This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Events and Points:
1· President Mubarak of Egypt hosted Prime Minister Olmert, President Abbas, and King Abdullah of Jordan at Sharm el-Sheikh. It was agreed Egypt would return its security personnel to Gaza to continue negotiations with Hamas particularly over the release of Gilad Schalit the kidnapped Israeli soldier; it would also redouble its efforts to block the flow of arms into Gaza. PM Olmert agreed to enact a staged payment of withheld Palestinian tax revenues collected by Israel, and to release 250 prisoners after they agree to sign a non-violence agreement. President Abbas requested he be allowed to bring Fatah’s Badr Brigade into the West Bank in order to shore up his emergency government and establish discipline amongst the various Fatah-related, and other, gangs; he also requested the release of popular Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti, who is currently serving five sentences for murder, in an Israeli jail.
2· Hamas responded to the Sharm el-Sheikh conference by releasing an audiotape of kidnapped soldier Schalit in which he said his condition was deteriorating and he could not understand why he had not been freed in a prisoner swap.
Hamas successfully imposed its rule and order on the Gaza Strip but failed to meet its own deadline for releasing BBC reporter Alan Johnston. They blamed the BBC and British government for refusing permission to use force to release him. One member of the Dagmoush clan responsible for his kidnap was executed and two others arrested in an effort to pressurise the clan to release Johnston. The clan released a video in response showing Johnston wearing a homemade suicide belt that the kidnappers threatened to explode should force be used to free him. After further Hamas pressure they threatened to cut his throat unless their demands were met, which included the release of three Al Qaeda prisoners, two in Jordan and Abu Qatada in Britain. Al Qaeda’s official offer of an alliance with Hamas was rejected.
3· The Winograd Committee on the Second Lebanon War released the testimony of former Science, Culture and Sports Minister Ophir Paz-Pines. He claimed the government had no idea what was happening on the home front during the war and that there was no plan beyond the initial air bombing campaign, which he supported. He abstained during the Cabinet vote over the later ground operation, which he was against. The Winograd Committee hinted it was unlikely they would be able to publish their report on the Second Lebanon War before mid September this year and that they will not issue warning letters as they have in the past about individuals criticised in the report.
4· 13 Qassam missiles fell on or near Sderot and Ashkelon, a four-fold increase on last week. Islamic Jihad fired most of the missiles. At least 11 mortar rounds were fired, mainly at the Karni border crossing into the northeastern Gaza Strip, resulting in its closure. The Kerem Shalom crossing, at the southeastern tip of the Gaza Strip, also had to be closed due to the uncovering of an explosive device. Supplies into Gaza are currently entering by the smaller and more isolated and defensible Sufa crossing in the southeast. The IDF carried out anti-tunnel and bunker uncovering operations at the Karni and Kissufim crossings in eastern Gaza following Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Popular Resistance Committee threats of future incursions and kidnappings of Israelis within Israeli territory. 12 Palestinian gunmen who confronted the IDF search teams were killed, as were several senior Islamic Jihad Qassam missile operatives and manufacturers; 3 IDF were wounded.
5· President Bush refused to mediate between Syria and Israel. This effectively closed any possibility of Israel-Syria talks. The Syrian regime believe the talks cannot be serious without US involvement and PM Olmert’s government is not prepared to risk its relationship with the Bush administration by pursuing any substantial talks without their full support.
6· President Abbas cancelled all passports originally dispensed in Gaza. In theory no Gazans can leave, as their travel documents are no longer valid; he also declared Hamas’ Izzadin Qassam military wing and Fatah’s own Al Aqsa Brigades militia, illegal. He does not recognise Hamas’ Executive Force, which currently enforces law and order in Gaza, nor does he recognise Hamas as part of the government. President Abbas has to renew his interim emergency government every 30 days according to the Palestinian Assembly’s Constitution, and can only do so on two more occasions before elections have to be called.
7· Newly-elected Labour Party leader Ehud Barak could not persuade his senior Labour rivals Ami Ayalon or Amir Peretz to join him in government. This leaves PM Olmert with greater scope in next week’s coalition Cabinet reshuffle, but also makes an early election more likely.
8· 6 Spanish and Colombian UNIFIL soldiers were killed by a bomb in South Lebanon. Most sources believe the responsibility lies with Fatah al-Islam, an Al Qaeda affiliate, tolerated and supported by the Syrian regime. This comes a week after a missile attack on Israel probably by the same group, or an affiliate, also tolerated by Syria. Fatah al-Islam has recently suffered a setback in their fight with Lebanese Army forces in Nahr al-Bared camp near Tripoli north Lebanon.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· President Mubarak is urging the Israeli government to allow him to introduce more security personnel into the Sinai Peninsula in breach of the Peace Agreement (1979), which restricts the numbers of troops Egypt is allowed. He insisted he could not stem the flow of arms into Gaza without these forces. Former Premier Arik Sharon had agreed to Egypt introducing 6,000 more men but was overruled by his previous Cabinet. Egypt’s main means of pressuring Israel and Hamas is over weapons flows into Gaza. Mubarak’s quid pro quo for stemming the flow of arms is an increase in troops. This could be difficult for PM Olmert to push through Cabinet but it is vital if Egypt’s cooperation is to be bought. The US Senate warned Egypt this week it would reduce US loans and grants if Egypt failed to block the arms flow, especially of missiles, into Gaza.
· President Abbas’ position is so weak he cannot rely on his own security forces and appealed to PM Olmert to allow Fatah’s quasi-military Badr Brigade to enter the West Bank from Jordan. Abbas is totally dependent on Jordan and Israel for his own security. Israel’s constant arrests of Al Aqsa, Islamic Jihad and Hamas militants have allowed him to remain in position. He will have no choice but to call elections within the next few months and to restart talks with Hamas.
But at the moment he is considering sidelining them by calling on the Palestine Liberation Organisation, of which Hamas is not a member, to re-establish itself.
This strategy is unlikely to succeed because few PLO members will believe it possible to unite Palestine without Hamas’ participation, however detested they are by most of its members. The best Abbas could achieve would be to split a reconvened PLO, and as Hamas make up roughly 40% of the Palestinian popular vote, he would have to rely on an ever diminishing minority to stay in power.
· President Abbas’ plea for the release of convicted murderer and popular Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti, is his only hope. It was Abbas’ refusal to reform the Palestinian Authority, at Barghouti’s request, that split Fatah before the 2006 elections thus enabling a Hamas victory. Should Barghouti return and be allowed to unite Fatah they would win the forthcoming elections. Unfortunately for Abbas this requires Israel’s consent, which with an early Israeli election highly probable, is unlikely.
· Hamas cannot be ignored by President Abbbas and are likely to remain rulers of Gaza for the time being. Hamas can only be removed with the support of both Israel and Egypt and this is unlikely unless Hamas miscalculate and provoke an overwhelming response from Israel. Pressure is mounting within Israel for the release of Schalit and this can only be achieved with the release of some key Hamas convicted terrorists.
Again, given Israel’s approaching elections this has little chance of success. Nevertheless, if Schalit can be brought home at least some of the electorate might be pleased, despite the claims by many that it was bought at too high a price and from a position of weakness.
· Former Science, Culture and Sports Minister Ophir Paz-Pines' testimony to the Winograd Committee on the Second Lebanon War exposed the lack of planning and preparedness of the IDF and its High Command, and how much of the war was fought in an ad hoc manner.
Paz-Pines’ testimony is riddled with contradictions. He was for an immediate military response but blamed PM Olmert rather than the IDF for the total lack of preparation. He did not take responsibility for the consequences of his voting for immediate action but when the need to use ground forces in Lebanon arose, which was to lead to UNIFIL and Lebanese Forces guarding Israel’s border, he voted against. He later insisted he would camp outside the PM’s office until he resigned. He failed to do so.
Winograd is likely to find his reasoning, and that of almost all involved with Lebanon over the last 7 years, to be entirely faulty. The criticisms will probably be generous in their harshness and breadth. This is indicated by their statement that they will not warn those in advance of the criticisms, as well as the length of time it is taking to formulate them. At the moment the earliest date of publication is likely to be September 12th.
· Hamas refuse to restrain Islamic Jihad from firing Qassam missiles at Israel as a matter of principle. This will be the most likely cause of a major conflagration. Israel’s need to respond to the threat, for both strategic and political reasons, would probably lead to an escalation in military exchanges. Hamas, Syria, Hizbollah, and Iran have signed a mutual defence agreement that requires each to come to the others' aid when under attack. This would lead to a full-scale war between Israel and the Islamist-Syrian alliance. This is far less likely if Hamas reign in Islamic Jihad.
· A further complication is the 20-year-old rivalry between the jihadist groups and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Hamas are an affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood and rivals with Al Qaeda.
Islamic Jihad has stronger links and affiliations to the Brotherhood than Al Qaeda, but nevertheless maintain links with both.
The Palestinian Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon, and The Army of Islam in Gaza, which currently holds Alan Johnston, both have links with Al Qaeda.
Although Hamas rejected an alliance offered this week by Al Qaeda’s deputy leader, Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahri, there is a long tradition of rival Islamist groups making temporary alliances of interest. Al-Zawahri attempted in Sudan, in 1995, to reconcile Al Qaeda and the Brotherhood. If they unite against Israel it could also lead to a major conflagration. The aim of Al Qaeda is to ensure that it does.
The more radical elements within Hamas, such as its military wing, could also ally with Al Qaeda affiliates if they feel they have no choice, for example if they come under simultaneous pressure from Egypt, Israel, and Fatah, and are unable or unwilling, to compromise.
Just as likely is the deliberate undermining of Hamas by Al Qaeda and its affiliates through propagating a more extreme line that insists any accommodation, however temporary, with Israel’s existence is a betrayal. At the very least this will lead to further schisms that will make any peace agreement near impossible as they battle it out between themselves.
Only if Hamas confront, contain, and/or defeat this pot pourri of nihilist jihadists will any progress be made. But this will probably only happen after an extreme provocation against Hamas by one, or several, rival jihadist groups.
· President Bush’s refusal to engage with Syria will make war more likely. It will also lead to the need for Olmert to be replaced sooner rather than later. Olmert needs progress on at least one front. The most likely to succeed was Syria. The need to replace Olmert with a stronger government that is capable of engaging Syria, and of making bold decisions with or without the United States, has become paramount.
The decision to hold elections sooner has been made more likely by the decision of Labour’s senior figures Amir Peretz and Ami Ayalon not to join the present government. They are holding out for better positions within a new Labour-led government, so, in order to hold his own party together Ehud Barak will have to force an election. This, however, might play into Likud’s hands, as they are currently ahead in the polls.
· The possibility of war is also more likely with the move of the Al Qaeda affiliate, Fatah al-Islam, from its base in northern Lebanon to Israel’s border. Fatah al-Islam could not operate without the collusion of the Syrian intelligence services. This means Syria is prepared to take great risks to force the US to engage with her regime by inflaming the situation on the Lebanese-Israel border. But, if Israel feels impelled to respond to another strategic threat a miscalculation by any of the parties could end in a war on several of Israel’s fronts.
· Both Syria and Iran have come under increased pressure from the international community over the Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri assassination, as well as Iran’s nuclear weapons programme. The only method they know to get other parties to acquiesce is to threaten them and create instability. Their preferred method is to slowly increase the pressure so that their opponents behave more cautiously and they can buy time. For Syria this means buying time to assassinate more anti-Syrian politicians in Lebanon to make any vote for a Hariri Tribunal unworkable. And, for Iran it is to buy enough time to pass the nuclear threshold without having been attacked.
Recommended source on Al Qaeda: Burke, Jason; Al-Qaeda (2003-4; Penguin)
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
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