This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Events and Points:
1· President Mubarak of Egypt hosted Prime Minister Olmert, President Abbas, and King Abdullah of Jordan at Sharm el-Sheikh. It was agreed Egypt would return its security personnel to Gaza to continue negotiations with Hamas particularly over the release of Gilad Schalit the kidnapped Israeli soldier; it would also redouble its efforts to block the flow of arms into Gaza. PM Olmert agreed to enact a staged payment of withheld Palestinian tax revenues collected by Israel, and to release 250 prisoners after they agree to sign a non-violence agreement. President Abbas requested he be allowed to bring Fatah’s Badr Brigade into the West Bank in order to shore up his emergency government and establish discipline amongst the various Fatah-related, and other, gangs; he also requested the release of popular Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti, who is currently serving five sentences for murder, in an Israeli jail.
2· Hamas responded to the Sharm el-Sheikh conference by releasing an audiotape of kidnapped soldier Schalit in which he said his condition was deteriorating and he could not understand why he had not been freed in a prisoner swap.
Hamas successfully imposed its rule and order on the Gaza Strip but failed to meet its own deadline for releasing BBC reporter Alan Johnston. They blamed the BBC and British government for refusing permission to use force to release him. One member of the Dagmoush clan responsible for his kidnap was executed and two others arrested in an effort to pressurise the clan to release Johnston. The clan released a video in response showing Johnston wearing a homemade suicide belt that the kidnappers threatened to explode should force be used to free him. After further Hamas pressure they threatened to cut his throat unless their demands were met, which included the release of three Al Qaeda prisoners, two in Jordan and Abu Qatada in Britain. Al Qaeda’s official offer of an alliance with Hamas was rejected.
3· The Winograd Committee on the Second Lebanon War released the testimony of former Science, Culture and Sports Minister Ophir Paz-Pines. He claimed the government had no idea what was happening on the home front during the war and that there was no plan beyond the initial air bombing campaign, which he supported. He abstained during the Cabinet vote over the later ground operation, which he was against. The Winograd Committee hinted it was unlikely they would be able to publish their report on the Second Lebanon War before mid September this year and that they will not issue warning letters as they have in the past about individuals criticised in the report.
4· 13 Qassam missiles fell on or near Sderot and Ashkelon, a four-fold increase on last week. Islamic Jihad fired most of the missiles. At least 11 mortar rounds were fired, mainly at the Karni border crossing into the northeastern Gaza Strip, resulting in its closure. The Kerem Shalom crossing, at the southeastern tip of the Gaza Strip, also had to be closed due to the uncovering of an explosive device. Supplies into Gaza are currently entering by the smaller and more isolated and defensible Sufa crossing in the southeast. The IDF carried out anti-tunnel and bunker uncovering operations at the Karni and Kissufim crossings in eastern Gaza following Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Popular Resistance Committee threats of future incursions and kidnappings of Israelis within Israeli territory. 12 Palestinian gunmen who confronted the IDF search teams were killed, as were several senior Islamic Jihad Qassam missile operatives and manufacturers; 3 IDF were wounded.
5· President Bush refused to mediate between Syria and Israel. This effectively closed any possibility of Israel-Syria talks. The Syrian regime believe the talks cannot be serious without US involvement and PM Olmert’s government is not prepared to risk its relationship with the Bush administration by pursuing any substantial talks without their full support.
6· President Abbas cancelled all passports originally dispensed in Gaza. In theory no Gazans can leave, as their travel documents are no longer valid; he also declared Hamas’ Izzadin Qassam military wing and Fatah’s own Al Aqsa Brigades militia, illegal. He does not recognise Hamas’ Executive Force, which currently enforces law and order in Gaza, nor does he recognise Hamas as part of the government. President Abbas has to renew his interim emergency government every 30 days according to the Palestinian Assembly’s Constitution, and can only do so on two more occasions before elections have to be called.
7· Newly-elected Labour Party leader Ehud Barak could not persuade his senior Labour rivals Ami Ayalon or Amir Peretz to join him in government. This leaves PM Olmert with greater scope in next week’s coalition Cabinet reshuffle, but also makes an early election more likely.
8· 6 Spanish and Colombian UNIFIL soldiers were killed by a bomb in South Lebanon. Most sources believe the responsibility lies with Fatah al-Islam, an Al Qaeda affiliate, tolerated and supported by the Syrian regime. This comes a week after a missile attack on Israel probably by the same group, or an affiliate, also tolerated by Syria. Fatah al-Islam has recently suffered a setback in their fight with Lebanese Army forces in Nahr al-Bared camp near Tripoli north Lebanon.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· President Mubarak is urging the Israeli government to allow him to introduce more security personnel into the Sinai Peninsula in breach of the Peace Agreement (1979), which restricts the numbers of troops Egypt is allowed. He insisted he could not stem the flow of arms into Gaza without these forces. Former Premier Arik Sharon had agreed to Egypt introducing 6,000 more men but was overruled by his previous Cabinet. Egypt’s main means of pressuring Israel and Hamas is over weapons flows into Gaza. Mubarak’s quid pro quo for stemming the flow of arms is an increase in troops. This could be difficult for PM Olmert to push through Cabinet but it is vital if Egypt’s cooperation is to be bought. The US Senate warned Egypt this week it would reduce US loans and grants if Egypt failed to block the arms flow, especially of missiles, into Gaza.
· President Abbas’ position is so weak he cannot rely on his own security forces and appealed to PM Olmert to allow Fatah’s quasi-military Badr Brigade to enter the West Bank from Jordan. Abbas is totally dependent on Jordan and Israel for his own security. Israel’s constant arrests of Al Aqsa, Islamic Jihad and Hamas militants have allowed him to remain in position. He will have no choice but to call elections within the next few months and to restart talks with Hamas.
But at the moment he is considering sidelining them by calling on the Palestine Liberation Organisation, of which Hamas is not a member, to re-establish itself.
This strategy is unlikely to succeed because few PLO members will believe it possible to unite Palestine without Hamas’ participation, however detested they are by most of its members. The best Abbas could achieve would be to split a reconvened PLO, and as Hamas make up roughly 40% of the Palestinian popular vote, he would have to rely on an ever diminishing minority to stay in power.
· President Abbas’ plea for the release of convicted murderer and popular Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti, is his only hope. It was Abbas’ refusal to reform the Palestinian Authority, at Barghouti’s request, that split Fatah before the 2006 elections thus enabling a Hamas victory. Should Barghouti return and be allowed to unite Fatah they would win the forthcoming elections. Unfortunately for Abbas this requires Israel’s consent, which with an early Israeli election highly probable, is unlikely.
· Hamas cannot be ignored by President Abbbas and are likely to remain rulers of Gaza for the time being. Hamas can only be removed with the support of both Israel and Egypt and this is unlikely unless Hamas miscalculate and provoke an overwhelming response from Israel. Pressure is mounting within Israel for the release of Schalit and this can only be achieved with the release of some key Hamas convicted terrorists.
Again, given Israel’s approaching elections this has little chance of success. Nevertheless, if Schalit can be brought home at least some of the electorate might be pleased, despite the claims by many that it was bought at too high a price and from a position of weakness.
· Former Science, Culture and Sports Minister Ophir Paz-Pines' testimony to the Winograd Committee on the Second Lebanon War exposed the lack of planning and preparedness of the IDF and its High Command, and how much of the war was fought in an ad hoc manner.
Paz-Pines’ testimony is riddled with contradictions. He was for an immediate military response but blamed PM Olmert rather than the IDF for the total lack of preparation. He did not take responsibility for the consequences of his voting for immediate action but when the need to use ground forces in Lebanon arose, which was to lead to UNIFIL and Lebanese Forces guarding Israel’s border, he voted against. He later insisted he would camp outside the PM’s office until he resigned. He failed to do so.
Winograd is likely to find his reasoning, and that of almost all involved with Lebanon over the last 7 years, to be entirely faulty. The criticisms will probably be generous in their harshness and breadth. This is indicated by their statement that they will not warn those in advance of the criticisms, as well as the length of time it is taking to formulate them. At the moment the earliest date of publication is likely to be September 12th.
· Hamas refuse to restrain Islamic Jihad from firing Qassam missiles at Israel as a matter of principle. This will be the most likely cause of a major conflagration. Israel’s need to respond to the threat, for both strategic and political reasons, would probably lead to an escalation in military exchanges. Hamas, Syria, Hizbollah, and Iran have signed a mutual defence agreement that requires each to come to the others' aid when under attack. This would lead to a full-scale war between Israel and the Islamist-Syrian alliance. This is far less likely if Hamas reign in Islamic Jihad.
· A further complication is the 20-year-old rivalry between the jihadist groups and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Hamas are an affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood and rivals with Al Qaeda.
Islamic Jihad has stronger links and affiliations to the Brotherhood than Al Qaeda, but nevertheless maintain links with both.
The Palestinian Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon, and The Army of Islam in Gaza, which currently holds Alan Johnston, both have links with Al Qaeda.
Although Hamas rejected an alliance offered this week by Al Qaeda’s deputy leader, Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahri, there is a long tradition of rival Islamist groups making temporary alliances of interest. Al-Zawahri attempted in Sudan, in 1995, to reconcile Al Qaeda and the Brotherhood. If they unite against Israel it could also lead to a major conflagration. The aim of Al Qaeda is to ensure that it does.
The more radical elements within Hamas, such as its military wing, could also ally with Al Qaeda affiliates if they feel they have no choice, for example if they come under simultaneous pressure from Egypt, Israel, and Fatah, and are unable or unwilling, to compromise.
Just as likely is the deliberate undermining of Hamas by Al Qaeda and its affiliates through propagating a more extreme line that insists any accommodation, however temporary, with Israel’s existence is a betrayal. At the very least this will lead to further schisms that will make any peace agreement near impossible as they battle it out between themselves.
Only if Hamas confront, contain, and/or defeat this pot pourri of nihilist jihadists will any progress be made. But this will probably only happen after an extreme provocation against Hamas by one, or several, rival jihadist groups.
· President Bush’s refusal to engage with Syria will make war more likely. It will also lead to the need for Olmert to be replaced sooner rather than later. Olmert needs progress on at least one front. The most likely to succeed was Syria. The need to replace Olmert with a stronger government that is capable of engaging Syria, and of making bold decisions with or without the United States, has become paramount.
The decision to hold elections sooner has been made more likely by the decision of Labour’s senior figures Amir Peretz and Ami Ayalon not to join the present government. They are holding out for better positions within a new Labour-led government, so, in order to hold his own party together Ehud Barak will have to force an election. This, however, might play into Likud’s hands, as they are currently ahead in the polls.
· The possibility of war is also more likely with the move of the Al Qaeda affiliate, Fatah al-Islam, from its base in northern Lebanon to Israel’s border. Fatah al-Islam could not operate without the collusion of the Syrian intelligence services. This means Syria is prepared to take great risks to force the US to engage with her regime by inflaming the situation on the Lebanese-Israel border. But, if Israel feels impelled to respond to another strategic threat a miscalculation by any of the parties could end in a war on several of Israel’s fronts.
· Both Syria and Iran have come under increased pressure from the international community over the Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri assassination, as well as Iran’s nuclear weapons programme. The only method they know to get other parties to acquiesce is to threaten them and create instability. Their preferred method is to slowly increase the pressure so that their opponents behave more cautiously and they can buy time. For Syria this means buying time to assassinate more anti-Syrian politicians in Lebanon to make any vote for a Hariri Tribunal unworkable. And, for Iran it is to buy enough time to pass the nuclear threshold without having been attacked.
Recommended source on Al Qaeda: Burke, Jason; Al-Qaeda (2003-4; Penguin)
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
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Wednesday, 27 June 2007
Wednesday, 20 June 2007
Week 14 June – 19 June 2007
This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1. Hamas militias staged a coup in Gaza easily disposing of Palestinian Authority security forces. Some Fatah members loyal to President Abbas, and clan members loyal to Fatah, including women and children, were summarily executed. In eight days fighting 160 Palestinians were killed and 796 wounded. After a lengthy delay, and threats from his own party, President Abbas declared a state of emergency, disbanded the national unity government and Hamas in the West Bank, and swore in a 12 person Cabinet government of mainly independent technocrats lead by US educated interim-Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad.
2. Former Labour PM Ehud Barak was sworn in as Defence Minister, replacing Labour’s defeated leader Amir Peretz, following Barak’s victory in the Labour Leadership Primaries. His main priority is apparently the missile threat from Gaza from where 3 Qassam missiles were fired at nearby Sderot in Israel, a 66% reduction on the previous week. However, 2 Katyusha missiles did hit Qiryat Shmona in Northern Israel, fired from Lebanon. The UN Security Council condemned the attack as a serious violation of UN Resolution 1701 that ended the Second Lebanon War.
3. The US, EU, and Israel pledged financial support for the new P.A. government of PM Fayyad, a former World Bank and International Monetary Fund official and economist. PM Olmert pledged his support during his visit to the US where he met with President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice.
4. Labour National Infrastructure Minister, and former Defence Minister, Binyamin Ben Eliezer’s testimony to the Winograd Committee on the Second Lebanon War was released. He claimed the IDF High Command misled PM Olmert, and that the IDF was totally unprepared for the kidnapping or its aftermath. He thought both PM Olmert and recently replaced Defence Minister Peretz were wholly unfamiliar with Defence issues. He claimed he would have waited a week, during which the Army could prepare, warning the Lebanese of the consequences if they did not hand back the kidnapped soldiers, and only then would have launched a ground assault.
5. Egypt, after 15 years, withdrew its Embassy from Gaza and moved it to Ramallah on the West Bank. It rejected any attempt by Hamas to set up a separate government in Gaza. Hamas rejected the dissolution of the national unity government and do not recognise the legitimacy of the new emergency government in Ramallah. Two separate Palestinian governments now exist: a Hamas one in the Gaza Strip under elected Hamas Prime Minister Haniyeh, and an interim emergency government in Ramallah under the de facto control of elected President Abbas, who is also head of Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the only recognised representative organisation of the Palestinian people. Hamas are not officially represented in the PLO. The Arab League also condemned the violence in Gaza, and stated there could be only one Palestinian government.
6. Hamas warned the Dagmoush/Durmush clan and their Islamist allies that they must surrender BBC journalist Alan Johnston to their custody or face the consequences. The “Army of Islam” (an Al Qaeda affiliate allied to the criminal Dagmoush clan) had previously stated they would kill Johnston if their demands were not met (e.g. the release of Abu Qatada from Britain), or if any non-negotiated attempts to release him were made.
7. Hamas and Egypt rejected Israel’s suggestion of an international force to monitor the Egypt-Gaza border for weapons smuggling, or to enter Gaza to restore order, Hamas stated it would be seen as an “occupying” force.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· President Abbas’ behaviour during the coup highlighted two characteristics: an adamant refusal to initiate or support any form of civil war, and his complete impotence as a leader. His hesitancy and impotence were also reflected in the behaviour of most of his commanders who fled the fighting in Gaza and returned to the West Bank, leaving the rank and file to fend for themselves. The coup was a reaction to an attempt by Abbas to bring the Hamas militias under the control of one authority. Previous attempts at absorbing Hamas militias into the P.A. security forces were consistently resisted by Hamas who saw it, correctly, as a means of curbing their freedom of action. They wanted to follow the Hizb’allah model in Lebanon where the Army is seen as weak and divided and Hizb’allah as a disciplined and formidable force. However, Abbas could not deliver on any security promises he made to Israel precisely because he had no control of Hamas or any of the other Islamist, quasi-Marxist, or criminal groups and militias that are active throughout the Territories.
· The underlying reasons for paralysis in the peace process remain the same. President Abbas still has no control of any of the myriad militias and gangs on the West Bank. There is a small possibility that Fatah will seize the opportunity to restrain all the violent elements that currently govern the streets of the West Bank towns and villages and serious progress might be achieved but this seems unlikely. Corruption is endemic, indiscipline the norm, nepotism and clan affiliation predominate, and government remains ineffective. Despite the EU, Norway, and Japan substantially increasing donations to the P.A. since the elections in January 2006, no economic progress has been achieved because the financial transparency and structures and administrative expertise required remain absent. The lack of control and security has also led to an increase in IDF checkpoints to prevent attacks exacerbating the economic decline. The IDF and Shin Bet (Israeli internal security) have intercepted dozens of kidnap, murder, and suicide bomb attempts in the last few weeks.
· Labour Leader and Defence Minister Barak has two self-contradictory problems. The first is to gain electoral credibility whilst serving as Defence Minister whilst simultaneously a) undermining the present government and all his coalition partners, and, b) avoiding any of the potentially negative consequences reflecting badly upon himself. He can then win the subsequent general election and become Prime Minister. He is not presently a Member of Knesset.
The second is the need to contain Hamas’ weapons supply from Egypt without making the security and political situation worse.
It is possible he will fail at both. He is likely to be criticised by the Winograd final report this summer for his unilateral withdrawal policy from Lebanon and for initiating the attitude of benign neglect that characterised the Northern Front. Should he try to stop the arms flow to Gaza it is possible that the force required would produce an adverse international response, alienate Egypt, and allow Syria and Iran the opportunity to open another front in Lebanon, thus endangering the UNIFIL presence.
Should he try to undermine the government from within, a publicly stated goal, he would alienate future coalition partners, remind the Israeli electorate of how ineffective a politician he is, and possibly lose the general election. Barak’s only previous political successes were two election victories, one general (1999), and the most recent Labour Leadership Primary (2007). Both these elections were won by his promising a great deal by saying very little. He refused interviews and gave no details of any of his policies; he survived less than 2 years as PM. He is considered to be highly intelligent, but arrogant, with few personal, political, or strategic skills. He has a genius for undermining essential allies, miscalculating during crucial negotiations, and alienating everybody he works with. He says he has changed and has learnt from his mistakes. There is no evidence to support this assertion. His main assets are his military record and his total self-belief. He remains Israel’s most decorated soldier, and has become a self-made millionaire.
· The West’s attempt to bolster President Abbas is based on a dearth of alternatives. Abbas is weak and ineffective because he is unable to deliver on any promises he makes. As long as he remains unable to control any of the armed gangs in the West Bank no progress can be made. Only if Fatah and the PLO decide to change their policy of allowing free reign to the armed groups will there be any progress. This will require the formation of a single, disciplined, and effective security force, which, despite 14 years of attempts, has failed to materialise. The main reason for this is the fragmented and clan-based nature of Palestinian society. No clan or group is prepared to give up its own arms, and thus, independence, for the greater good. In other words there is no dominant institutional framework of a civil society to speak of. But, most importantly of all, is the refusal to suspend armed struggle, a central pillar of Palestinian political and national identity.
· Labour National Infrastructure Minister, and former Defence Minister, Binyamin Ben Eliezer’s testimony to the Winograd Committee highlighted the total lack of preparedness of the IDF and the deliberate misleading of PM Olmert by Ground Forces Command in that regard. But, as with last week’s testimony by Transport Minister Shaul Mofaz, Ben Eliezer’s alternative strategy would clearly have been disastrous. He claimed that the IDF were unprepared but that it would have taken a week’s training to change this, whereupon a full-scale ground attack could have been successfully pursued despite also having forewarned the Lebanese of its imminence. This strategy, if pursued, would have led to inordinate loss of life. Ben Eliezer’s claims that Olmert and Peretz’s lack of military experience was crucial were also totally self-serving, he being Ehud Barak’s main backer for the Labour Party Leadership and future Premiership.
· Egypt’s role in containing Hamas remains crucial. Israel needs Egypt to stop the flow of medium to long range missiles into Gaza. So far Egypt has been unwilling and, to some extent, unable, to do so. Egypt sees its control of the arms flows into the Gaza Strip, historically within Egypt’s area of influence, as one of the few means it has to exert pressure on both Hamas and Israel. By threatening to reduce the arms flow she can pressure Hamas, by inaction she can pressure Israel. The Egyptian regime also has to contend with the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood to whom Hamas is an affiliate and offshoot. Overexertion against Hamas would increase domestic political pressure on the Egyptian regime, whereas under exertion could result in a direct threat to it. The Egyptian regime has to constantly manage this balance whilst keeping pressure on Israel to make concessions over the West Bank and Jerusalem by maintaining the military and terrorist threat from Hamas. At the moment Egypt’s strategy is being undermined by the intervention of her long-time rivals Iran and Syria, to whom Hamas currently owe allegiance.
· Hamas are now faced with imposing their will on the population of the Gaza Strip. Amongst the many armed criminal, Islamist, clan, and secular groups Hamas will need to control are the Dagmoush clan with their Islamist Al Qaeda affiliated allies who kidnapped the BBC’s Alan Johnston. The Hamas regime’s success in exerting its authority will be measured by the extent to which it can control the Dagmoush. If they fail to do so anarchy will continue to dominate life in Gaza. Hamas want to return to a national unity government because without Fatah they cannot gain control of the PLO and all its political and financial resources. Nevertheless, if they have to manage without Fatah they will do so, carrying on under the protection of Iran and the threat of Hizb’allah involvement, to engage Israel militarily. This will keep the Palestinian issue top of the international and Arab street agenda, forcing the Arab regimes and the West to pressure Israel to make concessions and begin negotiations for withdrawal.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
__________________________________________________________________________________________________¨_______________________________¨_________________________________
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1. Hamas militias staged a coup in Gaza easily disposing of Palestinian Authority security forces. Some Fatah members loyal to President Abbas, and clan members loyal to Fatah, including women and children, were summarily executed. In eight days fighting 160 Palestinians were killed and 796 wounded. After a lengthy delay, and threats from his own party, President Abbas declared a state of emergency, disbanded the national unity government and Hamas in the West Bank, and swore in a 12 person Cabinet government of mainly independent technocrats lead by US educated interim-Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad.
2. Former Labour PM Ehud Barak was sworn in as Defence Minister, replacing Labour’s defeated leader Amir Peretz, following Barak’s victory in the Labour Leadership Primaries. His main priority is apparently the missile threat from Gaza from where 3 Qassam missiles were fired at nearby Sderot in Israel, a 66% reduction on the previous week. However, 2 Katyusha missiles did hit Qiryat Shmona in Northern Israel, fired from Lebanon. The UN Security Council condemned the attack as a serious violation of UN Resolution 1701 that ended the Second Lebanon War.
3. The US, EU, and Israel pledged financial support for the new P.A. government of PM Fayyad, a former World Bank and International Monetary Fund official and economist. PM Olmert pledged his support during his visit to the US where he met with President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice.
4. Labour National Infrastructure Minister, and former Defence Minister, Binyamin Ben Eliezer’s testimony to the Winograd Committee on the Second Lebanon War was released. He claimed the IDF High Command misled PM Olmert, and that the IDF was totally unprepared for the kidnapping or its aftermath. He thought both PM Olmert and recently replaced Defence Minister Peretz were wholly unfamiliar with Defence issues. He claimed he would have waited a week, during which the Army could prepare, warning the Lebanese of the consequences if they did not hand back the kidnapped soldiers, and only then would have launched a ground assault.
5. Egypt, after 15 years, withdrew its Embassy from Gaza and moved it to Ramallah on the West Bank. It rejected any attempt by Hamas to set up a separate government in Gaza. Hamas rejected the dissolution of the national unity government and do not recognise the legitimacy of the new emergency government in Ramallah. Two separate Palestinian governments now exist: a Hamas one in the Gaza Strip under elected Hamas Prime Minister Haniyeh, and an interim emergency government in Ramallah under the de facto control of elected President Abbas, who is also head of Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the only recognised representative organisation of the Palestinian people. Hamas are not officially represented in the PLO. The Arab League also condemned the violence in Gaza, and stated there could be only one Palestinian government.
6. Hamas warned the Dagmoush/Durmush clan and their Islamist allies that they must surrender BBC journalist Alan Johnston to their custody or face the consequences. The “Army of Islam” (an Al Qaeda affiliate allied to the criminal Dagmoush clan) had previously stated they would kill Johnston if their demands were not met (e.g. the release of Abu Qatada from Britain), or if any non-negotiated attempts to release him were made.
7. Hamas and Egypt rejected Israel’s suggestion of an international force to monitor the Egypt-Gaza border for weapons smuggling, or to enter Gaza to restore order, Hamas stated it would be seen as an “occupying” force.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· President Abbas’ behaviour during the coup highlighted two characteristics: an adamant refusal to initiate or support any form of civil war, and his complete impotence as a leader. His hesitancy and impotence were also reflected in the behaviour of most of his commanders who fled the fighting in Gaza and returned to the West Bank, leaving the rank and file to fend for themselves. The coup was a reaction to an attempt by Abbas to bring the Hamas militias under the control of one authority. Previous attempts at absorbing Hamas militias into the P.A. security forces were consistently resisted by Hamas who saw it, correctly, as a means of curbing their freedom of action. They wanted to follow the Hizb’allah model in Lebanon where the Army is seen as weak and divided and Hizb’allah as a disciplined and formidable force. However, Abbas could not deliver on any security promises he made to Israel precisely because he had no control of Hamas or any of the other Islamist, quasi-Marxist, or criminal groups and militias that are active throughout the Territories.
· The underlying reasons for paralysis in the peace process remain the same. President Abbas still has no control of any of the myriad militias and gangs on the West Bank. There is a small possibility that Fatah will seize the opportunity to restrain all the violent elements that currently govern the streets of the West Bank towns and villages and serious progress might be achieved but this seems unlikely. Corruption is endemic, indiscipline the norm, nepotism and clan affiliation predominate, and government remains ineffective. Despite the EU, Norway, and Japan substantially increasing donations to the P.A. since the elections in January 2006, no economic progress has been achieved because the financial transparency and structures and administrative expertise required remain absent. The lack of control and security has also led to an increase in IDF checkpoints to prevent attacks exacerbating the economic decline. The IDF and Shin Bet (Israeli internal security) have intercepted dozens of kidnap, murder, and suicide bomb attempts in the last few weeks.
· Labour Leader and Defence Minister Barak has two self-contradictory problems. The first is to gain electoral credibility whilst serving as Defence Minister whilst simultaneously a) undermining the present government and all his coalition partners, and, b) avoiding any of the potentially negative consequences reflecting badly upon himself. He can then win the subsequent general election and become Prime Minister. He is not presently a Member of Knesset.
The second is the need to contain Hamas’ weapons supply from Egypt without making the security and political situation worse.
It is possible he will fail at both. He is likely to be criticised by the Winograd final report this summer for his unilateral withdrawal policy from Lebanon and for initiating the attitude of benign neglect that characterised the Northern Front. Should he try to stop the arms flow to Gaza it is possible that the force required would produce an adverse international response, alienate Egypt, and allow Syria and Iran the opportunity to open another front in Lebanon, thus endangering the UNIFIL presence.
Should he try to undermine the government from within, a publicly stated goal, he would alienate future coalition partners, remind the Israeli electorate of how ineffective a politician he is, and possibly lose the general election. Barak’s only previous political successes were two election victories, one general (1999), and the most recent Labour Leadership Primary (2007). Both these elections were won by his promising a great deal by saying very little. He refused interviews and gave no details of any of his policies; he survived less than 2 years as PM. He is considered to be highly intelligent, but arrogant, with few personal, political, or strategic skills. He has a genius for undermining essential allies, miscalculating during crucial negotiations, and alienating everybody he works with. He says he has changed and has learnt from his mistakes. There is no evidence to support this assertion. His main assets are his military record and his total self-belief. He remains Israel’s most decorated soldier, and has become a self-made millionaire.
· The West’s attempt to bolster President Abbas is based on a dearth of alternatives. Abbas is weak and ineffective because he is unable to deliver on any promises he makes. As long as he remains unable to control any of the armed gangs in the West Bank no progress can be made. Only if Fatah and the PLO decide to change their policy of allowing free reign to the armed groups will there be any progress. This will require the formation of a single, disciplined, and effective security force, which, despite 14 years of attempts, has failed to materialise. The main reason for this is the fragmented and clan-based nature of Palestinian society. No clan or group is prepared to give up its own arms, and thus, independence, for the greater good. In other words there is no dominant institutional framework of a civil society to speak of. But, most importantly of all, is the refusal to suspend armed struggle, a central pillar of Palestinian political and national identity.
· Labour National Infrastructure Minister, and former Defence Minister, Binyamin Ben Eliezer’s testimony to the Winograd Committee highlighted the total lack of preparedness of the IDF and the deliberate misleading of PM Olmert by Ground Forces Command in that regard. But, as with last week’s testimony by Transport Minister Shaul Mofaz, Ben Eliezer’s alternative strategy would clearly have been disastrous. He claimed that the IDF were unprepared but that it would have taken a week’s training to change this, whereupon a full-scale ground attack could have been successfully pursued despite also having forewarned the Lebanese of its imminence. This strategy, if pursued, would have led to inordinate loss of life. Ben Eliezer’s claims that Olmert and Peretz’s lack of military experience was crucial were also totally self-serving, he being Ehud Barak’s main backer for the Labour Party Leadership and future Premiership.
· Egypt’s role in containing Hamas remains crucial. Israel needs Egypt to stop the flow of medium to long range missiles into Gaza. So far Egypt has been unwilling and, to some extent, unable, to do so. Egypt sees its control of the arms flows into the Gaza Strip, historically within Egypt’s area of influence, as one of the few means it has to exert pressure on both Hamas and Israel. By threatening to reduce the arms flow she can pressure Hamas, by inaction she can pressure Israel. The Egyptian regime also has to contend with the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood to whom Hamas is an affiliate and offshoot. Overexertion against Hamas would increase domestic political pressure on the Egyptian regime, whereas under exertion could result in a direct threat to it. The Egyptian regime has to constantly manage this balance whilst keeping pressure on Israel to make concessions over the West Bank and Jerusalem by maintaining the military and terrorist threat from Hamas. At the moment Egypt’s strategy is being undermined by the intervention of her long-time rivals Iran and Syria, to whom Hamas currently owe allegiance.
· Hamas are now faced with imposing their will on the population of the Gaza Strip. Amongst the many armed criminal, Islamist, clan, and secular groups Hamas will need to control are the Dagmoush clan with their Islamist Al Qaeda affiliated allies who kidnapped the BBC’s Alan Johnston. The Hamas regime’s success in exerting its authority will be measured by the extent to which it can control the Dagmoush. If they fail to do so anarchy will continue to dominate life in Gaza. Hamas want to return to a national unity government because without Fatah they cannot gain control of the PLO and all its political and financial resources. Nevertheless, if they have to manage without Fatah they will do so, carrying on under the protection of Iran and the threat of Hizb’allah involvement, to engage Israel militarily. This will keep the Palestinian issue top of the international and Arab street agenda, forcing the Arab regimes and the West to pressure Israel to make concessions and begin negotiations for withdrawal.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
__________________________________________________________________________________________________¨_______________________________¨_________________________________
Wednesday, 13 June 2007
Week 6 June – 13 June 2007
This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1. Prime Minister Olmert sent intermediaries to probe the seriousness of Syria’s offer of peace negotiations and reiterated his commitment to talks. Turkey, Greece, and Germany, amongst others, have been passing messages between the two governments. Both Syria and Israel have stated the other is not serious, but both have indicated they would talk without preconditions. The United States remained sceptical of Syrian motives and intent but said they would not stop Israel pursuing contacts with the regime.
2. The security situation in Gaza continued to deteriorate with an intensification of the low level civil war. 10 Qassams landed on, or around, the nearby Israeli town of Sderot, a 50% reduction on last week. PM Olmert called for an International Force to control the Gazan-Egyptian border. Sderot remained unprotected as the government confessed it could not meet the High Court’s deadline to protect even the schools. All factories and properties also remained unprotected due to continuing bureaucratic delays, and general neglect. Palestinian mortars were repeatedly fired at crossings into Gaza, and at IDF posts, and an attempt to kidnap another Israeli soldier was belatedly foiled. The Islamic Jihad and Fatah attempted-kidnappers used a white jeep disguised as a TV vehicle, and RPG missiles, to breach the border. One of the four-man kidnap group was killed, the others escaped back into Gaza.
3. The Labour Party Leadership Primary run-off between former PM Ehud Barak and Ami Ayalon ended in a narrow win for former PM Ehud Barak. Ayalon may dispute the result due to polling irregularities in certain Arab and Druse villages. He is determined all irregularities be investigated. Ayalon lost the Kibbutz, Moshav, Arab, and Druse vote but won Tel Aviv, Be’er Sheva, and Haifa.
4. The Winograd Committee published ex Defence and current Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz’s testimony in which he stated his advice was repeatedly ignored and his expertise as an ex-Chief of Staff was never called upon. He claimed he would have ordered a ground force incursion almost immediately.
5. Iran threatened to attack Israeli and US targets worldwide if her nuclear facilities are attacked. These remarks were made in the context of increasing pressure upon Iran by the International Atomic Energy Agency to abide by mandatory United Nations Security Council Resolutions. These call upon Iran to cease uranium enrichment until Iran is confirmed to not be in breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which she is a signatory. The US and Israel carried out joint manoeuvres in the Negev desert just after the completion of relatively large scale IDF manoeuvres on mock-up Syrian villages.
6. IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi made clear his disinterest in a large-scale incursion into Gaza in case Syria decides to go to war over the Golan Heights. He does not want his frontline forces overstretched. Nevertheless, the IDF was preparing for such an eventuality. In Gaza, the IDF continued to employ a flexible array of tactics against terrorist missile cells and sites, and their leading operatives. A number of suspected and fugitive Palestinian terrorists were also arrested in the West Bank.
7. IDF Intelligence, and UN Middle East representatives, confirmed Hizb’allah rearmament. IDF Military Intelligence stated Hizb’allah had now replenished all its stocks of missiles, some reports quoted 20,000, and could now hit Tel Aviv at will. Many of their new underground bunker systems have been constructed within yards of UNIFIL positions in South Lebanon. UN sources also confirmed Syria allowed armed militia to infiltrate into Lebanon to support the terrorists fighting Lebanese government forces near Tripoli.
8. Israel launched Ofek-7 a spy satellite which, when linked to the still orbiting Ofek-5, will give the IDF better images and greater operational, tactical, as well as strategic capability. Although only Israel, China, France, India, Japan, Russia and the United States are capable of independent satellite launches, Iran and Egypt will soon follow. Israel has also launched several independent communications satellites.
9. Vice Prime Minister Shimon Peres (Kadima Party) became Israel’s 9th President. He won 58 of the first round Knesset Member votes; three short of an outright win. The other two candidates Reuven Rivlin (Likud; 37 votes), and Colette Avital (Labour; 21 votes) withdrew their candidacy allowing Peres to be automatically voted President on a yes/no second round vote which he won by 86 votes to 23. There were 4 abstentions in the first round, and 11, in the second.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· PM Olmert has changed his stand on talking with Syria for several reasons:
1) Domestic political pressure. Members of his own party, as well as others within the coalition were becoming anxious that President Bush’s hostility to Syria was constraining Israel’s ability to manoeuvre both in relation to the Palestinian impasse and potential gains on the Syrian front.
2) Both Syrian and Israeli talk of war had reached dangerous levels. A mistake by commanders on either side on the Golan Heights front could have led to a conflagration. Syria has prepared her side of the border for a guerrilla and missile campaign through a vast increase in arms sales from Iran and Russia. Nevertheless, her posture remains defensive.
3) A genuine peace agreement with Syria would undermine both Iran and Hamas. They would have even fewer grounds to continue their armed struggle against Israel. Syria is the most tenacious and longstanding member of the rejectionist front of Arab and Muslim states committed to never recognising Israel. To reverse that position would increase the likelihood of general recognition, if not acceptance, of the Jewish State.
4) The continuing civil war within the Palestinian camp had closed many options for the government. President Abbas was unable to deliver on any promise made because he does not control the streets and refuses under almost any circumstances to use force against fellow Palestinians. Hamas have simply called his bluff and with the constant state of war even the semblance of progress in negotiations had disappeared. The Qassam attacks on Israel from Gaza were a symptom of this impasse and had increased domestic pressure on Olmert to act against them. It also exposed the total neglect of Sderot, the target of over 4,000 missiles in the last 6 years. Sderot still has no real protection for its civilian population from the missile strikes, despite a High Court order imposing a deadline for the government to supply sufficient bomb shelters for all schools within Qassam missile range.
5) Successful negotiations with Syria would seriously undermine the immediate calls for PM Olmert’s resignation. There would be pressure to reach a consensus within the coalition to take advantage of any serious possibility for peace with one of Israel’s most intractable enemies.
6) President Bush acquiesced to PM Olmert’s suggestion that it had become politically untenable for him to ignore the possibility of peace talks. The President also realised that to prevent such a move would undermine his relationship with the Gulf States, which he needs in order to resolve the Iraq conflict. They all believe that separating the Syrian Assad regime from Iran is vital for the stability of the region and would seriously undermine rival Iranian influence within the Arab world.
· The current situation in Gaza has several consequences:
a) Fewer Qassams are falling on Sderot, which is offering respite to both Sderot’s inhabitants and the government, which has been severely embarrassed by its neglect.
b) Chaos in Gaza reduces the chances of successful negotiations with the Palestinians.
c) It increases the chance of Egyptian interference. This may have positive or negative consequences depending upon the strategic view Egypt takes, for example if it motivates them to support or block an International Force on Gaza’s border with Egypt.
d) If Gaza becomes a Hamas run entity they can choose to impose discipline on the area or to allow Islamic Jihad to fire Qassams at will upon Israel. This will leave Israel with little option but to continue to target Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s leadership.
· Ehud Barak’s victory in theory puts greater pressure on Olmert to resign sooner rather than later as Barak has insisted he may pull Labour out of the coalition upon publication of the final Winograd report this summer. But Winograd is likely to be highly critical of Barak as well as Olmert and an early election may not appeal to the Labour Party’s National Executive. Polls may also show that Labour would not do well. The desire to oust Olmert would also open up splits within Kadima, which could benefit Likud far more than Labour, another reason to postpone, rather than hasten to, elections.
· Transportation Minister Mofaz’s testimony to the Winograd Committee has exposed the lack of consultation involved during the Second Lebanon War. But it also highlighted and exposed Mofaz’s role in its shortcomings. He stated he would have sent in ground forces at a much earlier stage, yet it was clear from all the evidence that, at least partly due to Mofaz’s own ineptitude as a former Chief of Staff, these same ground forces were ill-prepared for such a mission. They did not have the equipment, the training, the leadership, or the detailed planning required. The result of sending ground forces into Lebanon at a very early stage would have been a large loss of life for possibly very little gain. In other words Mofaz’s suggestions and advice, if implemented, would have created a genuine, rather than a perceived, failure of the Second Lebanon War, a failure which, in any case, has been grossly exaggerated. Mofaz too, is likely to be severely criticised in the Winograd final report this summer.
· Iran’s Interior Minister’s confession that the regime has sabotage networks all over the world and would force the price of oil up to $250 a barrel if attacked, is a clear indication of their concern over a summer offensive by the United States, possibly with Israel, they believe, attacking Syria or Hizb’allah. It is clear that Iran and Hizb’allah’s leadership do not want another confrontation in Lebanon but that they are ready to take advantage of one should it occur. Israel is in a similar position and would inflict severe damage on any party that initiates a new round of conflict. The IDF has been training constantly since the new Chief of Staff took his post. His focus has been on the Northern Front; he has little interest in any major operation in Gaza and believes that the current measures against the terrorist groups there are sufficient.
· The assassination of the anti-Syrian Lebanese legislator (13 June), the Hamas coup in Gaza (13 June), and the infiltration of armed pro-Syrian groups into Northern Lebanon to fight the Lebanese Army are all Iran and Syria’s response to recent United Nations Security Council decisions. UNSC are about to vote on increasing sanctions on Iran, and, on 12 June, they voted unanimously for an International Tribunal into Lebanese PM Hariri’s assassination. Iran and Syria expect to either get the UNSC to back down or to cause a split that will severely curtail any action that can be taken against their respective regimes. This will give Iran time to develop a nuclear weapon that will neutralise any future attempts by the United States to produce regime change. Further assassinations will force elections in Lebanon, which pro-Syrian parties are likely to win. The new legislature and government will then vote for confederation with Syria returning Lebanon to Syrian, and Iranian, hegemony.
· Iran, once nuclear, believes it would be able to extend its hegemony over the region. Syria, protected by Iran’s nuclear umbrella, believes it would be able to negotiate over the Golan Heights from a position of strength. Lebanon and Palestine would slowly become Islamist entities committed to missile strikes against Israel under Iranian nuclear protection. This, they believe, will force Israel to:
a) effectively surrender through appeasement and fear;
b) become paralysed through fear of a conflagration;
c) initiate a war that Israel, they believe, could not possibly win;
d) enter a war of attrition that would only increase pressure on Israel to make concessions and withdraw to the 1967 borders.
The main flaw in the Iranian-Syrian strategy is that it assumes Israel fears a conflagration if necessary, and, that she will lose such a conflagration, either in the short or long term. Iran and Syria have confused Israel’s withdrawals with weakness, rather than naked self-interest. This is a major strategic mistake on their part, and could lead to their making further strategic miscalculations. Nevertheless, any belief that the current position can be sustained by Israel is mistaken. Negotiations with Hamas and Syria, whether direct or indirect, are inevitable.
· Seven years after his betrayal by Shas, during his previous attempt to become President, and the disastrous Presidency of Likud’s alleged rapist Moshe Katsav, Shimon Peres achieved his long overdue status as President. He may, however, face some outstanding technical charges concerning donations he received for a previous political campaign that he may not have registered in the appropriate fashion.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
____________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1. Prime Minister Olmert sent intermediaries to probe the seriousness of Syria’s offer of peace negotiations and reiterated his commitment to talks. Turkey, Greece, and Germany, amongst others, have been passing messages between the two governments. Both Syria and Israel have stated the other is not serious, but both have indicated they would talk without preconditions. The United States remained sceptical of Syrian motives and intent but said they would not stop Israel pursuing contacts with the regime.
2. The security situation in Gaza continued to deteriorate with an intensification of the low level civil war. 10 Qassams landed on, or around, the nearby Israeli town of Sderot, a 50% reduction on last week. PM Olmert called for an International Force to control the Gazan-Egyptian border. Sderot remained unprotected as the government confessed it could not meet the High Court’s deadline to protect even the schools. All factories and properties also remained unprotected due to continuing bureaucratic delays, and general neglect. Palestinian mortars were repeatedly fired at crossings into Gaza, and at IDF posts, and an attempt to kidnap another Israeli soldier was belatedly foiled. The Islamic Jihad and Fatah attempted-kidnappers used a white jeep disguised as a TV vehicle, and RPG missiles, to breach the border. One of the four-man kidnap group was killed, the others escaped back into Gaza.
3. The Labour Party Leadership Primary run-off between former PM Ehud Barak and Ami Ayalon ended in a narrow win for former PM Ehud Barak. Ayalon may dispute the result due to polling irregularities in certain Arab and Druse villages. He is determined all irregularities be investigated. Ayalon lost the Kibbutz, Moshav, Arab, and Druse vote but won Tel Aviv, Be’er Sheva, and Haifa.
4. The Winograd Committee published ex Defence and current Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz’s testimony in which he stated his advice was repeatedly ignored and his expertise as an ex-Chief of Staff was never called upon. He claimed he would have ordered a ground force incursion almost immediately.
5. Iran threatened to attack Israeli and US targets worldwide if her nuclear facilities are attacked. These remarks were made in the context of increasing pressure upon Iran by the International Atomic Energy Agency to abide by mandatory United Nations Security Council Resolutions. These call upon Iran to cease uranium enrichment until Iran is confirmed to not be in breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which she is a signatory. The US and Israel carried out joint manoeuvres in the Negev desert just after the completion of relatively large scale IDF manoeuvres on mock-up Syrian villages.
6. IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi made clear his disinterest in a large-scale incursion into Gaza in case Syria decides to go to war over the Golan Heights. He does not want his frontline forces overstretched. Nevertheless, the IDF was preparing for such an eventuality. In Gaza, the IDF continued to employ a flexible array of tactics against terrorist missile cells and sites, and their leading operatives. A number of suspected and fugitive Palestinian terrorists were also arrested in the West Bank.
7. IDF Intelligence, and UN Middle East representatives, confirmed Hizb’allah rearmament. IDF Military Intelligence stated Hizb’allah had now replenished all its stocks of missiles, some reports quoted 20,000, and could now hit Tel Aviv at will. Many of their new underground bunker systems have been constructed within yards of UNIFIL positions in South Lebanon. UN sources also confirmed Syria allowed armed militia to infiltrate into Lebanon to support the terrorists fighting Lebanese government forces near Tripoli.
8. Israel launched Ofek-7 a spy satellite which, when linked to the still orbiting Ofek-5, will give the IDF better images and greater operational, tactical, as well as strategic capability. Although only Israel, China, France, India, Japan, Russia and the United States are capable of independent satellite launches, Iran and Egypt will soon follow. Israel has also launched several independent communications satellites.
9. Vice Prime Minister Shimon Peres (Kadima Party) became Israel’s 9th President. He won 58 of the first round Knesset Member votes; three short of an outright win. The other two candidates Reuven Rivlin (Likud; 37 votes), and Colette Avital (Labour; 21 votes) withdrew their candidacy allowing Peres to be automatically voted President on a yes/no second round vote which he won by 86 votes to 23. There were 4 abstentions in the first round, and 11, in the second.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· PM Olmert has changed his stand on talking with Syria for several reasons:
1) Domestic political pressure. Members of his own party, as well as others within the coalition were becoming anxious that President Bush’s hostility to Syria was constraining Israel’s ability to manoeuvre both in relation to the Palestinian impasse and potential gains on the Syrian front.
2) Both Syrian and Israeli talk of war had reached dangerous levels. A mistake by commanders on either side on the Golan Heights front could have led to a conflagration. Syria has prepared her side of the border for a guerrilla and missile campaign through a vast increase in arms sales from Iran and Russia. Nevertheless, her posture remains defensive.
3) A genuine peace agreement with Syria would undermine both Iran and Hamas. They would have even fewer grounds to continue their armed struggle against Israel. Syria is the most tenacious and longstanding member of the rejectionist front of Arab and Muslim states committed to never recognising Israel. To reverse that position would increase the likelihood of general recognition, if not acceptance, of the Jewish State.
4) The continuing civil war within the Palestinian camp had closed many options for the government. President Abbas was unable to deliver on any promise made because he does not control the streets and refuses under almost any circumstances to use force against fellow Palestinians. Hamas have simply called his bluff and with the constant state of war even the semblance of progress in negotiations had disappeared. The Qassam attacks on Israel from Gaza were a symptom of this impasse and had increased domestic pressure on Olmert to act against them. It also exposed the total neglect of Sderot, the target of over 4,000 missiles in the last 6 years. Sderot still has no real protection for its civilian population from the missile strikes, despite a High Court order imposing a deadline for the government to supply sufficient bomb shelters for all schools within Qassam missile range.
5) Successful negotiations with Syria would seriously undermine the immediate calls for PM Olmert’s resignation. There would be pressure to reach a consensus within the coalition to take advantage of any serious possibility for peace with one of Israel’s most intractable enemies.
6) President Bush acquiesced to PM Olmert’s suggestion that it had become politically untenable for him to ignore the possibility of peace talks. The President also realised that to prevent such a move would undermine his relationship with the Gulf States, which he needs in order to resolve the Iraq conflict. They all believe that separating the Syrian Assad regime from Iran is vital for the stability of the region and would seriously undermine rival Iranian influence within the Arab world.
· The current situation in Gaza has several consequences:
a) Fewer Qassams are falling on Sderot, which is offering respite to both Sderot’s inhabitants and the government, which has been severely embarrassed by its neglect.
b) Chaos in Gaza reduces the chances of successful negotiations with the Palestinians.
c) It increases the chance of Egyptian interference. This may have positive or negative consequences depending upon the strategic view Egypt takes, for example if it motivates them to support or block an International Force on Gaza’s border with Egypt.
d) If Gaza becomes a Hamas run entity they can choose to impose discipline on the area or to allow Islamic Jihad to fire Qassams at will upon Israel. This will leave Israel with little option but to continue to target Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s leadership.
· Ehud Barak’s victory in theory puts greater pressure on Olmert to resign sooner rather than later as Barak has insisted he may pull Labour out of the coalition upon publication of the final Winograd report this summer. But Winograd is likely to be highly critical of Barak as well as Olmert and an early election may not appeal to the Labour Party’s National Executive. Polls may also show that Labour would not do well. The desire to oust Olmert would also open up splits within Kadima, which could benefit Likud far more than Labour, another reason to postpone, rather than hasten to, elections.
· Transportation Minister Mofaz’s testimony to the Winograd Committee has exposed the lack of consultation involved during the Second Lebanon War. But it also highlighted and exposed Mofaz’s role in its shortcomings. He stated he would have sent in ground forces at a much earlier stage, yet it was clear from all the evidence that, at least partly due to Mofaz’s own ineptitude as a former Chief of Staff, these same ground forces were ill-prepared for such a mission. They did not have the equipment, the training, the leadership, or the detailed planning required. The result of sending ground forces into Lebanon at a very early stage would have been a large loss of life for possibly very little gain. In other words Mofaz’s suggestions and advice, if implemented, would have created a genuine, rather than a perceived, failure of the Second Lebanon War, a failure which, in any case, has been grossly exaggerated. Mofaz too, is likely to be severely criticised in the Winograd final report this summer.
· Iran’s Interior Minister’s confession that the regime has sabotage networks all over the world and would force the price of oil up to $250 a barrel if attacked, is a clear indication of their concern over a summer offensive by the United States, possibly with Israel, they believe, attacking Syria or Hizb’allah. It is clear that Iran and Hizb’allah’s leadership do not want another confrontation in Lebanon but that they are ready to take advantage of one should it occur. Israel is in a similar position and would inflict severe damage on any party that initiates a new round of conflict. The IDF has been training constantly since the new Chief of Staff took his post. His focus has been on the Northern Front; he has little interest in any major operation in Gaza and believes that the current measures against the terrorist groups there are sufficient.
· The assassination of the anti-Syrian Lebanese legislator (13 June), the Hamas coup in Gaza (13 June), and the infiltration of armed pro-Syrian groups into Northern Lebanon to fight the Lebanese Army are all Iran and Syria’s response to recent United Nations Security Council decisions. UNSC are about to vote on increasing sanctions on Iran, and, on 12 June, they voted unanimously for an International Tribunal into Lebanese PM Hariri’s assassination. Iran and Syria expect to either get the UNSC to back down or to cause a split that will severely curtail any action that can be taken against their respective regimes. This will give Iran time to develop a nuclear weapon that will neutralise any future attempts by the United States to produce regime change. Further assassinations will force elections in Lebanon, which pro-Syrian parties are likely to win. The new legislature and government will then vote for confederation with Syria returning Lebanon to Syrian, and Iranian, hegemony.
· Iran, once nuclear, believes it would be able to extend its hegemony over the region. Syria, protected by Iran’s nuclear umbrella, believes it would be able to negotiate over the Golan Heights from a position of strength. Lebanon and Palestine would slowly become Islamist entities committed to missile strikes against Israel under Iranian nuclear protection. This, they believe, will force Israel to:
a) effectively surrender through appeasement and fear;
b) become paralysed through fear of a conflagration;
c) initiate a war that Israel, they believe, could not possibly win;
d) enter a war of attrition that would only increase pressure on Israel to make concessions and withdraw to the 1967 borders.
The main flaw in the Iranian-Syrian strategy is that it assumes Israel fears a conflagration if necessary, and, that she will lose such a conflagration, either in the short or long term. Iran and Syria have confused Israel’s withdrawals with weakness, rather than naked self-interest. This is a major strategic mistake on their part, and could lead to their making further strategic miscalculations. Nevertheless, any belief that the current position can be sustained by Israel is mistaken. Negotiations with Hamas and Syria, whether direct or indirect, are inevitable.
· Seven years after his betrayal by Shas, during his previous attempt to become President, and the disastrous Presidency of Likud’s alleged rapist Moshe Katsav, Shimon Peres achieved his long overdue status as President. He may, however, face some outstanding technical charges concerning donations he received for a previous political campaign that he may not have registered in the appropriate fashion.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
____________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
Wednesday, 6 June 2007
Week 30 May – 5 June 2007
This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on: http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1. 18 Qassam missiles and 5 mortar rounds were fired at Sderot and the Erez border crossing by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, an almost 50% reduction on the previous week. This is due in part to new more vigorous IDF operations in Gaza and the West Bank. Sderot was given special status to allow businesses to claim speedy compensation for losses suffered as a result of 268 missile attacks in the last 16 days. Some new portable anti-missile pod shelters were delivered to streets, factories, and schools this week. 50% of Sderot’s population have left their homes, accusing the government of neglect and an inability to protect their families.
2. PM Olmert signalled a change of policy towards Syria by announcing the need to make a concerted effort to find out the regime’s true intentions. This follows a change of policy by the Bush Administration. The change has arisen in the context of increasing fears that Syria will misread Israel’s more vigorous defence exercises as actual preparations for war, as well as the latest United Nations Security Council unanimous vote to set up an international tribunal into the murder of Lebanese PM Hariri. The evidence so far indicates pro-Syrian Lebanese, and, Syrian, security personnel, carried out the attack.
3. Labour Party leadership contender, Ami Ayalon, joined forces with the previously defeated candidate Labour Defence Minister Peretz, in an effort to win the Labour Party leadership race against former PM Ehud Barak. Ayalon has made a complete U-Turn and now says he is prepared to stay in an Olmert-led government.
4. Reports emerged that the National Security Council supported Foreign Minister Livni’s view, that the war in Lebanon should be short and a diplomatic resolution paramount, as most “realistic” objectives had been achieved. The government did not discuss this advice nor was it passed to the Security Cabinet during the war.
5. Egypt’s representative in Gaza rejected Foreign Minister Livni’s idea of an International Force to maintain order and security there. He argued security should be upheld by Egypt and Israel with the Palestinians within the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.
6. The Israeli government rejected Hamas’ suggestion of a yearlong ceasefire in both the West Bank and Gaza. Israel argued that dozens of planned attacks on Israeli civilians are thwarted each week in the West Bank, and a ceasefire outside the context of genuine peace efforts would simply put its citizens’ lives in greater danger.
7. Military Intelligence advised Syria was preparing for a possible conflict this summer, and pointed out its missiles were capable of hitting Tel Aviv without needing to be moved to any forward positions. However, they stated there were no indications of any immediate danger. Hamas, similarly, now have missiles that can strike 20 kilometres into Israel but have yet to use them. Military Intelligence expects missiles with a 40-kilometre range to be acquired by the organisation soon, allowing them to strike Tel Aviv.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· The consequences of Sderot’s neglect are now being paid for. Businesses are being compensated, populations temporarily re-housed, mental health staff bussed in, and new security measures introduced. Hamas have been forced onto the defensive but not before achieving their goal of re-focussing Palestinian attention onto Israel rather than the near civil war they provoked.
· It is clear that the new Chief of Staff has returned to a more imaginative and diverse panoply of security measures, from arresting senior politicians, to assassinating individual terrorists in sometimes unusual circumstances, to operations deep inside hostile territory. This tactical flexibility lies in contrast to current strategic constraints. The IDF does not want to provoke a confrontation, as it does not want to fight simultaneously on several fronts. Nor does it want to offer either Iran or Syria excuses to divert attention from the real issues currently engaging the international community: Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, and Syria’s involvement in the assassination of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
· The hostile stalemate and paralysis within the Palestinian community and the danger of a confrontation with Syria have focussed Prime Minister Olmert’s attention onto Syrian peace overtures. A peace agreement with Syria may undercut both Iran together with its client Hizb’allah, as well as Syria’s Palestinian client Hamas.
· Syria’s main priorities are to get the United States to drop both economic sanctions, and the tribunal into Hariri’s murder. Olmert would not have attempted the Syrian option without at first clearing it with the United States. President Bush had wanted to maintain a consistent policy of isolation towards Syria for supporting terrorism in Iraq, Hizb’alah in Lebanon, for its alliance with Iran, and for the Hariri murder. But the need for Sunni Arab states’ support in Iraq has led to a more flexible response towards Syria. The President also wants to encourage the Saudi-initiated Arab League agreement to recognise Israel should a peace deal be struck.
· It is difficult to foresee anything arising from any of these developments as things stand, unless Syria gets the tribunal and sanctions dropped, Iran is allowed to develop a nuclear weapon and gets sanctions removed, Hamas is allowed to ignore Israel’s existence and develop a strategic missile capability, and Israel accepts the right of return of several million descendants of Palestinian refugees from the 1947-8 civil war in Palestine.
· Ami Ayalon had to make a complete U-Turn and allow Labour to stay in an Olmert-led government if he wanted to get current Defence Minister Peretz’s support. This, in the short term, works to everyone’s advantage. Olmert can stay as Prime Minister, Labour can stay in the government, and Kadima do not have to face a split between PM Olmert and Foreign Minister Livni. However, once the Winograd Committee report is published later this summer all the previous tensions and pressures will resurface.
· The report that the National Security Council supported Livni’s position at a certain point during the war will become significant if:
1) It is shown PM Olmert deliberately ignored their advice or failed to pass on their advice to the Cabinet.
2) If factions within the government use it against him and can prove he deliberately misled them by failing to make the advice known.
· It is important to understand that this advice was not sound. If it had been followed:
1) The 10-15,000 UNIFIL force would not have been introduced into Southern Lebanon.
2) The Lebanese Army would not have moved to Israel’s border for the first time in nearly 40 years.
3) Hizb’allah would not have been forced to act covertly South of the Litani River, nor would they have been forced away from Israel’s border and from Israeli territory adjacent to the border.
4) It is highly unlikely that Israel would have been able to achieve:
a) That UN Resolution 1701 (2006) reiterate the legal and moral obligation upon Hizb’allah to disarm (UN Resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) and the Taif Accords (1989));
b) Nor that it call for the release of the two kidnapped Israelis (preamble of the Resolution only);
c) Nor that a zone free of militia weapons from the Israeli border to the Litani River (in principle not practise) be created;
d) Nor that the responsibility for the conflict be placed on the shoulders of Hizb’allah;
e) Nor that Israel be allowed to stay in Lebanon until the new UNIFIL force had arrived in strength;
f) Nor that any onerous measures or responsibility be placed upon Israel.
· Egypt’s rejection of an international force in Gaza is a serious setback. It indicates Egypt sees no strategic or tactical advantage in resolving the chaos in Gaza at the moment.
· The missile encirclement of Israel is almost complete. Hamas’ demand for a ceasefire in the West Bank will ensure its success. Israel has two options:
1. The negotiated option, which would need to involve a large International Force both in Gaza and the West Bank, similar to, but larger than, UNIFIL forces in Lebanon. This may need to involve Israel being affiliated to NATO in some way, a withdrawal from most (90%) of the West Bank, and a time frame of 3-5 years.
2. The military option in which very severe blows are dealt to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, similar to the blow dealt to Hizb’allah, which bring about a desire on their part for some kind of foreign intervention. At the moment there is absolutely no incentive for Hamas or Islamic Jihad to make any kind of peace. The Iran-Syria-Hizb’allah-Hamas alliance remains strong. Europe’s investments in Iran’s energy resources alone are over $100 billion, and EU grants to the Palestinian Authority are at record levels (according to EU Foreign and Security Policy Representative Javier Solana), despite the technical refusal to give financial aid directly to Hamas.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
____________________________________________________________________¨_______________________________¨_________________________________¨_____________________________________________________________________
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1. 18 Qassam missiles and 5 mortar rounds were fired at Sderot and the Erez border crossing by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, an almost 50% reduction on the previous week. This is due in part to new more vigorous IDF operations in Gaza and the West Bank. Sderot was given special status to allow businesses to claim speedy compensation for losses suffered as a result of 268 missile attacks in the last 16 days. Some new portable anti-missile pod shelters were delivered to streets, factories, and schools this week. 50% of Sderot’s population have left their homes, accusing the government of neglect and an inability to protect their families.
2. PM Olmert signalled a change of policy towards Syria by announcing the need to make a concerted effort to find out the regime’s true intentions. This follows a change of policy by the Bush Administration. The change has arisen in the context of increasing fears that Syria will misread Israel’s more vigorous defence exercises as actual preparations for war, as well as the latest United Nations Security Council unanimous vote to set up an international tribunal into the murder of Lebanese PM Hariri. The evidence so far indicates pro-Syrian Lebanese, and, Syrian, security personnel, carried out the attack.
3. Labour Party leadership contender, Ami Ayalon, joined forces with the previously defeated candidate Labour Defence Minister Peretz, in an effort to win the Labour Party leadership race against former PM Ehud Barak. Ayalon has made a complete U-Turn and now says he is prepared to stay in an Olmert-led government.
4. Reports emerged that the National Security Council supported Foreign Minister Livni’s view, that the war in Lebanon should be short and a diplomatic resolution paramount, as most “realistic” objectives had been achieved. The government did not discuss this advice nor was it passed to the Security Cabinet during the war.
5. Egypt’s representative in Gaza rejected Foreign Minister Livni’s idea of an International Force to maintain order and security there. He argued security should be upheld by Egypt and Israel with the Palestinians within the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.
6. The Israeli government rejected Hamas’ suggestion of a yearlong ceasefire in both the West Bank and Gaza. Israel argued that dozens of planned attacks on Israeli civilians are thwarted each week in the West Bank, and a ceasefire outside the context of genuine peace efforts would simply put its citizens’ lives in greater danger.
7. Military Intelligence advised Syria was preparing for a possible conflict this summer, and pointed out its missiles were capable of hitting Tel Aviv without needing to be moved to any forward positions. However, they stated there were no indications of any immediate danger. Hamas, similarly, now have missiles that can strike 20 kilometres into Israel but have yet to use them. Military Intelligence expects missiles with a 40-kilometre range to be acquired by the organisation soon, allowing them to strike Tel Aviv.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· The consequences of Sderot’s neglect are now being paid for. Businesses are being compensated, populations temporarily re-housed, mental health staff bussed in, and new security measures introduced. Hamas have been forced onto the defensive but not before achieving their goal of re-focussing Palestinian attention onto Israel rather than the near civil war they provoked.
· It is clear that the new Chief of Staff has returned to a more imaginative and diverse panoply of security measures, from arresting senior politicians, to assassinating individual terrorists in sometimes unusual circumstances, to operations deep inside hostile territory. This tactical flexibility lies in contrast to current strategic constraints. The IDF does not want to provoke a confrontation, as it does not want to fight simultaneously on several fronts. Nor does it want to offer either Iran or Syria excuses to divert attention from the real issues currently engaging the international community: Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, and Syria’s involvement in the assassination of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
· The hostile stalemate and paralysis within the Palestinian community and the danger of a confrontation with Syria have focussed Prime Minister Olmert’s attention onto Syrian peace overtures. A peace agreement with Syria may undercut both Iran together with its client Hizb’allah, as well as Syria’s Palestinian client Hamas.
· Syria’s main priorities are to get the United States to drop both economic sanctions, and the tribunal into Hariri’s murder. Olmert would not have attempted the Syrian option without at first clearing it with the United States. President Bush had wanted to maintain a consistent policy of isolation towards Syria for supporting terrorism in Iraq, Hizb’alah in Lebanon, for its alliance with Iran, and for the Hariri murder. But the need for Sunni Arab states’ support in Iraq has led to a more flexible response towards Syria. The President also wants to encourage the Saudi-initiated Arab League agreement to recognise Israel should a peace deal be struck.
· It is difficult to foresee anything arising from any of these developments as things stand, unless Syria gets the tribunal and sanctions dropped, Iran is allowed to develop a nuclear weapon and gets sanctions removed, Hamas is allowed to ignore Israel’s existence and develop a strategic missile capability, and Israel accepts the right of return of several million descendants of Palestinian refugees from the 1947-8 civil war in Palestine.
· Ami Ayalon had to make a complete U-Turn and allow Labour to stay in an Olmert-led government if he wanted to get current Defence Minister Peretz’s support. This, in the short term, works to everyone’s advantage. Olmert can stay as Prime Minister, Labour can stay in the government, and Kadima do not have to face a split between PM Olmert and Foreign Minister Livni. However, once the Winograd Committee report is published later this summer all the previous tensions and pressures will resurface.
· The report that the National Security Council supported Livni’s position at a certain point during the war will become significant if:
1) It is shown PM Olmert deliberately ignored their advice or failed to pass on their advice to the Cabinet.
2) If factions within the government use it against him and can prove he deliberately misled them by failing to make the advice known.
· It is important to understand that this advice was not sound. If it had been followed:
1) The 10-15,000 UNIFIL force would not have been introduced into Southern Lebanon.
2) The Lebanese Army would not have moved to Israel’s border for the first time in nearly 40 years.
3) Hizb’allah would not have been forced to act covertly South of the Litani River, nor would they have been forced away from Israel’s border and from Israeli territory adjacent to the border.
4) It is highly unlikely that Israel would have been able to achieve:
a) That UN Resolution 1701 (2006) reiterate the legal and moral obligation upon Hizb’allah to disarm (UN Resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) and the Taif Accords (1989));
b) Nor that it call for the release of the two kidnapped Israelis (preamble of the Resolution only);
c) Nor that a zone free of militia weapons from the Israeli border to the Litani River (in principle not practise) be created;
d) Nor that the responsibility for the conflict be placed on the shoulders of Hizb’allah;
e) Nor that Israel be allowed to stay in Lebanon until the new UNIFIL force had arrived in strength;
f) Nor that any onerous measures or responsibility be placed upon Israel.
· Egypt’s rejection of an international force in Gaza is a serious setback. It indicates Egypt sees no strategic or tactical advantage in resolving the chaos in Gaza at the moment.
· The missile encirclement of Israel is almost complete. Hamas’ demand for a ceasefire in the West Bank will ensure its success. Israel has two options:
1. The negotiated option, which would need to involve a large International Force both in Gaza and the West Bank, similar to, but larger than, UNIFIL forces in Lebanon. This may need to involve Israel being affiliated to NATO in some way, a withdrawal from most (90%) of the West Bank, and a time frame of 3-5 years.
2. The military option in which very severe blows are dealt to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, similar to the blow dealt to Hizb’allah, which bring about a desire on their part for some kind of foreign intervention. At the moment there is absolutely no incentive for Hamas or Islamic Jihad to make any kind of peace. The Iran-Syria-Hizb’allah-Hamas alliance remains strong. Europe’s investments in Iran’s energy resources alone are over $100 billion, and EU grants to the Palestinian Authority are at record levels (according to EU Foreign and Security Policy Representative Javier Solana), despite the technical refusal to give financial aid directly to Hamas.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
____________________________________________________________________¨_______________________________¨_________________________________¨_____________________________________________________________________
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