Week 30 May – 5 June 2007

This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on: http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/

· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS


· Main Points:

1. 18 Qassam missiles and 5 mortar rounds were fired at Sderot and the Erez border crossing by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, an almost 50% reduction on the previous week. This is due in part to new more vigorous IDF operations in Gaza and the West Bank. Sderot was given special status to allow businesses to claim speedy compensation for losses suffered as a result of 268 missile attacks in the last 16 days. Some new portable anti-missile pod shelters were delivered to streets, factories, and schools this week. 50% of Sderot’s population have left their homes, accusing the government of neglect and an inability to protect their families.

2. PM Olmert signalled a change of policy towards Syria by announcing the need to make a concerted effort to find out the regime’s true intentions. This follows a change of policy by the Bush Administration. The change has arisen in the context of increasing fears that Syria will misread Israel’s more vigorous defence exercises as actual preparations for war, as well as the latest United Nations Security Council unanimous vote to set up an international tribunal into the murder of Lebanese PM Hariri. The evidence so far indicates pro-Syrian Lebanese, and, Syrian, security personnel, carried out the attack.

3. Labour Party leadership contender, Ami Ayalon, joined forces with the previously defeated candidate Labour Defence Minister Peretz, in an effort to win the Labour Party leadership race against former PM Ehud Barak. Ayalon has made a complete U-Turn and now says he is prepared to stay in an Olmert-led government.

4. Reports emerged that the National Security Council supported Foreign Minister Livni’s view, that the war in Lebanon should be short and a diplomatic resolution paramount, as most “realistic” objectives had been achieved. The government did not discuss this advice nor was it passed to the Security Cabinet during the war.

5. Egypt’s representative in Gaza rejected Foreign Minister Livni’s idea of an International Force to maintain order and security there. He argued security should be upheld by Egypt and Israel with the Palestinians within the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

6. The Israeli government rejected Hamas’ suggestion of a yearlong ceasefire in both the West Bank and Gaza. Israel argued that dozens of planned attacks on Israeli civilians are thwarted each week in the West Bank, and a ceasefire outside the context of genuine peace efforts would simply put its citizens’ lives in greater danger.

7. Military Intelligence advised Syria was preparing for a possible conflict this summer, and pointed out its missiles were capable of hitting Tel Aviv without needing to be moved to any forward positions. However, they stated there were no indications of any immediate danger. Hamas, similarly, now have missiles that can strike 20 kilometres into Israel but have yet to use them. Military Intelligence expects missiles with a 40-kilometre range to be acquired by the organisation soon, allowing them to strike Tel Aviv.


· ANALYSIS - General Picture:

· The consequences of Sderot’s neglect are now being paid for. Businesses are being compensated, populations temporarily re-housed, mental health staff bussed in, and new security measures introduced. Hamas have been forced onto the defensive but not before achieving their goal of re-focussing Palestinian attention onto Israel rather than the near civil war they provoked.

· It is clear that the new Chief of Staff has returned to a more imaginative and diverse panoply of security measures, from arresting senior politicians, to assassinating individual terrorists in sometimes unusual circumstances, to operations deep inside hostile territory. This tactical flexibility lies in contrast to current strategic constraints. The IDF does not want to provoke a confrontation, as it does not want to fight simultaneously on several fronts. Nor does it want to offer either Iran or Syria excuses to divert attention from the real issues currently engaging the international community: Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, and Syria’s involvement in the assassination of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

· The hostile stalemate and paralysis within the Palestinian community and the danger of a confrontation with Syria have focussed Prime Minister Olmert’s attention onto Syrian peace overtures. A peace agreement with Syria may undercut both Iran together with its client Hizb’allah, as well as Syria’s Palestinian client Hamas.

· Syria’s main priorities are to get the United States to drop both economic sanctions, and the tribunal into Hariri’s murder. Olmert would not have attempted the Syrian option without at first clearing it with the United States. President Bush had wanted to maintain a consistent policy of isolation towards Syria for supporting terrorism in Iraq, Hizb’alah in Lebanon, for its alliance with Iran, and for the Hariri murder. But the need for Sunni Arab states’ support in Iraq has led to a more flexible response towards Syria. The President also wants to encourage the Saudi-initiated Arab League agreement to recognise Israel should a peace deal be struck.

· It is difficult to foresee anything arising from any of these developments as things stand, unless Syria gets the tribunal and sanctions dropped, Iran is allowed to develop a nuclear weapon and gets sanctions removed, Hamas is allowed to ignore Israel’s existence and develop a strategic missile capability, and Israel accepts the right of return of several million descendants of Palestinian refugees from the 1947-8 civil war in Palestine.

· Ami Ayalon had to make a complete U-Turn and allow Labour to stay in an Olmert-led government if he wanted to get current Defence Minister Peretz’s support. This, in the short term, works to everyone’s advantage. Olmert can stay as Prime Minister, Labour can stay in the government, and Kadima do not have to face a split between PM Olmert and Foreign Minister Livni. However, once the Winograd Committee report is published later this summer all the previous tensions and pressures will resurface.

· The report that the National Security Council supported Livni’s position at a certain point during the war will become significant if:

1) It is shown PM Olmert deliberately ignored their advice or failed to pass on their advice to the Cabinet.

2) If factions within the government use it against him and can prove he deliberately misled them by failing to make the advice known.

· It is important to understand that this advice was not sound. If it had been followed:

1) The 10-15,000 UNIFIL force would not have been introduced into Southern Lebanon.

2) The Lebanese Army would not have moved to Israel’s border for the first time in nearly 40 years.

3) Hizb’allah would not have been forced to act covertly South of the Litani River, nor would they have been forced away from Israel’s border and from Israeli territory adjacent to the border.

4) It is highly unlikely that Israel would have been able to achieve:
a) That UN Resolution 1701 (2006) reiterate the legal and moral obligation upon Hizb’allah to disarm (UN Resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) and the Taif Accords (1989));
b) Nor that it call for the release of the two kidnapped Israelis (preamble of the Resolution only);
c) Nor that a zone free of militia weapons from the Israeli border to the Litani River (in principle not practise) be created;
d) Nor that the responsibility for the conflict be placed on the shoulders of Hizb’allah;
e) Nor that Israel be allowed to stay in Lebanon until the new UNIFIL force had arrived in strength;
f) Nor that any onerous measures or responsibility be placed upon Israel.

· Egypt’s rejection of an international force in Gaza is a serious setback. It indicates Egypt sees no strategic or tactical advantage in resolving the chaos in Gaza at the moment.

· The missile encirclement of Israel is almost complete. Hamas’ demand for a ceasefire in the West Bank will ensure its success. Israel has two options:

1. The negotiated option, which would need to involve a large International Force both in Gaza and the West Bank, similar to, but larger than, UNIFIL forces in Lebanon. This may need to involve Israel being affiliated to NATO in some way, a withdrawal from most (90%) of the West Bank, and a time frame of 3-5 years.

2. The military option in which very severe blows are dealt to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, similar to the blow dealt to Hizb’allah, which bring about a desire on their part for some kind of foreign intervention. At the moment there is absolutely no incentive for Hamas or Islamic Jihad to make any kind of peace. The Iran-Syria-Hizb’allah-Hamas alliance remains strong. Europe’s investments in Iran’s energy resources alone are over $100 billion, and EU grants to the Palestinian Authority are at record levels (according to EU Foreign and Security Policy Representative Javier Solana), despite the technical refusal to give financial aid directly to Hamas.


Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/

For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/

For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html

For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/

For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -

News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/

A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/

The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/

Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/

A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/


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