This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1. Prime Minister Olmert sent intermediaries to probe the seriousness of Syria’s offer of peace negotiations and reiterated his commitment to talks. Turkey, Greece, and Germany, amongst others, have been passing messages between the two governments. Both Syria and Israel have stated the other is not serious, but both have indicated they would talk without preconditions. The United States remained sceptical of Syrian motives and intent but said they would not stop Israel pursuing contacts with the regime.
2. The security situation in Gaza continued to deteriorate with an intensification of the low level civil war. 10 Qassams landed on, or around, the nearby Israeli town of Sderot, a 50% reduction on last week. PM Olmert called for an International Force to control the Gazan-Egyptian border. Sderot remained unprotected as the government confessed it could not meet the High Court’s deadline to protect even the schools. All factories and properties also remained unprotected due to continuing bureaucratic delays, and general neglect. Palestinian mortars were repeatedly fired at crossings into Gaza, and at IDF posts, and an attempt to kidnap another Israeli soldier was belatedly foiled. The Islamic Jihad and Fatah attempted-kidnappers used a white jeep disguised as a TV vehicle, and RPG missiles, to breach the border. One of the four-man kidnap group was killed, the others escaped back into Gaza.
3. The Labour Party Leadership Primary run-off between former PM Ehud Barak and Ami Ayalon ended in a narrow win for former PM Ehud Barak. Ayalon may dispute the result due to polling irregularities in certain Arab and Druse villages. He is determined all irregularities be investigated. Ayalon lost the Kibbutz, Moshav, Arab, and Druse vote but won Tel Aviv, Be’er Sheva, and Haifa.
4. The Winograd Committee published ex Defence and current Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz’s testimony in which he stated his advice was repeatedly ignored and his expertise as an ex-Chief of Staff was never called upon. He claimed he would have ordered a ground force incursion almost immediately.
5. Iran threatened to attack Israeli and US targets worldwide if her nuclear facilities are attacked. These remarks were made in the context of increasing pressure upon Iran by the International Atomic Energy Agency to abide by mandatory United Nations Security Council Resolutions. These call upon Iran to cease uranium enrichment until Iran is confirmed to not be in breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which she is a signatory. The US and Israel carried out joint manoeuvres in the Negev desert just after the completion of relatively large scale IDF manoeuvres on mock-up Syrian villages.
6. IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi made clear his disinterest in a large-scale incursion into Gaza in case Syria decides to go to war over the Golan Heights. He does not want his frontline forces overstretched. Nevertheless, the IDF was preparing for such an eventuality. In Gaza, the IDF continued to employ a flexible array of tactics against terrorist missile cells and sites, and their leading operatives. A number of suspected and fugitive Palestinian terrorists were also arrested in the West Bank.
7. IDF Intelligence, and UN Middle East representatives, confirmed Hizb’allah rearmament. IDF Military Intelligence stated Hizb’allah had now replenished all its stocks of missiles, some reports quoted 20,000, and could now hit Tel Aviv at will. Many of their new underground bunker systems have been constructed within yards of UNIFIL positions in South Lebanon. UN sources also confirmed Syria allowed armed militia to infiltrate into Lebanon to support the terrorists fighting Lebanese government forces near Tripoli.
8. Israel launched Ofek-7 a spy satellite which, when linked to the still orbiting Ofek-5, will give the IDF better images and greater operational, tactical, as well as strategic capability. Although only Israel, China, France, India, Japan, Russia and the United States are capable of independent satellite launches, Iran and Egypt will soon follow. Israel has also launched several independent communications satellites.
9. Vice Prime Minister Shimon Peres (Kadima Party) became Israel’s 9th President. He won 58 of the first round Knesset Member votes; three short of an outright win. The other two candidates Reuven Rivlin (Likud; 37 votes), and Colette Avital (Labour; 21 votes) withdrew their candidacy allowing Peres to be automatically voted President on a yes/no second round vote which he won by 86 votes to 23. There were 4 abstentions in the first round, and 11, in the second.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· PM Olmert has changed his stand on talking with Syria for several reasons:
1) Domestic political pressure. Members of his own party, as well as others within the coalition were becoming anxious that President Bush’s hostility to Syria was constraining Israel’s ability to manoeuvre both in relation to the Palestinian impasse and potential gains on the Syrian front.
2) Both Syrian and Israeli talk of war had reached dangerous levels. A mistake by commanders on either side on the Golan Heights front could have led to a conflagration. Syria has prepared her side of the border for a guerrilla and missile campaign through a vast increase in arms sales from Iran and Russia. Nevertheless, her posture remains defensive.
3) A genuine peace agreement with Syria would undermine both Iran and Hamas. They would have even fewer grounds to continue their armed struggle against Israel. Syria is the most tenacious and longstanding member of the rejectionist front of Arab and Muslim states committed to never recognising Israel. To reverse that position would increase the likelihood of general recognition, if not acceptance, of the Jewish State.
4) The continuing civil war within the Palestinian camp had closed many options for the government. President Abbas was unable to deliver on any promise made because he does not control the streets and refuses under almost any circumstances to use force against fellow Palestinians. Hamas have simply called his bluff and with the constant state of war even the semblance of progress in negotiations had disappeared. The Qassam attacks on Israel from Gaza were a symptom of this impasse and had increased domestic pressure on Olmert to act against them. It also exposed the total neglect of Sderot, the target of over 4,000 missiles in the last 6 years. Sderot still has no real protection for its civilian population from the missile strikes, despite a High Court order imposing a deadline for the government to supply sufficient bomb shelters for all schools within Qassam missile range.
5) Successful negotiations with Syria would seriously undermine the immediate calls for PM Olmert’s resignation. There would be pressure to reach a consensus within the coalition to take advantage of any serious possibility for peace with one of Israel’s most intractable enemies.
6) President Bush acquiesced to PM Olmert’s suggestion that it had become politically untenable for him to ignore the possibility of peace talks. The President also realised that to prevent such a move would undermine his relationship with the Gulf States, which he needs in order to resolve the Iraq conflict. They all believe that separating the Syrian Assad regime from Iran is vital for the stability of the region and would seriously undermine rival Iranian influence within the Arab world.
· The current situation in Gaza has several consequences:
a) Fewer Qassams are falling on Sderot, which is offering respite to both Sderot’s inhabitants and the government, which has been severely embarrassed by its neglect.
b) Chaos in Gaza reduces the chances of successful negotiations with the Palestinians.
c) It increases the chance of Egyptian interference. This may have positive or negative consequences depending upon the strategic view Egypt takes, for example if it motivates them to support or block an International Force on Gaza’s border with Egypt.
d) If Gaza becomes a Hamas run entity they can choose to impose discipline on the area or to allow Islamic Jihad to fire Qassams at will upon Israel. This will leave Israel with little option but to continue to target Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s leadership.
· Ehud Barak’s victory in theory puts greater pressure on Olmert to resign sooner rather than later as Barak has insisted he may pull Labour out of the coalition upon publication of the final Winograd report this summer. But Winograd is likely to be highly critical of Barak as well as Olmert and an early election may not appeal to the Labour Party’s National Executive. Polls may also show that Labour would not do well. The desire to oust Olmert would also open up splits within Kadima, which could benefit Likud far more than Labour, another reason to postpone, rather than hasten to, elections.
· Transportation Minister Mofaz’s testimony to the Winograd Committee has exposed the lack of consultation involved during the Second Lebanon War. But it also highlighted and exposed Mofaz’s role in its shortcomings. He stated he would have sent in ground forces at a much earlier stage, yet it was clear from all the evidence that, at least partly due to Mofaz’s own ineptitude as a former Chief of Staff, these same ground forces were ill-prepared for such a mission. They did not have the equipment, the training, the leadership, or the detailed planning required. The result of sending ground forces into Lebanon at a very early stage would have been a large loss of life for possibly very little gain. In other words Mofaz’s suggestions and advice, if implemented, would have created a genuine, rather than a perceived, failure of the Second Lebanon War, a failure which, in any case, has been grossly exaggerated. Mofaz too, is likely to be severely criticised in the Winograd final report this summer.
· Iran’s Interior Minister’s confession that the regime has sabotage networks all over the world and would force the price of oil up to $250 a barrel if attacked, is a clear indication of their concern over a summer offensive by the United States, possibly with Israel, they believe, attacking Syria or Hizb’allah. It is clear that Iran and Hizb’allah’s leadership do not want another confrontation in Lebanon but that they are ready to take advantage of one should it occur. Israel is in a similar position and would inflict severe damage on any party that initiates a new round of conflict. The IDF has been training constantly since the new Chief of Staff took his post. His focus has been on the Northern Front; he has little interest in any major operation in Gaza and believes that the current measures against the terrorist groups there are sufficient.
· The assassination of the anti-Syrian Lebanese legislator (13 June), the Hamas coup in Gaza (13 June), and the infiltration of armed pro-Syrian groups into Northern Lebanon to fight the Lebanese Army are all Iran and Syria’s response to recent United Nations Security Council decisions. UNSC are about to vote on increasing sanctions on Iran, and, on 12 June, they voted unanimously for an International Tribunal into Lebanese PM Hariri’s assassination. Iran and Syria expect to either get the UNSC to back down or to cause a split that will severely curtail any action that can be taken against their respective regimes. This will give Iran time to develop a nuclear weapon that will neutralise any future attempts by the United States to produce regime change. Further assassinations will force elections in Lebanon, which pro-Syrian parties are likely to win. The new legislature and government will then vote for confederation with Syria returning Lebanon to Syrian, and Iranian, hegemony.
· Iran, once nuclear, believes it would be able to extend its hegemony over the region. Syria, protected by Iran’s nuclear umbrella, believes it would be able to negotiate over the Golan Heights from a position of strength. Lebanon and Palestine would slowly become Islamist entities committed to missile strikes against Israel under Iranian nuclear protection. This, they believe, will force Israel to:
a) effectively surrender through appeasement and fear;
b) become paralysed through fear of a conflagration;
c) initiate a war that Israel, they believe, could not possibly win;
d) enter a war of attrition that would only increase pressure on Israel to make concessions and withdraw to the 1967 borders.
The main flaw in the Iranian-Syrian strategy is that it assumes Israel fears a conflagration if necessary, and, that she will lose such a conflagration, either in the short or long term. Iran and Syria have confused Israel’s withdrawals with weakness, rather than naked self-interest. This is a major strategic mistake on their part, and could lead to their making further strategic miscalculations. Nevertheless, any belief that the current position can be sustained by Israel is mistaken. Negotiations with Hamas and Syria, whether direct or indirect, are inevitable.
· Seven years after his betrayal by Shas, during his previous attempt to become President, and the disastrous Presidency of Likud’s alleged rapist Moshe Katsav, Shimon Peres achieved his long overdue status as President. He may, however, face some outstanding technical charges concerning donations he received for a previous political campaign that he may not have registered in the appropriate fashion.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
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