This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
Apologies for delays in posting this week Jo Rowling's Deathly Hallows called:
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· Hamas and Islamic Jihad fired 5 Qassam missiles and 5 mortar rounds at Israel last week, slightly less than the previous week. Hamas and Fatah continued to arrest and imprison each other’s members. Hamas warned President Abbas that its patience was wearing thin; any more arrests would lead to a violent response. Fatah and Hamas students clashed at the an-Najah University of Nablus on the West Bank. Hamas also accused Abbas of collaborating with Israel in attempts to assassinate their leaders. President Abbas forbade Palestinian Authority justice system workers to function under Hamas rule in Gaza, so Hamas set up their own court system. Israel continued small-scale military operations within the Gaza Strip to intercept Qassam firing cells.
2· President Abbas won the support of the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s Central Council to hold early legislative and presidential elections. He will ask the reconstituted PLO Palestine National Council to introduce proportional representation and eliminate regional balloting, a system that had benefited Hamas due to splits in Fatah during the 2006 election. Hamas declared the move illegal because the Hamas-dominated Palestinian Legislative Council of the Palestinian Authority did not approve the move. They also claimed there would be no elections in the Gaza Strip, declared elections in the West Bank would not be trouble free, and could only be won by Fatah through abuse of the electoral system.
3· Israel released 255 Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Democratic Front of the Liberation of Palestine members from prison in an attempt to boost Abbas’ position, and as a goodwill gesture. This followed the freeing of withheld Palestinian taxes, and payments from the EU, Japan and the US to the emergency government of President Abbas on the West Bank. Islamic Jihad in the West Bank declared they are prepared to halt suicide bombings within Israel in order to enable a general truce. Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, meanwhile, unveiled its new Quds 4 rocket that can hit any point in Ashqelon city, and any point up to half way along the Ashqelon-Ashdod motorway along Israel's southern Mediterranean coast.
4· IDF intelligence briefs concerning the completion of Hizb’allah’s rearmament in southern Lebanon appeared to be confirmed by its head Hassan Nasrallah who declared Hizb’allah could now hit anywhere in Israel. The UN Security Council accused Syria of clandestinely rearming Hizb’allah in breach of mandatory UNSC Resolution 1701 that ended the Second Lebanon War. The UNSC called on its Secretary General to help implement new measures that would prevent cross border smuggling. The UNSC criticised Syria for its non-cooperation over maps of the disputed Shebaa Farms area that Syria claims is Lebanese, and that Israel controls and insists is part of Syria; a UN special committee had confirmed that the Farms were Syrian. The UNSC also criticised Israel for its continued over flights of Lebanon, in breach of Resolution 1701. Representatives of Iran, Hamas, Hizb’allah, and Syria met in Damascus to reaffirm their strategic alliance. President Ahmadinejad also reaffirmed his support for the Palestinian armed struggle.
5· Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declared he would fight and win the next election. Vice Premier Haim Ramon claimed there was no one in Kadima who could seriously replace PM Olmert, and he would challenge and defeat both Labour’s Barak and Likud’s Netanyahu in any elections. PM Olmert dismissed the court’s decision to enforce the completion of Sderot’s school bunkers before the school year, saying the government, not the courts, decides allocation of resources. The High Court responded to Olmert’s criticisms by calling upon him to cease undermining and terrorising judges just for doing their jobs. The Prime Minister also stated most of the criticisms in State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss’ report were already being addressed. PM Olmert rejected any major military assault on Gaza and insisted withdrawal from the West Bank was inevitable.
6· The Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Jordan held talks in Israel as purveyors of the Arab League’s views on how peace talks might progress. An interim meeting before the autumn major peace conference under the auspices of the United States was also suggested.
7· Tony Blair visited Israel and the West Bank for the first time as representative of the Quartet (EU, Russia, UN and US). He stated he was there to listen and would probably establish himself in the British Governor of Palestine’s old residence, Government House, adjacent to the UN compound in Jerusalem. He stated he would probably reside there one week every month from September. His stated mandate is to promote reform and economic development, and to build state institutions for the proposed state of Palestine.
8· The Winograd Committee report on the Second Lebanon War will address the issue of alleged war crimes. This was confirmed in a letter to Meretz MK Zehava Gal-On.
9· Israel completed a $4 billion solar energy deal to supply power to 500,000 households in southern California’s Mojave Desert. Israel also announced that its first all weather spy satellite will be launched in September using an Indian rocket fired from Sriharikota space centre in India. Its main function will be to monitor Iran’s nuclear weapons programmes.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· Hamas continued to mount minor attacks on Israel and the border. The level of violence indicates that Hamas is not interested at present in a major confrontation with Israel. The split between Hamas and Fatah widened. President Abbas is at present taking a political risk by closing the door for the moment on any talks with Hamas, or with Syria. His short-term strategy is to win the presidential and legislative elections and control the West Bank, then having gained a power base, and from a position of strength, attempt reconciliation with Hamas at a time of his choosing. Hamas have made it clear they will sabotage this strategy through violence on the West Bank and no compromise over Gaza.
· There are signs from the prisoner release and the attempt by Islamic Jihad to have a truce, that the dual pressure of Israeli and Palestinian security forces arrests, together with a clear political strategy of peace talks, new elections, and a crackdown on Hamas, have forced the militants on the West Bank to give the political option a chance. Hamas will wait to see when the elections are called, and to what extent they are penalised on the West Bank during the process, before deciding how, or if, they will sabotage them.
· Both the UN and the Iran-Syria axis are jostling for position over Lebanon, Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, and the International Tribunal into the assassination of Lebanese PM Hariri. Iran and Syria by rearming Hizb’allah, and organising attacks on UNIFIL forces and the Lebanese Army, as well as sending Katyushas into Israel, are warning the UN in general and the US in particular that they will respond violently if their national self interest, the survival of their respective regimes, is deemed at risk. Hizb’allah’s rearmament was seen as vital to counter any military threat to Iran, and any threat to Syria’s regime. The reestablishment of this strategic military balance is a warning to the US that they may be able to withdraw their troops from Iraq in the future but Israel remains permanently vulnerable to missile attack.
· Shebaa Farms is a 25km² area of Syrian territory on the slopes of the Golan Heights that Syria has pretended is Lebanese in order to give Hizb’allah the pretext it needs to continue its attacks on Israel. A UN special committee has deemed it Syrian, but because it has become a domestic political issue in Lebanon, with all parties now claiming it as Lebanese, the UN has asked Israel to consider handing it over to the UN to end its being used as a propaganda and military tool. Israel remains concerned at the precedent this will set, and in any case would want official Lebanese government recognition of Israel in return.
· The visit of President Ahmadinejad to Damascus was to reinforce the strategic military alliance between Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hizb’allah. An attack on one of the radical quartet would result in a response from them all. Were Israel or the US to attack Iran’s nuclear weapons making facilities Israel would be attacked by the alliance. If the Hariri Tribunal resulted in the arrest or imprisonment of any of the Syrian regime’s elite, UNIFIL forces would be attacked. Any US or coalition forces in Iraq would also be attacked by agents and surrogates of both Iran and Syria. The radical quartet also prepared its responses to the peace and UN conferences on Palestine, the increased sanctions on Iran because of her illegal uranium enrichment practices, and to the trial of those suspected Syrian agents involved in the assassination of Lebanese PM Hariri, all to be held or reviewed in September.
· PM Ehud Olmert made it clear that he would destroy his Kadima party rather than be forced out of power, or to make way for Tzipi Livni the Foreign Minister and Deputy Premier. His criticisms of the High Court, State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss (though not his report), of Defence Minister Barak, and opposition Likud leader Bibi Netanyahu, as well as implicitly the IDF by his absolute rejection of any major Gaza operation, indicate what the political contours will be for the rest of his administration:
1. He will not tolerate any attempts to oust him either by the Winograd Committee or members of his own party, not without an extraordinary political struggle.
2. He is not afraid of Labour leaving the government or of challenging them in any elections should they be called. This also implies he assumes he can replace Labour with the orthodox United Torah Judaism Party should Labour resign from the government.
3. He will not allow the Courts to interfere with political decisions made by his government, at least not without a fight.
4. He will not allow the IDF to have more money until they radically reform themselves. Nor will he be pushed into any major military operation that could be used as an excuse to bolster defence spending.
5. He expects civilians who live in border lying regions to accept their lives are difficult and subject to danger and to adapt accordingly.
6. He will resist the legalistic culture of forcing politicians to resign following unsubstantiated accusations or aspersions on their character or personality.
7. He expects to preside over the withdrawal of Israeli forces and citizens from most of the West Bank under the umbrella of new peace talks later this year and beyond.
· The visit of Tony Blair and the Arab delegation that presented the views of the Arab League indicate that the strategy of isolating Hamas, Iran, Syria, and Hizb’allah, whilst pursuing a unilateral peace on the West Bank starting in earnest this September, has been agreed by the Quartet (EU, Russia, UN, and US), some members of the Arab League and Israel. This will coincide with further measures to isolate and pressurise Iran and Syria in the UN. Their expected reaction has been outlined above.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English: http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
_______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
Sunday, 29 July 2007
Thursday, 19 July 2007
Week 11 July – 18 July 2007
This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· Hamas fired 5 Qassam missiles and 12 mortar rounds at Sderot in Israel and nearby farms, a small decrease on last week. The mortar fire was mainly directed at the Erez border crossing into Israel (N Gaza). The IDF lost its first soldier in combat this year during an operation to arrest wanted suspected terrorists and discover weapons and missiles within the Gaza Strip. Some of the 12 arrested men were taken back to Israel for questioning. The current series of IDF search and destroy missions into Gaza has ended. Hamas continued to arrest Fatah and Al Qaeda affiliated members, as part of its drive to impose its rule over the Gaza Strip. Egypt’s closure of the border continued despite protests by Gazans. Israel continued to allow essential non-commercial goods to flow into Gaza through the isolated Sufa crossing (SE Gaza), which has yet to be attacked. Significant commercial activity within Gaza had effectively ceased. Israel continued to lose millions of dollars of export income as a result of the closure by Hamas of the major Kerem Shalom crossing (S Gaza), to all flower, fruit and vegetable imports from Israel.
2· President Abbas has called for a meeting of the Central Council of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in which he hoped to get approval for new Presidential and Parliamentary elections. Hamas has no representation within the PLO, the sole internationally recognised representative body of the Palestinian people. Hamas countered with a plan to convene the Palestinian Legislative Council (Parliament), in which it is the majority party, on Sunday, where it proposes to adopt a no-confidence motion against the interim government of Salaam Fayyad. Prime Minister Fayyad’s emergency government ended after 30 days, he now heads a slightly expanded interim government of mainly technocrats and independents pending elections.
3· Prime Minister Olmert succeeded in getting a list of 250 Palestinian prisoners for release agreed by the government and security services. He also arranged an amnesty for 178 Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades members if they gave up their terrorist activities and handed in their weapons to security forces loyal to President Abbas. PM Olmert also had separate meetings with King Abdullah of Jordan and President Abbas. The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades militia announced it was to disarm and would cease attacks on Israeli targets.
4· A series of meetings concerned with Israel-Palestine peace negotiations were announced. The Arab League is to send Jordan and Egypt’s Foreign Ministers to represent their views, but not their organisation, to Jerusalem for talks next week. Tony Blair is to come to Israel next week as a representative of the Quartet (UN, EU, US, Russia), he plans to stay one week in every four in Jerusalem. President Bush announced a proposed regional meeting, possibly in September, headed by Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, with all parties interested in peace.
5· Shimon Peres became Israel’s 9th President. He pledged to encourage the creation of a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine dispute, which he said was the majority view within Israel.
6· President Assad of Syria hinted, upon his swearing in for his second 7-year term with a 97.62% mandate, that he would consider talks with Israel, without US mediation, if Prime Minister Olmert pledged publicly to complete withdrawal from the Golan Heights. He also implied Turkey could be the intermediary in setting up such talks. A $1 billion Russo-Syrian arms deal was also confirmed.
The UN and US, in a closed UN meeting on UN Resolution 1701 that ended the Second Lebanon War, accused Syria of illegally transferring arms to Hizb’allah, in direct contravention of the mandatory Resolution (1701).
7· State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss released his office’s report on the Home Front during the Second Lebanon War (2006). All senior political and IDF figures were criticised for neglecting the Home Front. A total lack of strategic and local coordination and planning with regard to civilian protection was identified, which applied to successive governments, not just PM Olmert’s. 458 facilities containing dangerous chemicals remain unprotected from attack, as do all civilians living nearby.
Another report by a subcommittee of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee claimed that the civilian population in the North was effectively unprotected against a sudden chemical attack, had no access to gas masks, and that 50% of the population remained unprotected from missile attack and had no bomb shelters to go to.
8· India-Israel commercial ties strengthened with the confirmation of $1.6 billion of trade between the two countries (2006), and the announcement of a new $1.3 billion anti-missile project.
9· Iran agreed to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection of its heavy water plant at Arak. This facilitates the process of plutonium-based nuclear bomb making. Other safeguards upon the uranium enrichment plant at Nantaz were also agreed. The decision was made in advance of the UNSC meeting on increased sanctions on Iran for non-compliance with previous mandatory UNSC resolutions concerning nuclear weapons manufacture. Iran also agreed to an Iraqi offer for further talks in Baghdad, with the US, on Iraq’s security.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· Hamas continued to impose its hegemony upon the Gaza Strip with its arrests of Al Qaeda affiliated militia members. This indicates its priorities remain the security and control of Gaza over and above any strategic anti-Western alliance with Al-Qaeda, a long time rival. However, temporary alliances may evolve in the future. The reduction in Qassam fire this week may also indicate an agreement with Islamic Jihad that Qassam missiles can no longer be fired without prior Hamas approval. The constant IDF raids into Gaza to counter Islamic Jihad fired rockets will have also forced Hamas’ hand. Hamas found it difficult to reconcile its claims to have brought increased security to Gaza with the increase in IDF raids. Egypt’s refusal to open the border to Gazans has also put pressure on Hamas that relied heavily on Iranian cash infusions via the EU monitored border crossing at Rafah. The refusal to supply Hamas with funds from the EU, US, Japan, and some Gulf States, has considerably restricted Hamas’ room for manoeuvre. Hamas also still needs Egyptian and Israeli cooperation to free its prisoners.
· A major political confrontation is likely should Hamas successfully convene the Palestinian Legislative Council and pass a motion of no confidence in President Abbas’ selected interim government of Salaam Fayyad. According to the lawyers and experts who drew up the Palestinian Constitution, the current government is illegal, because it requires the consent of the Hamas dominated Legislature. Hence, President Abbas’ attempts to reconvene the PLO, of which Hamas is not a member, to enable him to call new elections, thus bypassing any objections. Hamas have long been demanding to be represented in the only internationally recognised representative organisation of the Palestinian people (the PLO). In the short term the current standoff can only result in two Palestinian states or entities. But, in the medium term it is clear that Abbas can offer membership of the PLO in exchange for the return of Fatah’s presence in Gaza, and, new elections there.
· PM Olmert has agreed to the Fatah prisoner releases and amnesties for the Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades militias because of Abbas’ impotence. The calls for negotiations by the Quartet members, their sending a high profile representative Tony Blair, and the forthcoming meeting concerned with presenting the Arab League position through the offices of the Jordanian and Egyptian Foreign Ministries are all designed to bolster Abbas. It is also likely that the Palestinian quasi-military Badr Brigade based in Jordan will be allowed to buttress Abbas’ security forces in the West Bank.
· Syria is currently making less belligerent noises because the UN Security Council is currently considering Syria’s violation of mandatory UNSC Resolution 1701 which makes it in breach of international law by transferring weapons to non-government forces in Lebanon (Hizb’allah). Nevertheless Syria is preparing for a war in 2008 should her demands not be met. The likelihood of a war this summer is slim unless someone makes a major miscalculation, which seems unlikely considering the increasing diplomatic activity planned for this summer and autumn, and the price both Iran and Syria would pay if they challenged the international community just as it gears up for peace and security talks in Baghdad, Jerusalem, and possibly Geneva in the fall.
· The State Comptroller’s report, together with that of a subcommittee of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, clearly state that successive Israeli governments whether of Labour’s Ehud Barak or Likud’s Arik Sharon, have systematically neglected the protection, safety, and security of border region citizens. This criminal neglect continues today with no protection against gas or chemical attack because no gas masks could be distributed in time, and 50% of the population totally unprotected from missile attack, as they have no bomb shelters to go to. Almost no sensitive industrial or chemical sites are protected from missile attack.
· It has taken another 6 months to allocate funds to Sderot for bunkers and anti-missile shelters despite it having been under almost daily missile attack for nearly 6 years. Government bureaucracy, Treasury procrastination, and political posturing have been blamed for the delay. PM Olmert’s extraordinarily insensitive remarks about citizens having to expect to put up with these attacks exposed his underlying attitude of indifference to Israeli civilian suffering during the Second Lebanon War, and partially explain the government’s stunning neglect.
· The Winograd Committee’s report into the Second Lebanon War is likely to be further delayed as lawyers representing all those likely to be criticised demand clear notice so that they can prepare their clients’ defence. As this is likely to include almost every senior politician and IDF officer that has served in the last 7 years the delay may be significant (November/December). This, however, gives PM Olmert more time to either organise his rearguard action, or, be further exposed to even more reports highlighting systemic incompetence on the part of his, and all previous, governments. There is no question that to blame PM Olmert for all these systemic and chronic faults is unjust, but it is an unfortunate fact of democratic political life that one be sometimes sacrificed on the altar of public opinion. The evidence, however, points to a serial inability of the Israeli public to accept the financial and other sacrifices needed to sustain their own defence, and, to accept their own responsibility for the systemic lack of professionalism, neglect, and ineptitude of their own institutions. Two examples were the insistence by IDF Reservists on cutting their period spent on Reserve duty, which in turn was supported by the Knesset, along with constant cuts in the Defence Budget. This in turn led to two of the biggest problems faced by the IDF during the Second Lebanon War, the lack of fitness of the Reserves and the deplorable state of their combat equipment. Both of these faults were due directly to decisions taken by the very people upon whom they rebounded.
· Iran’s apparent flexibility in allowing inspections of its facilities is the clearest indication yet that UN Security Council pressure is paying off. It is possible that North Korea’s decision to suspend its nuclear programme as a result of pressure from China has also been a factor in Iran’s decision making. Much of Iran’s nuclear and missile development has been based on exchanges of information with the Asian dictatorship. It is clear that if China and Russia are prepared to join with the US and the UK in putting pressure on Iran to pursue a purely civilian nuclear energy programme she will be forced to do so. Without China and Russia’s consent the West will be faced with two stark options:
a) A military strike or b) a long-term strategy of containment.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
___________________________________
________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· Hamas fired 5 Qassam missiles and 12 mortar rounds at Sderot in Israel and nearby farms, a small decrease on last week. The mortar fire was mainly directed at the Erez border crossing into Israel (N Gaza). The IDF lost its first soldier in combat this year during an operation to arrest wanted suspected terrorists and discover weapons and missiles within the Gaza Strip. Some of the 12 arrested men were taken back to Israel for questioning. The current series of IDF search and destroy missions into Gaza has ended. Hamas continued to arrest Fatah and Al Qaeda affiliated members, as part of its drive to impose its rule over the Gaza Strip. Egypt’s closure of the border continued despite protests by Gazans. Israel continued to allow essential non-commercial goods to flow into Gaza through the isolated Sufa crossing (SE Gaza), which has yet to be attacked. Significant commercial activity within Gaza had effectively ceased. Israel continued to lose millions of dollars of export income as a result of the closure by Hamas of the major Kerem Shalom crossing (S Gaza), to all flower, fruit and vegetable imports from Israel.
2· President Abbas has called for a meeting of the Central Council of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in which he hoped to get approval for new Presidential and Parliamentary elections. Hamas has no representation within the PLO, the sole internationally recognised representative body of the Palestinian people. Hamas countered with a plan to convene the Palestinian Legislative Council (Parliament), in which it is the majority party, on Sunday, where it proposes to adopt a no-confidence motion against the interim government of Salaam Fayyad. Prime Minister Fayyad’s emergency government ended after 30 days, he now heads a slightly expanded interim government of mainly technocrats and independents pending elections.
3· Prime Minister Olmert succeeded in getting a list of 250 Palestinian prisoners for release agreed by the government and security services. He also arranged an amnesty for 178 Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades members if they gave up their terrorist activities and handed in their weapons to security forces loyal to President Abbas. PM Olmert also had separate meetings with King Abdullah of Jordan and President Abbas. The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades militia announced it was to disarm and would cease attacks on Israeli targets.
4· A series of meetings concerned with Israel-Palestine peace negotiations were announced. The Arab League is to send Jordan and Egypt’s Foreign Ministers to represent their views, but not their organisation, to Jerusalem for talks next week. Tony Blair is to come to Israel next week as a representative of the Quartet (UN, EU, US, Russia), he plans to stay one week in every four in Jerusalem. President Bush announced a proposed regional meeting, possibly in September, headed by Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, with all parties interested in peace.
5· Shimon Peres became Israel’s 9th President. He pledged to encourage the creation of a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine dispute, which he said was the majority view within Israel.
6· President Assad of Syria hinted, upon his swearing in for his second 7-year term with a 97.62% mandate, that he would consider talks with Israel, without US mediation, if Prime Minister Olmert pledged publicly to complete withdrawal from the Golan Heights. He also implied Turkey could be the intermediary in setting up such talks. A $1 billion Russo-Syrian arms deal was also confirmed.
The UN and US, in a closed UN meeting on UN Resolution 1701 that ended the Second Lebanon War, accused Syria of illegally transferring arms to Hizb’allah, in direct contravention of the mandatory Resolution (1701).
7· State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss released his office’s report on the Home Front during the Second Lebanon War (2006). All senior political and IDF figures were criticised for neglecting the Home Front. A total lack of strategic and local coordination and planning with regard to civilian protection was identified, which applied to successive governments, not just PM Olmert’s. 458 facilities containing dangerous chemicals remain unprotected from attack, as do all civilians living nearby.
Another report by a subcommittee of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee claimed that the civilian population in the North was effectively unprotected against a sudden chemical attack, had no access to gas masks, and that 50% of the population remained unprotected from missile attack and had no bomb shelters to go to.
8· India-Israel commercial ties strengthened with the confirmation of $1.6 billion of trade between the two countries (2006), and the announcement of a new $1.3 billion anti-missile project.
9· Iran agreed to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection of its heavy water plant at Arak. This facilitates the process of plutonium-based nuclear bomb making. Other safeguards upon the uranium enrichment plant at Nantaz were also agreed. The decision was made in advance of the UNSC meeting on increased sanctions on Iran for non-compliance with previous mandatory UNSC resolutions concerning nuclear weapons manufacture. Iran also agreed to an Iraqi offer for further talks in Baghdad, with the US, on Iraq’s security.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· Hamas continued to impose its hegemony upon the Gaza Strip with its arrests of Al Qaeda affiliated militia members. This indicates its priorities remain the security and control of Gaza over and above any strategic anti-Western alliance with Al-Qaeda, a long time rival. However, temporary alliances may evolve in the future. The reduction in Qassam fire this week may also indicate an agreement with Islamic Jihad that Qassam missiles can no longer be fired without prior Hamas approval. The constant IDF raids into Gaza to counter Islamic Jihad fired rockets will have also forced Hamas’ hand. Hamas found it difficult to reconcile its claims to have brought increased security to Gaza with the increase in IDF raids. Egypt’s refusal to open the border to Gazans has also put pressure on Hamas that relied heavily on Iranian cash infusions via the EU monitored border crossing at Rafah. The refusal to supply Hamas with funds from the EU, US, Japan, and some Gulf States, has considerably restricted Hamas’ room for manoeuvre. Hamas also still needs Egyptian and Israeli cooperation to free its prisoners.
· A major political confrontation is likely should Hamas successfully convene the Palestinian Legislative Council and pass a motion of no confidence in President Abbas’ selected interim government of Salaam Fayyad. According to the lawyers and experts who drew up the Palestinian Constitution, the current government is illegal, because it requires the consent of the Hamas dominated Legislature. Hence, President Abbas’ attempts to reconvene the PLO, of which Hamas is not a member, to enable him to call new elections, thus bypassing any objections. Hamas have long been demanding to be represented in the only internationally recognised representative organisation of the Palestinian people (the PLO). In the short term the current standoff can only result in two Palestinian states or entities. But, in the medium term it is clear that Abbas can offer membership of the PLO in exchange for the return of Fatah’s presence in Gaza, and, new elections there.
· PM Olmert has agreed to the Fatah prisoner releases and amnesties for the Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades militias because of Abbas’ impotence. The calls for negotiations by the Quartet members, their sending a high profile representative Tony Blair, and the forthcoming meeting concerned with presenting the Arab League position through the offices of the Jordanian and Egyptian Foreign Ministries are all designed to bolster Abbas. It is also likely that the Palestinian quasi-military Badr Brigade based in Jordan will be allowed to buttress Abbas’ security forces in the West Bank.
· Syria is currently making less belligerent noises because the UN Security Council is currently considering Syria’s violation of mandatory UNSC Resolution 1701 which makes it in breach of international law by transferring weapons to non-government forces in Lebanon (Hizb’allah). Nevertheless Syria is preparing for a war in 2008 should her demands not be met. The likelihood of a war this summer is slim unless someone makes a major miscalculation, which seems unlikely considering the increasing diplomatic activity planned for this summer and autumn, and the price both Iran and Syria would pay if they challenged the international community just as it gears up for peace and security talks in Baghdad, Jerusalem, and possibly Geneva in the fall.
· The State Comptroller’s report, together with that of a subcommittee of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, clearly state that successive Israeli governments whether of Labour’s Ehud Barak or Likud’s Arik Sharon, have systematically neglected the protection, safety, and security of border region citizens. This criminal neglect continues today with no protection against gas or chemical attack because no gas masks could be distributed in time, and 50% of the population totally unprotected from missile attack, as they have no bomb shelters to go to. Almost no sensitive industrial or chemical sites are protected from missile attack.
· It has taken another 6 months to allocate funds to Sderot for bunkers and anti-missile shelters despite it having been under almost daily missile attack for nearly 6 years. Government bureaucracy, Treasury procrastination, and political posturing have been blamed for the delay. PM Olmert’s extraordinarily insensitive remarks about citizens having to expect to put up with these attacks exposed his underlying attitude of indifference to Israeli civilian suffering during the Second Lebanon War, and partially explain the government’s stunning neglect.
· The Winograd Committee’s report into the Second Lebanon War is likely to be further delayed as lawyers representing all those likely to be criticised demand clear notice so that they can prepare their clients’ defence. As this is likely to include almost every senior politician and IDF officer that has served in the last 7 years the delay may be significant (November/December). This, however, gives PM Olmert more time to either organise his rearguard action, or, be further exposed to even more reports highlighting systemic incompetence on the part of his, and all previous, governments. There is no question that to blame PM Olmert for all these systemic and chronic faults is unjust, but it is an unfortunate fact of democratic political life that one be sometimes sacrificed on the altar of public opinion. The evidence, however, points to a serial inability of the Israeli public to accept the financial and other sacrifices needed to sustain their own defence, and, to accept their own responsibility for the systemic lack of professionalism, neglect, and ineptitude of their own institutions. Two examples were the insistence by IDF Reservists on cutting their period spent on Reserve duty, which in turn was supported by the Knesset, along with constant cuts in the Defence Budget. This in turn led to two of the biggest problems faced by the IDF during the Second Lebanon War, the lack of fitness of the Reserves and the deplorable state of their combat equipment. Both of these faults were due directly to decisions taken by the very people upon whom they rebounded.
· Iran’s apparent flexibility in allowing inspections of its facilities is the clearest indication yet that UN Security Council pressure is paying off. It is possible that North Korea’s decision to suspend its nuclear programme as a result of pressure from China has also been a factor in Iran’s decision making. Much of Iran’s nuclear and missile development has been based on exchanges of information with the Asian dictatorship. It is clear that if China and Russia are prepared to join with the US and the UK in putting pressure on Iran to pursue a purely civilian nuclear energy programme she will be forced to do so. Without China and Russia’s consent the West will be faced with two stark options:
a) A military strike or b) a long-term strategy of containment.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
___________________________________
________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
Wednesday, 11 July 2007
Week 4 July – 10 July 2007
This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 7 Qassam missiles and 18 mortar rounds were fired into southern Israel. The mortars were aimed at the Erez (N Gaza) and Kerem Shalom (S Gaza) border crossings. The number of Qassams fired was half last week’s but Hamas, unusually, took direct responsibility for them. The IDF had successfully carried out a series of anti Qassam missile, tunnel, and weapons searches within the Gaza Strip during which a senior Hamas military commander had been killed. Hamas continued to impose its rule on Gaza and now has 7-10,000 trained men under its direct command. Arrests of Fatah officials continued but so did Hamas' demands for a new unity government.
2· Secret negotiations continued with Hamas leaders imprisoned in Israel over the release of kidnapped corporal Schalit who has been held in Gaza for over a year. It was claimed that some of the Hamas prisoners would be exchanged directly for Schalit whilst others would be exiled. This avenue for talks has been opened because negotiations through Egyptian intermediaries with Hamas in Gaza had been suspended since Egyptian intelligence representatives were withdrawn following Hamas’ coup there. Egyptian forces discovered 1,200 kilograms of explosives buried in the Sinai desert near Gaza, and continued to keep the border with Gaza closed.
3· Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s attempts to free 250 prisoners for President Abbas as a gesture of goodwill encountered two problems. First, there was resistance from within the coalition government to the deal, which was successfully overcome. Second the list supplied by Shin Bet and the Justice Ministry contained too many names that were due for release in the near future. Olmert asked for a new list.
4· Olmert also again called for direct talks with Syrian President Assad without US involvement. President Bush continued to eschew any connections with Syria because of their support for terrorism in Lebanon and Iraq. Syria simultaneously called for talks with US mediation, whilst insisting that Israel was about to launch a war. Syria ordered all its citizens to return from Lebanon by 15 July, and has removed all military checkpoints on the North Central Golan Heights near Kuneitra. The UNSC is to discuss on 16 July the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1701 that ended the Second Lebanon War (12 August 2006), called for an end to all militias in Lebanon, and reiterated its support for Lebanese sovereignty and independence.
On or around the same date the United Nations Security Council is due to receive the report from UN investigator Serge Brammertz into the assassination of Lebanon’s PM Rafiq Hariri and other related crimes in which Syrian security personnel have been implicated.
5· The Arab League delegation due this week in Jerusalem was cancelled. No clear official reasons were given but the delegation is expected within the next week or two. Some sources claimed that Olmert wished to meet with Condoleeza Rice of the US State Department, and President Abbas following the prisoner release, before the delegation arrived.
6· PM Olmert’s Cabinet reshuffle that followed a series of resignations resulted in a minor rift with Labour as Haim Ramon, previously convicted of sexual harassment, was readmitted into the government as Vice Premier and Minister in the Prime Minister's Office with responsibility for state policy. Ramon had been found guilty of forcibly kissing a female employee working in his Justice Ministry office in 2006. Several other Ministers, and potential rivals, from Olmert’s Kadima Party were given promotions.
7· Silvan Shalom retired from the Likud Leadership Primary. Its leader, Bibi Netanyahu, had called a snap primary election, which Shalom felt gave the Party little time to prepare. Only right wing activist Moshe Feiglin remains in the race but stands no chance of replacing Netanyahu as leader. However, Netanyahu’s bullying tactics alienated some within the Party. The polls still favour Likud to win any early election though it does face an unwelcome challenge from Russian billionaire Arkadi Gaydamak’s new party “Social Justice”, which may take some votes from traditional Likud voters.
8· The International Atomic Energy Agency claimed that Iran had slowed down its uranium enrichment process in advance of the United Nations Security Council vote on increased sanctions against it for non-compliance with mandatory UNSC Resolutions concerning unauthorised enrichment.
9· Italian PM Romano Prodi became the first senior foreign politician to visit Sderot near Gaza and expressed astonishment that the area had been hit by 5,000 Qassam missiles in the last few years, describing it as “impossible” for the civilians there. He suggested Israel accept a non-military nuclear Iran but insisted Italy would comply with sanctions against Iran’s military programme despite long standing Italian business connections. Defence Ministry officials claimed the security fence in the West Bank which also follows the 1967 border, will not be completed until 2010 due to 148 legal challenges as well as government bureaucracy and apathy.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· The IDF policy of countering terrorist missile and other forms of attacks from Gaza has put Hamas in a difficult position. If Hamas does nothing to counter the successful IDF incursions its raison d’être is impugned. Hamas has itself stated the only reason Israel withdrew from Gaza was because Hamas forced it to leave. On the other hand Hamas needs time to assert its hegemony over the Strip. To confront the IDF would endanger its efforts and postpone any likelihood of a prisoner swap. But to do nothing undermines Hamas authority and honour. At some stage a confrontation is inevitable and Hamas’ acknowledgement that it fired the Qassam missiles into Israel is a warning. Israel’s only concern is for the kidnapped soldier Gilad Schalit but the IDF carried out its “Summer Rains” operation, in which 400 Palestinians died despite their concerns for his safety so a confrontation remains likely. The main uncertainty is whether the confrontation will be made with or without Syrian, Hizb’allah, or Iranian coordination.
· The issue of Schalit remains problematic for Israel. The temporary refusal of Egypt to become involved with negotiations, the difficulty in choosing which prisoners to set free, the constant interference of Hamas leaders in Damascus and through them Syria and Iran, has made his release more complex and less likely. Israel has to walk a fine line between making Schalit’s release worthwhile to Hamas whilst not rewarding their behaviour. This requires the IDF to keep up its deterrent activities against Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Army of Islam and its Dagmoush clan and Al Qaeda affiliates, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and other quasi-Marxist groups, and the renegade Fatah Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, thus keeping them on the defensive, whilst, simultaneously, negotiating a prisoner swap through Egypt.
· Egypt’s only means of influencing events in Gaza and Israel is through the weapons tunnels into the Strip. But, the longer Egypt allows the smuggling to continue the more likely Al Qaeda and other radical elements will become uncontrollable. Schalit also remains one of the few areas of leverage Egypt has. Hamas and Israel refuse to negotiate directly, which makes Egypt indispensable. Yet, the longer there is no prisoner swap the more likely a full-scale confrontation will develop. Egypt wants to punish Hamas for the coup but the Egyptian regime also needs to render itself indispensable as well in order to keep Hamas under some sort of control. Finally, Egypt has to bear in mind the US Congress has threatened to cut its grant aid if the regime does not at least try to end the weapons smuggling into Gaza.
· The difficulties Prime Minister Olmert has faced in his attempts to bolster President Abbas through the prisoner release are symptomatic of a much deeper problem. The Palestinian avenue for peace is blocked by the ineptitude, corruption, and impotence of Abbas, and the sure knowledge that any agreement with him will be useless because Hamas will undermine it by whatever means. Only a united Palestinian negotiating partner has even the slightest possibility of delivering any agreement. Israel needs at least the tacit approval of Hamas. This cannot happen as long as the Palestinian factions are at loggerheads. This partly explains Olmert’s refusal to see the Arab League delegation from Jordan and Egypt this week and his appeal to Syria for direct negotiations. However, without the mediation of the US Administration little can be agreed. The Syrian regime will not take any strategic risks without US guarantees that sanctions will be lifted and the regime left undisturbed. Some sort of recognition that Lebanon is within Syria’s legitimate sphere of influence would also have to be given.
· Syria too is walking a tightrope. The regime does not want a war with Israel, despite any misplaced confidence in the damage it can inflict. It desperately needs the US to intervene to allow it to balance its strategic alliance with Iran against another major power in order to avoid total dependence on the Iranian regime. But if the US is unable or unwilling to offer any alternative strategic alliance, and the regime perceives its existence at stake, it will throw in its lot with Tehran. This means a continuation of the crude, but so far effective, strategy of threats, assassinations, and terrorism, in Lebanon, and Iraq. Syria has now clearly allied itself with Al Qaeda affiliated groups. It is using them to put pressure on the Lebanese government, UNIFIL and Israel, through assassinations, Katyusha attacks on Israel, camp wars, roadside bombs against UNIFIL, and criminal activity such as bank robberies. It sees the 16 July report on the Hariri assassination, and the UNSC discussion of Resolution 1701 on Lebanese independence as crucial to its future. This explains its call to all Syrians to return from Lebanon by 15 July, its veiled threats against Israel through the dismantlement of its border posts on the Golan, and its appeals for peace talks with Israel through US mediation. The message to the US, UN, and Israel is simple: you may despise our modus operandi but you can achieve nothing without engaging with both our regime and our interests.
· Olmert’s Cabinet reshuffle indicates he is not prepared to leave the post of PM following the Winograd Committee findings on the Second Lebanon War this autumn without a fight. The reintroduction of Haim Ramon to his Private Office and as Vice Premier is a direct slap in the face to Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and Ehud Barak. Ramon will be doing all in his power to form an alliance with United Torah Judaism, so the government can continue to function without Labour should they resign from the government. If Livni objects she will be forced to resign after her appeal to Olmert to go will have fallen on deaf ears for the second time running. Olmert can then organise a post for himself if he needs to resign, such as the Finance or Foreign Ministry, or in the worst case Minister without Portfolio. However, Olmert may be forced to reluctantly retire from the government if Winograd is unanimously and specifically hostile to him, in which case he will have to settle for a position on one of the leading Knesset Committees.
· Iran continues to play for time as the new UNSC vote on increased sanctions approaches by showing willing and reducing the pace of its nuclear uranium enrichment programme. It is clear from visiting Italian Prime Minister Prodi’s remarks that the EU will expect Israel to accept Iran's nuclear energy programme, which remains a necessary and legitimate national goal, should the UN be able to forge a compromise with the radical regime by which it abandons its nuclear weapons ambitions.
Israel has done nothing to defend its population against attack. Defence funds for the Home Front have been delayed and cut. The bunkers have not been renovated or improved to withstand any ballistic missile threat, or even Katyusha threat, from Iran, Syria, Hamas, or Hizb’allah. The fence continues to lag behind; a one-year project is now expected to last 8 years (2002-2010). Olmert explained this criminal neglect as a cost issue, saying that there was an element of risk involved in living in Israel. This would explain his indifference towards the elderly and infirm during the Lebanon war, all of whom were left to charities to be looked after in their homes as they were unable to get to a local bunker, added to which, few if any were suitably provisioned or capable of accommodating them.
· The latest assessments of Iran’s capability are that she will be ready to manufacture either plutonium or uranium-based nuclear weapons within 2 to 3 years. The US is not prepared to countenance a military strike against Iran, despite noises to the contrary. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, an expert on containment of the Soviet nuclear threat, is the dominant voice at present and is unlikely to change her position. If any clear evidence emerges that Iran is supplying terrorist groups with weapons of mass destruction or is preparing an imminent strike the US position will change. Increasing sanctions is the main weapon against Iranian nuclear weapons ambitions. Israel is not prepared strategically, politically, psychologically, or in terms of Home Defence, to strike Iran at present.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
_________________________
_________________________
_________________________
______________________
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 7 Qassam missiles and 18 mortar rounds were fired into southern Israel. The mortars were aimed at the Erez (N Gaza) and Kerem Shalom (S Gaza) border crossings. The number of Qassams fired was half last week’s but Hamas, unusually, took direct responsibility for them. The IDF had successfully carried out a series of anti Qassam missile, tunnel, and weapons searches within the Gaza Strip during which a senior Hamas military commander had been killed. Hamas continued to impose its rule on Gaza and now has 7-10,000 trained men under its direct command. Arrests of Fatah officials continued but so did Hamas' demands for a new unity government.
2· Secret negotiations continued with Hamas leaders imprisoned in Israel over the release of kidnapped corporal Schalit who has been held in Gaza for over a year. It was claimed that some of the Hamas prisoners would be exchanged directly for Schalit whilst others would be exiled. This avenue for talks has been opened because negotiations through Egyptian intermediaries with Hamas in Gaza had been suspended since Egyptian intelligence representatives were withdrawn following Hamas’ coup there. Egyptian forces discovered 1,200 kilograms of explosives buried in the Sinai desert near Gaza, and continued to keep the border with Gaza closed.
3· Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s attempts to free 250 prisoners for President Abbas as a gesture of goodwill encountered two problems. First, there was resistance from within the coalition government to the deal, which was successfully overcome. Second the list supplied by Shin Bet and the Justice Ministry contained too many names that were due for release in the near future. Olmert asked for a new list.
4· Olmert also again called for direct talks with Syrian President Assad without US involvement. President Bush continued to eschew any connections with Syria because of their support for terrorism in Lebanon and Iraq. Syria simultaneously called for talks with US mediation, whilst insisting that Israel was about to launch a war. Syria ordered all its citizens to return from Lebanon by 15 July, and has removed all military checkpoints on the North Central Golan Heights near Kuneitra. The UNSC is to discuss on 16 July the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1701 that ended the Second Lebanon War (12 August 2006), called for an end to all militias in Lebanon, and reiterated its support for Lebanese sovereignty and independence.
On or around the same date the United Nations Security Council is due to receive the report from UN investigator Serge Brammertz into the assassination of Lebanon’s PM Rafiq Hariri and other related crimes in which Syrian security personnel have been implicated.
5· The Arab League delegation due this week in Jerusalem was cancelled. No clear official reasons were given but the delegation is expected within the next week or two. Some sources claimed that Olmert wished to meet with Condoleeza Rice of the US State Department, and President Abbas following the prisoner release, before the delegation arrived.
6· PM Olmert’s Cabinet reshuffle that followed a series of resignations resulted in a minor rift with Labour as Haim Ramon, previously convicted of sexual harassment, was readmitted into the government as Vice Premier and Minister in the Prime Minister's Office with responsibility for state policy. Ramon had been found guilty of forcibly kissing a female employee working in his Justice Ministry office in 2006. Several other Ministers, and potential rivals, from Olmert’s Kadima Party were given promotions.
7· Silvan Shalom retired from the Likud Leadership Primary. Its leader, Bibi Netanyahu, had called a snap primary election, which Shalom felt gave the Party little time to prepare. Only right wing activist Moshe Feiglin remains in the race but stands no chance of replacing Netanyahu as leader. However, Netanyahu’s bullying tactics alienated some within the Party. The polls still favour Likud to win any early election though it does face an unwelcome challenge from Russian billionaire Arkadi Gaydamak’s new party “Social Justice”, which may take some votes from traditional Likud voters.
8· The International Atomic Energy Agency claimed that Iran had slowed down its uranium enrichment process in advance of the United Nations Security Council vote on increased sanctions against it for non-compliance with mandatory UNSC Resolutions concerning unauthorised enrichment.
9· Italian PM Romano Prodi became the first senior foreign politician to visit Sderot near Gaza and expressed astonishment that the area had been hit by 5,000 Qassam missiles in the last few years, describing it as “impossible” for the civilians there. He suggested Israel accept a non-military nuclear Iran but insisted Italy would comply with sanctions against Iran’s military programme despite long standing Italian business connections. Defence Ministry officials claimed the security fence in the West Bank which also follows the 1967 border, will not be completed until 2010 due to 148 legal challenges as well as government bureaucracy and apathy.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· The IDF policy of countering terrorist missile and other forms of attacks from Gaza has put Hamas in a difficult position. If Hamas does nothing to counter the successful IDF incursions its raison d’être is impugned. Hamas has itself stated the only reason Israel withdrew from Gaza was because Hamas forced it to leave. On the other hand Hamas needs time to assert its hegemony over the Strip. To confront the IDF would endanger its efforts and postpone any likelihood of a prisoner swap. But to do nothing undermines Hamas authority and honour. At some stage a confrontation is inevitable and Hamas’ acknowledgement that it fired the Qassam missiles into Israel is a warning. Israel’s only concern is for the kidnapped soldier Gilad Schalit but the IDF carried out its “Summer Rains” operation, in which 400 Palestinians died despite their concerns for his safety so a confrontation remains likely. The main uncertainty is whether the confrontation will be made with or without Syrian, Hizb’allah, or Iranian coordination.
· The issue of Schalit remains problematic for Israel. The temporary refusal of Egypt to become involved with negotiations, the difficulty in choosing which prisoners to set free, the constant interference of Hamas leaders in Damascus and through them Syria and Iran, has made his release more complex and less likely. Israel has to walk a fine line between making Schalit’s release worthwhile to Hamas whilst not rewarding their behaviour. This requires the IDF to keep up its deterrent activities against Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Army of Islam and its Dagmoush clan and Al Qaeda affiliates, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and other quasi-Marxist groups, and the renegade Fatah Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, thus keeping them on the defensive, whilst, simultaneously, negotiating a prisoner swap through Egypt.
· Egypt’s only means of influencing events in Gaza and Israel is through the weapons tunnels into the Strip. But, the longer Egypt allows the smuggling to continue the more likely Al Qaeda and other radical elements will become uncontrollable. Schalit also remains one of the few areas of leverage Egypt has. Hamas and Israel refuse to negotiate directly, which makes Egypt indispensable. Yet, the longer there is no prisoner swap the more likely a full-scale confrontation will develop. Egypt wants to punish Hamas for the coup but the Egyptian regime also needs to render itself indispensable as well in order to keep Hamas under some sort of control. Finally, Egypt has to bear in mind the US Congress has threatened to cut its grant aid if the regime does not at least try to end the weapons smuggling into Gaza.
· The difficulties Prime Minister Olmert has faced in his attempts to bolster President Abbas through the prisoner release are symptomatic of a much deeper problem. The Palestinian avenue for peace is blocked by the ineptitude, corruption, and impotence of Abbas, and the sure knowledge that any agreement with him will be useless because Hamas will undermine it by whatever means. Only a united Palestinian negotiating partner has even the slightest possibility of delivering any agreement. Israel needs at least the tacit approval of Hamas. This cannot happen as long as the Palestinian factions are at loggerheads. This partly explains Olmert’s refusal to see the Arab League delegation from Jordan and Egypt this week and his appeal to Syria for direct negotiations. However, without the mediation of the US Administration little can be agreed. The Syrian regime will not take any strategic risks without US guarantees that sanctions will be lifted and the regime left undisturbed. Some sort of recognition that Lebanon is within Syria’s legitimate sphere of influence would also have to be given.
· Syria too is walking a tightrope. The regime does not want a war with Israel, despite any misplaced confidence in the damage it can inflict. It desperately needs the US to intervene to allow it to balance its strategic alliance with Iran against another major power in order to avoid total dependence on the Iranian regime. But if the US is unable or unwilling to offer any alternative strategic alliance, and the regime perceives its existence at stake, it will throw in its lot with Tehran. This means a continuation of the crude, but so far effective, strategy of threats, assassinations, and terrorism, in Lebanon, and Iraq. Syria has now clearly allied itself with Al Qaeda affiliated groups. It is using them to put pressure on the Lebanese government, UNIFIL and Israel, through assassinations, Katyusha attacks on Israel, camp wars, roadside bombs against UNIFIL, and criminal activity such as bank robberies. It sees the 16 July report on the Hariri assassination, and the UNSC discussion of Resolution 1701 on Lebanese independence as crucial to its future. This explains its call to all Syrians to return from Lebanon by 15 July, its veiled threats against Israel through the dismantlement of its border posts on the Golan, and its appeals for peace talks with Israel through US mediation. The message to the US, UN, and Israel is simple: you may despise our modus operandi but you can achieve nothing without engaging with both our regime and our interests.
· Olmert’s Cabinet reshuffle indicates he is not prepared to leave the post of PM following the Winograd Committee findings on the Second Lebanon War this autumn without a fight. The reintroduction of Haim Ramon to his Private Office and as Vice Premier is a direct slap in the face to Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and Ehud Barak. Ramon will be doing all in his power to form an alliance with United Torah Judaism, so the government can continue to function without Labour should they resign from the government. If Livni objects she will be forced to resign after her appeal to Olmert to go will have fallen on deaf ears for the second time running. Olmert can then organise a post for himself if he needs to resign, such as the Finance or Foreign Ministry, or in the worst case Minister without Portfolio. However, Olmert may be forced to reluctantly retire from the government if Winograd is unanimously and specifically hostile to him, in which case he will have to settle for a position on one of the leading Knesset Committees.
· Iran continues to play for time as the new UNSC vote on increased sanctions approaches by showing willing and reducing the pace of its nuclear uranium enrichment programme. It is clear from visiting Italian Prime Minister Prodi’s remarks that the EU will expect Israel to accept Iran's nuclear energy programme, which remains a necessary and legitimate national goal, should the UN be able to forge a compromise with the radical regime by which it abandons its nuclear weapons ambitions.
Israel has done nothing to defend its population against attack. Defence funds for the Home Front have been delayed and cut. The bunkers have not been renovated or improved to withstand any ballistic missile threat, or even Katyusha threat, from Iran, Syria, Hamas, or Hizb’allah. The fence continues to lag behind; a one-year project is now expected to last 8 years (2002-2010). Olmert explained this criminal neglect as a cost issue, saying that there was an element of risk involved in living in Israel. This would explain his indifference towards the elderly and infirm during the Lebanon war, all of whom were left to charities to be looked after in their homes as they were unable to get to a local bunker, added to which, few if any were suitably provisioned or capable of accommodating them.
· The latest assessments of Iran’s capability are that she will be ready to manufacture either plutonium or uranium-based nuclear weapons within 2 to 3 years. The US is not prepared to countenance a military strike against Iran, despite noises to the contrary. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, an expert on containment of the Soviet nuclear threat, is the dominant voice at present and is unlikely to change her position. If any clear evidence emerges that Iran is supplying terrorist groups with weapons of mass destruction or is preparing an imminent strike the US position will change. Increasing sanctions is the main weapon against Iranian nuclear weapons ambitions. Israel is not prepared strategically, politically, psychologically, or in terms of Home Defence, to strike Iran at present.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
_________________________
_________________________
_________________________
______________________
Wednesday, 4 July 2007
Week 27 June – 3 July 2007
This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· Hamas applied sufficient pressure on the Dagmoush clan to force the release of BBC correspondent Alan Johnston. Negotiations between Hamas and the Dagmoush continued up until the last minute before his release. The Dagmoush had accepted blood money for the death of one of their clan at the hands of Hamas several weeks ago but were holding out for further concessions by demanding the release of convicted Islamist prisoners. But once the clan realised that Hamas would continue the siege of their part of Sabra neighbourhood in Gaza City indefinitely, and relatives of the kidnappers had been arrested, and upon their receiving promises of safety in front of independent witnesses, they finally acquiesced to the pressure. Hamas made clear they expected negotiations to continue with Israel over the release of Corporal Schalit in exchange for the mass release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, but exclusively through Egyptian mediation.
2· Egyptian President Mubarak and former Hamas PM Haniyeh both rejected any involvement of international forces in or around the Gaza Strip. Hamas stated they will treat any such forces as occupiers. Israel’s attempts to disengage completely from Gaza and make the security threat and weapons supplies into the Strip an international issue appeared to have failed for the moment. Russia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt pleaded for the reconstitution of the national unity government of former Prime Minister Haniyeh’s Hamas, and President Abbas’ Fatah, parties.
3· The IDF continued to mount operations in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, searching for weapons, explosive devices, missiles, wanted militants, and tunnels from the Strip into Israel. There were several targeted killings of Islamic Jihad commanders responsible for missile, mortar, and previous, or attempted, suicide attacks upon Israel. Israel’s Security Service also arrested 11 Hamas members involved in recruiting East Jerusalem Arabs with Israeli Residency Permits and/or identity cards to commit acts of terrorism, and take over the Temple Mount from the Jordan-affiliated Waqf (Muslim Religious Trust), that traditionally run the holy site.
13 Qassam missiles landed in or near Sderot, and 16 mortar shells were fired at border crossings this week, a similar tally to last week’s. Despite the shelling, the Karni crossing (NE Gaza Strip), was reopened by Israel to border traffic.
4· Labour leader and Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s decision to force elections in 2008, should PM Ehud Olmert not resign from the government following the publication of the final draft of the Winograd report on the Second Lebanon War in mid September or early October, was accepted by the Labour Party Central Committee. Other members said not enough Central Committee members were present at the vote so it may have to be retaken.
5· Likud leader Bibi Netanyahu announced Likud Leadership Primaries would be held 3rd September in anticipation of early 2008 elections. Three Likud candidates have declared themselves so far. They include Netanyahu, ex-Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, and right-winger Moshe Feiglin. The same three candidates ran in the December 2005 Likud Leadership Primaries. Netanyahu is certain to be re-elected.
6· UNIFIL and LAF (Lebanese Army Forces) preliminary findings concerning both the 24 June bomb attack on UNIFIL and 17 June missile attack on N Israel, blamed Al Qaeda or their affiliates, the first such operations by them in Lebanon.
7· President Katsav formally handed in his resignation having accepted a plea bargain with Attorney General Menachem Mazuz. Katsav has to admit his guilt to the indecent act and sexual and witness harassment charges, pay compensation to two of the alleged eight victims, not appeal the charges, and accept a one year suspended jail sentence. The rape charges are dropped as part of the bargain. Knesset Speaker Labour’s Dalia Itzik is acting President until 15 July when Shimon Peres will become President. 15,000 women demonstrated against the plea bargain arrangement and it is currently under legal challenge by several campaign groups. President Katsav dismissed over 90% of the allegations against him including all the serious charges, and said he agreed to the bargain only in order to stop the distress to his family that the prolonged legal procedures and media scrutiny had engendered.
8· Prime Minister Ehud Olmert continued in his attempts to release 250 Palestinian prisoners with “no blood on their hands” to the new administration on the West Bank. The government also released $118 million in withheld tax receipts to President Abbas’ emergency cabinet. This allowed the first full payment in 17 months of wages to all civil servants, including security personnel, not affiliated with Hamas. PM Olmert accepted Finance Minister Abraham Hirshson’s resignation so he could deal with allegations of impropriety. Another Kadima MK, Ronnie Bar-On, replaced him. Olmert also noted that the State was unable to stop every Qassam as it was too expensive and that to live in Israel was to accept certain levels of risk.
9· Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair was selected to represent the Quartet (EU, Russia, UN, and USA), in the Middle East. This post normally focuses upon building Palestinian institutions in preparation for independence and statehood. These narrow parameters may be expanded to accommodate Mr Blair’s peacemaking ambitions.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· Hamas’ success in freeing Alan Johnston is vital to their imposing their hegemony over Gaza. The criminal Dagmoush clan with its affiliations to Al Qaeda, have been curtailed. They can no longer play Hamas and Fatah off against each other and now know Hamas would crush them should they transgress Hamas’ interests. The release also gives Hamas credibility in their negotiations through Egypt with Israel in the prisoner exchange of kidnapped Corporal Schalit for 450 Palestinian prisoners. Most of the freed prisoners will belong to Hamas, but to placate some Fatah and other groups that are currently affiliated with Hamas in Gaza, non-Hamas prisoners may be demanded. This puts Israel in an invidious position. Hamas will gain at least 450 prisoners in exchange for a successful cross-border kidnap, but President Abbas will only receive 250 prisoners in exchange for a stated policy of non-violence and a reaffirmation of Fatah’s recognition of Israel. The most likely outcome will be the postponement of any deal with Hamas as Israel does not want to be seen rewarding the group and conversely does want to reward President Abbas.
· Another Palestinian national unity government is inevitable at some point. Even if elections are held and Hamas lose in Gaza, which is highly unlikely, Hamas would never allow Fatah rule over the Strip. An accommodation has to be reached. It is possible that President Abbas is preparing the ground for elections in the West Bank that would see a noticeable defeat for Hamas there. He can then bargain from a position of strength over the composition of the Cabinet, maintaining control over security and finance in the West Bank, whilst leaving Gaza to Hamas. This is unlikely to succeed without the support and release of the popular imprisoned leader Marwan Barghouti, currently in jail in Israel on multiple murder charges. He is the only Palestinian figure capable of uniting all the various Fatah and non-Hamas factions.
· Egypt’s rejection of a multi national force on the Sinai-Gaza border is a setback for Israel, as Egypt’s unwillingness or inability to curb the arms flows into Gaza is at the heart of the Hamas takeover. Egypt’s only means of influencing events in the Israel-Palestine dispute, or in Gaza itself, is through the manipulation of arms flows. Egypt wants to maintain this weapon as well as increase its military presence in the Sinai. It cannot do so without an agreement with Israel because of the terms of the 1979 Peace Accord, which restricts Egyptian forces’ numbers. Israel will have to agree to renegotiate the treaty to satisfy Egyptian concerns that are becoming ever more pressing. Egypt has to contend with an increase in Muslim Brotherhood activity, the infiltration of Al Qaeda into Sinai, and a recalcitrant Bedouin community whose main income is derived from arms and people smuggling.
· The most satisfactory result for Labour and Kadima would be if PM Olmert resigned soon after the final Winograd report is published between mid September and mid October. This will enable Kadima to elect or select a new leader and give time for Labour’s Ehud Barak to impose his authority upon the Defence post. The coalition could then continue until Barak thought it opportune to withdraw from the government and demand a general election. However, should Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni become leader of Kadima and the government, and move the peace process forward, the elections may be postponed until at least late 2008. If Olmert refuses to resign Kadima might well implode from internal differences and early elections may be forced upon all the parties. This is unlikely, as Olmert will probably use his position to remain in a government post in exchange for his resignation and a recommendation that Livni replace him.
· Syria’s collusion in allowing Al Qaeda into Lebanon from Syrian territory is her way of increasing pressure on the Saniora government to reject the UN Tribunal into the murder of PM Hariri. It is also a way of putting pressure on Israel to negotiate with her over the Golan Heights, and a warning to the US Administration that she can no longer be ignored. The US has imposed sanctions against Syria. It is also a way of warning the EU that Lebanon is within Syria’s sphere of influence not Europe’s or the United Nations’.
· President Katsav was granted a plea bargain for two reasons. First, rape charges, particularly so long after the event, are notoriously difficult to prosecute, and there is evidence that Katsav was in some kind of relationship with at least two of the alleged rape victims. Second, the effect of a long trial, with Katsav being the second President to have to resign early, would be contrary to Israel’s national interest because it would subject Israel and the post of the Presidency to international ridicule, as opposed to the plea bargain, which directly humiliates Katzav and stains his reputation forever.
· PM Olmert may be able to lay the early foundations of some kind of peace process but he will not be able to see anything through. He has 3-5% public support. The Winograd Committee report on the Second Lebanon War will be scathing not only about him but also about Barak, ex-Defence and current Transport Minister Mofaz, and many others. Livni is likely to escape criticism, which will strengthen her position. But, only strong Palestinian leadership can deliver peace, post-Olmert. The only strong leader who recognises Israel and can deliver the Palestinians to the peace table is the convicted mass murderer Marwan Barghouti. Livni will probably have to free him before there can be any movement. He will also save Abbas should any elections be held because he can unite Fatah as well as some Independents and Marxists. He will then be strong enough to make a deal with Hamas and present a united front at any negotiations without which there will be no progress. But such a scenario is unlikely at the moment and would most likely come only some time after an Israeli general election, if at all. Unfortunately for Abbas he will have to hold elections soon according to the PA’s Constitution. It is therefore possible that he will stall for time and call on a reconvened Palestine Liberation Organisation to run the West Bank, as it has no Hamas representatives, and is the sole internationally recognised representative organisation of the Palestinian people.
· Tony Blair will enter the Middle East during a time of uncertainty and transition, and will have to resign himself to many years of talks before he is likely to see any progress. He will need to be prepared to commit himself to three to five years’ hard negotiations if he is to witness any developments either in the peace process or in the institutional infrastructure of a nascent Palestinian State.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
___________________________________________
_______________________________
_________________________________
____________________________________
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· Hamas applied sufficient pressure on the Dagmoush clan to force the release of BBC correspondent Alan Johnston. Negotiations between Hamas and the Dagmoush continued up until the last minute before his release. The Dagmoush had accepted blood money for the death of one of their clan at the hands of Hamas several weeks ago but were holding out for further concessions by demanding the release of convicted Islamist prisoners. But once the clan realised that Hamas would continue the siege of their part of Sabra neighbourhood in Gaza City indefinitely, and relatives of the kidnappers had been arrested, and upon their receiving promises of safety in front of independent witnesses, they finally acquiesced to the pressure. Hamas made clear they expected negotiations to continue with Israel over the release of Corporal Schalit in exchange for the mass release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, but exclusively through Egyptian mediation.
2· Egyptian President Mubarak and former Hamas PM Haniyeh both rejected any involvement of international forces in or around the Gaza Strip. Hamas stated they will treat any such forces as occupiers. Israel’s attempts to disengage completely from Gaza and make the security threat and weapons supplies into the Strip an international issue appeared to have failed for the moment. Russia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt pleaded for the reconstitution of the national unity government of former Prime Minister Haniyeh’s Hamas, and President Abbas’ Fatah, parties.
3· The IDF continued to mount operations in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, searching for weapons, explosive devices, missiles, wanted militants, and tunnels from the Strip into Israel. There were several targeted killings of Islamic Jihad commanders responsible for missile, mortar, and previous, or attempted, suicide attacks upon Israel. Israel’s Security Service also arrested 11 Hamas members involved in recruiting East Jerusalem Arabs with Israeli Residency Permits and/or identity cards to commit acts of terrorism, and take over the Temple Mount from the Jordan-affiliated Waqf (Muslim Religious Trust), that traditionally run the holy site.
13 Qassam missiles landed in or near Sderot, and 16 mortar shells were fired at border crossings this week, a similar tally to last week’s. Despite the shelling, the Karni crossing (NE Gaza Strip), was reopened by Israel to border traffic.
4· Labour leader and Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s decision to force elections in 2008, should PM Ehud Olmert not resign from the government following the publication of the final draft of the Winograd report on the Second Lebanon War in mid September or early October, was accepted by the Labour Party Central Committee. Other members said not enough Central Committee members were present at the vote so it may have to be retaken.
5· Likud leader Bibi Netanyahu announced Likud Leadership Primaries would be held 3rd September in anticipation of early 2008 elections. Three Likud candidates have declared themselves so far. They include Netanyahu, ex-Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, and right-winger Moshe Feiglin. The same three candidates ran in the December 2005 Likud Leadership Primaries. Netanyahu is certain to be re-elected.
6· UNIFIL and LAF (Lebanese Army Forces) preliminary findings concerning both the 24 June bomb attack on UNIFIL and 17 June missile attack on N Israel, blamed Al Qaeda or their affiliates, the first such operations by them in Lebanon.
7· President Katsav formally handed in his resignation having accepted a plea bargain with Attorney General Menachem Mazuz. Katsav has to admit his guilt to the indecent act and sexual and witness harassment charges, pay compensation to two of the alleged eight victims, not appeal the charges, and accept a one year suspended jail sentence. The rape charges are dropped as part of the bargain. Knesset Speaker Labour’s Dalia Itzik is acting President until 15 July when Shimon Peres will become President. 15,000 women demonstrated against the plea bargain arrangement and it is currently under legal challenge by several campaign groups. President Katsav dismissed over 90% of the allegations against him including all the serious charges, and said he agreed to the bargain only in order to stop the distress to his family that the prolonged legal procedures and media scrutiny had engendered.
8· Prime Minister Ehud Olmert continued in his attempts to release 250 Palestinian prisoners with “no blood on their hands” to the new administration on the West Bank. The government also released $118 million in withheld tax receipts to President Abbas’ emergency cabinet. This allowed the first full payment in 17 months of wages to all civil servants, including security personnel, not affiliated with Hamas. PM Olmert accepted Finance Minister Abraham Hirshson’s resignation so he could deal with allegations of impropriety. Another Kadima MK, Ronnie Bar-On, replaced him. Olmert also noted that the State was unable to stop every Qassam as it was too expensive and that to live in Israel was to accept certain levels of risk.
9· Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair was selected to represent the Quartet (EU, Russia, UN, and USA), in the Middle East. This post normally focuses upon building Palestinian institutions in preparation for independence and statehood. These narrow parameters may be expanded to accommodate Mr Blair’s peacemaking ambitions.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· Hamas’ success in freeing Alan Johnston is vital to their imposing their hegemony over Gaza. The criminal Dagmoush clan with its affiliations to Al Qaeda, have been curtailed. They can no longer play Hamas and Fatah off against each other and now know Hamas would crush them should they transgress Hamas’ interests. The release also gives Hamas credibility in their negotiations through Egypt with Israel in the prisoner exchange of kidnapped Corporal Schalit for 450 Palestinian prisoners. Most of the freed prisoners will belong to Hamas, but to placate some Fatah and other groups that are currently affiliated with Hamas in Gaza, non-Hamas prisoners may be demanded. This puts Israel in an invidious position. Hamas will gain at least 450 prisoners in exchange for a successful cross-border kidnap, but President Abbas will only receive 250 prisoners in exchange for a stated policy of non-violence and a reaffirmation of Fatah’s recognition of Israel. The most likely outcome will be the postponement of any deal with Hamas as Israel does not want to be seen rewarding the group and conversely does want to reward President Abbas.
· Another Palestinian national unity government is inevitable at some point. Even if elections are held and Hamas lose in Gaza, which is highly unlikely, Hamas would never allow Fatah rule over the Strip. An accommodation has to be reached. It is possible that President Abbas is preparing the ground for elections in the West Bank that would see a noticeable defeat for Hamas there. He can then bargain from a position of strength over the composition of the Cabinet, maintaining control over security and finance in the West Bank, whilst leaving Gaza to Hamas. This is unlikely to succeed without the support and release of the popular imprisoned leader Marwan Barghouti, currently in jail in Israel on multiple murder charges. He is the only Palestinian figure capable of uniting all the various Fatah and non-Hamas factions.
· Egypt’s rejection of a multi national force on the Sinai-Gaza border is a setback for Israel, as Egypt’s unwillingness or inability to curb the arms flows into Gaza is at the heart of the Hamas takeover. Egypt’s only means of influencing events in the Israel-Palestine dispute, or in Gaza itself, is through the manipulation of arms flows. Egypt wants to maintain this weapon as well as increase its military presence in the Sinai. It cannot do so without an agreement with Israel because of the terms of the 1979 Peace Accord, which restricts Egyptian forces’ numbers. Israel will have to agree to renegotiate the treaty to satisfy Egyptian concerns that are becoming ever more pressing. Egypt has to contend with an increase in Muslim Brotherhood activity, the infiltration of Al Qaeda into Sinai, and a recalcitrant Bedouin community whose main income is derived from arms and people smuggling.
· The most satisfactory result for Labour and Kadima would be if PM Olmert resigned soon after the final Winograd report is published between mid September and mid October. This will enable Kadima to elect or select a new leader and give time for Labour’s Ehud Barak to impose his authority upon the Defence post. The coalition could then continue until Barak thought it opportune to withdraw from the government and demand a general election. However, should Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni become leader of Kadima and the government, and move the peace process forward, the elections may be postponed until at least late 2008. If Olmert refuses to resign Kadima might well implode from internal differences and early elections may be forced upon all the parties. This is unlikely, as Olmert will probably use his position to remain in a government post in exchange for his resignation and a recommendation that Livni replace him.
· Syria’s collusion in allowing Al Qaeda into Lebanon from Syrian territory is her way of increasing pressure on the Saniora government to reject the UN Tribunal into the murder of PM Hariri. It is also a way of putting pressure on Israel to negotiate with her over the Golan Heights, and a warning to the US Administration that she can no longer be ignored. The US has imposed sanctions against Syria. It is also a way of warning the EU that Lebanon is within Syria’s sphere of influence not Europe’s or the United Nations’.
· President Katsav was granted a plea bargain for two reasons. First, rape charges, particularly so long after the event, are notoriously difficult to prosecute, and there is evidence that Katsav was in some kind of relationship with at least two of the alleged rape victims. Second, the effect of a long trial, with Katsav being the second President to have to resign early, would be contrary to Israel’s national interest because it would subject Israel and the post of the Presidency to international ridicule, as opposed to the plea bargain, which directly humiliates Katzav and stains his reputation forever.
· PM Olmert may be able to lay the early foundations of some kind of peace process but he will not be able to see anything through. He has 3-5% public support. The Winograd Committee report on the Second Lebanon War will be scathing not only about him but also about Barak, ex-Defence and current Transport Minister Mofaz, and many others. Livni is likely to escape criticism, which will strengthen her position. But, only strong Palestinian leadership can deliver peace, post-Olmert. The only strong leader who recognises Israel and can deliver the Palestinians to the peace table is the convicted mass murderer Marwan Barghouti. Livni will probably have to free him before there can be any movement. He will also save Abbas should any elections be held because he can unite Fatah as well as some Independents and Marxists. He will then be strong enough to make a deal with Hamas and present a united front at any negotiations without which there will be no progress. But such a scenario is unlikely at the moment and would most likely come only some time after an Israeli general election, if at all. Unfortunately for Abbas he will have to hold elections soon according to the PA’s Constitution. It is therefore possible that he will stall for time and call on a reconvened Palestine Liberation Organisation to run the West Bank, as it has no Hamas representatives, and is the sole internationally recognised representative organisation of the Palestinian people.
· Tony Blair will enter the Middle East during a time of uncertainty and transition, and will have to resign himself to many years of talks before he is likely to see any progress. He will need to be prepared to commit himself to three to five years’ hard negotiations if he is to witness any developments either in the peace process or in the institutional infrastructure of a nascent Palestinian State.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
___________________________________________
_______________________________
_________________________________
____________________________________
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