barrages, but, it can destroy Syria’s infrastructure if it needs to.
· The stupidity and short-sightedness of the IDF and Defence Ministry was exposed this week after 69 young IDF recruits were wounded inside a basic training base situated within range of Qassam missile fire from Gaza.
The IDF and Defence Ministry were aware of the pointless danger their most precious assets, their young men and women conscripts, were put in because last year exactly the same thing happened but with fewer casualties.
Nothing was done, no lessons were learnt, no one took responsibility, and no leadership or decisiveness was shown. A clearer example of incompetence, moral cowardice, inertia, lack of initiative, indifference and callousness could not be made and it represents a true picture of the IDF’s and Defence Ministry’s mindset.
This callousness was particularly evident during the war by the Home Front Command and will no doubt be addressed by the Winograd Committee’s final report into the Second Lebanon War.
· Binyamin Netanyahu’s testimony to the Winograd Committee was blatantly self-serving and entirely missed the point. The IDF was not prepared for a large-scale ground incursion at the beginning of the war. There was no defence against short and medium range missiles. No Prime Minister can expect to be lied to by his Chief of Staff who had, in his turn, been lied to by the men under his command.
Prime Minister Olmert did seek advice from innumerable security and military sources and they all told him the same thing: Israel’s deterrence had to be restored immediately.
They just forgot to tell him, or did not know, that they did not have the means to carry out such a policy. If a large ground force had been used at an early stage of the war mass casualties would have resulted because, for political and budgetary reasons, and due to systemic IDF High Command failures, there had been insufficient training to execute it properly.
Even with the keenest minds inhabiting the finest National Security Council Prime Minister Olmert would still have been faced with exactly the same problems. The facts are simple: Olmert achieved more in 40 days than any Israeli had in 40 years of dealing with the dysfunctional entity known as Lebanon, he fought the war in a way that barely impinged on Israel’s economy, and he scared Hizb’allah and Iran into behaving with caution.
But, precisely because Olmert had to make it up as he went along, having been misled and let down by a hopelessly inept Northern Command, and because he was too free with the occasional hyperbolic statement, and failed to grasp the importance of the Home Front or the true psychological effect of the incessant shelling, he lost the trust of the Israeli public, which at the best of times are critical and distrustful of their politicians.
· PM Olmert remains in a surprisingly strong position at the moment mainly due to the weakness of his coalition partners and the opposition. Labour and Likud are profoundly divided because of internal ideological and personality differences. The acceptance of Labour’s Ami Ayalon into the Cabinet is a major victory for both Olmert and Ehud Barak. Ayalon had previously insisted Olmert resign and that he would never serve under him. Ayalon’s connections with moderate Palestinians, his knowledge of Israel’s security needs, and his integrity will be powerful assets. But it remains to be seen if he can work with Barak. They are similar in many ways, headstrong, highly intelligent, controlling, planners who are not good with people, experts in all facets of security, and exceptionally brave risk takers. They both lack Olmert’s Machiavellian political skills however. This means that if Olmert can ride out the post-Winograd final report storm he may survive until late 2008 or longer. Assuming he is not charged with embezzlement or corruption in the meantime.
· Ami Ayalon’s input will be sorely needed as Israel tries to find a way to deal with the Qassam missile threat without enfeebling the northern front or central command both of which have their hands full at the moment. Central Command will have to cope with an intense effort to infiltrate suicide bombers into Tel Aviv and adjacent urban centres to the West Bank such as Netanya, Petakh Tikva, Kfar Saba and Afula.
He will also have to deal with the criminal neglect of the people of Sderot as chief implementer of Winograd’s Home Front recommendations.
It is not in Israel’s interest to respond with a large-scale ground incursion for the present. Israel is still interested in making a deal with Hamas to free Schalit. It is also the height of the holiday season in which all security forces are stretched to the limit and are on high alert.
Hamas will be let off the hook in Gaza if Israel were to mount a substantial attack. The Palestinian factions will all instinctively unite and President Abbas will be put in an impossible position having to condemn Israel’s behaviour whilst attempting to negotiate a peace deal.
The negotiations in Washington would be effectively sabotaged.
Israel has no option at the moment, assuming any negotiation process is to proceed, but to offer Sderot substantially more anti-Qassam missile shelters, protection, financial support and subsidies, as well as political and moral support.
This will have to be combined with ever more inventive methods of undermining Hamas politically and militarily. Military operations will have to penetrate deeper into Hamas and Islamic Jihad territory and cause significant psychological and structural damage, but the main emphasis will have to be on preventing successful Qassam missile and other terror attacks.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
In Memoriam Lilian Rosenthal
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 11 Qassam missiles landed on or near Sderot this week, an over 50% reduction on last week. A direct hit on a basic training facility for new recruits at Zikim in Israel (near the north Gaza border) wounded 69 male and female new recruits, 2 seriously. At least 22 mortar rounds fell on border crossing areas between Gaza and Israel, which led to the temporary closure of the Sufa crossing (southeast Gaza). Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for almost all the attacks. Hamas publicly approved the actions.
A joint Islamic Jihad and Fatah Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade operation to breach the Gaza fence and kidnap IDF personnel was thwarted when the truck and car carrying explosives and men were destroyed near the Kissufim crossing, central Gaza, by the IDF. The IDF destroyed 11 Qassam launchers during a regular search and destroy operation.
Confrontations between Fatah supporters and the Hamas Executive Force militia continued throughout Gaza. Hamas continued to use violence to break up all non-Hamas meetings and arrests of PLO officials were carried out for the first time accompanied by anti-PLO rhetoric. All partisan media outlets continued to castigate the other side with Hamas closing down all remaining Fatah media outlets in Gaza. Journalists continued to be routinely threatened by Hamas personnel.
Hamas called on all factions to cease mortar and other attacks on the border crossings during Ramadan. Hamas remained in complete control of Gaza.
In an unconfirmed claim Hamas stated that the leader involved in the kidnapping of corporal Schalit from Israel had been arrested by IDF forces and taken from Gaza to Israel. Hamas remained in talks with EU security officials over Schalit’s release and stated they would consider a first visit by a representative of the Red Cross to Schalit.
2· President Abbas and Palestinian Authority personnel in the West Bank continued to publicly criticise Hamas demanding they apologise for the coup in Gaza and return to the status quo ante. Fatah continued to arrest Hamas personnel, violently break up Hamas functions at West Bank Universities, and beat up journalists. A major anti-Hamas media campaign continued to focus on Hamas violence and extremism labelling the organisation “Shiites” and predicting its inevitable downfall in Gaza.
President Abbas continued to express doubts about the purpose of the proposed November regional summit in Washington. He stated he was concluding the framework for final status issues, a declaration of principles, with Prime Minister Olmert, which would then lead to an international conference during which he hoped to negotiate the details of the final status issues and a permanent peace treaty.
Abbas also visited Saudi Arabia to discuss the proposed US summit, Hamas-Fatah reconciliation, and funding.
P.A. Prime Minister Salam Fayyad said he needed the United States to agree an explicit commitment to a Palestinian state, a binding timetable, and international guarantees concerning implementation.
PA-Israel negotiating teams and joint ministerial committees have been established to facilitate the talks.
3· An alert security guard at a West Bank checkpoint averted a major suicide bombing in Tel Aviv. A young teenager was arrested and the explosives and suicide belt he was carrying on behalf of the suicide cell in Israel were destroyed. Previously security chiefs had testified to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee that Iran and Syria had ordered major terror attacks in order to sabotage the forthcoming November summit. Terror cells from Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Fatah’s Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, and the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine had all received similar instructions and were cooperating in its implementation. It is thought further funds have now been made available to all these organisations to ensure a response to Israel’s purported raid on Syria as well.
4· It was reported that the Israel Air Force bombed a target in northeastern Syria. Reports of a nuclear-related consignment from North Korea being unloaded in the last few months may be related to the dictatorship’s particularly vociferous condemnation of the purported IAF strike.
Iran and Russia expressed concern over increased tension in the region.
No explosions were recorded following the apparent strike and Syria denied anything was destroyed but stated retaliation for the alleged breach to her sovereignty would follow soon.
Turkey demanded Israel explain why empty excess fuel tanks were dumped upon its territory bordering Syria. The area that was allegedly targeted was close to the vital Euphrates-supplied Buhayrat al Assad dam.
The international reaction to the alleged operation was muted particularly as Syria refused to supply any evidence to confirm it.
5· Binyamin Netanyahu’s testimony to the Winograd Committee into the Second Lebanon War was released. He expressed surprise the Reserves were not called up, insisted that the Prime Minister was primarily responsible, not the Defence establishment, for the defence of the state, and that the PM should have relied on the National Security Council, which he had established, to offer alternative advice to that of the Defence establishment including the Minister of Defence. He also stated that only ground forces could deal with a missile threat.
6· All the major Israeli political parties held their pre New Year meetings. Labour discussed their bankruptcy and concerns over Ehud Barak’s style of leadership. Likud attempted to cover up its internal divisions with the infiltration of an extreme right-wing bloc led by Moshe Feiglin. Kadima had a large upbeat meeting focussing on the future and the expansion of its party membership.
7· It was proposed that Ami Ayalon Labour MK and former leadership candidate and ex Navy chief and Internal Security Agency (Shin Bet) head join the government as Minister Without Portfolio. He will be a member of the inner security cabinet, chair the Knesset State Control Committee, and oversee and manage the Winograd Committee’s recommendations for the Home Front made in response to the Second Lebanon War.
8· The Cabinet rejected a large-scale operation into Gaza to end the Qassam missile attacks. Defence Minister Ehud Barak stated a large-scale operation was inevitable at some stage if the attacks continued. The reasons given for not engaging the terror cells on any significant scale were:
1. The Chief of Staff did not want any large-scale operation in the south as long as the northern front remained tense.
2. Hamas, and by inference Iran and Syria, would gain politically from any such attack.
3. Nothing should be done at this stage to endanger or complicate the proposed November summit conference in Washington.
4. Everything should be done to avoid confrontation over the Holy Day period from Rosh HaShana (13 September) to Simchat Torah (5 October), which also includes Yom Kippur and Sukkot. The security forces are always at full stretch during this time as major terrorist attacks often coincide with Jewish festivals.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· The reduction in Qassam launches and the increasingly frantic media and street clashes in Gaza indicate Hamas are coming under increased pressure. Their call to halt attacks on the border crossings also indicate the economic situation is deteriorating within the Strip. Their willingness to hold talks with EU security officials and even the Red Cross about the general situation and prisoner releases is also a sign of their increased insecurity, as are their arrests of PLO members associated with Fatah, and their repeated calls for reconciliation talks in Saudi Arabia.
There is no sign they will not be able to deal with any internal threats for the foreseeable future but they are not comfortable with the increasingly sophisticated and far-reaching raids the IDF are now mounting within Gaza.
The fact they are using Islamic Jihad, the Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, and the Popular Resistance Committees as proxies for all offensive actions this week indicates they remain fearful of Israeli targeted killings of their senior membership.
Despite being on the defensive they remain securely in control in the Gaza Strip.
· The Egyptian regime is currently having problems with the Muslim Brotherhood and does not want the Brotherhood's affiliate, Hamas, to have any political successes at the moment. It is therefore not enthusiastic about releasing Schalit in a major prisoner swap, as this would give Hamas a major political boost just when it is coming under severe pressure and extracting concessions might be possible. It would rather put Hamas on the defensive leading up to the proposed November regional summit in Washington, and especially during September and October, as United Nations Security Council pressure builds on both Syria and Iran over the Hariri assassination and the breaches of UN Resolutions concerning Iran’s nuclear weapons programme. UNSC resolutions are expected on increasing sanctions against Iran, and on the next step in prosecuting the Syrian organised assassination of Lebanese PM Hariri.
· Fatah has become increasingly assertive in its rhetoric against Hamas. It has gone on the political offensive in Gaza, initiating confrontations with Hamas, and has continued to arrest and marginalize Hamas representatives in the West Bank. It is unlikely such a proactive stance would have been taken unless the PA and Israeli security forces were not working closely together in the West Bank to minimise Hamas operations there.
President Abbas’ refusal to stand for re-election has freed him to take a slightly more assertive stance against Hamas, but he knows that anything agreed in Washington this November cannot be implemented in Gaza without a Fatah-Hamas reconciliation. He may have been buoyed by recent polls, which show a marked deterioration in Hamas’ popularity even in the Gaza Strip.
Tony Blair’s personal encouragement and support for President Abbas should not be excluded from the equation, from September he will be a semi-permanent fixture in Jerusalem, and his sole focus will be on creating a Palestinian state.
· Prime Minister Fayyad’s insistence on a binding timetable and international guarantees of successful implementation of any agreement indicate a profound lack of confidence in the proposed summit. The Palestinian position is that nothing has changed since Oslo and that only severe pressure on Israel can deliver a state.
The position of Israel, the United States, and almost certainly the United Kingdom, is that a gradual process of confidence building, particularly through massive economic investment in the West Bank, managed by an efficient administration rather than patronage and cronyism will deliver a viable state.
No state will be possible without a large international force of 15-25,000 men within its borders for the foreseeable future, accompanied by the complete withdrawal of IDF forces to positions behind a realigned security barrier. An obvious indication of future failure will be the absence of an international force in any final talks.
The best that could be achieved at the proposed November summit is the first stage of a process that cannot be less than 3-5 years in duration assuming all goes well.
· The arrest of the young teenage terrorist at one of the West Bank’s checkpoints indicates how vital they are to Israel’s security. It was only one of dozens of attempts that have been foiled in the last few weeks by Hamas, Fatah’s Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, Islamic Jihad, and the quasi-Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, with Syrian and Iranian instruction and funding, to carry out attacks inside Israel.
The original motive was to sabotage the proposed November summit, but a marked increase in attempts will probably occur following the alleged IDF operation within Syrian air space. Iran will want to ensure that Israel pays a heavy price for such an incursion in order to bolster deterrence from attack of its own nuclear sites.
If Israel’s security forces are unable to deal with this new wave of attacks a much tighter clampdown on Hamas, and all other radical groups in the West Bank, will inevitably follow. A useful indicator of progress in Israel-PA cooperation will be how successful they are in stemming the tide of attempted attacks.
If frustrated, Iran and Syria will be tempted to hit Israel-related targets all over the world, but this will then expose them to the scrutiny of all anti-extremist intelligence services and any evidence they collect will be used to enforce further sanctions against the Iranian regime, and Syria’s regime will in its turn come under even greater scrutiny. It should not be forgotten that Iran and Syria played vital roles in the destruction of the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie Scotland in December 1988. Iran funded it and Syria supplied the logistical support and the PFLP-GC bomb maker before it was passed to Libya to be planted.
· It remains unclear what the target of Israel’s probable foray into Syria was. The speculation has been wild so far but assuming Israel penetrated deep into Syrian air space we can conclude:
1. Israel’s Air Force is capable of bombing targets deep inside Syria, in this case the area on the central northern border with Turkey.
2. Israel has successfully tested some of Syria’s Russian and Iranian supplied air defences and no aircraft were lost.
3. Israel gained valuable logistics and intelligence data.
4. Its pilots and all communications and technical systems personnel gained invaluable data and experience.
5. Clear political and military messages were sent to Syria and Iran:
a) If a weapons of mass destruction facility was bombed, of which there is no proof so far, then the message is that Israel will not tolerate such a facility on Syrian soil.
b) Israel can attack whatever facility she deems a threat.
c) Israel can and will penetrate whatever defence systems the Russians, Iranians, or North Koreans put up.
d) There are, and will be, costs to attacking Israel; whether directly or through proxies whether they be Hizb’allah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Fatah Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, Fatah al Islam, or the ever-reliable Syrian-Palestinian PFLP-General Command.
e) Syrian and Iranian strategic facilities are also vulnerable. The main focus of the flights appears to have been areas adjacent to Syria’s main dam.
Note that this has all been done in the past and has had no effect. 34 years of peace on the Golan was only achieved after Israel’s artillery was within range of Damascus’ suburbs in October 1973.
Thanks to the negligence and short sightedness of successive Israeli governments and Chiefs of Staff Israel cannot offer its civilian population protection from missile barrages, but, it can destroy Syria’s infrastructure if it needs to.
· The stupidity and short-sightedness of the IDF and Defence Ministry was exposed this week after 69 young IDF recruits were wounded inside a basic training base situated within range of Qassam missile fire from Gaza.
The IDF and Defence Ministry were aware of the pointless danger their most precious assets, their young men and women conscripts, were put in because last year exactly the same thing happened but with fewer casualties.
Nothing was done, no lessons were learnt, no one took responsibility, and no leadership or decisiveness was shown. A clearer example of incompetence, moral cowardice, inertia, lack of initiative, indifference and callousness could not be made and it represents a true picture of the IDF’s and Defence Ministry’s mindset.
This callousness was particularly evident during the war by the Home Front Command and will no doubt be addressed by the Winograd Committee’s final report into the Second Lebanon War.
· Binyamin Netanyahu’s testimony to the Winograd Committee was blatantly self-serving and entirely missed the point. The IDF was not prepared for a large-scale ground incursion at the beginning of the war. There was no defence against short and medium range missiles. No Prime Minister can expect to be lied to by his Chief of Staff who had, in his turn, been lied to by the men under his command.
Prime Minister Olmert did seek advice from innumerable security and military sources and they all told him the same thing: Israel’s deterrence had to be restored immediately.
They just forgot to tell him, or did not know, that they did not have the means to carry out such a policy. If a large ground force had been used at an early stage of the war mass casualties would have resulted because, for political and budgetary reasons, and due to systemic IDF High Command failures, there had been insufficient training to execute it properly.
Even with the keenest minds inhabiting the finest National Security Council Prime Minister Olmert would still have been faced with exactly the same problems. The facts are simple: Olmert achieved more in 40 days than any Israeli had in 40 years of dealing with the dysfunctional entity known as Lebanon, he fought the war in a way that barely impinged on Israel’s economy, and he scared Hizb’allah and Iran into behaving with caution.
But, precisely because Olmert had to make it up as he went along, having been misled and let down by a hopelessly inept Northern Command, and because he was too free with the occasional hyperbolic statement, and failed to grasp the importance of the Home Front or the true psychological effect of the incessant shelling, he lost the trust of the Israeli public, which at the best of times are critical and distrustful of their politicians.
· PM Olmert remains in a surprisingly strong position at the moment mainly due to the weakness of his coalition partners and the opposition. Labour and Likud are profoundly divided because of internal ideological and personality differences. The acceptance of Labour’s Ami Ayalon into the Cabinet is a major victory for both Olmert and Ehud Barak. Ayalon had previously insisted Olmert resign and that he would never serve under him. Ayalon’s connections with moderate Palestinians, his knowledge of Israel’s security needs, and his integrity will be powerful assets. But it remains to be seen if he can work with Barak. They are similar in many ways, headstrong, highly intelligent, controlling, planners who are not good with people, experts in all facets of security, and exceptionally brave risk takers. They both lack Olmert’s Machiavellian political skills however. This means that if Olmert can ride out the post-Winograd final report storm he may survive until late 2008 or longer. Assuming he is not charged with embezzlement or corruption in the meantime.
· Ami Ayalon’s input will be sorely needed as Israel tries to find a way to deal with the Qassam missile threat without enfeebling the northern front or central command both of which have their hands full at the moment. Central Command will have to cope with an intense effort to infiltrate suicide bombers into Tel Aviv and adjacent urban centres to the West Bank such as Netanya, Petakh Tikva, Kfar Saba and Afula.
He will also have to deal with the criminal neglect of the people of Sderot as chief implementer of Winograd’s Home Front recommendations.
It is not in Israel’s interest to respond with a large-scale ground incursion for the present. Israel is still interested in making a deal with Hamas to free Schalit. It is also the height of the holiday season in which all security forces are stretched to the limit and are on high alert.
Hamas will be let off the hook in Gaza if Israel were to mount a substantial attack. The Palestinian factions will all instinctively unite and President Abbas will be put in an impossible position having to condemn Israel’s behaviour whilst attempting to negotiate a peace deal.
The negotiations in Washington would be effectively sabotaged.
Israel has no option at the moment, assuming any negotiation process is to proceed, but to offer Sderot substantially more anti-Qassam missile shelters, protection, financial support and subsidies, as well as political and moral support.
This will have to be combined with ever more inventive methods of undermining Hamas politically and militarily. Military operations will have to penetrate deeper into Hamas and Islamic Jihad territory and cause significant psychological and structural damage, but the main emphasis will have to be on preventing successful Qassam missile and other terror attacks.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
Thursday, 6 September 2007
Week 29 August – 4 September 2007
This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with:
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 24 Qassam missiles landed in and around Sderot this week a 70% increase on last. Another kindergarten was hit 12 infants were taken to hospital suffering from shock. Islamic Jihad again claimed responsibility and confirmed that they are operating with Hamas approval and coordination. They stated the increase in firings was to mark the beginning of the school year in Israel.
Hamas organised a demonstration against Egypt’s closure of the border crossing at Rafah (S Gaza) but shot a demonstrator dead by accident, 10 more were wounded in the ensuing panic.
Fatah continued to demonstrate against Hamas rule, which led to such gatherings and all street prayer meetings being outlawed. Fatah also claimed responsibility for five bombings of Hamas targets no injuries were caused.
The Palestine Authority in the West Bank also ordered Gaza’s 900-strong fire fighting force to strike as Hamas were taking over their buildings and assets.
Egypt uncovered 2.7 tons of explosives and several dozen Katyusha rockets in the Gifgafa area of northwest Sinai destined for Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip.
EU secret service officers held talks in Gaza with Hamas in order to clarify their future plans.
2· President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert continued their meetings.
Abbas nominated Adnan Husseini as his special adviser on Jerusalem.
President Abbas also stated that the November meeting in Washington would be a “waste of time”, a “failure”, and “merely a statement” unless the following points were addressed:
1. The release and amnesty of 139 prisoners preferably before Ramadan (13 September), including the 39 exiled to Gaza and abroad for the siege and desecration of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem in 2002.
2. The removal of checkpoints across the West Bank to ease trade and civilian travel.
3. Ending the smuggling of money and arms via tunnels on Egypt’s border to Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
4. The speedy implementation of US General Keith Dayton’s plan to train and deploy a 5 Battalion-strong (3-5,000 men) pro-Abbas force in the West Bank.
5. The reopening of Orient House in northeast Jerusalem as a Palestine Authority and Palestine Liberation Organisation centre enabling the official flying of the flag of Palestine there for the first time since August 2001.
6. The inclusion of core issues in talks, namely, borders, refugees, and Jerusalem as the capital of a future state of Palestine.
7. A clear internationally supervised timetable for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.
3· President Abbas changed the electoral system so that it was no longer detrimental to Fatah candidates and advantageous to Hamas. His aides admitted, however, that until Hamas gave up power in Gaza he would be unable to hold the proposed Presidential and Legislative elections.
Imprisoned Fatah leader, and Presidential hopeful, Marwan Barghouti, issued a statement from jail in Israel calling on Fatah to reform before the elections and criticised Hamas for not approving them, and for their “bloody coup”, as well as the blow they dealt to Palestine’s “nascent democratic experience” by their monopoly of rule in Gaza.
Jibril Rajoub ex Palestinian Authority Security Minister indicated he might be a candidate for the Presidency in the forthcoming elections. He has maintained good relations with Hamas and continues to hold reconciliation talks with them on President Abbas’ behalf. He told Israeli representatives that Hamas and Islamic Jihad would accept Israel once she had withdrawn to the 1967 borders and the state of Palestine had been established.
Latest estimates are that 80,000 arms are currently in the hands of unofficial or illegal militias in the West Bank, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
4· Home Front Commander Major General Yitzhak Gershon gave testimony twice this week to the Knesset State Control Committee on Home Front security effectiveness both during the Second Lebanon War and as it currently stands.
He claimed that he was not allowed to call up any reserves by Chief of Staff Dan Halutz during the war. As a result he did not have enough men. But, it would have made no difference anyway because what made people feel secure was stopping attacks which the IDF was unable to do.
He claimed there were a surplus of shelters in Sderot (164), and a further 200 in the surrounding area and that the majority of Sderot’s kindergartens had been fortified.
He rejected any responsibility for any deficiencies in Home Front performance during the Second Lebanon War as alleged by the State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss.
Minister of Defence Ehud Barak was forced to declare a state of emergency in Sderot and the surrounding area following the barrage of Qassams that greeted children on their first two days at school.
5· The Winograd Committee agreed before the High Court to allow those most harshly criticised in the forthcoming final report on the Second Lebanon War to defend themselves and to call witnesses in their defence. This was a complete reversal of their previous stance.
6· Presidents Bush and Sarkozy (France) both made speeches condemning Iran’s attempts to gain nuclear weapons capability. Bush claimed the Middle East was now under the “shadow of a nuclear Holocaust”, and Sarkozy stated that if sanctions were not tightened the world would be faced with the catastrophe of “the Iranian bomb or the bombing of Iran.”
Iran’s President Ahmadinejad responded by saying that the target of 3,000 working centrifuges had now been met. The IAEA claimed this statement was unlikely to be true. If the claim was true, and Iran was able to run them successfully, then she would have a nuclear device in approximately one year’s time.
Ahmadinejad’s statement followed the signing of an agreement with the IAEA granting them greater access to Iran’s nuclear facilities.
7· Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi approved the first 5-year spending and procurement plan for the IDF. He announced he was unable to stretch his budget to include constructing a fence on the Egyptian border despite the fact it was porous; and, that the separation fence against suicide bombers from the West Bank remained the priority despite Ehud Barak’s claim that it was unlikely to be completed for several years. He also announced the proposed sale of IDF real estate and efficiency measures to further help finance the procurement plan.
The Cabinet is expected to accept the plan in January 2008.
The main procurement items were:
a) 25 US-made F-35 stealth-capable fighter planes, due in 2013-14 at $50-60 million each.
b) 2 newly-developed US-made multi-purpose shallow-hulled Littoral Combat Ships at $250 million each; delivery date unspecified.
c) The currently under development Israel-produced “Trophy” anti-missile protection system for armoured vehicles, delivery date unspecified.
d) The currently under development Israel-produced “Iron Dome” defence system against short range Qassam and Katyusha missiles; delivery due 2010-12.
e) The Israel-made “Barak” defence system against anti-ship missiles.
f) Mass production of the Israel-made “Namer” reinforced personnel carrying vehicle.
g) Substantial purchase of the US-made “Stryker” 8-wheel multi-purpose carrier vehicle.
h) Continued development of the joint Israel-US Arrow 3 defence system against long-range missiles.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· The increase of Islamic Jihad missiles fired at Sderot highlight Hamas’ continued frustration at the lack of progress in opening the borders with both Egypt and Israel, with the prisoner exchange talks via Egypt with Israel, and most of all the unity talks with Fatah and its representative President Abbas. Hamas’ grip on Gaza is secure but the increase in Fatah activity is also giving it some concern.
Hamas remains surprised at Europe’s continued boycott but is as yet unwilling to make any compromises. This is due to the pressure exerted by its Damascus-based exiled leader Khaled Meshaal and its own military wing. Hamas remain dependent upon Iran and Syria for funds and military equipment and training. Neither nation is in any mood to compromise until the issues of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and Syria’s involvement in the assassination of Lebanon’s PM Hariri are resolved in the United Nations Security Council this month. It is also their intention to sabotage any agreement reached in Washington this November.
· President Abbas’ list of demands (above) indicates just how difficult his and Prime Minister Olmert’s positions are. Abbas does not feel that there is any real chance of significant progress in Washington and that the main aim for both Israel and the Bush Administration is to get Saudi Arabia to pledge itself to the peace process and full recognition of Israel. Saudi Arabia, no friend of Abbas, Fatah, or the PLO, will only oblige if it is presented with a detailed withdrawal plan by Israel to the 1967 borders. This is politically impossible for PM Olmert to sell to his coalition partners, and it is unlikely Olmert would acquiesce to it in any case.
· President Abbas’ position becomes more untenable by the day. He has done everything in his power to ensure a Fatah victory at the next elections in which he has already pledged he will not stand. As a result he can no longer credibly talk on behalf of the Palestinian people. He cannot even get himself electorally replaced because without Hamas acquiescence in Gaza he cannot hold national elections anyway. No one in Fatah sees him as a credible leader and most are positioning themselves for the post-Abbas era, nor does he command the loyalty of any armed group. He will not be able to implement any contentious agreement made in Washington in November. His list of demands indicates that without total compliance by Israel his position is in any case untenable.
· Major General Yitzhak Gershon’s testimony to the Knesset State Control Committee highlighted the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of far too many within the IDF High Command.
He refused to accept responsibility for any failures, he refused to fulfil his duty to the people under his care, he refused to take the concerns of civilians who have been the victim of 6 consecutive years of shelling seriously, he refused to stand up for himself or those under his command when the Chief of Staff indicated he disagreed with him. Finally, he had absolutely no conception of the practical difficulties faced by the civilian population of Sderot when actually under fire.
They have 15 seconds from the sound of the alarm to get to a bombproof area. Few, if any, public shelters are designed to accommodate dozens or more civilians running, often with screaming babies in their arms, into a narrow entranced room. Nor are there enough Home Front forces available to help.
His refusal to insist that Home Front reserves be called up during the Second Lebanon War was either evidence of a clear dereliction of duty and moral cowardice, or, an extraordinary insensitivity and callousness towards those he was duty-bound to protect.
· The Winograd Committee’s 180 degree about turn in the face of legal pressure to allow those facing serious criticism to defend themselves against the final report’s accusations has probably ended any possibility of its publication into the Second Lebanon War’s failures in November. It may also delay a possible revolt against PM Olmert by those within his own Kadima party, as well as any direct pressure on him to resign as a result of publication. This helps Labour leader Ehud Barak who remains keen to stay in the Defence Ministry post for as long as possible. The Labour Party is bankrupt and Barak needs to be seen to have done something at Defence before presenting himself to the electorate.
· The statements by Presidents Bush and Sarkozy of France were clearly coordinated following Sarkozy’s recent visit to the US including to President Bush’s ranch in Texas. The aim was to put as much pressure on members of the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency to increase sanctions on Iran to make her comply with UNSC Resolutions, just before the latest sanctions vote later this month. The IAEA are in the embarrassing position of either having to say President Ahmadinejad is lying about having 3,000 centrifuges in use to enrich uranium or admit they were wrong about their recent estimates of Iran having 1,968 centrifuges in operation at the Nantaz enrichment facility.
President Ahmadinejad’s tactics remain spectacularly predictable: at the first sign of pressure up the ante and terrify everyone into submission. This was the advice given to Revolutionary Guards' representatives from the General in charge of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Whenever anyone attempted to pressure Pakistan to slow or end its nuclear programme they threatened war with India and everyone backed off.
·Ehud Barak and Gabi Ashkenazi’s 5-year plan for the IDF clearly has the threat from Iran as a major factor in their purchasing decisions. The F-35 is an excellent platform from which to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities. The “Littoral Combat Ships” and the “Stryker” all-purpose vehicles can be used to mount ground operations, as well as against chemical and biological threats, as Stryker can be converted into a chemical and biological reconnaissance vehicle and detector.
There will be a large increase in heavily armoured ground forces vehicles, which will have protective systems to repel anti-tank/armoured vehicle missiles.
The refusal to attack Gaza in strength is partly due to budgetary constraints, as well as the desire to not get embroiled in a campaign of Hamas’ choosing. There appears to be little, if anything, that can be done against Qassam missile fire on Sderot. The inability, and political refusal, to defend Sderot’s population is a strategic mistake due wholly to political and military negligence and shortsightedness. It is not, however, something that can be ignored for much longer by the cocooned political and military elites.
The Winograd report may be an important catalyst to a more active and considered policy in the future. However, strategic thinking has historically never been one of Israel’s strengths, and, post Winograd or not, that is unlikely to change.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 24 Qassam missiles landed in and around Sderot this week a 70% increase on last. Another kindergarten was hit 12 infants were taken to hospital suffering from shock. Islamic Jihad again claimed responsibility and confirmed that they are operating with Hamas approval and coordination. They stated the increase in firings was to mark the beginning of the school year in Israel.
Hamas organised a demonstration against Egypt’s closure of the border crossing at Rafah (S Gaza) but shot a demonstrator dead by accident, 10 more were wounded in the ensuing panic.
Fatah continued to demonstrate against Hamas rule, which led to such gatherings and all street prayer meetings being outlawed. Fatah also claimed responsibility for five bombings of Hamas targets no injuries were caused.
The Palestine Authority in the West Bank also ordered Gaza’s 900-strong fire fighting force to strike as Hamas were taking over their buildings and assets.
Egypt uncovered 2.7 tons of explosives and several dozen Katyusha rockets in the Gifgafa area of northwest Sinai destined for Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip.
EU secret service officers held talks in Gaza with Hamas in order to clarify their future plans.
2· President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert continued their meetings.
Abbas nominated Adnan Husseini as his special adviser on Jerusalem.
President Abbas also stated that the November meeting in Washington would be a “waste of time”, a “failure”, and “merely a statement” unless the following points were addressed:
1. The release and amnesty of 139 prisoners preferably before Ramadan (13 September), including the 39 exiled to Gaza and abroad for the siege and desecration of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem in 2002.
2. The removal of checkpoints across the West Bank to ease trade and civilian travel.
3. Ending the smuggling of money and arms via tunnels on Egypt’s border to Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
4. The speedy implementation of US General Keith Dayton’s plan to train and deploy a 5 Battalion-strong (3-5,000 men) pro-Abbas force in the West Bank.
5. The reopening of Orient House in northeast Jerusalem as a Palestine Authority and Palestine Liberation Organisation centre enabling the official flying of the flag of Palestine there for the first time since August 2001.
6. The inclusion of core issues in talks, namely, borders, refugees, and Jerusalem as the capital of a future state of Palestine.
7. A clear internationally supervised timetable for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.
3· President Abbas changed the electoral system so that it was no longer detrimental to Fatah candidates and advantageous to Hamas. His aides admitted, however, that until Hamas gave up power in Gaza he would be unable to hold the proposed Presidential and Legislative elections.
Imprisoned Fatah leader, and Presidential hopeful, Marwan Barghouti, issued a statement from jail in Israel calling on Fatah to reform before the elections and criticised Hamas for not approving them, and for their “bloody coup”, as well as the blow they dealt to Palestine’s “nascent democratic experience” by their monopoly of rule in Gaza.
Jibril Rajoub ex Palestinian Authority Security Minister indicated he might be a candidate for the Presidency in the forthcoming elections. He has maintained good relations with Hamas and continues to hold reconciliation talks with them on President Abbas’ behalf. He told Israeli representatives that Hamas and Islamic Jihad would accept Israel once she had withdrawn to the 1967 borders and the state of Palestine had been established.
Latest estimates are that 80,000 arms are currently in the hands of unofficial or illegal militias in the West Bank, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
4· Home Front Commander Major General Yitzhak Gershon gave testimony twice this week to the Knesset State Control Committee on Home Front security effectiveness both during the Second Lebanon War and as it currently stands.
He claimed that he was not allowed to call up any reserves by Chief of Staff Dan Halutz during the war. As a result he did not have enough men. But, it would have made no difference anyway because what made people feel secure was stopping attacks which the IDF was unable to do.
He claimed there were a surplus of shelters in Sderot (164), and a further 200 in the surrounding area and that the majority of Sderot’s kindergartens had been fortified.
He rejected any responsibility for any deficiencies in Home Front performance during the Second Lebanon War as alleged by the State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss.
Minister of Defence Ehud Barak was forced to declare a state of emergency in Sderot and the surrounding area following the barrage of Qassams that greeted children on their first two days at school.
5· The Winograd Committee agreed before the High Court to allow those most harshly criticised in the forthcoming final report on the Second Lebanon War to defend themselves and to call witnesses in their defence. This was a complete reversal of their previous stance.
6· Presidents Bush and Sarkozy (France) both made speeches condemning Iran’s attempts to gain nuclear weapons capability. Bush claimed the Middle East was now under the “shadow of a nuclear Holocaust”, and Sarkozy stated that if sanctions were not tightened the world would be faced with the catastrophe of “the Iranian bomb or the bombing of Iran.”
Iran’s President Ahmadinejad responded by saying that the target of 3,000 working centrifuges had now been met. The IAEA claimed this statement was unlikely to be true. If the claim was true, and Iran was able to run them successfully, then she would have a nuclear device in approximately one year’s time.
Ahmadinejad’s statement followed the signing of an agreement with the IAEA granting them greater access to Iran’s nuclear facilities.
7· Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi approved the first 5-year spending and procurement plan for the IDF. He announced he was unable to stretch his budget to include constructing a fence on the Egyptian border despite the fact it was porous; and, that the separation fence against suicide bombers from the West Bank remained the priority despite Ehud Barak’s claim that it was unlikely to be completed for several years. He also announced the proposed sale of IDF real estate and efficiency measures to further help finance the procurement plan.
The Cabinet is expected to accept the plan in January 2008.
The main procurement items were:
a) 25 US-made F-35 stealth-capable fighter planes, due in 2013-14 at $50-60 million each.
b) 2 newly-developed US-made multi-purpose shallow-hulled Littoral Combat Ships at $250 million each; delivery date unspecified.
c) The currently under development Israel-produced “Trophy” anti-missile protection system for armoured vehicles, delivery date unspecified.
d) The currently under development Israel-produced “Iron Dome” defence system against short range Qassam and Katyusha missiles; delivery due 2010-12.
e) The Israel-made “Barak” defence system against anti-ship missiles.
f) Mass production of the Israel-made “Namer” reinforced personnel carrying vehicle.
g) Substantial purchase of the US-made “Stryker” 8-wheel multi-purpose carrier vehicle.
h) Continued development of the joint Israel-US Arrow 3 defence system against long-range missiles.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· The increase of Islamic Jihad missiles fired at Sderot highlight Hamas’ continued frustration at the lack of progress in opening the borders with both Egypt and Israel, with the prisoner exchange talks via Egypt with Israel, and most of all the unity talks with Fatah and its representative President Abbas. Hamas’ grip on Gaza is secure but the increase in Fatah activity is also giving it some concern.
Hamas remains surprised at Europe’s continued boycott but is as yet unwilling to make any compromises. This is due to the pressure exerted by its Damascus-based exiled leader Khaled Meshaal and its own military wing. Hamas remain dependent upon Iran and Syria for funds and military equipment and training. Neither nation is in any mood to compromise until the issues of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and Syria’s involvement in the assassination of Lebanon’s PM Hariri are resolved in the United Nations Security Council this month. It is also their intention to sabotage any agreement reached in Washington this November.
· President Abbas’ list of demands (above) indicates just how difficult his and Prime Minister Olmert’s positions are. Abbas does not feel that there is any real chance of significant progress in Washington and that the main aim for both Israel and the Bush Administration is to get Saudi Arabia to pledge itself to the peace process and full recognition of Israel. Saudi Arabia, no friend of Abbas, Fatah, or the PLO, will only oblige if it is presented with a detailed withdrawal plan by Israel to the 1967 borders. This is politically impossible for PM Olmert to sell to his coalition partners, and it is unlikely Olmert would acquiesce to it in any case.
· President Abbas’ position becomes more untenable by the day. He has done everything in his power to ensure a Fatah victory at the next elections in which he has already pledged he will not stand. As a result he can no longer credibly talk on behalf of the Palestinian people. He cannot even get himself electorally replaced because without Hamas acquiescence in Gaza he cannot hold national elections anyway. No one in Fatah sees him as a credible leader and most are positioning themselves for the post-Abbas era, nor does he command the loyalty of any armed group. He will not be able to implement any contentious agreement made in Washington in November. His list of demands indicates that without total compliance by Israel his position is in any case untenable.
· Major General Yitzhak Gershon’s testimony to the Knesset State Control Committee highlighted the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of far too many within the IDF High Command.
He refused to accept responsibility for any failures, he refused to fulfil his duty to the people under his care, he refused to take the concerns of civilians who have been the victim of 6 consecutive years of shelling seriously, he refused to stand up for himself or those under his command when the Chief of Staff indicated he disagreed with him. Finally, he had absolutely no conception of the practical difficulties faced by the civilian population of Sderot when actually under fire.
They have 15 seconds from the sound of the alarm to get to a bombproof area. Few, if any, public shelters are designed to accommodate dozens or more civilians running, often with screaming babies in their arms, into a narrow entranced room. Nor are there enough Home Front forces available to help.
His refusal to insist that Home Front reserves be called up during the Second Lebanon War was either evidence of a clear dereliction of duty and moral cowardice, or, an extraordinary insensitivity and callousness towards those he was duty-bound to protect.
· The Winograd Committee’s 180 degree about turn in the face of legal pressure to allow those facing serious criticism to defend themselves against the final report’s accusations has probably ended any possibility of its publication into the Second Lebanon War’s failures in November. It may also delay a possible revolt against PM Olmert by those within his own Kadima party, as well as any direct pressure on him to resign as a result of publication. This helps Labour leader Ehud Barak who remains keen to stay in the Defence Ministry post for as long as possible. The Labour Party is bankrupt and Barak needs to be seen to have done something at Defence before presenting himself to the electorate.
· The statements by Presidents Bush and Sarkozy of France were clearly coordinated following Sarkozy’s recent visit to the US including to President Bush’s ranch in Texas. The aim was to put as much pressure on members of the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency to increase sanctions on Iran to make her comply with UNSC Resolutions, just before the latest sanctions vote later this month. The IAEA are in the embarrassing position of either having to say President Ahmadinejad is lying about having 3,000 centrifuges in use to enrich uranium or admit they were wrong about their recent estimates of Iran having 1,968 centrifuges in operation at the Nantaz enrichment facility.
President Ahmadinejad’s tactics remain spectacularly predictable: at the first sign of pressure up the ante and terrify everyone into submission. This was the advice given to Revolutionary Guards' representatives from the General in charge of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Whenever anyone attempted to pressure Pakistan to slow or end its nuclear programme they threatened war with India and everyone backed off.
·Ehud Barak and Gabi Ashkenazi’s 5-year plan for the IDF clearly has the threat from Iran as a major factor in their purchasing decisions. The F-35 is an excellent platform from which to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities. The “Littoral Combat Ships” and the “Stryker” all-purpose vehicles can be used to mount ground operations, as well as against chemical and biological threats, as Stryker can be converted into a chemical and biological reconnaissance vehicle and detector.
There will be a large increase in heavily armoured ground forces vehicles, which will have protective systems to repel anti-tank/armoured vehicle missiles.
The refusal to attack Gaza in strength is partly due to budgetary constraints, as well as the desire to not get embroiled in a campaign of Hamas’ choosing. There appears to be little, if anything, that can be done against Qassam missile fire on Sderot. The inability, and political refusal, to defend Sderot’s population is a strategic mistake due wholly to political and military negligence and shortsightedness. It is not, however, something that can be ignored for much longer by the cocooned political and military elites.
The Winograd report may be an important catalyst to a more active and considered policy in the future. However, strategic thinking has historically never been one of Israel’s strengths, and, post Winograd or not, that is unlikely to change.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
Monday, 3 September 2007
Week 22 August – 28 August 2007
This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with:
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 14 Qassam missiles and 7 mortar rounds were fired at Israel and the border crossings this week, roughly similar to last week. 1 missile made a direct hit on a kindergarten in Sderot, the 2nd such event in as many weeks. Islamic Jihad confirmed that they fired the Qassam missiles with Hamas approval and coordination. 500 missiles and mortars have been fired from Gaza since 31 May 2007.
There was a substantial increase in Palestinian youths penetrating the fences and walls around Gaza, including a 2-man armed Popular Resistance Committee (Fatah Al Aqsa, Islamic Jihad and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Army of Islam coalition) cell that successfully scaled part of the border comprised of a 9 metre high wall and were only detected after they fired upon several border and IDF posts several kilometres inside Israel.
Hamas have successfully smuggled 40 tons of TNT from Sinai in the last month.
Syria-based Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal ordered a large-scale attack by West Bank-based Hamas cells on Israel; he also gave a 3 hour interview for CNN setting out Hamas’ position and explaining why US peace efforts were doomed to failure because they excluded Hamas and Syria.
2· Hamas released a series of statements this week concerning: prisoner exchanges; the inevitable failure of the November regional summit in Washington; and the basis for re-establishing the status quo ante in Gaza. Hamas reiterated they wanted significant representation within the PLO, and the reinstatement of Parliament in exchange for the reestablishment of Palestinian Authority institutions in Gaza. Hamas also blamed Israel for the breakdown in the prisoner swap talks two months previously.
Fatah continued to organise anti-Hamas rallies in Gaza, which were violently broken up by Hamas security forces. Hamas accused Fatah of setting up secret cells to assassinate senior Hamas figures and anticipated further pressures would be applied upon them as the November summit approached. Palestinian journalists in both Gaza and the West Bank protested against the daily, including death, threats against them by both Hamas and Fatah.
Sources close to President Abbas insisted he would not stand for re-election and that he wanted a younger generation of Fatah leaders to succeed him.
Prime Minister Fayyad stated he would freeze 103 bank accounts for breaches in laws governing civil groups. Most appeared to belong to groups associated with Hamas.
3· Defence Minister and Labour Party leader Ehud Barak stated he may have to delay leaving the government and forcing an election because of his Party’s $30 million debt. Labour Secretary General Eitan Cabel, and treasurer Moshe Amit confessed the Party faced liquidation if it did not sack its staff and sell all its remaining assets.
4· The controversy over the lack of protection for the children of Sderot continued. 20-25% of Sderot’s children have not been registered for the coming week’s new scholastic year. State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss visited Sderot and expressed deep concern. The High Court allowed the government several months to complete its protection of Sderot’s schools, and delayed for 3 weeks its response to the government’s request that the deadline to protect Sderot’s schools be extended by another 3 years (sic).
5· Over 10 non-senior Kadima MKs unofficially threatened to resign before the publication of the Winograd findings in November should PM Olmert not stand down. Likud offered them places on its list should they resign soon.
6· The United Nations Security Council unanimously agreed to extend UNIFIL’s mandate in southern Lebanon for another year. This followed a plea from the Lebanese government. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni welcomed the decision.
7· Syria and Iran claimed they were both capable and willing to fill the vacuum that will be created by the withdrawal of western forces from Iraq. President Ahmadinejad claimed Iran was now “nuclear” and that western attempts to thwart her plans had failed. Iran also unveiled its latest 900-kilogram “smart bomb” which can be fired from its F-4 and F-5 jets. Iran has also completed its supplies to Hizb’allah in south Lebanon of its C-802 Chinese designed anti-ship missiles, as well as anti-air missiles to supplement its re-supply of ground to ground short, medium, and long range missiles.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· Hamas’ efforts are mainly focussed on making them impossible to ignore in the oncoming talks scheduled for Washington in November. Khaled Meshaal insisted talks that excluded Syria would go nowhere. It is clear from the increase in incursions and the planned mass killings inside Israel that both Syria and Hamas are deeply frustrated by the Bush Administration’s insistence on their exclusion and the lack of progress on the prisoner exchange with Israel. Hamas are also beginning to feel the pressure from the mass unemployment in Gaza caused by the border closures with Israel and Egypt, which are being accompanied by financial restrictions by the Palestinian Authority.
· President Abbas has not refuted the repeated rumours he will not stand in the 2008 Legislative and Presidential elections. This position puts pressure upon Israel and Hamas to make concessions before somebody less amenable to compromise replaces him, but it is also self-defeating because the closer Abbas is to retirement the less relevant he becomes to the negotiations. It has also created turmoil within Fatah as the older and younger generations fight each other for power.
Fatah still has the ability to undermine Hamas in Gaza and can bury any peace process at will. Independent Prime Minister Fayyad has also shown, at President Abbas’ urging, the ability to make Hamas rule in Gaza problematic by undermining Hamas’ funding.
· Defence Minister and Labour Party leader Ehud Barak may have found the excuse he needs to gain more time as Defence Minister before forcing a general election at a time of his choosing, namely, his party’s near bankruptcy.
Barak’s hope is to call an election in late 2008, which will give him both 18 months as Defence Minister and time to stabilise Labour’s funding. His hope must be that Olmert survives the Winograd Committee findings into the Second Lebanon War due out in November, and, by remaining prime minister not only cause fissures within the ruling Kadima party but also sabotage any chance it may have of surviving beyond the next election.
Unfortunately for Barak there remains the possibility that Kadima will split forcing an election at the least propitious time for Labour, when it won’t be able to finance an election campaign and will look ridiculous in the eyes of the electorate, or, Olmert will resign and his replacement will be capable of holding both Kadima and the government together as well as being popular with the public.
However, only Avi Dichter, the current Interior Minister, is capable of fulfilling such a role but he has, so far, ruled himself out of the running. He is also an inexperienced politician having first been elected in March 2006.
Shaul Mofaz, the Transport Minister and ex Chief of Staff remains popular amongst both the public and the Kadima party membership but his political and military record is deeply flawed and he is as inexperienced as Avi Dichter.
· The controversy over the lack of protection for Sderot's children has highlighted the strategic need for an anti-missile system. The Arrow2 system that was based in 2 locations only has now been more widely dispersed across the North.
The aim is to have a triple-layered anti-missile defence system. The Arrow2 system is designed to counter long-range missiles; the "David's Sling" system in development by Rafael is designed to counter medium range missiles; and, the "Iron Dome" system still currently under development is meant to counter Qassam and Katyusha short-range missiles. Ehud Barak has said it will take 3 to 5 years to get the systems in place assuming the various development budgets are not, once again, cut.
· Iranian and Syrian claims that they are willing and able to fill the vacuum caused by British and US withdrawal from Iraq in 2008 is meant to remind the US Congress that the Bush Administration’s position of refusing to engage seriously with either of them is both futile and counterproductive. This may be the case but such statements do nothing to assuage the fears of all parties in the region. The Arab League has suggested talks but has refused to countenance a unilateral Syrian-Iranian strategy for Iraq. The Iran-Syria position has simply made future Saudi and Israeli interference in both Iraq and Iran inevitable. However, at present, both Iran and Syria feel they are on the verge of a historic defeat of the West and its centuries-long interference in their region.
· Syria sent an emissary to Israel to express its willingness to engage in talks without the United States, a major change in its previous position, but that it was unwilling to rupture its strategic alliance with Iran as a precondition. Israel’s position remains unchanged it cannot afford to engage in talks with Syria without the express consent of the Bush Administration, which refuses to grant it because of Syria’s role in global terrorism and its pivotal role in supporting the killing of US forces in Iraq.
The Administration has also made it clear that it will not tolerate Iran’s destabilising role in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine, particularly when coupled to a nuclear weapons threat. President Bush’s assessment of the credibility of Syria’s peace overtures is predicated on Syria’s willingness to distance itself from Iran.
· Syria will not give up its strategic military and financial relationship with Iran, not whilst it sees the US and western coalition forces on the verge of defeat in the region. It remains in Iran’s interest to maintain the Syrian regime in power but the current US Administration sees the Syrian regime as a threat to regional stability. Unless the US makes it clear that they will support the continued rule of the Syrian regime and support it financially and militarily, and allow it to interfere in Lebanon, there is no incentive for Syria to meet US demands to break its links with Iran.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 14 Qassam missiles and 7 mortar rounds were fired at Israel and the border crossings this week, roughly similar to last week. 1 missile made a direct hit on a kindergarten in Sderot, the 2nd such event in as many weeks. Islamic Jihad confirmed that they fired the Qassam missiles with Hamas approval and coordination. 500 missiles and mortars have been fired from Gaza since 31 May 2007.
There was a substantial increase in Palestinian youths penetrating the fences and walls around Gaza, including a 2-man armed Popular Resistance Committee (Fatah Al Aqsa, Islamic Jihad and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Army of Islam coalition) cell that successfully scaled part of the border comprised of a 9 metre high wall and were only detected after they fired upon several border and IDF posts several kilometres inside Israel.
Hamas have successfully smuggled 40 tons of TNT from Sinai in the last month.
Syria-based Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal ordered a large-scale attack by West Bank-based Hamas cells on Israel; he also gave a 3 hour interview for CNN setting out Hamas’ position and explaining why US peace efforts were doomed to failure because they excluded Hamas and Syria.
2· Hamas released a series of statements this week concerning: prisoner exchanges; the inevitable failure of the November regional summit in Washington; and the basis for re-establishing the status quo ante in Gaza. Hamas reiterated they wanted significant representation within the PLO, and the reinstatement of Parliament in exchange for the reestablishment of Palestinian Authority institutions in Gaza. Hamas also blamed Israel for the breakdown in the prisoner swap talks two months previously.
Fatah continued to organise anti-Hamas rallies in Gaza, which were violently broken up by Hamas security forces. Hamas accused Fatah of setting up secret cells to assassinate senior Hamas figures and anticipated further pressures would be applied upon them as the November summit approached. Palestinian journalists in both Gaza and the West Bank protested against the daily, including death, threats against them by both Hamas and Fatah.
Sources close to President Abbas insisted he would not stand for re-election and that he wanted a younger generation of Fatah leaders to succeed him.
Prime Minister Fayyad stated he would freeze 103 bank accounts for breaches in laws governing civil groups. Most appeared to belong to groups associated with Hamas.
3· Defence Minister and Labour Party leader Ehud Barak stated he may have to delay leaving the government and forcing an election because of his Party’s $30 million debt. Labour Secretary General Eitan Cabel, and treasurer Moshe Amit confessed the Party faced liquidation if it did not sack its staff and sell all its remaining assets.
4· The controversy over the lack of protection for the children of Sderot continued. 20-25% of Sderot’s children have not been registered for the coming week’s new scholastic year. State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss visited Sderot and expressed deep concern. The High Court allowed the government several months to complete its protection of Sderot’s schools, and delayed for 3 weeks its response to the government’s request that the deadline to protect Sderot’s schools be extended by another 3 years (sic).
5· Over 10 non-senior Kadima MKs unofficially threatened to resign before the publication of the Winograd findings in November should PM Olmert not stand down. Likud offered them places on its list should they resign soon.
6· The United Nations Security Council unanimously agreed to extend UNIFIL’s mandate in southern Lebanon for another year. This followed a plea from the Lebanese government. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni welcomed the decision.
7· Syria and Iran claimed they were both capable and willing to fill the vacuum that will be created by the withdrawal of western forces from Iraq. President Ahmadinejad claimed Iran was now “nuclear” and that western attempts to thwart her plans had failed. Iran also unveiled its latest 900-kilogram “smart bomb” which can be fired from its F-4 and F-5 jets. Iran has also completed its supplies to Hizb’allah in south Lebanon of its C-802 Chinese designed anti-ship missiles, as well as anti-air missiles to supplement its re-supply of ground to ground short, medium, and long range missiles.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· Hamas’ efforts are mainly focussed on making them impossible to ignore in the oncoming talks scheduled for Washington in November. Khaled Meshaal insisted talks that excluded Syria would go nowhere. It is clear from the increase in incursions and the planned mass killings inside Israel that both Syria and Hamas are deeply frustrated by the Bush Administration’s insistence on their exclusion and the lack of progress on the prisoner exchange with Israel. Hamas are also beginning to feel the pressure from the mass unemployment in Gaza caused by the border closures with Israel and Egypt, which are being accompanied by financial restrictions by the Palestinian Authority.
· President Abbas has not refuted the repeated rumours he will not stand in the 2008 Legislative and Presidential elections. This position puts pressure upon Israel and Hamas to make concessions before somebody less amenable to compromise replaces him, but it is also self-defeating because the closer Abbas is to retirement the less relevant he becomes to the negotiations. It has also created turmoil within Fatah as the older and younger generations fight each other for power.
Fatah still has the ability to undermine Hamas in Gaza and can bury any peace process at will. Independent Prime Minister Fayyad has also shown, at President Abbas’ urging, the ability to make Hamas rule in Gaza problematic by undermining Hamas’ funding.
· Defence Minister and Labour Party leader Ehud Barak may have found the excuse he needs to gain more time as Defence Minister before forcing a general election at a time of his choosing, namely, his party’s near bankruptcy.
Barak’s hope is to call an election in late 2008, which will give him both 18 months as Defence Minister and time to stabilise Labour’s funding. His hope must be that Olmert survives the Winograd Committee findings into the Second Lebanon War due out in November, and, by remaining prime minister not only cause fissures within the ruling Kadima party but also sabotage any chance it may have of surviving beyond the next election.
Unfortunately for Barak there remains the possibility that Kadima will split forcing an election at the least propitious time for Labour, when it won’t be able to finance an election campaign and will look ridiculous in the eyes of the electorate, or, Olmert will resign and his replacement will be capable of holding both Kadima and the government together as well as being popular with the public.
However, only Avi Dichter, the current Interior Minister, is capable of fulfilling such a role but he has, so far, ruled himself out of the running. He is also an inexperienced politician having first been elected in March 2006.
Shaul Mofaz, the Transport Minister and ex Chief of Staff remains popular amongst both the public and the Kadima party membership but his political and military record is deeply flawed and he is as inexperienced as Avi Dichter.
· The controversy over the lack of protection for Sderot's children has highlighted the strategic need for an anti-missile system. The Arrow2 system that was based in 2 locations only has now been more widely dispersed across the North.
The aim is to have a triple-layered anti-missile defence system. The Arrow2 system is designed to counter long-range missiles; the "David's Sling" system in development by Rafael is designed to counter medium range missiles; and, the "Iron Dome" system still currently under development is meant to counter Qassam and Katyusha short-range missiles. Ehud Barak has said it will take 3 to 5 years to get the systems in place assuming the various development budgets are not, once again, cut.
· Iranian and Syrian claims that they are willing and able to fill the vacuum caused by British and US withdrawal from Iraq in 2008 is meant to remind the US Congress that the Bush Administration’s position of refusing to engage seriously with either of them is both futile and counterproductive. This may be the case but such statements do nothing to assuage the fears of all parties in the region. The Arab League has suggested talks but has refused to countenance a unilateral Syrian-Iranian strategy for Iraq. The Iran-Syria position has simply made future Saudi and Israeli interference in both Iraq and Iran inevitable. However, at present, both Iran and Syria feel they are on the verge of a historic defeat of the West and its centuries-long interference in their region.
· Syria sent an emissary to Israel to express its willingness to engage in talks without the United States, a major change in its previous position, but that it was unwilling to rupture its strategic alliance with Iran as a precondition. Israel’s position remains unchanged it cannot afford to engage in talks with Syria without the express consent of the Bush Administration, which refuses to grant it because of Syria’s role in global terrorism and its pivotal role in supporting the killing of US forces in Iraq.
The Administration has also made it clear that it will not tolerate Iran’s destabilising role in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine, particularly when coupled to a nuclear weapons threat. President Bush’s assessment of the credibility of Syria’s peace overtures is predicated on Syria’s willingness to distance itself from Iran.
· Syria will not give up its strategic military and financial relationship with Iran, not whilst it sees the US and western coalition forces on the verge of defeat in the region. It remains in Iran’s interest to maintain the Syrian regime in power but the current US Administration sees the Syrian regime as a threat to regional stability. Unless the US makes it clear that they will support the continued rule of the Syrian regime and support it financially and militarily, and allow it to interfere in Lebanon, there is no incentive for Syria to meet US demands to break its links with Iran.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________
Thursday, 23 August 2007
Week 15 August – 21 August 2007
This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with:
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 13 Qassam missiles and roughly 30 mortar rounds were fired at Israel this week. The level of Qassam fire nearly doubled from last week and the mortar fire, mainly directed at Gaza-Israel border crossing areas, increased significantly. Several Hamas-planted mines were also defused on the border. These attacks led to the EU suspending payments on fuel supplies to Gaza, which in turn led to some power cuts. The IDF continued to target Islamic Jihad and Hamas cells that fired Qassam missiles and continued to attempt to attack the border respectively. Some senior Islamic Jihad and Hamas commanders were killed as a result.
The EU agreed to continue payments for 25-30% of Gaza’s energy needs on a provisional basis after Hamas promised to stop its efforts to tax recipients and suppliers in order to finance their rule over the Gaza Strip.
Egypt continued to discover explosives in the Sinai; the latest find was 500 kilograms of TNT, 15 miles (25 kilometres) from S Gaza, its intended destination.
2· Palestinian Authority interim Prime Minister Fayyad apprised the EU of Hamas violations of fuel supply agreements to Gaza, and their violation of President Abbas’ decree that exempted all Gazans from paying taxes following the Hamas coup.
The PA held meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Japan, Jordan, and Israel to discuss plans for a regional industrial and agricultural zone near Jericho connected to a similar zone and airport in Jordan that would enable immediate access to overseas markets. Japan also provided $20 million in financial aid to the PA, and charitable foundations, in the West Bank.
President Abbas and PM Fayyad continued to be criticised for the lack of reforms to Fatah and their abandonment of armed resistance against Israel. The West Bank-based Fatah militia Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades used the arrests of two members by Israel for clear breaches of their amnesty agreements to declare a renewal of the armed struggle and rearmament. Tunis-based Fatah leader Farouk Kaddoumi called for unity by a return to armed struggle.
Abbas held talks in Jordan with two of Fatah’s Tunis-based old guard, Abu Mahir Ghnaim and Ahmed Afanah, who have well-established contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood and Syria respectively, and like Kaddoumi, opposed the Oslo Accords of 1993 that were the basis for all consequent PLO/PA-Israel agreements and mutual recognition.
Another, formerly Gaza-based, Fatah and clan leader Muhammad Dahlan returned to the West Bank this week following surgery in Europe. Hamas insisted he would never be allowed to return to Gaza.
3· A series of failures involving Israel’s institutions were reported this week:
1. Aviation safety procedures and equipment at Ben Gurion Airport were criticised for being outmoded and on the verge of collapse following the publication of the interim report of the Lapidot Committee ordered by Transport Minister Shaul Mofaz.
2. Minister of Environment Gideon Ezra admitted to the Knesset State Control Committee that his department had failed to implement a 2003 Cabinet decision to take responsibility for hazardous materials and had hence failed during the 2006 Lebanon War to secure sensitive sites or to coordinate its activities with the Home Front Command or the Emergency Services. This followed criticism of his Ministry, the Home Front Command, and the Police, in the State Comptroller’s 18 July 2007 report.
3. The head of the Home Front Major-General Yitzhak Gershon insisted the hazardous materials problem had been addressed by the Army despite the absence of a single recommendation having been put to the government on the issue. Gershon also claimed it was not possible to defend civilians from Qassam rocket hits, and blamed local authorities for not providing adequate bomb shelters. Despite a High Court injunction insisting all schools and major institutions within range be safeguarded from Qassam attacks, only 24 schools have some sort of protection, the rest will have none until the end of 2007, again, it was claimed, partly due to the Finance Ministry’s inability to make funds available. An appeal by residents bordering Gaza to force the government to implement the injunction immediately was refused by the High Court.
4. State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss accused the Finance Ministry of foot dragging, ignorance, and bureaucracy, concerning their mismanagement and mishandling of the Holocaust survivors payments case, which was eventually settled as a result of the direct intervention of Prime Minister Olmert.
5. The Accountant General stated the burden of public corruption was almost as large as the Defence burden and that the attempt to manipulate the Bank Leumi tender was the worst case of corruption in Israel’s history.
4· Hizb’allah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah announced a “great surprise” should new hostilities arise against Israel that could both change the “fate of the war and the region.” Hizb’allah now had anti-tank missiles that could penetrate Israeli and US tanks, missiles that could hit any part of Israel, and missiles that could hit any ship. Hizb’allah claimed it expected a war with Israel within a year or so.
Muqtadar al-Sadr, Shia political and militia leader in Iraq, stated this week his group now had formal links with Hizb’allah and that his men and Hizb’allah’s train together both in Lebanon and Iraq. His militia assassinated the second provincial Shia Governor in nine days in southern Iraq using a Hizb’allah-designed roadside bomb, and are responsible for attacks on British forces stationed there. He also claimed his militia would inevitably become involved in future Hizb’allah-Israel clashes.
Iran’s commander of the Revolutionary Guard, Yayha Rahim Safavi, also claimed the new Shihab-3 ballistic missile now had a remote guidance system. The implication was it could penetrate Israel’s anti-missile systems.
The US administration intends to designate Iran’s Revolutionary Guard a terrorist organisation thereby making its funds and any contributors to them subject to investigation and possible confiscation.
5· The Winograd Committee on the Second Lebanon War released the testimony of Tzahi Hanegbi, Chair of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, this week. The main points were:
a) His Committee had failed to formulate a recommendation to the government on a ground incursion because they were divided on the issue.
b) He supported both the decision to go to war, and, later, the ground incursion, because he felt it was the only way to stop the Katyusha rocket fire.
c) Hanegbi claimed that the war weakened Hizb’allah and reduced the threat to Israel’s northern communities.
d) He blamed the IDF and the media for lapses in field security, the media should never have been allowed to report, speculate on, and anticipate, IDF movements from the border itself: “the public’s right to know is not the enemy’s right to know.”
e) The Committee set up a subcommittee headed by Labour MK Ami Ayalon to look into the management of the home front.
f) The Committee were surprised the Reserves were not called up at an earlier stage of the war.
g) Many of the Committee were convinced diplomacy was needed to end the threat to the communities in the North.
h) Finally, he claimed that this war, other than possibly the War of Independence of 1948, was the only war to end in any sort of diplomatic achievement for Israel, the fruits of which were the deployment of the Lebanese Army into the south of the country (for the first time in nearly 40 years), and the stationing of a potent multinational force there (UNIFIL).
6· The Governor of the Bank of Israel, Stanley Fischer, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the US that included $30 billion of military aid over the next 10 years. Fischer stated Israel’s defence burden at 10% of GDP was the highest in the western world and that the US deal allowed Israel to spend up to 25% on Israeli manufactured military equipment. Previously only US equipment could be purchased. He also announced that US non-military economic grants to Israel would cease around 2009. He maintained Israel’s economy was strong with a low deficit of less than 2% of GDP, and with inflation contained within a 1-3% range.
7· The IDF General Staff held a two-day conference to establish which weapons systems it will invest in over the next 5 years. The 5-year review was established by the Brodet Committee, which handed over its mainly secret proposals to the Defence establishment in May 2007. The Committee was set up to resolve differences between the Defence and Finance Ministries during and following the Second Lebanon War. Both Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi and Defence Minister Ehud Barak want the ground forces strengthened. Barak stated he wanted two new reserve divisions, anti-missile systems to protect tanks, and an anti-missile system to protect the civilian population from short as well as long range missile attack. Barak suggested many of these systems would take 5 to 7 years to develop. The Cabinet approved less than half the budget the Defence establishment demanded in late July. Prime Minister Olmert claimed it was ludicrous to put welfare and education spending on hold so that Defence could have all it insisted upon. The defence budget has been cut for the last 13 years, since 1994, following the Oslo Accords with the PLO, and the end of the Cold War.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· Hamas and Islamic Jihad have increased their attacks on Israel and the border crossings for several reasons:
1. The overall plan to create a bunker and tunnel system on the border with Israel and Egypt continues. To achieve this the militant groups need to control the border areas by making them too dangerous for the IDF to operate in.
2. Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who last week were on the verge of a violent feud, have decided to unite in their efforts to control the border areas. Islamic Jihad is no longer under any constraints concerning Qassam fire. Also, the military wing of Hamas felt they could not restrain Islamic Jihad from responding to the killing of their commanders.
3. Hamas want to control the border crossings themselves but they are not prepared to recognise Israel by negotiating a formal agreement concerning border traffic. Hamas’ attacks on the border crossings have several aims:
a) to force Israel into informal talks that will accept Hamas as the controlling force on the Gaza side of the border;
b) to force the international community, especially the Arab and Muslim nations, to address the issue of the closed border with Egypt. Once that border is open Iranian funds will be able to flow freely into Gaza;
c) to force the international community to pressure Israel to return to the status quo ante and allow free flow of goods and raw materials, much of which allow Hamas and Islamic Jihad to maintain their cottage industry output of Qassam missiles.
· Prime Minister Fayyad’s government indicated their continued support for isolating Hamas by informing the EU about breaches in EU and Palestinian Authority regulations concerning taxes upon fuel or services generally. President Abbas decreed all Gazans exempt from paying taxes shortly after the Hamas coup precisely in order to sabotage any efforts to legitimise or establish their rule.
Hamas, short of revenue, and having eaten into their Iranian-supplied funds, wanted to tax the use of fuel paid for by the EU, which does not accept Hamas rule in Gaza. It was also a timely reminder to Hamas that the PA still has some teeth.
· President Abbas released several Hamas members accused of trying to establish terror cells in the West Bank, and called on Hamas to “return to national unity” by ending their rule in Gaza. He also called on the services of Fatah veterans who have historic connections with Syria and the Muslim Brotherhood to help him find a way out of the current impasse. It is clear Abbas wishes to represent the whole Palestinian people at the November Washington summit, and that he has heeded the, sometimes crude, attempts to force him to re-engage with Hamas.
The reappearance of Muhammed Dahlan indicates Abbas is still serious in his desire to re-establish PA rule in Gaza.
· Abbas is rightly concerned that Prime Minister Olmert is in no position to offer him any of the substantive concessions he needs to convince his constituency that it is worthwhile ending the armed struggle. He is therefore trying to cover all eventualities, still engaging with Japan on future economic plans for the West Bank and accepting funds, but also doing what he can to re-engage with Hamas, assuming they will make the necessary concessions and return to the status quo ante in Gaza with possible Egyptian mediation and forces to ensure and enforce a compromise. His talks with Fatah rejectionists from Tunis is also a sign to Olmert that if Abbas does not get what he needs there are other, far worse, alternatives to him that Olmert and Israel may end up having to deal with.
· Rumours concerning President Abbas’ refusal to stand at the forthcoming Presidential elections have produced a flurry of activity and divisions within Fatah as everyone positions themselves in anticipation of the race to replace him. The return of Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades to the armed struggle so soon after the amnesty by Israel is a sign of this process and highlights the total failure of Abbas to reform Fatah and introduce the youth movements into the mainstream, or to replace the corrupt old guard.
In terms of the peace process Abbas and Olmert find themselves in the unusual position of having the right policies but with absolutely no means to deliver them. Abbas has lost both credibility within Fatah and control over any of the armed groups in the West Bank, and Olmert has no credibility in the eyes of the Israeli public.
· The flurry of reports exposing endemic and systemic institutional failures highlight a unique Israeli cultural phenomenon: an almost congenital inability to run any large organisation efficiently, combined with a pathological need to expose and decry its failures as virulently and publicly as possible. All the failures involve state-run institutions many led by ex-military personnel. A total lack of transparency combined with inadequate public supervision is also common to all the exposed failures.
The insensitivity to the Holocaust victims is a vestige of the socialist Zionist vision of the defenceless weak Diaspora Jew, who failed to come to Eretz Israel before the foreseen catastrophe; this, combined with Israel’s notoriously inefficient bureaucracy, led to the embarrassing scenes of Holocaust camp survivors protesting outside the Prime Minister’s Office. Paradoxically it was only Olmert’s personal intervention that cut through the bureaucratic logjam to enable the survivors to receive the financial restitution owed to them.
The accusations of rampant corruption are often made, particularly by the current Accountant General, but rarely substantiated. Almost all of the prosecutions against leading politicians made in recent years, including against Binyamin Netanyahu, have all failed for lack of credible evidence. In fact the accusation against Olmert concerning his alleged corrupt role in the Bank Leumi tender has also been dropped due to a lack of any credible evidence.
Nevertheless, the lack of transparency and the crony-based culture in most of Israel’s major institutions is not conducive to efficient management or running of services. Israel’s establishment remains reluctant to loosen the grip of the state or to render its institutions either transparent or open to competition. The current wave of investigations indicates that changes will be made and that Israel remains a vibrant open society that also retains its historic cultural propensity for public self-flagellation.
· The heads of Hizb’allah, Iraq’s Mehdi militia, and the Revolutionary Guards statements this week indicate a formal alliance exists between these Shia groups that mean any future confrontations between Israel and Hizb’allah will automatically involve them all. In effect Israel would be at war with forces from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran; and, these forces would have access to the latest technology recently developed in Iran. They would also be in alliance with the Sunnis of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Gaza-based Popular Revolutionary Committees which include elements of the quasi-Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Fatah’s militant youth wing the Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades. In the event Al Qaeda affiliated groups would also form a temporary alliance during any such future conflict.
Militarily this alliance is incapable of defeating Israel but it clearly poses a long-term strategic threat. Iran clearly believes that once the US leaves Iraq it will only be a matter of time before Israel is forced to leave the West Bank and East Jerusalem and Israel’s demise would follow not long afterwards. The constant missile threat, the constant economic uncertainty, the demographic threat from within, and Israel’s own fragmented society, will all conspire to force the Jews to realise the notion of an independent Jewish State is simply not viable or sustainable.
Unfortunately for this plan all the historic evidence indicates the opposite will happen. The very increase in the threat will force greater resources and focus to be allocated to Israel’s survival. During the worst excesses of the suicide bombing campaign Israel’s emigration rates actually fell, and, during major conflicts Israel’s rates of Jewish immigration increase.
Nevertheless this strategic threat will put pressure on Israel to relinquish the West Bank so that western governments can then justify supporting Israel politically, economically, and militarily. However, this will not be possible without Palestinian acquiescence in accepting some form of western military presence, which is unlikely. The most probable outcome for the West Bank is a strong multinational force, with at least a western contingent, that will act as a military and political buffer between Israel and any future Palestine-Iran axis but this outcome could either be realised in years, or, decades.
· MK Tzahi Hanegbi’s testimony to the Winograd Committee, as head of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, has been the least critical of Olmert as one would possibly expect from one of his long time political allies. Nevertheless it did expose the complexity of the decision-making processes during the war and the variety of opinions within the committee itself.
Hanegbi was correct to point out the ridiculous extent of the access the media had to the front line and the minute-by-minute intelligence this was giving to Damascus and Tehran who were in direct contact with guerrilla forces on the border.
He was also one of the only witnesses to highlight the achievement of the Olmert government in getting both the Lebanese Army and a bolstered and credible UNIFIL force onto Israel’s northern border. In effect Olmert achieved in less than 40 days what no previous Israeli politician or general had achieved in nearly 40 years of conflict with the hyper-fragmented nation of Lebanon.
· Stanley Fischer’s announcement that on top of the $30 billion military aid package over 10 years Israel is to end its dependence on civilian economic grants from the US was historic. It confirmed that Israel’s economy is both thriving and on a sound footing. It is important to note that the Second Lebanon War’s economic effects on Israel were negligible but the costs to Lebanon and Iran were significant.
PM Olmert remained concerned that Israel’s economic divisions and educational deficiencies still needed urgent attention, and that the economy could not be sacrificed to the Defence Ministry and IDF’s bottomless demands. If the Defence establishment is to meet its own stated needs it must reform itself.
· The IDF’s two-day conference on prioritising its spending and strategic goals over the next 5 years is a turning point for the Defence establishment and Israel. The IDF High Command and Administration and Defence Ministry have become bywords for inefficiency, incompetence, waste, and corrupt practices.
These faults have all been highlighted by the Brodet Committee's interim report of May 2007 and the 5-year spending plan was one of their recommendations. It is meant to enable a more strategic view to be taken by both the Defence and Finance Ministries.
At the moment the Defence establishment has two of the most experienced and capable military minds at its head, Defence Minister Ehud Barak and Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi.
Their priority will be to cut the extraordinary waste and inefficiency so that any consequent savings can be diverted to the pressing need for protecting both tanks and armoured vehicles from missiles and explosive devices, and, the civilian population from ballistic and short-range missiles.
They also have a unique opportunity to use 25% of the US’s $3 billion annual military aid (i.e.$750 million per annum) on Israeli produced military equipment, the first time the US has allowed its own military aid to be used on non-United States-made military equipment.
The debate over lack of manpower is not the most pressing issue. No army ever won a battle using reluctant soldiers who would rather play Nintendo, or pray, than defend their country. The real issue is preparation and training and efficient use of resources.
Hamas and Iran will want to lure the IDF into a battle at a time and place of their choosing and one of the greatest challenges for the IDF will be to deny them that opportunity. The IDF strategy will need to be to avoid any significant military confrontation for as long as possible and that includes any attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Other sources used this week The Independent:
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2878769.ece
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
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"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 13 Qassam missiles and roughly 30 mortar rounds were fired at Israel this week. The level of Qassam fire nearly doubled from last week and the mortar fire, mainly directed at Gaza-Israel border crossing areas, increased significantly. Several Hamas-planted mines were also defused on the border. These attacks led to the EU suspending payments on fuel supplies to Gaza, which in turn led to some power cuts. The IDF continued to target Islamic Jihad and Hamas cells that fired Qassam missiles and continued to attempt to attack the border respectively. Some senior Islamic Jihad and Hamas commanders were killed as a result.
The EU agreed to continue payments for 25-30% of Gaza’s energy needs on a provisional basis after Hamas promised to stop its efforts to tax recipients and suppliers in order to finance their rule over the Gaza Strip.
Egypt continued to discover explosives in the Sinai; the latest find was 500 kilograms of TNT, 15 miles (25 kilometres) from S Gaza, its intended destination.
2· Palestinian Authority interim Prime Minister Fayyad apprised the EU of Hamas violations of fuel supply agreements to Gaza, and their violation of President Abbas’ decree that exempted all Gazans from paying taxes following the Hamas coup.
The PA held meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Japan, Jordan, and Israel to discuss plans for a regional industrial and agricultural zone near Jericho connected to a similar zone and airport in Jordan that would enable immediate access to overseas markets. Japan also provided $20 million in financial aid to the PA, and charitable foundations, in the West Bank.
President Abbas and PM Fayyad continued to be criticised for the lack of reforms to Fatah and their abandonment of armed resistance against Israel. The West Bank-based Fatah militia Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades used the arrests of two members by Israel for clear breaches of their amnesty agreements to declare a renewal of the armed struggle and rearmament. Tunis-based Fatah leader Farouk Kaddoumi called for unity by a return to armed struggle.
Abbas held talks in Jordan with two of Fatah’s Tunis-based old guard, Abu Mahir Ghnaim and Ahmed Afanah, who have well-established contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood and Syria respectively, and like Kaddoumi, opposed the Oslo Accords of 1993 that were the basis for all consequent PLO/PA-Israel agreements and mutual recognition.
Another, formerly Gaza-based, Fatah and clan leader Muhammad Dahlan returned to the West Bank this week following surgery in Europe. Hamas insisted he would never be allowed to return to Gaza.
3· A series of failures involving Israel’s institutions were reported this week:
1. Aviation safety procedures and equipment at Ben Gurion Airport were criticised for being outmoded and on the verge of collapse following the publication of the interim report of the Lapidot Committee ordered by Transport Minister Shaul Mofaz.
2. Minister of Environment Gideon Ezra admitted to the Knesset State Control Committee that his department had failed to implement a 2003 Cabinet decision to take responsibility for hazardous materials and had hence failed during the 2006 Lebanon War to secure sensitive sites or to coordinate its activities with the Home Front Command or the Emergency Services. This followed criticism of his Ministry, the Home Front Command, and the Police, in the State Comptroller’s 18 July 2007 report.
3. The head of the Home Front Major-General Yitzhak Gershon insisted the hazardous materials problem had been addressed by the Army despite the absence of a single recommendation having been put to the government on the issue. Gershon also claimed it was not possible to defend civilians from Qassam rocket hits, and blamed local authorities for not providing adequate bomb shelters. Despite a High Court injunction insisting all schools and major institutions within range be safeguarded from Qassam attacks, only 24 schools have some sort of protection, the rest will have none until the end of 2007, again, it was claimed, partly due to the Finance Ministry’s inability to make funds available. An appeal by residents bordering Gaza to force the government to implement the injunction immediately was refused by the High Court.
4. State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss accused the Finance Ministry of foot dragging, ignorance, and bureaucracy, concerning their mismanagement and mishandling of the Holocaust survivors payments case, which was eventually settled as a result of the direct intervention of Prime Minister Olmert.
5. The Accountant General stated the burden of public corruption was almost as large as the Defence burden and that the attempt to manipulate the Bank Leumi tender was the worst case of corruption in Israel’s history.
4· Hizb’allah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah announced a “great surprise” should new hostilities arise against Israel that could both change the “fate of the war and the region.” Hizb’allah now had anti-tank missiles that could penetrate Israeli and US tanks, missiles that could hit any part of Israel, and missiles that could hit any ship. Hizb’allah claimed it expected a war with Israel within a year or so.
Muqtadar al-Sadr, Shia political and militia leader in Iraq, stated this week his group now had formal links with Hizb’allah and that his men and Hizb’allah’s train together both in Lebanon and Iraq. His militia assassinated the second provincial Shia Governor in nine days in southern Iraq using a Hizb’allah-designed roadside bomb, and are responsible for attacks on British forces stationed there. He also claimed his militia would inevitably become involved in future Hizb’allah-Israel clashes.
Iran’s commander of the Revolutionary Guard, Yayha Rahim Safavi, also claimed the new Shihab-3 ballistic missile now had a remote guidance system. The implication was it could penetrate Israel’s anti-missile systems.
The US administration intends to designate Iran’s Revolutionary Guard a terrorist organisation thereby making its funds and any contributors to them subject to investigation and possible confiscation.
5· The Winograd Committee on the Second Lebanon War released the testimony of Tzahi Hanegbi, Chair of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, this week. The main points were:
a) His Committee had failed to formulate a recommendation to the government on a ground incursion because they were divided on the issue.
b) He supported both the decision to go to war, and, later, the ground incursion, because he felt it was the only way to stop the Katyusha rocket fire.
c) Hanegbi claimed that the war weakened Hizb’allah and reduced the threat to Israel’s northern communities.
d) He blamed the IDF and the media for lapses in field security, the media should never have been allowed to report, speculate on, and anticipate, IDF movements from the border itself: “the public’s right to know is not the enemy’s right to know.”
e) The Committee set up a subcommittee headed by Labour MK Ami Ayalon to look into the management of the home front.
f) The Committee were surprised the Reserves were not called up at an earlier stage of the war.
g) Many of the Committee were convinced diplomacy was needed to end the threat to the communities in the North.
h) Finally, he claimed that this war, other than possibly the War of Independence of 1948, was the only war to end in any sort of diplomatic achievement for Israel, the fruits of which were the deployment of the Lebanese Army into the south of the country (for the first time in nearly 40 years), and the stationing of a potent multinational force there (UNIFIL).
6· The Governor of the Bank of Israel, Stanley Fischer, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the US that included $30 billion of military aid over the next 10 years. Fischer stated Israel’s defence burden at 10% of GDP was the highest in the western world and that the US deal allowed Israel to spend up to 25% on Israeli manufactured military equipment. Previously only US equipment could be purchased. He also announced that US non-military economic grants to Israel would cease around 2009. He maintained Israel’s economy was strong with a low deficit of less than 2% of GDP, and with inflation contained within a 1-3% range.
7· The IDF General Staff held a two-day conference to establish which weapons systems it will invest in over the next 5 years. The 5-year review was established by the Brodet Committee, which handed over its mainly secret proposals to the Defence establishment in May 2007. The Committee was set up to resolve differences between the Defence and Finance Ministries during and following the Second Lebanon War. Both Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi and Defence Minister Ehud Barak want the ground forces strengthened. Barak stated he wanted two new reserve divisions, anti-missile systems to protect tanks, and an anti-missile system to protect the civilian population from short as well as long range missile attack. Barak suggested many of these systems would take 5 to 7 years to develop. The Cabinet approved less than half the budget the Defence establishment demanded in late July. Prime Minister Olmert claimed it was ludicrous to put welfare and education spending on hold so that Defence could have all it insisted upon. The defence budget has been cut for the last 13 years, since 1994, following the Oslo Accords with the PLO, and the end of the Cold War.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· Hamas and Islamic Jihad have increased their attacks on Israel and the border crossings for several reasons:
1. The overall plan to create a bunker and tunnel system on the border with Israel and Egypt continues. To achieve this the militant groups need to control the border areas by making them too dangerous for the IDF to operate in.
2. Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who last week were on the verge of a violent feud, have decided to unite in their efforts to control the border areas. Islamic Jihad is no longer under any constraints concerning Qassam fire. Also, the military wing of Hamas felt they could not restrain Islamic Jihad from responding to the killing of their commanders.
3. Hamas want to control the border crossings themselves but they are not prepared to recognise Israel by negotiating a formal agreement concerning border traffic. Hamas’ attacks on the border crossings have several aims:
a) to force Israel into informal talks that will accept Hamas as the controlling force on the Gaza side of the border;
b) to force the international community, especially the Arab and Muslim nations, to address the issue of the closed border with Egypt. Once that border is open Iranian funds will be able to flow freely into Gaza;
c) to force the international community to pressure Israel to return to the status quo ante and allow free flow of goods and raw materials, much of which allow Hamas and Islamic Jihad to maintain their cottage industry output of Qassam missiles.
· Prime Minister Fayyad’s government indicated their continued support for isolating Hamas by informing the EU about breaches in EU and Palestinian Authority regulations concerning taxes upon fuel or services generally. President Abbas decreed all Gazans exempt from paying taxes shortly after the Hamas coup precisely in order to sabotage any efforts to legitimise or establish their rule.
Hamas, short of revenue, and having eaten into their Iranian-supplied funds, wanted to tax the use of fuel paid for by the EU, which does not accept Hamas rule in Gaza. It was also a timely reminder to Hamas that the PA still has some teeth.
· President Abbas released several Hamas members accused of trying to establish terror cells in the West Bank, and called on Hamas to “return to national unity” by ending their rule in Gaza. He also called on the services of Fatah veterans who have historic connections with Syria and the Muslim Brotherhood to help him find a way out of the current impasse. It is clear Abbas wishes to represent the whole Palestinian people at the November Washington summit, and that he has heeded the, sometimes crude, attempts to force him to re-engage with Hamas.
The reappearance of Muhammed Dahlan indicates Abbas is still serious in his desire to re-establish PA rule in Gaza.
· Abbas is rightly concerned that Prime Minister Olmert is in no position to offer him any of the substantive concessions he needs to convince his constituency that it is worthwhile ending the armed struggle. He is therefore trying to cover all eventualities, still engaging with Japan on future economic plans for the West Bank and accepting funds, but also doing what he can to re-engage with Hamas, assuming they will make the necessary concessions and return to the status quo ante in Gaza with possible Egyptian mediation and forces to ensure and enforce a compromise. His talks with Fatah rejectionists from Tunis is also a sign to Olmert that if Abbas does not get what he needs there are other, far worse, alternatives to him that Olmert and Israel may end up having to deal with.
· Rumours concerning President Abbas’ refusal to stand at the forthcoming Presidential elections have produced a flurry of activity and divisions within Fatah as everyone positions themselves in anticipation of the race to replace him. The return of Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades to the armed struggle so soon after the amnesty by Israel is a sign of this process and highlights the total failure of Abbas to reform Fatah and introduce the youth movements into the mainstream, or to replace the corrupt old guard.
In terms of the peace process Abbas and Olmert find themselves in the unusual position of having the right policies but with absolutely no means to deliver them. Abbas has lost both credibility within Fatah and control over any of the armed groups in the West Bank, and Olmert has no credibility in the eyes of the Israeli public.
· The flurry of reports exposing endemic and systemic institutional failures highlight a unique Israeli cultural phenomenon: an almost congenital inability to run any large organisation efficiently, combined with a pathological need to expose and decry its failures as virulently and publicly as possible. All the failures involve state-run institutions many led by ex-military personnel. A total lack of transparency combined with inadequate public supervision is also common to all the exposed failures.
The insensitivity to the Holocaust victims is a vestige of the socialist Zionist vision of the defenceless weak Diaspora Jew, who failed to come to Eretz Israel before the foreseen catastrophe; this, combined with Israel’s notoriously inefficient bureaucracy, led to the embarrassing scenes of Holocaust camp survivors protesting outside the Prime Minister’s Office. Paradoxically it was only Olmert’s personal intervention that cut through the bureaucratic logjam to enable the survivors to receive the financial restitution owed to them.
The accusations of rampant corruption are often made, particularly by the current Accountant General, but rarely substantiated. Almost all of the prosecutions against leading politicians made in recent years, including against Binyamin Netanyahu, have all failed for lack of credible evidence. In fact the accusation against Olmert concerning his alleged corrupt role in the Bank Leumi tender has also been dropped due to a lack of any credible evidence.
Nevertheless, the lack of transparency and the crony-based culture in most of Israel’s major institutions is not conducive to efficient management or running of services. Israel’s establishment remains reluctant to loosen the grip of the state or to render its institutions either transparent or open to competition. The current wave of investigations indicates that changes will be made and that Israel remains a vibrant open society that also retains its historic cultural propensity for public self-flagellation.
· The heads of Hizb’allah, Iraq’s Mehdi militia, and the Revolutionary Guards statements this week indicate a formal alliance exists between these Shia groups that mean any future confrontations between Israel and Hizb’allah will automatically involve them all. In effect Israel would be at war with forces from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran; and, these forces would have access to the latest technology recently developed in Iran. They would also be in alliance with the Sunnis of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Gaza-based Popular Revolutionary Committees which include elements of the quasi-Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Fatah’s militant youth wing the Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades. In the event Al Qaeda affiliated groups would also form a temporary alliance during any such future conflict.
Militarily this alliance is incapable of defeating Israel but it clearly poses a long-term strategic threat. Iran clearly believes that once the US leaves Iraq it will only be a matter of time before Israel is forced to leave the West Bank and East Jerusalem and Israel’s demise would follow not long afterwards. The constant missile threat, the constant economic uncertainty, the demographic threat from within, and Israel’s own fragmented society, will all conspire to force the Jews to realise the notion of an independent Jewish State is simply not viable or sustainable.
Unfortunately for this plan all the historic evidence indicates the opposite will happen. The very increase in the threat will force greater resources and focus to be allocated to Israel’s survival. During the worst excesses of the suicide bombing campaign Israel’s emigration rates actually fell, and, during major conflicts Israel’s rates of Jewish immigration increase.
Nevertheless this strategic threat will put pressure on Israel to relinquish the West Bank so that western governments can then justify supporting Israel politically, economically, and militarily. However, this will not be possible without Palestinian acquiescence in accepting some form of western military presence, which is unlikely. The most probable outcome for the West Bank is a strong multinational force, with at least a western contingent, that will act as a military and political buffer between Israel and any future Palestine-Iran axis but this outcome could either be realised in years, or, decades.
· MK Tzahi Hanegbi’s testimony to the Winograd Committee, as head of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, has been the least critical of Olmert as one would possibly expect from one of his long time political allies. Nevertheless it did expose the complexity of the decision-making processes during the war and the variety of opinions within the committee itself.
Hanegbi was correct to point out the ridiculous extent of the access the media had to the front line and the minute-by-minute intelligence this was giving to Damascus and Tehran who were in direct contact with guerrilla forces on the border.
He was also one of the only witnesses to highlight the achievement of the Olmert government in getting both the Lebanese Army and a bolstered and credible UNIFIL force onto Israel’s northern border. In effect Olmert achieved in less than 40 days what no previous Israeli politician or general had achieved in nearly 40 years of conflict with the hyper-fragmented nation of Lebanon.
· Stanley Fischer’s announcement that on top of the $30 billion military aid package over 10 years Israel is to end its dependence on civilian economic grants from the US was historic. It confirmed that Israel’s economy is both thriving and on a sound footing. It is important to note that the Second Lebanon War’s economic effects on Israel were negligible but the costs to Lebanon and Iran were significant.
PM Olmert remained concerned that Israel’s economic divisions and educational deficiencies still needed urgent attention, and that the economy could not be sacrificed to the Defence Ministry and IDF’s bottomless demands. If the Defence establishment is to meet its own stated needs it must reform itself.
· The IDF’s two-day conference on prioritising its spending and strategic goals over the next 5 years is a turning point for the Defence establishment and Israel. The IDF High Command and Administration and Defence Ministry have become bywords for inefficiency, incompetence, waste, and corrupt practices.
These faults have all been highlighted by the Brodet Committee's interim report of May 2007 and the 5-year spending plan was one of their recommendations. It is meant to enable a more strategic view to be taken by both the Defence and Finance Ministries.
At the moment the Defence establishment has two of the most experienced and capable military minds at its head, Defence Minister Ehud Barak and Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi.
Their priority will be to cut the extraordinary waste and inefficiency so that any consequent savings can be diverted to the pressing need for protecting both tanks and armoured vehicles from missiles and explosive devices, and, the civilian population from ballistic and short-range missiles.
They also have a unique opportunity to use 25% of the US’s $3 billion annual military aid (i.e.$750 million per annum) on Israeli produced military equipment, the first time the US has allowed its own military aid to be used on non-United States-made military equipment.
The debate over lack of manpower is not the most pressing issue. No army ever won a battle using reluctant soldiers who would rather play Nintendo, or pray, than defend their country. The real issue is preparation and training and efficient use of resources.
Hamas and Iran will want to lure the IDF into a battle at a time and place of their choosing and one of the greatest challenges for the IDF will be to deny them that opportunity. The IDF strategy will need to be to avoid any significant military confrontation for as long as possible and that includes any attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Other sources used this week The Independent:
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2878769.ece
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
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