Tuesday, 29 May 2007
Week 23 May - 29 May 2007
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1. 33 Qassam missiles hit Sderot (250 in last 12 days) and the surrounding area.
Two Israeli civilians were killed and 16 injured. The missiles have also created extensive fire damage to summer wheat crops. The quantity of missiles fired has decreased this week but their quality and effectiveness in terms of accuracy, larger explosive charge, and mainly ball bearing shrapnel, has increased. Very few buildings or even shelters in Sderot are able to protect residents against the new more powerful Qassams.
2. The total lack of protection and neglect of the civilians in Sderot continues to embarrass the government and IDF including the Home Front Command. 1,000 residents have returned from breaks away from the bombing but 10,000 have left the town. The Israeli Army and government, as well as Russian billionaire Arcadi Gaydamak, are supplying their hotel and camp accommodation. Children’s exams are being held in schools and halls outside missile range. The President of the Manufacturers of Israel claimed a budget, previously withheld, had now been approved to protect Sderot’s factories. He asked why it had taken 6 years (4,000 missiles and mortars have been fired at or near Sderot in that time).
3. Defence Minister Amir Peretz, also current Labour leader, who is a resident of Sderot, cast his vote for the Labour Party Leadership Primaries; he came third. Former Navy and Shin Bet head Ami Ayalon came second behind former PM and Chief of Staff Ehud Barak. The second and final round of voting between the remaining contenders, Barak and Ayalon, is in two weeks.
4. The Brodet Committee reviewed the Defence Budget and concluded that defence cuts and inefficient systems were partly to blame for Second Lebanon War failures.
5. 58 arrests of leading terrorist and political leaders from Hamas, Fatah, and Fatah’s Al Aqsa Brigades were made in both Gaza and the West Bank.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· The missile threat to Sderot is now perceived as strategic, and no longer local, by the government and IDF. This is because:
1) The quality, range, and accuracy of the missiles continues to improve. Ashqelon, a major city, and Ashdod, a strategically vital port, will soon be vulnerable.
2) The civilian population of Sderot are completely exposed. The latest Qassam missiles can destroy shelters and safe rooms within houses. The government has neglected the Home Front consistently for over 6 years. Sderot has been ignored because of a) its location near Gaza, b) its population mix: Sephardi Jews and poor recent ex Soviet Union immigrants, and c) the relatively low death rate in relation to the number of missiles fired (roughly 4,000 in 6 years).
3) The neglect of Sderot coupled to the increased effectiveness of the missiles has led to large levels of emigration from the town. A similar phenomenon occurred in Qiryat Shmona (on the Northern Lebanese border) during the late 1970s and early 1980s under similar circumstances. This led to the Litani Operation of 1978 and the First Lebanon War of 1982. Significant population displacement is considered a strategic threat to the State’s future well being and security.
4) The fact that Hamas, Islamic Jihad, breakaway Fatah Al Aqsa Brigades cells, quasi Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine cells, and small Al Qaeda related and other Islamist cells can dictate Israel’s domestic politics, and increasingly, regional politics, has become a strategic factor. It is no coincidence that the kidnapping of Corporal Shalit from Israel to Gaza led to kidnappings in Northern Israel by Hizb’allah. The links between the terrorist groups mean that local incidents can become strategic threats. Once deterrence is perceived to have weakened all groups in the region are prepared to vie with one another to gain advantage. The popularity and support for each group and cell increases with each attack on Israel.
· The relatively large number of arrests of prominent Palestinians is a clear attempt to emphasise to those in control of terrorism Israel’s true capabilities should the State take decisive action. Olmert’s government has been characterised by relative restraint preferring to use EU monitors on the Gaza border, and happy to accept Lebanese Army and UNIFIL forces on Israel’s Northern border. Israel has two options in the medium term if the missile threat persists: a) to get an international force into Gaza, or b) to invade with overwhelming force. Olmert prefers the first option. Paradoxically, it is possible that his preferred option will only be achieved after a major military ground operation.
· If Ami Ayalon wins the Labour Leadership Primary, Israel may face a prolonged period of instability. He has insisted Olmert resign from the government or he will take Labour out of the coalition. This will not necessarily lead to early elections, as most political parties see no advantage in holding them. The pressure on Olmert to resign will increase which may lead to fissures within his party Kadima. Should Kadima split a right wing government may be formed either with or without elections.
· Ami Ayalon has proven to be politically naïve. Olmert’s position is vulnerable, he being unlikely to withstand the fallout from the Winograd Committee’s Final Report on the Second Lebanon War, due out this summer. Labour is not ready for general elections and is likely to lose even more seats under Ayalon. Only if Peretz puts his dislike for Barak ahead of common political sense will he allow Ayalon to win the next round of Primaries by allowing the Peretz Labour Party membership vote to go to Ayalon. If Peretz can make a deal with Barak, involving Barak going to Defence and he, Peretz, to Finance, Welfare, or Industry, it is likely Olmert will accept it and reshuffle the Cabinet accordingly. Barak had said he had no interest in leaving the coalition or early elections but has recently hinted the opposite unless Olmert gives a date for his resignation.
· At the moment it appears Peretz would prefer to deal with Ayalon because he feels he stands more chance of a senior position within an Ayalon-led coalition. This can only occur if Ayalon makes a 180 degree U-Turn on his previous position to leave the government should Olmert not resign immediately.
All three Labour candidates have shown political ineptness. Peretz said he is now the kingmaker, which has alienated him from his colleagues and made him a laughing stock amongst the public.
Barak and Ayalon keep changing their positions in relation to whether they will or will not stay in the government.
Barak's position is so weak he has refused to hold Press conferences to explain his position on anything. Ayalon, by all accounts, behaves as though he is running a military unit, issuing orders and assuming they will be obeyed. In Israeli politics, in which each party is a coalition that then enters a coalition government, this is unlikely to win him any friends. His political position, Centre-Left will also appeal to few.
Unfortunately for Barak the Winograd Committee is likely to severely criticise his role leading up to the Second Lebanon War.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
Tuesday, 22 May 2007
Week 16 May – 22 May 2007
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1. Over 150 Qassam missiles fired from Gaza landed in Israel mostly in and around the southern town of Sderot. The government were forced to abandon their policy of restraint and order the IDF to respond.
2. IAF missiles kill 40 Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives in Gaza. Hamas threaten a campaign of suicide bombers and missile attacks from the West Bank.
3. The offer of $65m by billionaire Arcadi Gaydamak (wanted for alleged tax evasion, money laundering, and illegal arms deals in France), to protect the town of Sderot, resulted in some visits by government ministers and, previously withheld, promises of aid. The town is now under the emergency powers of the Home Front Command and is able to claim defence financing and some compensation and tax breaks.
23 of Sderot’s 58 bomb shelters are operational. 16% of the town’s population have left permanently.
4. The OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) invited Israel to membership talks. This follows Israel’s Gross Domestic Product growth of 5.1% in 2006 and Israel’s rising from 23rd to 15rh in the World Economic Forum’s global competitive index, 17 places above any other Middle Eastern state.
5. The Winograd Inquiry released Public Security Minister Avi Dichter’s evidence in which he claimed Chief of Staff Dan Halutz deceived him as to IDF capability, and the length of time the conflict would last. Defence Minister Peretz said that the IDF now know their operational goals. He blamed previous Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Staff for the absence of counter measures to deal with the missiles from Gaza and Lebanon, a claim supported by the independent State Comptroller (9 May).
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· The barrage of 155 missiles fired against Sderot this week, was decided by the military wings of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in direct response to the losses they suffered during the recent Hamas-Fatah conflict that left scores of Palestinian dead, and which had led to their deep unpopularity within Gaza. They believe that by provoking a war with Israel they will be able to temporarily put aside their differences with the other Palestinian factions, and regain their position as the pre-eminent opposition to Israel. No Palestinian faction dares attack another during a conflagration with Israel.
· Hamas itself has split. The leaders in Damascus do not want a deal with Fatah unless they can control at least 40% of the seats within the PLO. They support Iran and Syria and want to divert attention away from the forthcoming UNSC decisions to: a) prosecute the murderers of Lebanon’s late PM Hariri and b) to increase sanctions against Iran to limit their nuclear weapons development programme. The political wing of Hamas in Gaza are more prepared to make a deal with Fatah, and are prepared to leave Fatah alone to negotiate with Israel. This now means that both Hamas and Fatah are split politically, and, in practise, have little control over their military wings.
· The bombardment of Sderot has exposed the almost total neglect of the town. Time and again the IDF, and Defence and Finance Ministries have blocked or postponed any progress on dealing with the security of the town. The Winograd Committee of Inquiry into the Second Lebanon War has exposed this dereliction of duty, inefficiency, and lack of professionalism, as both endemic and systemic.
· Comments made this week by both the Defence Minister Peretz and Internal Security Minister Dichter have once again exposed deceit by the IDF High Command with regard to its preparedness. They also made clear that, and this was confirmed by the State Comptroller’s Office last week, the IDF and Defence and Finance Ministries had sabotaged all efforts to find a solution to the dual tunnel and missile threats from Gaza. Budgetary constraints are the most likely explanation for this gross dereliction of duty but, once again, it nevertheless exposes a systemic inability to think strategically.
· The current conflicts have the following possible outcomes:
1) A miscalculation might lead to a general war involving Syria, Iran, Hamas, and Hizb’allah. At the moment this remains the least likely possibility.
2) A war of attrition against Hamas and Islamic Jihad will continue in the Gaza Strip leading to the intervention of an international force, which may benefit everyone. This can only be realised if the split within Hamas ends and Islamic Jihad are threatened with severe consequences by Hamas and Fatah should they attack any international force.
3) The war of attrition may last several months at the end of which Hamas will declare a temporary truce. This will not end Qassam missile strikes on Israel as Islamic Jihad have always rejected any compromise or cessation of the conflict.
· The underlying causes of the conflict remain:
a) The various splits within the Palestinian factions all of whom are armed.
b) Syria’s refusal to hand over Harriri’s murderers.
c) Iran’s refusal to halt its nuclear weapons programme.
d) The inability of any of the Palestinian factions to deliver any agreement they may make.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/