This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 7 Qassam missiles and 18 mortar rounds were fired into southern Israel. The mortars were aimed at the Erez (N Gaza) and Kerem Shalom (S Gaza) border crossings. The number of Qassams fired was half last week’s but Hamas, unusually, took direct responsibility for them. The IDF had successfully carried out a series of anti Qassam missile, tunnel, and weapons searches within the Gaza Strip during which a senior Hamas military commander had been killed. Hamas continued to impose its rule on Gaza and now has 7-10,000 trained men under its direct command. Arrests of Fatah officials continued but so did Hamas' demands for a new unity government.
2· Secret negotiations continued with Hamas leaders imprisoned in Israel over the release of kidnapped corporal Schalit who has been held in Gaza for over a year. It was claimed that some of the Hamas prisoners would be exchanged directly for Schalit whilst others would be exiled. This avenue for talks has been opened because negotiations through Egyptian intermediaries with Hamas in Gaza had been suspended since Egyptian intelligence representatives were withdrawn following Hamas’ coup there. Egyptian forces discovered 1,200 kilograms of explosives buried in the Sinai desert near Gaza, and continued to keep the border with Gaza closed.
3· Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s attempts to free 250 prisoners for President Abbas as a gesture of goodwill encountered two problems. First, there was resistance from within the coalition government to the deal, which was successfully overcome. Second the list supplied by Shin Bet and the Justice Ministry contained too many names that were due for release in the near future. Olmert asked for a new list.
4· Olmert also again called for direct talks with Syrian President Assad without US involvement. President Bush continued to eschew any connections with Syria because of their support for terrorism in Lebanon and Iraq. Syria simultaneously called for talks with US mediation, whilst insisting that Israel was about to launch a war. Syria ordered all its citizens to return from Lebanon by 15 July, and has removed all military checkpoints on the North Central Golan Heights near Kuneitra. The UNSC is to discuss on 16 July the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1701 that ended the Second Lebanon War (12 August 2006), called for an end to all militias in Lebanon, and reiterated its support for Lebanese sovereignty and independence.
On or around the same date the United Nations Security Council is due to receive the report from UN investigator Serge Brammertz into the assassination of Lebanon’s PM Rafiq Hariri and other related crimes in which Syrian security personnel have been implicated.
5· The Arab League delegation due this week in Jerusalem was cancelled. No clear official reasons were given but the delegation is expected within the next week or two. Some sources claimed that Olmert wished to meet with Condoleeza Rice of the US State Department, and President Abbas following the prisoner release, before the delegation arrived.
6· PM Olmert’s Cabinet reshuffle that followed a series of resignations resulted in a minor rift with Labour as Haim Ramon, previously convicted of sexual harassment, was readmitted into the government as Vice Premier and Minister in the Prime Minister's Office with responsibility for state policy. Ramon had been found guilty of forcibly kissing a female employee working in his Justice Ministry office in 2006. Several other Ministers, and potential rivals, from Olmert’s Kadima Party were given promotions.
7· Silvan Shalom retired from the Likud Leadership Primary. Its leader, Bibi Netanyahu, had called a snap primary election, which Shalom felt gave the Party little time to prepare. Only right wing activist Moshe Feiglin remains in the race but stands no chance of replacing Netanyahu as leader. However, Netanyahu’s bullying tactics alienated some within the Party. The polls still favour Likud to win any early election though it does face an unwelcome challenge from Russian billionaire Arkadi Gaydamak’s new party “Social Justice”, which may take some votes from traditional Likud voters.
8· The International Atomic Energy Agency claimed that Iran had slowed down its uranium enrichment process in advance of the United Nations Security Council vote on increased sanctions against it for non-compliance with mandatory UNSC Resolutions concerning unauthorised enrichment.
9· Italian PM Romano Prodi became the first senior foreign politician to visit Sderot near Gaza and expressed astonishment that the area had been hit by 5,000 Qassam missiles in the last few years, describing it as “impossible” for the civilians there. He suggested Israel accept a non-military nuclear Iran but insisted Italy would comply with sanctions against Iran’s military programme despite long standing Italian business connections. Defence Ministry officials claimed the security fence in the West Bank which also follows the 1967 border, will not be completed until 2010 due to 148 legal challenges as well as government bureaucracy and apathy.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· The IDF policy of countering terrorist missile and other forms of attacks from Gaza has put Hamas in a difficult position. If Hamas does nothing to counter the successful IDF incursions its raison d’être is impugned. Hamas has itself stated the only reason Israel withdrew from Gaza was because Hamas forced it to leave. On the other hand Hamas needs time to assert its hegemony over the Strip. To confront the IDF would endanger its efforts and postpone any likelihood of a prisoner swap. But to do nothing undermines Hamas authority and honour. At some stage a confrontation is inevitable and Hamas’ acknowledgement that it fired the Qassam missiles into Israel is a warning. Israel’s only concern is for the kidnapped soldier Gilad Schalit but the IDF carried out its “Summer Rains” operation, in which 400 Palestinians died despite their concerns for his safety so a confrontation remains likely. The main uncertainty is whether the confrontation will be made with or without Syrian, Hizb’allah, or Iranian coordination.
· The issue of Schalit remains problematic for Israel. The temporary refusal of Egypt to become involved with negotiations, the difficulty in choosing which prisoners to set free, the constant interference of Hamas leaders in Damascus and through them Syria and Iran, has made his release more complex and less likely. Israel has to walk a fine line between making Schalit’s release worthwhile to Hamas whilst not rewarding their behaviour. This requires the IDF to keep up its deterrent activities against Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Army of Islam and its Dagmoush clan and Al Qaeda affiliates, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and other quasi-Marxist groups, and the renegade Fatah Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, thus keeping them on the defensive, whilst, simultaneously, negotiating a prisoner swap through Egypt.
· Egypt’s only means of influencing events in Gaza and Israel is through the weapons tunnels into the Strip. But, the longer Egypt allows the smuggling to continue the more likely Al Qaeda and other radical elements will become uncontrollable. Schalit also remains one of the few areas of leverage Egypt has. Hamas and Israel refuse to negotiate directly, which makes Egypt indispensable. Yet, the longer there is no prisoner swap the more likely a full-scale confrontation will develop. Egypt wants to punish Hamas for the coup but the Egyptian regime also needs to render itself indispensable as well in order to keep Hamas under some sort of control. Finally, Egypt has to bear in mind the US Congress has threatened to cut its grant aid if the regime does not at least try to end the weapons smuggling into Gaza.
· The difficulties Prime Minister Olmert has faced in his attempts to bolster President Abbas through the prisoner release are symptomatic of a much deeper problem. The Palestinian avenue for peace is blocked by the ineptitude, corruption, and impotence of Abbas, and the sure knowledge that any agreement with him will be useless because Hamas will undermine it by whatever means. Only a united Palestinian negotiating partner has even the slightest possibility of delivering any agreement. Israel needs at least the tacit approval of Hamas. This cannot happen as long as the Palestinian factions are at loggerheads. This partly explains Olmert’s refusal to see the Arab League delegation from Jordan and Egypt this week and his appeal to Syria for direct negotiations. However, without the mediation of the US Administration little can be agreed. The Syrian regime will not take any strategic risks without US guarantees that sanctions will be lifted and the regime left undisturbed. Some sort of recognition that Lebanon is within Syria’s legitimate sphere of influence would also have to be given.
· Syria too is walking a tightrope. The regime does not want a war with Israel, despite any misplaced confidence in the damage it can inflict. It desperately needs the US to intervene to allow it to balance its strategic alliance with Iran against another major power in order to avoid total dependence on the Iranian regime. But if the US is unable or unwilling to offer any alternative strategic alliance, and the regime perceives its existence at stake, it will throw in its lot with Tehran. This means a continuation of the crude, but so far effective, strategy of threats, assassinations, and terrorism, in Lebanon, and Iraq. Syria has now clearly allied itself with Al Qaeda affiliated groups. It is using them to put pressure on the Lebanese government, UNIFIL and Israel, through assassinations, Katyusha attacks on Israel, camp wars, roadside bombs against UNIFIL, and criminal activity such as bank robberies. It sees the 16 July report on the Hariri assassination, and the UNSC discussion of Resolution 1701 on Lebanese independence as crucial to its future. This explains its call to all Syrians to return from Lebanon by 15 July, its veiled threats against Israel through the dismantlement of its border posts on the Golan, and its appeals for peace talks with Israel through US mediation. The message to the US, UN, and Israel is simple: you may despise our modus operandi but you can achieve nothing without engaging with both our regime and our interests.
· Olmert’s Cabinet reshuffle indicates he is not prepared to leave the post of PM following the Winograd Committee findings on the Second Lebanon War this autumn without a fight. The reintroduction of Haim Ramon to his Private Office and as Vice Premier is a direct slap in the face to Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and Ehud Barak. Ramon will be doing all in his power to form an alliance with United Torah Judaism, so the government can continue to function without Labour should they resign from the government. If Livni objects she will be forced to resign after her appeal to Olmert to go will have fallen on deaf ears for the second time running. Olmert can then organise a post for himself if he needs to resign, such as the Finance or Foreign Ministry, or in the worst case Minister without Portfolio. However, Olmert may be forced to reluctantly retire from the government if Winograd is unanimously and specifically hostile to him, in which case he will have to settle for a position on one of the leading Knesset Committees.
· Iran continues to play for time as the new UNSC vote on increased sanctions approaches by showing willing and reducing the pace of its nuclear uranium enrichment programme. It is clear from visiting Italian Prime Minister Prodi’s remarks that the EU will expect Israel to accept Iran's nuclear energy programme, which remains a necessary and legitimate national goal, should the UN be able to forge a compromise with the radical regime by which it abandons its nuclear weapons ambitions.
Israel has done nothing to defend its population against attack. Defence funds for the Home Front have been delayed and cut. The bunkers have not been renovated or improved to withstand any ballistic missile threat, or even Katyusha threat, from Iran, Syria, Hamas, or Hizb’allah. The fence continues to lag behind; a one-year project is now expected to last 8 years (2002-2010). Olmert explained this criminal neglect as a cost issue, saying that there was an element of risk involved in living in Israel. This would explain his indifference towards the elderly and infirm during the Lebanon war, all of whom were left to charities to be looked after in their homes as they were unable to get to a local bunker, added to which, few if any were suitably provisioned or capable of accommodating them.
· The latest assessments of Iran’s capability are that she will be ready to manufacture either plutonium or uranium-based nuclear weapons within 2 to 3 years. The US is not prepared to countenance a military strike against Iran, despite noises to the contrary. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, an expert on containment of the Soviet nuclear threat, is the dominant voice at present and is unlikely to change her position. If any clear evidence emerges that Iran is supplying terrorist groups with weapons of mass destruction or is preparing an imminent strike the US position will change. Increasing sanctions is the main weapon against Iranian nuclear weapons ambitions. Israel is not prepared strategically, politically, psychologically, or in terms of Home Defence, to strike Iran at present.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
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