Week 14 June – 19 June 2007

This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/

· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS

· Main Points:

1. Hamas militias staged a coup in Gaza easily disposing of Palestinian Authority security forces. Some Fatah members loyal to President Abbas, and clan members loyal to Fatah, including women and children, were summarily executed. In eight days fighting 160 Palestinians were killed and 796 wounded. After a lengthy delay, and threats from his own party, President Abbas declared a state of emergency, disbanded the national unity government and Hamas in the West Bank, and swore in a 12 person Cabinet government of mainly independent technocrats lead by US educated interim-Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad.

2. Former Labour PM Ehud Barak was sworn in as Defence Minister, replacing Labour’s defeated leader Amir Peretz, following Barak’s victory in the Labour Leadership Primaries. His main priority is apparently the missile threat from Gaza from where 3 Qassam missiles were fired at nearby Sderot in Israel, a 66% reduction on the previous week. However, 2 Katyusha missiles did hit Qiryat Shmona in Northern Israel, fired from Lebanon. The UN Security Council condemned the attack as a serious violation of UN Resolution 1701 that ended the Second Lebanon War.

3. The US, EU, and Israel pledged financial support for the new P.A. government of PM Fayyad, a former World Bank and International Monetary Fund official and economist. PM Olmert pledged his support during his visit to the US where he met with President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice.

4. Labour National Infrastructure Minister, and former Defence Minister, Binyamin Ben Eliezer’s testimony to the Winograd Committee on the Second Lebanon War was released. He claimed the IDF High Command misled PM Olmert, and that the IDF was totally unprepared for the kidnapping or its aftermath. He thought both PM Olmert and recently replaced Defence Minister Peretz were wholly unfamiliar with Defence issues. He claimed he would have waited a week, during which the Army could prepare, warning the Lebanese of the consequences if they did not hand back the kidnapped soldiers, and only then would have launched a ground assault.

5. Egypt, after 15 years, withdrew its Embassy from Gaza and moved it to Ramallah on the West Bank. It rejected any attempt by Hamas to set up a separate government in Gaza. Hamas rejected the dissolution of the national unity government and do not recognise the legitimacy of the new emergency government in Ramallah. Two separate Palestinian governments now exist: a Hamas one in the Gaza Strip under elected Hamas Prime Minister Haniyeh, and an interim emergency government in Ramallah under the de facto control of elected President Abbas, who is also head of Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the only recognised representative organisation of the Palestinian people. Hamas are not officially represented in the PLO. The Arab League also condemned the violence in Gaza, and stated there could be only one Palestinian government.

6. Hamas warned the Dagmoush/Durmush clan and their Islamist allies that they must surrender BBC journalist Alan Johnston to their custody or face the consequences. The “Army of Islam” (an Al Qaeda affiliate allied to the criminal Dagmoush clan) had previously stated they would kill Johnston if their demands were not met (e.g. the release of Abu Qatada from Britain), or if any non-negotiated attempts to release him were made.

7. Hamas and Egypt rejected Israel’s suggestion of an international force to monitor the Egypt-Gaza border for weapons smuggling, or to enter Gaza to restore order, Hamas stated it would be seen as an “occupying” force.

· ANALYSIS - General Picture:

· President Abbas’ behaviour during the coup highlighted two characteristics: an adamant refusal to initiate or support any form of civil war, and his complete impotence as a leader. His hesitancy and impotence were also reflected in the behaviour of most of his commanders who fled the fighting in Gaza and returned to the West Bank, leaving the rank and file to fend for themselves. The coup was a reaction to an attempt by Abbas to bring the Hamas militias under the control of one authority. Previous attempts at absorbing Hamas militias into the P.A. security forces were consistently resisted by Hamas who saw it, correctly, as a means of curbing their freedom of action. They wanted to follow the Hizb’allah model in Lebanon where the Army is seen as weak and divided and Hizb’allah as a disciplined and formidable force. However, Abbas could not deliver on any security promises he made to Israel precisely because he had no control of Hamas or any of the other Islamist, quasi-Marxist, or criminal groups and militias that are active throughout the Territories.

· The underlying reasons for paralysis in the peace process remain the same. President Abbas still has no control of any of the myriad militias and gangs on the West Bank. There is a small possibility that Fatah will seize the opportunity to restrain all the violent elements that currently govern the streets of the West Bank towns and villages and serious progress might be achieved but this seems unlikely. Corruption is endemic, indiscipline the norm, nepotism and clan affiliation predominate, and government remains ineffective. Despite the EU, Norway, and Japan substantially increasing donations to the P.A. since the elections in January 2006, no economic progress has been achieved because the financial transparency and structures and administrative expertise required remain absent. The lack of control and security has also led to an increase in IDF checkpoints to prevent attacks exacerbating the economic decline. The IDF and Shin Bet (Israeli internal security) have intercepted dozens of kidnap, murder, and suicide bomb attempts in the last few weeks.

· Labour Leader and Defence Minister Barak has two self-contradictory problems. The first is to gain electoral credibility whilst serving as Defence Minister whilst simultaneously a) undermining the present government and all his coalition partners, and, b) avoiding any of the potentially negative consequences reflecting badly upon himself. He can then win the subsequent general election and become Prime Minister. He is not presently a Member of Knesset.
The second is the need to contain Hamas’ weapons supply from Egypt without making the security and political situation worse.
It is possible he will fail at both. He is likely to be criticised by the Winograd final report this summer for his unilateral withdrawal policy from Lebanon and for initiating the attitude of benign neglect that characterised the Northern Front. Should he try to stop the arms flow to Gaza it is possible that the force required would produce an adverse international response, alienate Egypt, and allow Syria and Iran the opportunity to open another front in Lebanon, thus endangering the UNIFIL presence.
Should he try to undermine the government from within, a publicly stated goal, he would alienate future coalition partners, remind the Israeli electorate of how ineffective a politician he is, and possibly lose the general election. Barak’s only previous political successes were two election victories, one general (1999), and the most recent Labour Leadership Primary (2007). Both these elections were won by his promising a great deal by saying very little. He refused interviews and gave no details of any of his policies; he survived less than 2 years as PM. He is considered to be highly intelligent, but arrogant, with few personal, political, or strategic skills. He has a genius for undermining essential allies, miscalculating during crucial negotiations, and alienating everybody he works with. He says he has changed and has learnt from his mistakes. There is no evidence to support this assertion. His main assets are his military record and his total self-belief. He remains Israel’s most decorated soldier, and has become a self-made millionaire.

· The West’s attempt to bolster President Abbas is based on a dearth of alternatives. Abbas is weak and ineffective because he is unable to deliver on any promises he makes. As long as he remains unable to control any of the armed gangs in the West Bank no progress can be made. Only if Fatah and the PLO decide to change their policy of allowing free reign to the armed groups will there be any progress. This will require the formation of a single, disciplined, and effective security force, which, despite 14 years of attempts, has failed to materialise. The main reason for this is the fragmented and clan-based nature of Palestinian society. No clan or group is prepared to give up its own arms, and thus, independence, for the greater good. In other words there is no dominant institutional framework of a civil society to speak of. But, most importantly of all, is the refusal to suspend armed struggle, a central pillar of Palestinian political and national identity.

· Labour National Infrastructure Minister, and former Defence Minister, Binyamin Ben Eliezer’s testimony to the Winograd Committee highlighted the total lack of preparedness of the IDF and the deliberate misleading of PM Olmert by Ground Forces Command in that regard. But, as with last week’s testimony by Transport Minister Shaul Mofaz, Ben Eliezer’s alternative strategy would clearly have been disastrous. He claimed that the IDF were unprepared but that it would have taken a week’s training to change this, whereupon a full-scale ground attack could have been successfully pursued despite also having forewarned the Lebanese of its imminence. This strategy, if pursued, would have led to inordinate loss of life. Ben Eliezer’s claims that Olmert and Peretz’s lack of military experience was crucial were also totally self-serving, he being Ehud Barak’s main backer for the Labour Party Leadership and future Premiership.

· Egypt’s role in containing Hamas remains crucial. Israel needs Egypt to stop the flow of medium to long range missiles into Gaza. So far Egypt has been unwilling and, to some extent, unable, to do so. Egypt sees its control of the arms flows into the Gaza Strip, historically within Egypt’s area of influence, as one of the few means it has to exert pressure on both Hamas and Israel. By threatening to reduce the arms flow she can pressure Hamas, by inaction she can pressure Israel. The Egyptian regime also has to contend with the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood to whom Hamas is an affiliate and offshoot. Overexertion against Hamas would increase domestic political pressure on the Egyptian regime, whereas under exertion could result in a direct threat to it. The Egyptian regime has to constantly manage this balance whilst keeping pressure on Israel to make concessions over the West Bank and Jerusalem by maintaining the military and terrorist threat from Hamas. At the moment Egypt’s strategy is being undermined by the intervention of her long-time rivals Iran and Syria, to whom Hamas currently owe allegiance.

· Hamas are now faced with imposing their will on the population of the Gaza Strip. Amongst the many armed criminal, Islamist, clan, and secular groups Hamas will need to control are the Dagmoush clan with their Islamist Al Qaeda affiliated allies who kidnapped the BBC’s Alan Johnston. The Hamas regime’s success in exerting its authority will be measured by the extent to which it can control the Dagmoush. If they fail to do so anarchy will continue to dominate life in Gaza. Hamas want to return to a national unity government because without Fatah they cannot gain control of the PLO and all its political and financial resources. Nevertheless, if they have to manage without Fatah they will do so, carrying on under the protection of Iran and the threat of Hizb’allah involvement, to engage Israel militarily. This will keep the Palestinian issue top of the international and Arab street agenda, forcing the Arab regimes and the West to pressure Israel to make concessions and begin negotiations for withdrawal.


Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/

For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/

For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html

For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/

For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -

News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/

A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/

The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/

Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/

A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/


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