This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with:
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 13 Qassam missiles and roughly 30 mortar rounds were fired at Israel this week. The level of Qassam fire nearly doubled from last week and the mortar fire, mainly directed at Gaza-Israel border crossing areas, increased significantly. Several Hamas-planted mines were also defused on the border. These attacks led to the EU suspending payments on fuel supplies to Gaza, which in turn led to some power cuts. The IDF continued to target Islamic Jihad and Hamas cells that fired Qassam missiles and continued to attempt to attack the border respectively. Some senior Islamic Jihad and Hamas commanders were killed as a result.
The EU agreed to continue payments for 25-30% of Gaza’s energy needs on a provisional basis after Hamas promised to stop its efforts to tax recipients and suppliers in order to finance their rule over the Gaza Strip.
Egypt continued to discover explosives in the Sinai; the latest find was 500 kilograms of TNT, 15 miles (25 kilometres) from S Gaza, its intended destination.
2· Palestinian Authority interim Prime Minister Fayyad apprised the EU of Hamas violations of fuel supply agreements to Gaza, and their violation of President Abbas’ decree that exempted all Gazans from paying taxes following the Hamas coup.
The PA held meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Japan, Jordan, and Israel to discuss plans for a regional industrial and agricultural zone near Jericho connected to a similar zone and airport in Jordan that would enable immediate access to overseas markets. Japan also provided $20 million in financial aid to the PA, and charitable foundations, in the West Bank.
President Abbas and PM Fayyad continued to be criticised for the lack of reforms to Fatah and their abandonment of armed resistance against Israel. The West Bank-based Fatah militia Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades used the arrests of two members by Israel for clear breaches of their amnesty agreements to declare a renewal of the armed struggle and rearmament. Tunis-based Fatah leader Farouk Kaddoumi called for unity by a return to armed struggle.
Abbas held talks in Jordan with two of Fatah’s Tunis-based old guard, Abu Mahir Ghnaim and Ahmed Afanah, who have well-established contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood and Syria respectively, and like Kaddoumi, opposed the Oslo Accords of 1993 that were the basis for all consequent PLO/PA-Israel agreements and mutual recognition.
Another, formerly Gaza-based, Fatah and clan leader Muhammad Dahlan returned to the West Bank this week following surgery in Europe. Hamas insisted he would never be allowed to return to Gaza.
3· A series of failures involving Israel’s institutions were reported this week:
1. Aviation safety procedures and equipment at Ben Gurion Airport were criticised for being outmoded and on the verge of collapse following the publication of the interim report of the Lapidot Committee ordered by Transport Minister Shaul Mofaz.
2. Minister of Environment Gideon Ezra admitted to the Knesset State Control Committee that his department had failed to implement a 2003 Cabinet decision to take responsibility for hazardous materials and had hence failed during the 2006 Lebanon War to secure sensitive sites or to coordinate its activities with the Home Front Command or the Emergency Services. This followed criticism of his Ministry, the Home Front Command, and the Police, in the State Comptroller’s 18 July 2007 report.
3. The head of the Home Front Major-General Yitzhak Gershon insisted the hazardous materials problem had been addressed by the Army despite the absence of a single recommendation having been put to the government on the issue. Gershon also claimed it was not possible to defend civilians from Qassam rocket hits, and blamed local authorities for not providing adequate bomb shelters. Despite a High Court injunction insisting all schools and major institutions within range be safeguarded from Qassam attacks, only 24 schools have some sort of protection, the rest will have none until the end of 2007, again, it was claimed, partly due to the Finance Ministry’s inability to make funds available. An appeal by residents bordering Gaza to force the government to implement the injunction immediately was refused by the High Court.
4. State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss accused the Finance Ministry of foot dragging, ignorance, and bureaucracy, concerning their mismanagement and mishandling of the Holocaust survivors payments case, which was eventually settled as a result of the direct intervention of Prime Minister Olmert.
5. The Accountant General stated the burden of public corruption was almost as large as the Defence burden and that the attempt to manipulate the Bank Leumi tender was the worst case of corruption in Israel’s history.
4· Hizb’allah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah announced a “great surprise” should new hostilities arise against Israel that could both change the “fate of the war and the region.” Hizb’allah now had anti-tank missiles that could penetrate Israeli and US tanks, missiles that could hit any part of Israel, and missiles that could hit any ship. Hizb’allah claimed it expected a war with Israel within a year or so.
Muqtadar al-Sadr, Shia political and militia leader in Iraq, stated this week his group now had formal links with Hizb’allah and that his men and Hizb’allah’s train together both in Lebanon and Iraq. His militia assassinated the second provincial Shia Governor in nine days in southern Iraq using a Hizb’allah-designed roadside bomb, and are responsible for attacks on British forces stationed there. He also claimed his militia would inevitably become involved in future Hizb’allah-Israel clashes.
Iran’s commander of the Revolutionary Guard, Yayha Rahim Safavi, also claimed the new Shihab-3 ballistic missile now had a remote guidance system. The implication was it could penetrate Israel’s anti-missile systems.
The US administration intends to designate Iran’s Revolutionary Guard a terrorist organisation thereby making its funds and any contributors to them subject to investigation and possible confiscation.
5· The Winograd Committee on the Second Lebanon War released the testimony of Tzahi Hanegbi, Chair of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, this week. The main points were:
a) His Committee had failed to formulate a recommendation to the government on a ground incursion because they were divided on the issue.
b) He supported both the decision to go to war, and, later, the ground incursion, because he felt it was the only way to stop the Katyusha rocket fire.
c) Hanegbi claimed that the war weakened Hizb’allah and reduced the threat to Israel’s northern communities.
d) He blamed the IDF and the media for lapses in field security, the media should never have been allowed to report, speculate on, and anticipate, IDF movements from the border itself: “the public’s right to know is not the enemy’s right to know.”
e) The Committee set up a subcommittee headed by Labour MK Ami Ayalon to look into the management of the home front.
f) The Committee were surprised the Reserves were not called up at an earlier stage of the war.
g) Many of the Committee were convinced diplomacy was needed to end the threat to the communities in the North.
h) Finally, he claimed that this war, other than possibly the War of Independence of 1948, was the only war to end in any sort of diplomatic achievement for Israel, the fruits of which were the deployment of the Lebanese Army into the south of the country (for the first time in nearly 40 years), and the stationing of a potent multinational force there (UNIFIL).
6· The Governor of the Bank of Israel, Stanley Fischer, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the US that included $30 billion of military aid over the next 10 years. Fischer stated Israel’s defence burden at 10% of GDP was the highest in the western world and that the US deal allowed Israel to spend up to 25% on Israeli manufactured military equipment. Previously only US equipment could be purchased. He also announced that US non-military economic grants to Israel would cease around 2009. He maintained Israel’s economy was strong with a low deficit of less than 2% of GDP, and with inflation contained within a 1-3% range.
7· The IDF General Staff held a two-day conference to establish which weapons systems it will invest in over the next 5 years. The 5-year review was established by the Brodet Committee, which handed over its mainly secret proposals to the Defence establishment in May 2007. The Committee was set up to resolve differences between the Defence and Finance Ministries during and following the Second Lebanon War. Both Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi and Defence Minister Ehud Barak want the ground forces strengthened. Barak stated he wanted two new reserve divisions, anti-missile systems to protect tanks, and an anti-missile system to protect the civilian population from short as well as long range missile attack. Barak suggested many of these systems would take 5 to 7 years to develop. The Cabinet approved less than half the budget the Defence establishment demanded in late July. Prime Minister Olmert claimed it was ludicrous to put welfare and education spending on hold so that Defence could have all it insisted upon. The defence budget has been cut for the last 13 years, since 1994, following the Oslo Accords with the PLO, and the end of the Cold War.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· Hamas and Islamic Jihad have increased their attacks on Israel and the border crossings for several reasons:
1. The overall plan to create a bunker and tunnel system on the border with Israel and Egypt continues. To achieve this the militant groups need to control the border areas by making them too dangerous for the IDF to operate in.
2. Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who last week were on the verge of a violent feud, have decided to unite in their efforts to control the border areas. Islamic Jihad is no longer under any constraints concerning Qassam fire. Also, the military wing of Hamas felt they could not restrain Islamic Jihad from responding to the killing of their commanders.
3. Hamas want to control the border crossings themselves but they are not prepared to recognise Israel by negotiating a formal agreement concerning border traffic. Hamas’ attacks on the border crossings have several aims:
a) to force Israel into informal talks that will accept Hamas as the controlling force on the Gaza side of the border;
b) to force the international community, especially the Arab and Muslim nations, to address the issue of the closed border with Egypt. Once that border is open Iranian funds will be able to flow freely into Gaza;
c) to force the international community to pressure Israel to return to the status quo ante and allow free flow of goods and raw materials, much of which allow Hamas and Islamic Jihad to maintain their cottage industry output of Qassam missiles.
· Prime Minister Fayyad’s government indicated their continued support for isolating Hamas by informing the EU about breaches in EU and Palestinian Authority regulations concerning taxes upon fuel or services generally. President Abbas decreed all Gazans exempt from paying taxes shortly after the Hamas coup precisely in order to sabotage any efforts to legitimise or establish their rule.
Hamas, short of revenue, and having eaten into their Iranian-supplied funds, wanted to tax the use of fuel paid for by the EU, which does not accept Hamas rule in Gaza. It was also a timely reminder to Hamas that the PA still has some teeth.
· President Abbas released several Hamas members accused of trying to establish terror cells in the West Bank, and called on Hamas to “return to national unity” by ending their rule in Gaza. He also called on the services of Fatah veterans who have historic connections with Syria and the Muslim Brotherhood to help him find a way out of the current impasse. It is clear Abbas wishes to represent the whole Palestinian people at the November Washington summit, and that he has heeded the, sometimes crude, attempts to force him to re-engage with Hamas.
The reappearance of Muhammed Dahlan indicates Abbas is still serious in his desire to re-establish PA rule in Gaza.
· Abbas is rightly concerned that Prime Minister Olmert is in no position to offer him any of the substantive concessions he needs to convince his constituency that it is worthwhile ending the armed struggle. He is therefore trying to cover all eventualities, still engaging with Japan on future economic plans for the West Bank and accepting funds, but also doing what he can to re-engage with Hamas, assuming they will make the necessary concessions and return to the status quo ante in Gaza with possible Egyptian mediation and forces to ensure and enforce a compromise. His talks with Fatah rejectionists from Tunis is also a sign to Olmert that if Abbas does not get what he needs there are other, far worse, alternatives to him that Olmert and Israel may end up having to deal with.
· Rumours concerning President Abbas’ refusal to stand at the forthcoming Presidential elections have produced a flurry of activity and divisions within Fatah as everyone positions themselves in anticipation of the race to replace him. The return of Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades to the armed struggle so soon after the amnesty by Israel is a sign of this process and highlights the total failure of Abbas to reform Fatah and introduce the youth movements into the mainstream, or to replace the corrupt old guard.
In terms of the peace process Abbas and Olmert find themselves in the unusual position of having the right policies but with absolutely no means to deliver them. Abbas has lost both credibility within Fatah and control over any of the armed groups in the West Bank, and Olmert has no credibility in the eyes of the Israeli public.
· The flurry of reports exposing endemic and systemic institutional failures highlight a unique Israeli cultural phenomenon: an almost congenital inability to run any large organisation efficiently, combined with a pathological need to expose and decry its failures as virulently and publicly as possible. All the failures involve state-run institutions many led by ex-military personnel. A total lack of transparency combined with inadequate public supervision is also common to all the exposed failures.
The insensitivity to the Holocaust victims is a vestige of the socialist Zionist vision of the defenceless weak Diaspora Jew, who failed to come to Eretz Israel before the foreseen catastrophe; this, combined with Israel’s notoriously inefficient bureaucracy, led to the embarrassing scenes of Holocaust camp survivors protesting outside the Prime Minister’s Office. Paradoxically it was only Olmert’s personal intervention that cut through the bureaucratic logjam to enable the survivors to receive the financial restitution owed to them.
The accusations of rampant corruption are often made, particularly by the current Accountant General, but rarely substantiated. Almost all of the prosecutions against leading politicians made in recent years, including against Binyamin Netanyahu, have all failed for lack of credible evidence. In fact the accusation against Olmert concerning his alleged corrupt role in the Bank Leumi tender has also been dropped due to a lack of any credible evidence.
Nevertheless, the lack of transparency and the crony-based culture in most of Israel’s major institutions is not conducive to efficient management or running of services. Israel’s establishment remains reluctant to loosen the grip of the state or to render its institutions either transparent or open to competition. The current wave of investigations indicates that changes will be made and that Israel remains a vibrant open society that also retains its historic cultural propensity for public self-flagellation.
· The heads of Hizb’allah, Iraq’s Mehdi militia, and the Revolutionary Guards statements this week indicate a formal alliance exists between these Shia groups that mean any future confrontations between Israel and Hizb’allah will automatically involve them all. In effect Israel would be at war with forces from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran; and, these forces would have access to the latest technology recently developed in Iran. They would also be in alliance with the Sunnis of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Gaza-based Popular Revolutionary Committees which include elements of the quasi-Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Fatah’s militant youth wing the Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades. In the event Al Qaeda affiliated groups would also form a temporary alliance during any such future conflict.
Militarily this alliance is incapable of defeating Israel but it clearly poses a long-term strategic threat. Iran clearly believes that once the US leaves Iraq it will only be a matter of time before Israel is forced to leave the West Bank and East Jerusalem and Israel’s demise would follow not long afterwards. The constant missile threat, the constant economic uncertainty, the demographic threat from within, and Israel’s own fragmented society, will all conspire to force the Jews to realise the notion of an independent Jewish State is simply not viable or sustainable.
Unfortunately for this plan all the historic evidence indicates the opposite will happen. The very increase in the threat will force greater resources and focus to be allocated to Israel’s survival. During the worst excesses of the suicide bombing campaign Israel’s emigration rates actually fell, and, during major conflicts Israel’s rates of Jewish immigration increase.
Nevertheless this strategic threat will put pressure on Israel to relinquish the West Bank so that western governments can then justify supporting Israel politically, economically, and militarily. However, this will not be possible without Palestinian acquiescence in accepting some form of western military presence, which is unlikely. The most probable outcome for the West Bank is a strong multinational force, with at least a western contingent, that will act as a military and political buffer between Israel and any future Palestine-Iran axis but this outcome could either be realised in years, or, decades.
· MK Tzahi Hanegbi’s testimony to the Winograd Committee, as head of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, has been the least critical of Olmert as one would possibly expect from one of his long time political allies. Nevertheless it did expose the complexity of the decision-making processes during the war and the variety of opinions within the committee itself.
Hanegbi was correct to point out the ridiculous extent of the access the media had to the front line and the minute-by-minute intelligence this was giving to Damascus and Tehran who were in direct contact with guerrilla forces on the border.
He was also one of the only witnesses to highlight the achievement of the Olmert government in getting both the Lebanese Army and a bolstered and credible UNIFIL force onto Israel’s northern border. In effect Olmert achieved in less than 40 days what no previous Israeli politician or general had achieved in nearly 40 years of conflict with the hyper-fragmented nation of Lebanon.
· Stanley Fischer’s announcement that on top of the $30 billion military aid package over 10 years Israel is to end its dependence on civilian economic grants from the US was historic. It confirmed that Israel’s economy is both thriving and on a sound footing. It is important to note that the Second Lebanon War’s economic effects on Israel were negligible but the costs to Lebanon and Iran were significant.
PM Olmert remained concerned that Israel’s economic divisions and educational deficiencies still needed urgent attention, and that the economy could not be sacrificed to the Defence Ministry and IDF’s bottomless demands. If the Defence establishment is to meet its own stated needs it must reform itself.
· The IDF’s two-day conference on prioritising its spending and strategic goals over the next 5 years is a turning point for the Defence establishment and Israel. The IDF High Command and Administration and Defence Ministry have become bywords for inefficiency, incompetence, waste, and corrupt practices.
These faults have all been highlighted by the Brodet Committee's interim report of May 2007 and the 5-year spending plan was one of their recommendations. It is meant to enable a more strategic view to be taken by both the Defence and Finance Ministries.
At the moment the Defence establishment has two of the most experienced and capable military minds at its head, Defence Minister Ehud Barak and Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi.
Their priority will be to cut the extraordinary waste and inefficiency so that any consequent savings can be diverted to the pressing need for protecting both tanks and armoured vehicles from missiles and explosive devices, and, the civilian population from ballistic and short-range missiles.
They also have a unique opportunity to use 25% of the US’s $3 billion annual military aid (i.e.$750 million per annum) on Israeli produced military equipment, the first time the US has allowed its own military aid to be used on non-United States-made military equipment.
The debate over lack of manpower is not the most pressing issue. No army ever won a battle using reluctant soldiers who would rather play Nintendo, or pray, than defend their country. The real issue is preparation and training and efficient use of resources.
Hamas and Iran will want to lure the IDF into a battle at a time and place of their choosing and one of the greatest challenges for the IDF will be to deny them that opportunity. The IDF strategy will need to be to avoid any significant military confrontation for as long as possible and that includes any attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Other sources used this week The Independent:
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2878769.ece
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
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Thursday, 23 August 2007
Thursday, 16 August 2007
Week 9 August – 14 August 2007
This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with:
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 8 Qassam missiles were fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel this week, a small increase on last. The IDF continued to target Islamic Jihad militant commanders but have increased their focus on Hamas commanders following a series of attempts to mine the border by its operatives in the last few weeks, and the discovery of a network of tunnels aimed at Israeli territory similar to those used to enter Israel and kidnap corporal Schalit in June 2006.
Hamas have banned all demonstrations without 48-hour prior notice following an anti-Hamas demonstration this week, as well as the use of firearms and fireworks during wedding celebrations. Six Fatah weddings were violently disrupted for breaking this rule and singing Fatah songs. Hamas also beat the demonstrators and observing media and confiscated their photographic equipment, later raiding media outlets in order to prevent any broadcasts of the demonstration or the Hamas reaction.
Hamas also lost two men in clashes with the Al Qaeda-affiliated criminal Dogmoush clan in west Gaza City; 20 others were wounded.
2· Unofficial Hamas-Fatah talks continued this week. President Abbas is coming under pressure, particularly from Arab League countries, to resume the national unity government before talks in Washington in November. Russia and EU countries have all expressed the hope that Fatah and Hamas will settle their differences. The United States and Israel both stated that any Fatah-Hamas rapprochement would lead to the end of talks unless Hamas recognise Israel, adhere to previous peace deals, and cease terrorism. President Abbas stated privately that he intends to hold Legislative and Presidential elections within the next six months whether or not Hamas cooperate in Gaza. He also stated Hamas needed to apologise for, and reverse, the coup in Gaza before he would reconsider reconvening a national unity government.
Palestinian Authority Police are now operating in Area B of the West Bank (rural areas not near the border with Jordan), for the first time since Hamas won the January 2006 elections. Also, for the first time since the intifada in 2000, Israel and the PA jointly signed in Jerusalem the six-monthly mandate of the international monitoring force in Hebron, in situ since 1997.
3· Dr. Ashraf al-Kurdi, Arafat's personal physician for 18 years up until a few months before his death, claimed on Al Jazeera that Arafat had HIV in his blood before he died; Al Jazeera terminated the interview. Later, he claimed the HIV virus was put into Arafat's blood in an effort to blur traces of poisoning, which he claimed was the "real" cause of death. Another Arafat aid, Bassam Abu Sharif formerly of the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, had earlier reaffirmed his claim that agents of Israel had poisoned Arafat. Hamas have also often claimed that close aides of Arafat were conspiring to kill him. No evidence was given to substantiate any of the claims. Arafat died in Paris where his doctors stated he died of intestinal inflammation, jaundice, and the blood condition disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC), having previously been in a coma. His widow Suha Arafat refused to have an autopsy and refused to make public the comprehensive medical report of the French doctors, as was her right under French law.
Suha Arafat had her Tunisian citizenship revoked this week and was asked to leave; she is currently in Malta with her brother Jubran Tawil, who is PA ambassador there, and her mother, the Paris-based radical Palestinian journalist Raymonda. Several, unconfirmed, reasons were reported for her sudden de facto deportation: she had secretly married the President’s brother-in-law, which Suha has denied; or, she had got involved in questionable financial and business dealings that could have embarrassed the President or his entourage. Suha Arafat is reported to receive anything from $22 million a year to a lump sum of $14 million plus $1.6 million per annum from the PA since Arafat’s death in November 2004. Suha did not respond to the HIV claims, nor has any connection been made between the claims and her hurried expulsion from Tunisia.
4· An investigation was launched into how the Palestinian Authority transferred thousands of dollars into the bank accounts of Hamas paramilitary Executive Force members in Gaza. A senior PA official within the finance department is currently under investigation and the bank accounts have been frozen. 1,000 militia members managed to withdraw salaries before the transfers were discovered. The money transferred was previously held back tax revenues, which Israel had expressly forbidden be handed over to Hamas.
5· Defence Minister Ehud Barak refused to allow the distribution of new gas masks for fear the Syrian regime would see it as a clear sign of impending war. He also refused to give towns and cities hit by hundreds of missiles during the Second Lebanon War (2006) the status of front line communities because they were not on the immediate border.
Barak denied reports that he did not believe peace was possible with either Fatah or Hamas and that he would not withdraw Israeli forces from the West Bank until Israel had complete anti-missile cover, which was only possible in 3 to 5 years time.
He claimed that the $116 million cut in funds allocated to the construction of the security fence would further delay its completion.
Several amnestied Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades (Fatah) members caught smuggling ammunition at checkpoints, and firing at IDF forces over the last week, were immediately released in order to avoid embarrassing President Abbas, despite the clear violation of their amnesty terms.
6· IDF Intelligence continued to send out confused assessments concerning whether President Assad of Syria is prepared to initiate a conflict with Israel should his demands over the Golan not be met, or in order to sabotage the international community’s attempts to bring the killers of President Hariri of Lebanon to justice. The IDF also assessed that Assad is convinced PM Olmert wants a war in order to escape and reverse the anticipated conclusion of the final Winograd report that he totally failed during the Second Lebanon War. The IDF warned that this Syrian assumption combined with separate Iranian and international pressures on the regime may result in a miscalculation on their part that could escalate into war.
The Vice President of Syria Farouq al-Shara stated Syria was not interested in war but is ready to repel any Israeli aggression. Syria has nearly completed the redeployment of its latest 500-kilogram payload Scud D missiles that can severely damage entire blocks of city buildings. It has also almost completed its deployment of anti-tank commando units in the northern and southern Golan, as well as its new anti-aircraft missiles designed to protect the ground-to-ground missile deployment.
Hizb’allah have purchased large areas of hilltop-forested land from Christian and Druze farmers at exceptional prices just north of the UNIFIL monitored area in southern Lebanon. They have stockpiled their new missiles just 16 kilometres from Israel’s border in anticipation of a new war.
7· Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated Israel was not interested in war and neither were the Syrians. He visited Northern Command Headquarters and was briefed on the current situation.
Police are to investigate allegations that PM Olmert interfered to help friends gain an advantage when as Finance Minister he supervised the government sale of the controlling interest of Bank Leumi. None of his friends were involved in the final sale but a breach in “conflict of interest” codes remains an issue.
PM Olmert narrowly came top in a poll of Kadima members, followed by Avi Dichter the Public Security Minister, Finance Minister Ronny Bar-On, Transport Minister Shaul Mofaz, and Minister of Interior Meir Sheetrit respectively. Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who is popular with the public, came sixth.
The Cabinet approved the Winograd-proposed National Security Council crisis centre be attached to PM Olmert’s office but available for relevant senior minister’s use in emergencies.
8· Binyamin Netanyahu won the Likud Leadership Primary by 73.2% of the vote. His closest rival extreme right-winger Moshe Feiglin won 23.4% of the vote. The voter turnout of 40% was higher than expected for a summer campaign and compared favourably with previous primary votes.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· Hamas continue to try and impose their brand of rule in Gaza but as of last week are encountering their first real opposition. Hamas’ response has been uncompromising and crude but their willingness to confront the Al Qaeda-affiliated crime-associated Dagmoush clan proves they feel strong enough to do so and that there is no love lost at present between the two extremist groups. Although Al Qaeda is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood their methodology is different. The emphasis in Al Qaeda is conflict on all fronts and violent global jihad whereas the Muslim Brotherhood emphasise reform through Islamisation of the Islamic nations including Israel-Palestine, and only then pursuing global jihad at a pace of their choosing. The destruction of Israel, starting with Israel’s access to Jerusalem, is the most important gauge of their success together with the replacement of the current regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Syria-Lebanon, and Palestine-Israel. Only then will they consider it appropriate to expand into global jihad, though spreading their theology globally remains a vital activity in the meantime.
· The increase in activity on Gaza’s borders indicates Hamas is already evolving the next step in its military-political strategy. The first priority is to enable further kidnappings and attacks on Israel through a network of tunnels from the Gaza Strip into Israel. This network will be part of the greater smuggling network connected to Sinai which will allow re-supply of both arms and finances from Iran. The breakdown of the economy and border closures will make Gaza’s residents dependent on Hamas for survival and increase their opportunities for military and religious recruitment. The next step, which has been pursued in some areas of Gaza already, is the creation of a network of bunkers that will criss-cross the border areas in the hope of creating an impenetrable barrier to IDF forces. This allied to the increase in range of the missiles now available to Islamic Jihad and Hamas will give strategic depth and offensive capability. This capability will increasingly be coordinated with Hizb’allah, Syria, and Iran, based upon the protocol on defence cooperation signed in Damascus on 10 March 2007.
The IDF will continue to attempt to sabotage these efforts through a series of cross border operations. The main purpose will be to force Hamas to use its resources on defensive rather than offensive measures until a political resolution to the conflict is reached.
· President Abbas is coming under severe pressure to begin talks with Hamas from all Arab League members and Russia. The progress made by the PA and Israel with their recent confidence building measures will be by their nature slow, and will not compensate for the vacuum created by the Fatah-Hamas divide. Egypt and Jordan for domestic political and strategic reasons need to establish a united Fatah-Hamas government in order to enable genuine progress in the creation of a Palestinian state, which they both believe will undermine the influence of the Syria-Iran axis and will also relieve domestic political pressure on their respective governments.
Egypt and Jordan have decided that the murky circumstances of Yassir Arafat’s death and its aftermath are a useful way to put pressure on Abbas to reengage in talks with Hamas. Abbas and Suha Arafat came to an agreement upon Arafat’s death that the medical records would remain a secret and that Suha would receive $22 million per annum from Arafat’s personal portfolio of worldwide accounts estimated at $800 million. The remainder would pass to the control of the PA, whose reserve accounts total roughly $3-4 billion. Other reports put Suha's inheritance at $14 million lump sum plus $1.6 million annually for 9 years then $600,000 per annum until her death.
· The reassertion of unconfirmable rumours concerning Arafat’s death, such as he had the HIV virus, he was poisoned, his personal physician had been prevented access and not been consulted, together with claims of Suha’s and Abbas’ involvement in an apparent cover up put immense pressure on them. It is possible that Suha Arafat’s loss of Tunisian citizenship is partly due to the authorities not wanting to be dragged into any potential scandal, and may have been used as an excuse to disembarrass the Tunisian government of a personality that attracted unsavoury comment.
· Egypt continues to pressure Hamas by maintaining its closure of the borders with Gaza, by refusing to reopen its consular buildings there, and by delaying talks over the release of Hamas prisoners, which Hamas sees as a potential symbol of success for their policy of armed resistance against Israel. Egypt is also slowly closing some of the smuggling tunnels that supply Hamas with Iranian arms and cash to run Gaza. Egypt does not want to close the tunnels completely because they are a useful source of income and intelligence for local commanders, and can be used to pressure Hamas by the threat of closure. Their non-closure can also be used to pressure Israel for concessions.
· The freeing of amnestied Al Aqsa Martyr's Brigades members after they were caught at road blocks smuggling weapons, and even firing at IDF forces, confirms their account of only having given in one of several of their personal weapons last week as a gesture towards President Abbas and the amnesty agreement. In reality they continue to use their remaining weapons as and when they please.
· The release of funds from the PA to pay Hamas militia salaries was probably a successful Hamas operation designed to embarrass President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad. The funds used were under the direct supervision of PM Fayyad and were part of the withheld tax revenues Israel had freed to the PA as part of confidence building measures and on condition they would not find their way to Hamas or any other terrorist organisation.
· Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s refusal to continue distribution of the new generation of gas masks in order not to disturb Syrian sensibilities, and his refusal to grant front line status to northern communities entitled to additional funding in order to save the Defence Ministry budget, are examples of the difficult decisions that he has had to face since taking office.
These decisions indicate that the IDF do not really believe a conflict in the North is either imminent or desirable.
The view of IDF intelligence that Assad might start a war because PM Olmert is seen as so weak he is bound to initiate a conflict is disingenuous, and can be seen as a crude attempt by the IDF to shift some of the blame for the current sense of insecurity onto the political echelon.
The reality is that the current Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, a no nonsense combat veteran, has been deeply shocked by the degeneration that 6 years of negligence has created within the conventional combat reserve force. The IDF has focussed almost exclusively on specialist counter-terror operations within the Occupied Territories and rather than tackle the extraordinary waste within the service in order to maintain its conventional army reserves in combat readiness it has used the budget cuts and strategic shift to specialist operations as an excuse to do nothing.
At the heart of the apathy lies a refusal by the public and political establishment to face the need for high defence expenditure allied to vigorous reform within the IDF and Defence Ministry.
The Israeli public has to understand that its desire for increased expenditure on health, welfare, and education comes at a price, and that the only solution is extraordinary financial discipline and institutional reform. Some aspects of this institutional failure will be analysed by the Winograd Committee in its final report into the Second Lebanon War.
· The budget cuts to the security fence, the inability of Israel to defend its most densely populated areas from short-range missiles following a withdrawal from the West Bank and the complete failure of President Abbas to offer leadership or provide security to either his own people or Israel mean a withdrawal is unlikely to occur soon. Barak cannot apply his mistaken unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon to the West Bank even if he wanted to, and Likud’s Bibi Netanyahu is likely to prevaricate for years before instituting a withdrawal. The only realistic option for Israel, the Arab League, and the West, is for a gradual withdrawal involving substantial international forces to provide security on the periphery of the West Bank. If the Quartet is prepared to allow Tony Blair to initiate this process there may be a chance of success within 3 to 5 years assuming he is prepared to endure that long as their representative.
· Binyamin Netanyahu comfortably won the Likud Leadership Primary but will face quite a struggle to evict extreme right-winger Moshe Feiglin from the party. He may cause a further splintering of the right were he to do so. He will also face a strong challenge at the next general election from other right of centre parties such as Arcadi Gaydamak’s new Social Justice Party, and Avigdor Lieberman’s Israel Beitenu Party. All these parties along with the National Religious and National Union Party coalition will join a right of centre government assuming Kadima collapses as the latest polls indicate.
· Kadima is in the unfortunate position of having solid policies and insecure and unpopular leadership, and not just with Prime Minister Olmert whose current public support stands at 5%. The most popular Kadima figure, Foreign Minister and Vice Premier Tzipi Livni, is not popular amongst the party faithful, and their second choice, Avi Dichter is not currently interested in taking on the leadership. This leaves Shaul Mofaz, a politically inexperienced ex Chief of Staff who has shown a genius for making bad political decisions and who oversaw the neglect of IDF conventional combat readiness during his military career. Even if Olmert survives the Winograd Committee’s findings it is difficult to see how his party can survive an election, even if Olmert stands down and there is a smooth transfer of power.
Kadima did have one significant success, the Cabinet passed the budget by 21 votes to 5. Only the ultra-orthodox Shas Party and Shaul Mofaz voted against. It therefore stands a good chance of getting Knesset approval, which would nullify an automatic spring 2008 election that comes into force should the coalition government not get the requisite Knesset majority.
additional source The Independent:
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2866781.ece
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
_______________________________________________________
____________________________________________
________________________________________________________
______________________________________________
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 8 Qassam missiles were fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel this week, a small increase on last. The IDF continued to target Islamic Jihad militant commanders but have increased their focus on Hamas commanders following a series of attempts to mine the border by its operatives in the last few weeks, and the discovery of a network of tunnels aimed at Israeli territory similar to those used to enter Israel and kidnap corporal Schalit in June 2006.
Hamas have banned all demonstrations without 48-hour prior notice following an anti-Hamas demonstration this week, as well as the use of firearms and fireworks during wedding celebrations. Six Fatah weddings were violently disrupted for breaking this rule and singing Fatah songs. Hamas also beat the demonstrators and observing media and confiscated their photographic equipment, later raiding media outlets in order to prevent any broadcasts of the demonstration or the Hamas reaction.
Hamas also lost two men in clashes with the Al Qaeda-affiliated criminal Dogmoush clan in west Gaza City; 20 others were wounded.
2· Unofficial Hamas-Fatah talks continued this week. President Abbas is coming under pressure, particularly from Arab League countries, to resume the national unity government before talks in Washington in November. Russia and EU countries have all expressed the hope that Fatah and Hamas will settle their differences. The United States and Israel both stated that any Fatah-Hamas rapprochement would lead to the end of talks unless Hamas recognise Israel, adhere to previous peace deals, and cease terrorism. President Abbas stated privately that he intends to hold Legislative and Presidential elections within the next six months whether or not Hamas cooperate in Gaza. He also stated Hamas needed to apologise for, and reverse, the coup in Gaza before he would reconsider reconvening a national unity government.
Palestinian Authority Police are now operating in Area B of the West Bank (rural areas not near the border with Jordan), for the first time since Hamas won the January 2006 elections. Also, for the first time since the intifada in 2000, Israel and the PA jointly signed in Jerusalem the six-monthly mandate of the international monitoring force in Hebron, in situ since 1997.
3· Dr. Ashraf al-Kurdi, Arafat's personal physician for 18 years up until a few months before his death, claimed on Al Jazeera that Arafat had HIV in his blood before he died; Al Jazeera terminated the interview. Later, he claimed the HIV virus was put into Arafat's blood in an effort to blur traces of poisoning, which he claimed was the "real" cause of death. Another Arafat aid, Bassam Abu Sharif formerly of the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, had earlier reaffirmed his claim that agents of Israel had poisoned Arafat. Hamas have also often claimed that close aides of Arafat were conspiring to kill him. No evidence was given to substantiate any of the claims. Arafat died in Paris where his doctors stated he died of intestinal inflammation, jaundice, and the blood condition disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC), having previously been in a coma. His widow Suha Arafat refused to have an autopsy and refused to make public the comprehensive medical report of the French doctors, as was her right under French law.
Suha Arafat had her Tunisian citizenship revoked this week and was asked to leave; she is currently in Malta with her brother Jubran Tawil, who is PA ambassador there, and her mother, the Paris-based radical Palestinian journalist Raymonda. Several, unconfirmed, reasons were reported for her sudden de facto deportation: she had secretly married the President’s brother-in-law, which Suha has denied; or, she had got involved in questionable financial and business dealings that could have embarrassed the President or his entourage. Suha Arafat is reported to receive anything from $22 million a year to a lump sum of $14 million plus $1.6 million per annum from the PA since Arafat’s death in November 2004. Suha did not respond to the HIV claims, nor has any connection been made between the claims and her hurried expulsion from Tunisia.
4· An investigation was launched into how the Palestinian Authority transferred thousands of dollars into the bank accounts of Hamas paramilitary Executive Force members in Gaza. A senior PA official within the finance department is currently under investigation and the bank accounts have been frozen. 1,000 militia members managed to withdraw salaries before the transfers were discovered. The money transferred was previously held back tax revenues, which Israel had expressly forbidden be handed over to Hamas.
5· Defence Minister Ehud Barak refused to allow the distribution of new gas masks for fear the Syrian regime would see it as a clear sign of impending war. He also refused to give towns and cities hit by hundreds of missiles during the Second Lebanon War (2006) the status of front line communities because they were not on the immediate border.
Barak denied reports that he did not believe peace was possible with either Fatah or Hamas and that he would not withdraw Israeli forces from the West Bank until Israel had complete anti-missile cover, which was only possible in 3 to 5 years time.
He claimed that the $116 million cut in funds allocated to the construction of the security fence would further delay its completion.
Several amnestied Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades (Fatah) members caught smuggling ammunition at checkpoints, and firing at IDF forces over the last week, were immediately released in order to avoid embarrassing President Abbas, despite the clear violation of their amnesty terms.
6· IDF Intelligence continued to send out confused assessments concerning whether President Assad of Syria is prepared to initiate a conflict with Israel should his demands over the Golan not be met, or in order to sabotage the international community’s attempts to bring the killers of President Hariri of Lebanon to justice. The IDF also assessed that Assad is convinced PM Olmert wants a war in order to escape and reverse the anticipated conclusion of the final Winograd report that he totally failed during the Second Lebanon War. The IDF warned that this Syrian assumption combined with separate Iranian and international pressures on the regime may result in a miscalculation on their part that could escalate into war.
The Vice President of Syria Farouq al-Shara stated Syria was not interested in war but is ready to repel any Israeli aggression. Syria has nearly completed the redeployment of its latest 500-kilogram payload Scud D missiles that can severely damage entire blocks of city buildings. It has also almost completed its deployment of anti-tank commando units in the northern and southern Golan, as well as its new anti-aircraft missiles designed to protect the ground-to-ground missile deployment.
Hizb’allah have purchased large areas of hilltop-forested land from Christian and Druze farmers at exceptional prices just north of the UNIFIL monitored area in southern Lebanon. They have stockpiled their new missiles just 16 kilometres from Israel’s border in anticipation of a new war.
7· Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated Israel was not interested in war and neither were the Syrians. He visited Northern Command Headquarters and was briefed on the current situation.
Police are to investigate allegations that PM Olmert interfered to help friends gain an advantage when as Finance Minister he supervised the government sale of the controlling interest of Bank Leumi. None of his friends were involved in the final sale but a breach in “conflict of interest” codes remains an issue.
PM Olmert narrowly came top in a poll of Kadima members, followed by Avi Dichter the Public Security Minister, Finance Minister Ronny Bar-On, Transport Minister Shaul Mofaz, and Minister of Interior Meir Sheetrit respectively. Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who is popular with the public, came sixth.
The Cabinet approved the Winograd-proposed National Security Council crisis centre be attached to PM Olmert’s office but available for relevant senior minister’s use in emergencies.
8· Binyamin Netanyahu won the Likud Leadership Primary by 73.2% of the vote. His closest rival extreme right-winger Moshe Feiglin won 23.4% of the vote. The voter turnout of 40% was higher than expected for a summer campaign and compared favourably with previous primary votes.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· Hamas continue to try and impose their brand of rule in Gaza but as of last week are encountering their first real opposition. Hamas’ response has been uncompromising and crude but their willingness to confront the Al Qaeda-affiliated crime-associated Dagmoush clan proves they feel strong enough to do so and that there is no love lost at present between the two extremist groups. Although Al Qaeda is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood their methodology is different. The emphasis in Al Qaeda is conflict on all fronts and violent global jihad whereas the Muslim Brotherhood emphasise reform through Islamisation of the Islamic nations including Israel-Palestine, and only then pursuing global jihad at a pace of their choosing. The destruction of Israel, starting with Israel’s access to Jerusalem, is the most important gauge of their success together with the replacement of the current regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Syria-Lebanon, and Palestine-Israel. Only then will they consider it appropriate to expand into global jihad, though spreading their theology globally remains a vital activity in the meantime.
· The increase in activity on Gaza’s borders indicates Hamas is already evolving the next step in its military-political strategy. The first priority is to enable further kidnappings and attacks on Israel through a network of tunnels from the Gaza Strip into Israel. This network will be part of the greater smuggling network connected to Sinai which will allow re-supply of both arms and finances from Iran. The breakdown of the economy and border closures will make Gaza’s residents dependent on Hamas for survival and increase their opportunities for military and religious recruitment. The next step, which has been pursued in some areas of Gaza already, is the creation of a network of bunkers that will criss-cross the border areas in the hope of creating an impenetrable barrier to IDF forces. This allied to the increase in range of the missiles now available to Islamic Jihad and Hamas will give strategic depth and offensive capability. This capability will increasingly be coordinated with Hizb’allah, Syria, and Iran, based upon the protocol on defence cooperation signed in Damascus on 10 March 2007.
The IDF will continue to attempt to sabotage these efforts through a series of cross border operations. The main purpose will be to force Hamas to use its resources on defensive rather than offensive measures until a political resolution to the conflict is reached.
· President Abbas is coming under severe pressure to begin talks with Hamas from all Arab League members and Russia. The progress made by the PA and Israel with their recent confidence building measures will be by their nature slow, and will not compensate for the vacuum created by the Fatah-Hamas divide. Egypt and Jordan for domestic political and strategic reasons need to establish a united Fatah-Hamas government in order to enable genuine progress in the creation of a Palestinian state, which they both believe will undermine the influence of the Syria-Iran axis and will also relieve domestic political pressure on their respective governments.
Egypt and Jordan have decided that the murky circumstances of Yassir Arafat’s death and its aftermath are a useful way to put pressure on Abbas to reengage in talks with Hamas. Abbas and Suha Arafat came to an agreement upon Arafat’s death that the medical records would remain a secret and that Suha would receive $22 million per annum from Arafat’s personal portfolio of worldwide accounts estimated at $800 million. The remainder would pass to the control of the PA, whose reserve accounts total roughly $3-4 billion. Other reports put Suha's inheritance at $14 million lump sum plus $1.6 million annually for 9 years then $600,000 per annum until her death.
· The reassertion of unconfirmable rumours concerning Arafat’s death, such as he had the HIV virus, he was poisoned, his personal physician had been prevented access and not been consulted, together with claims of Suha’s and Abbas’ involvement in an apparent cover up put immense pressure on them. It is possible that Suha Arafat’s loss of Tunisian citizenship is partly due to the authorities not wanting to be dragged into any potential scandal, and may have been used as an excuse to disembarrass the Tunisian government of a personality that attracted unsavoury comment.
· Egypt continues to pressure Hamas by maintaining its closure of the borders with Gaza, by refusing to reopen its consular buildings there, and by delaying talks over the release of Hamas prisoners, which Hamas sees as a potential symbol of success for their policy of armed resistance against Israel. Egypt is also slowly closing some of the smuggling tunnels that supply Hamas with Iranian arms and cash to run Gaza. Egypt does not want to close the tunnels completely because they are a useful source of income and intelligence for local commanders, and can be used to pressure Hamas by the threat of closure. Their non-closure can also be used to pressure Israel for concessions.
· The freeing of amnestied Al Aqsa Martyr's Brigades members after they were caught at road blocks smuggling weapons, and even firing at IDF forces, confirms their account of only having given in one of several of their personal weapons last week as a gesture towards President Abbas and the amnesty agreement. In reality they continue to use their remaining weapons as and when they please.
· The release of funds from the PA to pay Hamas militia salaries was probably a successful Hamas operation designed to embarrass President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad. The funds used were under the direct supervision of PM Fayyad and were part of the withheld tax revenues Israel had freed to the PA as part of confidence building measures and on condition they would not find their way to Hamas or any other terrorist organisation.
· Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s refusal to continue distribution of the new generation of gas masks in order not to disturb Syrian sensibilities, and his refusal to grant front line status to northern communities entitled to additional funding in order to save the Defence Ministry budget, are examples of the difficult decisions that he has had to face since taking office.
These decisions indicate that the IDF do not really believe a conflict in the North is either imminent or desirable.
The view of IDF intelligence that Assad might start a war because PM Olmert is seen as so weak he is bound to initiate a conflict is disingenuous, and can be seen as a crude attempt by the IDF to shift some of the blame for the current sense of insecurity onto the political echelon.
The reality is that the current Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, a no nonsense combat veteran, has been deeply shocked by the degeneration that 6 years of negligence has created within the conventional combat reserve force. The IDF has focussed almost exclusively on specialist counter-terror operations within the Occupied Territories and rather than tackle the extraordinary waste within the service in order to maintain its conventional army reserves in combat readiness it has used the budget cuts and strategic shift to specialist operations as an excuse to do nothing.
At the heart of the apathy lies a refusal by the public and political establishment to face the need for high defence expenditure allied to vigorous reform within the IDF and Defence Ministry.
The Israeli public has to understand that its desire for increased expenditure on health, welfare, and education comes at a price, and that the only solution is extraordinary financial discipline and institutional reform. Some aspects of this institutional failure will be analysed by the Winograd Committee in its final report into the Second Lebanon War.
· The budget cuts to the security fence, the inability of Israel to defend its most densely populated areas from short-range missiles following a withdrawal from the West Bank and the complete failure of President Abbas to offer leadership or provide security to either his own people or Israel mean a withdrawal is unlikely to occur soon. Barak cannot apply his mistaken unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon to the West Bank even if he wanted to, and Likud’s Bibi Netanyahu is likely to prevaricate for years before instituting a withdrawal. The only realistic option for Israel, the Arab League, and the West, is for a gradual withdrawal involving substantial international forces to provide security on the periphery of the West Bank. If the Quartet is prepared to allow Tony Blair to initiate this process there may be a chance of success within 3 to 5 years assuming he is prepared to endure that long as their representative.
· Binyamin Netanyahu comfortably won the Likud Leadership Primary but will face quite a struggle to evict extreme right-winger Moshe Feiglin from the party. He may cause a further splintering of the right were he to do so. He will also face a strong challenge at the next general election from other right of centre parties such as Arcadi Gaydamak’s new Social Justice Party, and Avigdor Lieberman’s Israel Beitenu Party. All these parties along with the National Religious and National Union Party coalition will join a right of centre government assuming Kadima collapses as the latest polls indicate.
· Kadima is in the unfortunate position of having solid policies and insecure and unpopular leadership, and not just with Prime Minister Olmert whose current public support stands at 5%. The most popular Kadima figure, Foreign Minister and Vice Premier Tzipi Livni, is not popular amongst the party faithful, and their second choice, Avi Dichter is not currently interested in taking on the leadership. This leaves Shaul Mofaz, a politically inexperienced ex Chief of Staff who has shown a genius for making bad political decisions and who oversaw the neglect of IDF conventional combat readiness during his military career. Even if Olmert survives the Winograd Committee’s findings it is difficult to see how his party can survive an election, even if Olmert stands down and there is a smooth transfer of power.
Kadima did have one significant success, the Cabinet passed the budget by 21 votes to 5. Only the ultra-orthodox Shas Party and Shaul Mofaz voted against. It therefore stands a good chance of getting Knesset approval, which would nullify an automatic spring 2008 election that comes into force should the coalition government not get the requisite Knesset majority.
additional source The Independent:
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2866781.ece
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
_______________________________________________________
____________________________________________
________________________________________________________
______________________________________________
Sunday, 12 August 2007
Week 1 August – 8 August 2007
This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with:
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· Islamic Jihad were predominantly responsible for the firing of 5 Qassam missiles at Sderot from Northern Gaza this week; 1 stray unexploded Qassam that landed in N Gaza killed 2 Palestinian children when they picked it up. This is half the number of missiles fired at Israel compared to last week and may reflect current tensions between Hamas and Islamic Jihad within the Gaza Strip.
Hamas banned the use or carrying of weapons in public, a ban that has been ignored by both Islamic Jihad and the Army of Islam, an Al Qaeda affiliate and offshoot of the criminal Dagmoush clan who were involved in the kidnappings of both corporal Gilad Schalit from Israel and the BBC’s Alan Johnston. Hamas killed several Islamic Jihad members this week for breaching the ban, and the Dagmoush clan have released video of their members illegally training under the Al Qaeda banner within Gaza. Hamas and Al Qaeda are currently staunch rivals.
Hamas continued to send small teams to plant bombs on the Gaza-Israel border several of whom have been intercepted and killed by the IDF including at both the Karni and Erez border crossings. One two-man suspected terror team managed to penetrate into Israel from Gaza but were apprehended together with two accomplices around Tel Aviv. The IDF also killed 2 Islamic Jihad commanders in Nablus and South Gaza, and maintained their policy of arresting violent militants in the West Bank.
Large quantities of explosives continued to be uncovered by Egypt in Sinai and by Israel in the West Bank. The Egyptian regime renewed its arrests of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’ parent organisation.
2· Both Hamas and Hizb’allah have made statements about prisoner swaps with Israel. Egypt intimated it was prepared to re-enter Gaza as intermediaries for the first time since the Hamas coup to resume talks on swapping 450 Hamas militants for corporal Schalit. Hamas had stated any pressure on them would result in stalemate over the swap. This may have been a response to the closure of 3,000 businesses with the loss of 68,000 jobs due to the ending of normal cross-border traffic into Gaza as a result of continued Hamas attacks.
Hizb’allah said they were not prepared to do the prisoner swap in two stages as suggested by Israel. They want one swap of all prisoners. The Israeli plan’s first stage was to involve the freeing of some Hizb’allah combatants in exchange for proof the two kidnapped Israeli soldiers were alive, followed by their exchange for the rest of the combatants in the second stage. Hizb’allah offered rewards for, and plan to kidnap, Israeli tourists and aid workers in Chechnya, Egypt, Kashmir, Lebanon, Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.
Hizb’allah have always refused to say, even to UN representatives, whether the two kidnapped Israeli soldiers are alive, and in contrast to Israel, have refused the Red Cross/Red Crescent access to assess prisoner welfare and permit communication home.
3· At the end of her visit to the region Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice promised $80 million to help President Abbas establish an effective security force on the West Bank. President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert also held the first leadership meeting inside the Palestinian Authority (Jericho) since the 2000 intifada began. These were preparatory talks for a proposed November 2007 summit in Washington involving any regional partners interested in fostering the peace process; Saudi Arabia expressed an interest in attending. .
Abbas and Olmert attempted to establish an “agreement of principles” based upon the Arab and Quartet (EU, Russia, UN, and US) peace plans, and, the US-brokered “road map” between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. Abbas wanted further prisoner releases, including 20 militants deported in 2002 for their violent takeover and desecration of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Bethlehem. It was agreed that security on the West Bank was vital but the interim PA government said it was incapable of providing it. Greater freedom of movement, and economic development and cooperation were discussed, as was the need to develop Palestinian infrastructure. Olmert stressed that progress was dependent on President Abbas rejecting any re-establishment of the national unity government with Hamas. Abbas continued to hold discreet talks with Hamas but is currently insisting they return Gaza to PA control. Israel’s Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni described the hoped for peace process as “normalisation in stages.”
4· The United Nations Secretary General recommended to the Security Council, at the request of the Lebanese government, that the South Lebanon UNIFIL force mandate due to expire 31 August be extended another year.
Elections to replace two of the assassinated Lebanese government legislators produced an unexpected blow to the government when the opposition Christian party the Free Patriotic Movement defeated the Phalangist Christian Amin Gemayel the father of the assassinated legislator, Pierre, by 418 votes. The result was due to the Armenian Christian vote which went to the opposition FPM, a predominantly Christian opposition party, and not the Phalangist Christians who form part of the ruling coalition. The results from some of the polling stations are being reviewed following objections from Amin Gemayel at alleged forgeries made by Armenian Tashnag party representatives.
5· Prime Minister Olmert stated there would be no confrontation with Syria this summer, though IDF Intelligence did state that Syria remained concerned that war was likely and was making non-offensive preparations. Syria continued to demand that talks on returning the Golan be resumed with US mediation. President Bush refused to enter talks until Syria ceased its support for terrorism in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine.
Syria agreed to Russia’s use of her naval facilities at Latakia port on the eastern Mediterranean in exchange for the cancellation of two-thirds of Syria’s, predominantly arms procurement, debt to Russia.
6· Labour Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s testimony to the Winograd Committee was released for publication. In it he defended his unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon (May 2000), and said he had anticipated the previous successful kidnap of 3 IDF soldiers by Hizb’allah, in October 2000, from the occupied Syrian Shebaa Farms border area, but the IDF failed to prevent it. He refused to attack Lebanon in 2000 saying it was not in Israel’s interest, and he also thought the 3 kidnapped soldiers were probably dead. He did not believe Hizb’allah would "dare" attack Israel proper after the UN had defined the border between Israel and Lebanon as part of the withdrawal process in 2000.
He thought the decision to attack Lebanon in 2006, though it had some international support, was also unwise. He claimed he would have struck hard in immediate response to the kidnap of 2006 but then desisted from any further attacks whilst demanding the return of the kidnapped soldiers. He would then have taken 6 weeks to prepare a military response and to assess the situation but would only have acted further if he felt it was in Israel’s vital security interest. He felt the government had allowed Hizb’allah, Syria, and Iran, to force a second front upon Israel, and criticised the Labour party’s previous leader and former Defence Minister, Amir Peretz, for agreeing to an immediate major military offensive without first having assessed whether the Home Front or the IDF were prepared for it.
7· Finance Minister Ronnie Bar-On presented the largest budget in Israel’s history ($75 billion) to the Cabinet. Two of the government coalition partners, Labour and the ultra-Orthodox Shas, said they would oppose the budget unless their Defence and Industry ministries received more. PM Olmert did finally agree to a $700 million increase in defence spending over two budgets, with $125 million of the increase to apply in 2008, and the outstanding increase of $572 million reserved for the 2009 budget. If the government cannot agree the budget by 31 December 2007 then it will continue to operate under the 2007 budget spending limits. If the new budget is not approved by 31 March 2008 the government falls and early elections are called.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· Hamas continued to arrest Fatah officials they feel pose a threat in Gaza or in response to arrests made in the West Bank of Hamas personnel. IDF Intelligence believe Hamas are already preparing for the next stage in their conflict with Israel. The urgency with which they dealt with Islamic Jihad personnel who breached the weapons ban, and their being prepared to kill those who disobeyed them indicates they will not tolerate any form of opposition. It is clear though from both Islamic Jihad and the Army of Islam’s responses this week that they will be difficult to control. The release of video showing Al Qaeda cells training in Gaza under the Army of Islam umbrella is a direct challenge to Hamas and is further evidence that Al Qaeda has targeted Gaza as a base of operations. This will pose a threat and be a source of instability for both Hamas and Israel.
Egypt has taken a more proactive attitude to the weapons smuggling efforts into Gaza. The reasons are partly domestic, as Hamas’ parent organisation the Muslim Brotherhood remains the regime's biggest threat. But Egypt has been warned by the US that its new 10-year weapons deal is based on Egypt’s being prepared to stop or severely curtail weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip. Another reason for Egypt’s greater activity is the increasing threat from Al Qaeda that has previously targeted Egypt’s tourist industry in Sinai.
· Hamas and Hizb’allah’s statements on their kidnapped Israelis indicate they are currently under political pressure and therefore need to press Israel for action and greater concessions. The pressure on Hamas derives from the total collapse of the economy in Gaza. Hamas expected EU sanctions to crumble by now and believed they could circumvent Israel’s steady military and economic squeeze. Hamas has called upon Egypt to help with the negotiations, as Egypt too starts to put pressure on Hamas by increasing the weapons and smuggling tunnels closures in Sinai. Hamas need to show evidence that there are benefits to its rule now that it has imposed its version of law and order on the Gaza Strip. Hamas continues to focus its energies on controlling every aspect of life in Gaza and on developing more sophisticated and longer-range missiles to be fired at Israel’s city ports of Ashqelon and Ashdod.
Hizb’allah have issued a general kidnap order against all Israelis to increase pressure on Israel to meet its demands for the release of all Lebanese prisoners including convicted terrorists caught in Israel following the murder of Israeli civilians. It is likely that Hizb’allah’s refusal to have a two-stage prisoner release is because at least one of the kidnapped Israelis is dead and they don’t want to give Israel a reason to refuse meeting their maximal demands.
Hizb'allah remains under domestic political scrutiny to justify its militia and incursion into Israel. The release of prisoners held for many years as a result of terror acts in Israel as part of a prisoner swap would, they believe, vindicate their militant position.
· Last week the proposed Washington forum on the Middle East was described as a peace conference to be held in September. The current description is a regional meeting of interested parties to be held in November. It is clear that after consultations with the parties in the region the US has realised that November is the earliest date for a meeting. This will allow time for the UN votes on sanctions against Iran and the international tribunal into the assassination of Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri to be passed in September or October. The final date for the election of a new Christian President in Lebanon, to replace the current Syrian puppet, Lebanese President Lahoud, is 23 November. Also, the Winograd Committee on the Second Lebanon War is supposed to have published its final report at the latest by November, although this may yet be subject to further delay.
· PM Olmert and President Abbas are both facing early elections next year. It has become obvious that even if Olmert survives the findings of the Winograd Committee final report and the consequent splits in his party, he will still not be able to hold a coalition government together. President Abbas by suspending the P.A. Legislature has no choice under the Palestinian Constitution but to hold elections within months.
Progress on the Syrian front for Israel has been halted by the refusal of President Bush to countenance mediation a basic demand of Syria’s. President Abbas’ hope that progress on Israeli withdrawal could be achieved upon the creation of a national unity government has also been halted by the Hamas coup in Gaza.
Both need substantial progress and concessions to be made but neither has the mandate or ability to deliver either. Abbas has had to keep the door open to Hamas in the likelihood that talks with Israel collapse, but Abbas knows he cannot return to a coalition with Hamas unless they are prepared to make substantial concessions over Gaza. PM Olmert has made it clear that should Abbas make a deal with Hamas he will call off the talks.
· Israel has offered a step-by-step approach to improving the general situation on the West Bank, whilst continuing to put pressure on Gaza, until the inevitable elections in 2008. The most pressing issues are:
1. The PA has said categorically it cannot deliver security on the West Bank. It expects Israel to not only take care of its own security but in effect to suppress all opposition to the PA on the West Bank too.
2. Abbas needs more prisoner releases if he is not to look ridiculous when Israel releases the 450 Hamas and other radical prisoners in exchange for the kidnapped corporal Schalit. Were Abbas to achieve fewer prisoner releases violence would once again be seen to pay dividends and moderation would be seen as a sign of weakness that attracts humiliation and exploitation.
3. Economic development is seen as vital by both sides but progress will inevitably be slow and is unlikely to show sufficient progress for either Olmert or Abbas to point to during their respective election campaigns.
4. In Israel it will be difficult to sell any prospective deal with Abbas as he is so obviously incapable of delivering anything agreed upon, cannot deliver security within the West Bank itself, never mind offer any to Israel, and is currently in negotiations with Hamas, a party that has proven not only that it will betray any Palestinian leader that it disagrees with but offers no hope of any compromise with Israel.
The only way out of this impasse is for a future Israeli coalition government to agree to outside economic and security intervention in the West Bank that will allow a stage-by-stage disengagement. Tony Blair’s role in such a process could be decisive. It will be possible to measure the extent of progress achieved at the regional summit in Washington in November by the depth of the negotiations on this process. If foreign intervention is not dealt with on any substantive level then progress will be both marginal and superficial.
· The next three months will be crucial for the future of Lebanon. The UNIFIL mandate will need to be renewed, a new President elected by the Legislature, and the international tribunal into the assassination of President Hariri convened and its preliminary findings heard. In this week’s elections the government coalition lost an important seat that would have helped in the Legislature’s vote for the majority’s preferred Presidential candidate. This was a direct result of the perennial divisions within the Lebanese Christian community. As the Speaker of Parliament is a pro Hizb’allah Shia, and he has already said he would not recognise these recent elections or convene the Legislature to vote for the new President, the likelihood is Lebanon will be ruled by two governments, possibly even with two Presidents.
· President Bush’s refusal to engage with Syria has led to an inevitable void that has quickly been filled by Russia. Syria is currently dependent upon Iran to maintain the regime’s strategic position in relation to the United States, Israel, Turkey, and, to a lesser extent than in the past, Iraq. Syria needs a counter balance to both the US and Iran and Russia’s intervention offers her greater scope for manoeuvre. Syria would prefer US backing as long as it was on her terms, i.e. influence in Lebanon, the return of the Golan, an end to US sanctions, the deletion of Syria from the US’s list of nations that sponsor terror, and US economic, and possibly military, support.
Syria’s fears about a summer 2007 conflagration are more about maintaining tensions in the region so that her position is not ignored, than any real fear of a war with Israel at this time.
· Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s testimony to the Winograd Committee was riddled with inconsistencies:
a) He claimed his unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon saved lives and was strategically wise and yet it was a major factor in the intifada that followed within months of the withdrawal. It gave the signal to Yassir Arafat that he had no need to compromise because Barak, or any future Israeli government, would unilaterally give him what he wanted as long as he killed enough Israelis. Thousands of Israeli civilians lost their lives as a consequence.
b) Barak claimed he anticipated an attack on the Shebaa Farms area in 2000 yet made no effort to hand it over to the UN, failed to ensure an attack happened, and failed to prevent the kidnapping of 3 IDF soldiers. He made no military response to the kidnappings despite previously stating that he would respond “harshly” to any incursions. Despite this he again made no connection between this pliant response and the message it sent to Hizb’allah, i.e. that there would be a restrained if nonexistent response to any future kidnappings.
c) He further claimed that Hizb’allah would not “dare” cross Israel’s border, and that was one of the reasons for the unilateral withdrawal with UN demarcation of the border. Yet that is exactly what Hizb’allah did in July 2006. In fact several Hizb’allah tunnels into Israel were discovered after the war.
d) He criticised the government for allowing Hizb’allah, Syria, and Iran, to open a second front but this was after the fact. 4,000 missiles landed on Israel from south Lebanon, proof positive a second front was already in situ, it was simply a case of what excuse they would make to use it.
e) He claimed he had prepared the North for any eventuality after the unilateral withdrawal but that everything changed drastically after he left office. Yet there was neither infrastructure to protect the civilian population in place nor any organisation. His plans, whatever they may have been, only existed on paper not in reality. The most important strategic threat to the North was the threat posed by Katyusha missiles, yet Barak focussed his strategic investments in long-range aircraft capable of hitting Iran rather than in an effective anti-missile missile system that would have offered protection to the North, the South, and Central Israel should he have decided to withdraw from the West Bank. He insists now that such a system is essential and that withdrawal from the West Bank, whether or not it was part of a peace agreement, would be too dangerous unless it was in position.
Yet he criticised his predecessor for his military inexperience and limited strategic understanding despite the fact it was this civilian, former Defence Minister Amir Peretz, who understood immediately the strategic threat posed by missiles and insisted the anti-missile defence system be made a top priority almost as soon as he took office in early 2006. The two previous greatest military minds and Prime Ministers, Arik Sharon and Barak himself, had failed to grasp the basic reality that there is only so long a civilian population can tolerate missiles landing on its towns and cities without any response from the government.
f) Barak stated he would have made an immediate harsh response and then stopped to take 6 weeks to reassess the situation and prepare the army. But Hizb’allah was already responding with barrages of Katyusha missiles within hours of the IDF’s initial response. Hizb’allah had already done what he had said they would never do, and invaded Israel proper. A 6 week lull in the fighting would have simply given Hizb’allah more time to resupply, reorganise, and plan the next phase of the campaign. They would have posed a far more deadly threat to any invading force had Barak’s plan been followed. This would have led to the worst possible scenario, either no response, just as happened under Barak in October 2000, or a belated response that would have led to mass casualties against an even better prepared enemy. If Barak had decided the risk was not worth it, as he had in 2000, Hizb’allah would then have been ensconced within sovereign Israeli territory just beyond the border fence with their tunnels intact, their strategic missile capability untouched, and nothing to bargain with to release the kidnapped soldiers.
g) Finally, Barak ignores the most obvious point of all. PM Olmert and Amir Peretz, the two inexperienced civilians, achieved what no previous Prime Minister, with exceptional military experience or not, had done:
In 40 days they had reversed a 40-year inability of the sovereign government of Lebanon to place its own army on its own southern border. Not only was this now achieved but so was a bolstered and substantial UNIFIL presence, a demand that every Israeli government had made since the 1978 incursion into South Lebanon to clear Palestinian terrorists from Israel’s northern border. All tunnels into Israel were found and destroyed, all bunkers in Israeli sovereign territory just beyond the fence were blown up, and no Hizb’allah fighters are able to openly carry arms. Bunkers are still being discovered and destroyed by both UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army. It is now a mandatory legal requirement of the UN that Hizb’allah be disarmed and not be resupplied. Syria and Iran are both in breach of this mandatory UN Resolution and are vulnerable to further sanctions. Hizb’allah have also probably had to move all its strategic missiles north of the Litani River outside of the zone currently occupied by UNIFIL forces. Israel’s northern border, at least for the last calendar year, has been quieter than in the last 40 years.
Hizb’allah’s whole infrastructure, its strategic plans, methods of communication, training, tactics, supplies and logistics, intelligence capability, have all been exposed and assessed by all western military forces, and continue to be so as result of the western-led UNIFIL presence.
· At the moment it looks likely the 2007 budget will be approved, particularly as the money has been found for Labour Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s pet project, the anti-missile missile system named “Iron Dome.” Nevertheless, a spring 2008 election should not be ruled out due to promises Barak made to Labour Party stalwarts. Ehud Olmert, should he survive the Winograd Committee’s final report, is unlikely to keep his coalition government going, even if he replaced Labour with the United Torah Judaism Party, to further than autumn 2008.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
___________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
_________________________________________________
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· Islamic Jihad were predominantly responsible for the firing of 5 Qassam missiles at Sderot from Northern Gaza this week; 1 stray unexploded Qassam that landed in N Gaza killed 2 Palestinian children when they picked it up. This is half the number of missiles fired at Israel compared to last week and may reflect current tensions between Hamas and Islamic Jihad within the Gaza Strip.
Hamas banned the use or carrying of weapons in public, a ban that has been ignored by both Islamic Jihad and the Army of Islam, an Al Qaeda affiliate and offshoot of the criminal Dagmoush clan who were involved in the kidnappings of both corporal Gilad Schalit from Israel and the BBC’s Alan Johnston. Hamas killed several Islamic Jihad members this week for breaching the ban, and the Dagmoush clan have released video of their members illegally training under the Al Qaeda banner within Gaza. Hamas and Al Qaeda are currently staunch rivals.
Hamas continued to send small teams to plant bombs on the Gaza-Israel border several of whom have been intercepted and killed by the IDF including at both the Karni and Erez border crossings. One two-man suspected terror team managed to penetrate into Israel from Gaza but were apprehended together with two accomplices around Tel Aviv. The IDF also killed 2 Islamic Jihad commanders in Nablus and South Gaza, and maintained their policy of arresting violent militants in the West Bank.
Large quantities of explosives continued to be uncovered by Egypt in Sinai and by Israel in the West Bank. The Egyptian regime renewed its arrests of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’ parent organisation.
2· Both Hamas and Hizb’allah have made statements about prisoner swaps with Israel. Egypt intimated it was prepared to re-enter Gaza as intermediaries for the first time since the Hamas coup to resume talks on swapping 450 Hamas militants for corporal Schalit. Hamas had stated any pressure on them would result in stalemate over the swap. This may have been a response to the closure of 3,000 businesses with the loss of 68,000 jobs due to the ending of normal cross-border traffic into Gaza as a result of continued Hamas attacks.
Hizb’allah said they were not prepared to do the prisoner swap in two stages as suggested by Israel. They want one swap of all prisoners. The Israeli plan’s first stage was to involve the freeing of some Hizb’allah combatants in exchange for proof the two kidnapped Israeli soldiers were alive, followed by their exchange for the rest of the combatants in the second stage. Hizb’allah offered rewards for, and plan to kidnap, Israeli tourists and aid workers in Chechnya, Egypt, Kashmir, Lebanon, Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.
Hizb’allah have always refused to say, even to UN representatives, whether the two kidnapped Israeli soldiers are alive, and in contrast to Israel, have refused the Red Cross/Red Crescent access to assess prisoner welfare and permit communication home.
3· At the end of her visit to the region Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice promised $80 million to help President Abbas establish an effective security force on the West Bank. President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert also held the first leadership meeting inside the Palestinian Authority (Jericho) since the 2000 intifada began. These were preparatory talks for a proposed November 2007 summit in Washington involving any regional partners interested in fostering the peace process; Saudi Arabia expressed an interest in attending. .
Abbas and Olmert attempted to establish an “agreement of principles” based upon the Arab and Quartet (EU, Russia, UN, and US) peace plans, and, the US-brokered “road map” between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. Abbas wanted further prisoner releases, including 20 militants deported in 2002 for their violent takeover and desecration of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Bethlehem. It was agreed that security on the West Bank was vital but the interim PA government said it was incapable of providing it. Greater freedom of movement, and economic development and cooperation were discussed, as was the need to develop Palestinian infrastructure. Olmert stressed that progress was dependent on President Abbas rejecting any re-establishment of the national unity government with Hamas. Abbas continued to hold discreet talks with Hamas but is currently insisting they return Gaza to PA control. Israel’s Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni described the hoped for peace process as “normalisation in stages.”
4· The United Nations Secretary General recommended to the Security Council, at the request of the Lebanese government, that the South Lebanon UNIFIL force mandate due to expire 31 August be extended another year.
Elections to replace two of the assassinated Lebanese government legislators produced an unexpected blow to the government when the opposition Christian party the Free Patriotic Movement defeated the Phalangist Christian Amin Gemayel the father of the assassinated legislator, Pierre, by 418 votes. The result was due to the Armenian Christian vote which went to the opposition FPM, a predominantly Christian opposition party, and not the Phalangist Christians who form part of the ruling coalition. The results from some of the polling stations are being reviewed following objections from Amin Gemayel at alleged forgeries made by Armenian Tashnag party representatives.
5· Prime Minister Olmert stated there would be no confrontation with Syria this summer, though IDF Intelligence did state that Syria remained concerned that war was likely and was making non-offensive preparations. Syria continued to demand that talks on returning the Golan be resumed with US mediation. President Bush refused to enter talks until Syria ceased its support for terrorism in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine.
Syria agreed to Russia’s use of her naval facilities at Latakia port on the eastern Mediterranean in exchange for the cancellation of two-thirds of Syria’s, predominantly arms procurement, debt to Russia.
6· Labour Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s testimony to the Winograd Committee was released for publication. In it he defended his unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon (May 2000), and said he had anticipated the previous successful kidnap of 3 IDF soldiers by Hizb’allah, in October 2000, from the occupied Syrian Shebaa Farms border area, but the IDF failed to prevent it. He refused to attack Lebanon in 2000 saying it was not in Israel’s interest, and he also thought the 3 kidnapped soldiers were probably dead. He did not believe Hizb’allah would "dare" attack Israel proper after the UN had defined the border between Israel and Lebanon as part of the withdrawal process in 2000.
He thought the decision to attack Lebanon in 2006, though it had some international support, was also unwise. He claimed he would have struck hard in immediate response to the kidnap of 2006 but then desisted from any further attacks whilst demanding the return of the kidnapped soldiers. He would then have taken 6 weeks to prepare a military response and to assess the situation but would only have acted further if he felt it was in Israel’s vital security interest. He felt the government had allowed Hizb’allah, Syria, and Iran, to force a second front upon Israel, and criticised the Labour party’s previous leader and former Defence Minister, Amir Peretz, for agreeing to an immediate major military offensive without first having assessed whether the Home Front or the IDF were prepared for it.
7· Finance Minister Ronnie Bar-On presented the largest budget in Israel’s history ($75 billion) to the Cabinet. Two of the government coalition partners, Labour and the ultra-Orthodox Shas, said they would oppose the budget unless their Defence and Industry ministries received more. PM Olmert did finally agree to a $700 million increase in defence spending over two budgets, with $125 million of the increase to apply in 2008, and the outstanding increase of $572 million reserved for the 2009 budget. If the government cannot agree the budget by 31 December 2007 then it will continue to operate under the 2007 budget spending limits. If the new budget is not approved by 31 March 2008 the government falls and early elections are called.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· Hamas continued to arrest Fatah officials they feel pose a threat in Gaza or in response to arrests made in the West Bank of Hamas personnel. IDF Intelligence believe Hamas are already preparing for the next stage in their conflict with Israel. The urgency with which they dealt with Islamic Jihad personnel who breached the weapons ban, and their being prepared to kill those who disobeyed them indicates they will not tolerate any form of opposition. It is clear though from both Islamic Jihad and the Army of Islam’s responses this week that they will be difficult to control. The release of video showing Al Qaeda cells training in Gaza under the Army of Islam umbrella is a direct challenge to Hamas and is further evidence that Al Qaeda has targeted Gaza as a base of operations. This will pose a threat and be a source of instability for both Hamas and Israel.
Egypt has taken a more proactive attitude to the weapons smuggling efforts into Gaza. The reasons are partly domestic, as Hamas’ parent organisation the Muslim Brotherhood remains the regime's biggest threat. But Egypt has been warned by the US that its new 10-year weapons deal is based on Egypt’s being prepared to stop or severely curtail weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip. Another reason for Egypt’s greater activity is the increasing threat from Al Qaeda that has previously targeted Egypt’s tourist industry in Sinai.
· Hamas and Hizb’allah’s statements on their kidnapped Israelis indicate they are currently under political pressure and therefore need to press Israel for action and greater concessions. The pressure on Hamas derives from the total collapse of the economy in Gaza. Hamas expected EU sanctions to crumble by now and believed they could circumvent Israel’s steady military and economic squeeze. Hamas has called upon Egypt to help with the negotiations, as Egypt too starts to put pressure on Hamas by increasing the weapons and smuggling tunnels closures in Sinai. Hamas need to show evidence that there are benefits to its rule now that it has imposed its version of law and order on the Gaza Strip. Hamas continues to focus its energies on controlling every aspect of life in Gaza and on developing more sophisticated and longer-range missiles to be fired at Israel’s city ports of Ashqelon and Ashdod.
Hizb’allah have issued a general kidnap order against all Israelis to increase pressure on Israel to meet its demands for the release of all Lebanese prisoners including convicted terrorists caught in Israel following the murder of Israeli civilians. It is likely that Hizb’allah’s refusal to have a two-stage prisoner release is because at least one of the kidnapped Israelis is dead and they don’t want to give Israel a reason to refuse meeting their maximal demands.
Hizb'allah remains under domestic political scrutiny to justify its militia and incursion into Israel. The release of prisoners held for many years as a result of terror acts in Israel as part of a prisoner swap would, they believe, vindicate their militant position.
· Last week the proposed Washington forum on the Middle East was described as a peace conference to be held in September. The current description is a regional meeting of interested parties to be held in November. It is clear that after consultations with the parties in the region the US has realised that November is the earliest date for a meeting. This will allow time for the UN votes on sanctions against Iran and the international tribunal into the assassination of Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri to be passed in September or October. The final date for the election of a new Christian President in Lebanon, to replace the current Syrian puppet, Lebanese President Lahoud, is 23 November. Also, the Winograd Committee on the Second Lebanon War is supposed to have published its final report at the latest by November, although this may yet be subject to further delay.
· PM Olmert and President Abbas are both facing early elections next year. It has become obvious that even if Olmert survives the findings of the Winograd Committee final report and the consequent splits in his party, he will still not be able to hold a coalition government together. President Abbas by suspending the P.A. Legislature has no choice under the Palestinian Constitution but to hold elections within months.
Progress on the Syrian front for Israel has been halted by the refusal of President Bush to countenance mediation a basic demand of Syria’s. President Abbas’ hope that progress on Israeli withdrawal could be achieved upon the creation of a national unity government has also been halted by the Hamas coup in Gaza.
Both need substantial progress and concessions to be made but neither has the mandate or ability to deliver either. Abbas has had to keep the door open to Hamas in the likelihood that talks with Israel collapse, but Abbas knows he cannot return to a coalition with Hamas unless they are prepared to make substantial concessions over Gaza. PM Olmert has made it clear that should Abbas make a deal with Hamas he will call off the talks.
· Israel has offered a step-by-step approach to improving the general situation on the West Bank, whilst continuing to put pressure on Gaza, until the inevitable elections in 2008. The most pressing issues are:
1. The PA has said categorically it cannot deliver security on the West Bank. It expects Israel to not only take care of its own security but in effect to suppress all opposition to the PA on the West Bank too.
2. Abbas needs more prisoner releases if he is not to look ridiculous when Israel releases the 450 Hamas and other radical prisoners in exchange for the kidnapped corporal Schalit. Were Abbas to achieve fewer prisoner releases violence would once again be seen to pay dividends and moderation would be seen as a sign of weakness that attracts humiliation and exploitation.
3. Economic development is seen as vital by both sides but progress will inevitably be slow and is unlikely to show sufficient progress for either Olmert or Abbas to point to during their respective election campaigns.
4. In Israel it will be difficult to sell any prospective deal with Abbas as he is so obviously incapable of delivering anything agreed upon, cannot deliver security within the West Bank itself, never mind offer any to Israel, and is currently in negotiations with Hamas, a party that has proven not only that it will betray any Palestinian leader that it disagrees with but offers no hope of any compromise with Israel.
The only way out of this impasse is for a future Israeli coalition government to agree to outside economic and security intervention in the West Bank that will allow a stage-by-stage disengagement. Tony Blair’s role in such a process could be decisive. It will be possible to measure the extent of progress achieved at the regional summit in Washington in November by the depth of the negotiations on this process. If foreign intervention is not dealt with on any substantive level then progress will be both marginal and superficial.
· The next three months will be crucial for the future of Lebanon. The UNIFIL mandate will need to be renewed, a new President elected by the Legislature, and the international tribunal into the assassination of President Hariri convened and its preliminary findings heard. In this week’s elections the government coalition lost an important seat that would have helped in the Legislature’s vote for the majority’s preferred Presidential candidate. This was a direct result of the perennial divisions within the Lebanese Christian community. As the Speaker of Parliament is a pro Hizb’allah Shia, and he has already said he would not recognise these recent elections or convene the Legislature to vote for the new President, the likelihood is Lebanon will be ruled by two governments, possibly even with two Presidents.
· President Bush’s refusal to engage with Syria has led to an inevitable void that has quickly been filled by Russia. Syria is currently dependent upon Iran to maintain the regime’s strategic position in relation to the United States, Israel, Turkey, and, to a lesser extent than in the past, Iraq. Syria needs a counter balance to both the US and Iran and Russia’s intervention offers her greater scope for manoeuvre. Syria would prefer US backing as long as it was on her terms, i.e. influence in Lebanon, the return of the Golan, an end to US sanctions, the deletion of Syria from the US’s list of nations that sponsor terror, and US economic, and possibly military, support.
Syria’s fears about a summer 2007 conflagration are more about maintaining tensions in the region so that her position is not ignored, than any real fear of a war with Israel at this time.
· Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s testimony to the Winograd Committee was riddled with inconsistencies:
a) He claimed his unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon saved lives and was strategically wise and yet it was a major factor in the intifada that followed within months of the withdrawal. It gave the signal to Yassir Arafat that he had no need to compromise because Barak, or any future Israeli government, would unilaterally give him what he wanted as long as he killed enough Israelis. Thousands of Israeli civilians lost their lives as a consequence.
b) Barak claimed he anticipated an attack on the Shebaa Farms area in 2000 yet made no effort to hand it over to the UN, failed to ensure an attack happened, and failed to prevent the kidnapping of 3 IDF soldiers. He made no military response to the kidnappings despite previously stating that he would respond “harshly” to any incursions. Despite this he again made no connection between this pliant response and the message it sent to Hizb’allah, i.e. that there would be a restrained if nonexistent response to any future kidnappings.
c) He further claimed that Hizb’allah would not “dare” cross Israel’s border, and that was one of the reasons for the unilateral withdrawal with UN demarcation of the border. Yet that is exactly what Hizb’allah did in July 2006. In fact several Hizb’allah tunnels into Israel were discovered after the war.
d) He criticised the government for allowing Hizb’allah, Syria, and Iran, to open a second front but this was after the fact. 4,000 missiles landed on Israel from south Lebanon, proof positive a second front was already in situ, it was simply a case of what excuse they would make to use it.
e) He claimed he had prepared the North for any eventuality after the unilateral withdrawal but that everything changed drastically after he left office. Yet there was neither infrastructure to protect the civilian population in place nor any organisation. His plans, whatever they may have been, only existed on paper not in reality. The most important strategic threat to the North was the threat posed by Katyusha missiles, yet Barak focussed his strategic investments in long-range aircraft capable of hitting Iran rather than in an effective anti-missile missile system that would have offered protection to the North, the South, and Central Israel should he have decided to withdraw from the West Bank. He insists now that such a system is essential and that withdrawal from the West Bank, whether or not it was part of a peace agreement, would be too dangerous unless it was in position.
Yet he criticised his predecessor for his military inexperience and limited strategic understanding despite the fact it was this civilian, former Defence Minister Amir Peretz, who understood immediately the strategic threat posed by missiles and insisted the anti-missile defence system be made a top priority almost as soon as he took office in early 2006. The two previous greatest military minds and Prime Ministers, Arik Sharon and Barak himself, had failed to grasp the basic reality that there is only so long a civilian population can tolerate missiles landing on its towns and cities without any response from the government.
f) Barak stated he would have made an immediate harsh response and then stopped to take 6 weeks to reassess the situation and prepare the army. But Hizb’allah was already responding with barrages of Katyusha missiles within hours of the IDF’s initial response. Hizb’allah had already done what he had said they would never do, and invaded Israel proper. A 6 week lull in the fighting would have simply given Hizb’allah more time to resupply, reorganise, and plan the next phase of the campaign. They would have posed a far more deadly threat to any invading force had Barak’s plan been followed. This would have led to the worst possible scenario, either no response, just as happened under Barak in October 2000, or a belated response that would have led to mass casualties against an even better prepared enemy. If Barak had decided the risk was not worth it, as he had in 2000, Hizb’allah would then have been ensconced within sovereign Israeli territory just beyond the border fence with their tunnels intact, their strategic missile capability untouched, and nothing to bargain with to release the kidnapped soldiers.
g) Finally, Barak ignores the most obvious point of all. PM Olmert and Amir Peretz, the two inexperienced civilians, achieved what no previous Prime Minister, with exceptional military experience or not, had done:
In 40 days they had reversed a 40-year inability of the sovereign government of Lebanon to place its own army on its own southern border. Not only was this now achieved but so was a bolstered and substantial UNIFIL presence, a demand that every Israeli government had made since the 1978 incursion into South Lebanon to clear Palestinian terrorists from Israel’s northern border. All tunnels into Israel were found and destroyed, all bunkers in Israeli sovereign territory just beyond the fence were blown up, and no Hizb’allah fighters are able to openly carry arms. Bunkers are still being discovered and destroyed by both UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army. It is now a mandatory legal requirement of the UN that Hizb’allah be disarmed and not be resupplied. Syria and Iran are both in breach of this mandatory UN Resolution and are vulnerable to further sanctions. Hizb’allah have also probably had to move all its strategic missiles north of the Litani River outside of the zone currently occupied by UNIFIL forces. Israel’s northern border, at least for the last calendar year, has been quieter than in the last 40 years.
Hizb’allah’s whole infrastructure, its strategic plans, methods of communication, training, tactics, supplies and logistics, intelligence capability, have all been exposed and assessed by all western military forces, and continue to be so as result of the western-led UNIFIL presence.
· At the moment it looks likely the 2007 budget will be approved, particularly as the money has been found for Labour Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s pet project, the anti-missile missile system named “Iron Dome.” Nevertheless, a spring 2008 election should not be ruled out due to promises Barak made to Labour Party stalwarts. Ehud Olmert, should he survive the Winograd Committee’s final report, is unlikely to keep his coalition government going, even if he replaced Labour with the United Torah Judaism Party, to further than autumn 2008.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
___________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
_________________________________________________
Thursday, 2 August 2007
Week 26 July – 31 July 2007
This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 12 Qassam missiles were fired from Gaza by Hamas and Islamic Jihad into Israel this week, over double last week’s tally. Several failed attempts were made to attack Israeli forces on the Gaza border. The IDF continued to mount small operations against Qassam missile cells killing the head of Islamic Jihad’s military wing in Gaza City.
Bedouin smugglers clashed with Egyptian security forces as they attempted to destroy buildings on the border that camouflaged weapons smuggling tunnels from Egypt’s Sinai desert into the southern Gaza Strip. Egypt continued to keep the border closed but allowed Israel to process for re-entry 6,000 mainly Fatah-supporting Gazans who had escaped last month’s clashes and had become trapped on Egypt’s side of the border. Hamas objected to being excluded from this procedure and to Israel’s participation in it.
Hamas has now taken responsibility for paying PA government and security officials in Gaza, who are mostly Hamas loyalists. Hamas also announced the formation of its own intelligence service, to be called the Internal Security Apparatus, which will replace the previous Fatah-dominated Preventive Security Force in Gaza.
2· Hamas and Fatah continued to arrest each other’s members and confiscate arms in Gaza and the West Bank respectively. Hamas produced documents proving late President Yassir Arafat used Palestinian Authority funds to pay for extravagant expenses of Fatah members. Fatah accused Hamas of an assassination attempt on President Abbas after gunshots were fired at his Residence near Ramallah, and, of attempting to set up an illegal militia on the West Bank.
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert suggested President Abbas use Jordanian Army forces to establish order and security on the West Bank, and allowed the delivery of several thousand automatic rifles to PA security forces, in addition to the 1,000 sent a few weeks ago.
President Abbas met President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, he confirmed Abbas was the legitimate leader of the Palestinian people and offered to mediate between him and Hamas as Palestinian unity was essential. Abbas stated Hamas’ actions in Gaza were a coup, and that should things return to the status quo ante he would be prepared to talk.
3· PA Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad’s aides announced Fayyad is likely to lead his own Independent party in the expected Palestinian elections, despite death threats and being labelled a “traitor” by the Palestinian Resistance Committee based in Gaza, a coalition of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades radicals who were responsible for the kidnapping of Gilad Schalit from southern Israel last year.
Fayyad had declared his government manifesto this week in which he refused to support armed struggle and denounced the use of violence and destruction in the name of Islam. Other elements of Fayyad’s manifesto included the return of Israel to the 1967 borders, Jerusalem as Palestine’s capital, the respect of all previous agreements made by the PLO including with Israel, and the resolution of the refugee issue based on Arab League and UN resolutions.
4· Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Defence Secretary Robert Gates visited the Middle East to discuss the forthcoming proposed peace conference in the autumn and the series of planned arms deals to “moderate” states in the region. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are to receive a $20 billion deal, which will include smart missiles. Egypt and Israel are scheduled to receive $13 billion and $30 billion respectively in military aid over the next 10 years. This effectively increases Israel’s military aid by 25% from $2.4 billion to $3 billion per year.
Rice also met the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman in Sharm e-Sheikh (Egypt), to urge their participation in the proposed autumn peace conference. Rice also reiterated President Bush’s position that Arab League member states should end the fiction that Israel did not exist, end all official media incitement against Israel, and send cabinet level ministers to Israel for talks.
5· The Arab League met in Cairo to discuss:
1. The results of the meeting in Israel in which the Jordanian and Egyptian delegation had been sent to represent the League’s views.
2. The Arab committee’s progress on trying to restore the situation in Gaza to the status quo ante.
3. PA Prime Minister Fayyad’s proposals for the Palestinian territories and the current state of talks with Israel.
4. Whether the Arab League should be represented at the proposed autumn peace conference.
Its Secretary General Amr Moussa stated Syria needed to be included in the talks, and that the conference should also include all areas of dispute between Israel and her neighbours. The US made it clear Syria is unfit to attend because of her continued support for terrorism in Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine, and her destabilising relationship with Iran.
Syria’s envoy left the Arab League meeting in Cairo in protest at the discussion of the US peace conference proposals. The Syrian position is that no discussions should be held until Hamas and Fatah are reconciled, Hamas returned to its Legislative Assembly majority in the West Bank, and Syria’s demands over the Golan Heights be met, namely that Israel should publicly state in advance of the negotiations that she will return all of the Golan to Syria.
6· The head of Hizb’allah, Hassan Nasrallah, stated there would be no deal to release the kidnapped Israeli soldiers held since last year until all Lebanese in Israeli jails were freed; that Hizb’allah was now ready to hit Israel at any time; and that Hizb’allah’s attack last year had made a shambles of US plans for the region. A Hizb’allah officer admitted that had the Second Lebanon War continued for another 10 days all his men would have had to surrender due to lack of provisions and ammunition.
7· Despite 5% economic growth for 4 years running, Prime Minister Olmert and Defence Minister Ehud Barak argued over cuts in the Defence budget. PM Olmert wanted to cut the defence budget and to set its levels for the next three years. Barak was concerned Israel’s commitment to the “Iron Dome” anti-missile system ($300 million), and the “Trophy” tank protection anti-missile system, as well as Army reform, would all be threatened if the budget was not increased. This coincided with a report by State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss in which he castigated the head of the Home Front Major General Yitzhak Gershon for failing to map out bomb shelter locations (both for army and resident information), failed to assess how many more were needed to protect the population, and did not understand the chain of command.
8· Former Justice Minister and current Vice Premier Haim Ramon testified to the Winograd Committee into the Second Lebanon War (2006), that he was for destroying Lebanon’s infrastructure by aerial bombing but against the ground invasion towards the end of the war. He stated PM Olmert disagreed with him and refused to order the destruction of Lebanon’s infrastructure, and, the reason Olmert had refused to send in ground forces at the beginning of the war was because the IDF High Command had said there was no need, and had, in any case, not called up the Reserves.
9· It was announced the last remnant of Ethiopian Jewry would be transported to Israel by the summer of 2008. These last Jews, known as the Falash Mura, are the remnant of clans forcibly baptised in the late 19th century, but who have since returned to Judaism. This final wave of 5,000 immigrants would bring to an end a 30-year campaign by pro-Ethiopian Jewish groups to bring Ethiopia’s remnant Jewish communities to Israel. There will thus be 100,000 Israelis of Jewish-Ethiopian descent by the end of 2008.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· The increase in Qassam fire was almost certainly connected to the importance of the killing of the head of Islamic Jihad, Gaza City district. Hamas is also testing the military limits with an increase in attempts at striking at IDF forces on the border. The IDF strategy is to continue a very limited campaign of attrition to keep Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine militias on the defensive.
Hamas’ main effort is on establishing its rule over Gaza. Law and order have apparently been established, and Hamas now has control over the court and jail systems, internal security, and administration. The economy remains in ruins but Hamas is still receiving funds from Iran as it has just paid the wages of all public sector workers. Nevertheless its failed attempt to impress the foreign media with how beneficent its rule is indicates its concern for the medium term future.
· President Abbas’ strategy remains the establishment of Fatah control over the West Bank, new elections when he deems the circumstances are in his favour, and a separate peace deal with Israel. He has shown no sign that he is able or willing to reform Fatah, or the corrupt practises endemic within both it and the PA. Prime Minister Fayyad’s attempt to control the centre ground through a new party only complicates matters for President Abbas because it will further split the secular vote.
It does not appear in Abbas’ interest to hold elections for many months. He will need to achieve major concessions from the proposed peace conference in the autumn before he will feel able to act. There remains a strong possibility that he will not stand for re-election.
· Condoleeza Rice and Robert Gates’ visit to the Middle East is President Bush’s final effort at finding some kind of agreement over Palestine before his term ends. The strategy is to isolate Syria and force it to choose between the return of the Golan Heights, good economic and diplomatic relations with the US, and a productive connection with Lebanon, or its continued support for Hizb’allah, Iran, and Hamas. The same applies to Hamas, it can agree to the three conditions of inclusion, namely recognition of Israel, meeting previous Palestinian treaty obligations made with Israel, and ceasing violence, or, remain excluded. But, this plan can easily founder or be delayed if not enough concessions are made by Israel, or the findings of the Winograd Committee report, due out in the autumn, forces the government to collapse resulting in early elections.
· The Gulf States and the Arab League face severe risks should they accept to attend the US proposed peace conference. Should it fail, or be delayed, for instance by Israel being plunged into a protracted election campaign and coalition government formation process, the Arab leaders who had risked recognition of Israel and progress in the peace talks would be left isolated and with nothing to show for their efforts. They have far more to lose than President Bush. They also risk splitting the Arab League by isolating Syria and forcing other Arab states to choose which side to commit themselves to. The only basis upon which they would be prepared to take such risks is if Israel makes deep concessions. But, a commitment of that kind could easily split Israel's government coalition and force new elections, again, putting the whole process on hold. It is also likely that if Hamas, or Syria, are excluded they could attempt to sabotage the talks by firing missiles at Israel, or attacking UNIFIL in Lebanon. Iran would probably also increase its attacks upon coalition forces in Iraq.
· The most likely method for any withdrawal process to succeed, whilst still maintaining any Israeli coalition government, is through a series of incremental withdrawals from the West Bank, in which Jordanian, UN, US, EU, and possibly Arab League and Russian forces would be involved. It is unlikely that such a withdrawal could be completed before the end of President Bush’s second term.
· President Bush needs to maintain pressure on Syria because this September sees:
1) The election of a new President in Lebanon;
2) UN discussions over increased sanctions against Iran, and;
3) The next stage in the International Tribunal over the allegedly Syrian-organised assassination of Lebanese PM Hariri.
If President Bush eases the pressure on Syria the calculation is they will impose, once again, a pro-Syrian Christian President who can sabotage the wishes of the current Saniora government, and, they will attempt to delay or sabotage the Tribunal’s proceedings. If Syria attempts to do either the Bush administration will probably demand an increase in US sanctions and call for UN sanctions as well. The intention is to force the Syrian government to stop its interference in Lebanon and to provide a disincentive to its radical policies. Syria, however, still expects the US to guarantee the return of the Golan Heights first, before it is prepared to countenance damaging its strategic alliance with Iran. The Syrian regime’s primary concern is the same as Iran’s, to maintain itself in power.
· Hizb’allah’s current agenda is to maintain pressure on Israel to counter any perceived threat of an imminent attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran believes that an attack is likely this summer and wants to counter this threat by using Hizb’allah against Israel. The strategic threat from Hizb’allah is unsustainable despite their complete rearmament. The IDF is prepared to invade Lebanon and inflict far more damage on the organisation than was achieved in the last war, which saw Hizb’allah within 10 days of complete surrender in the South of Lebanon, and their base in South Beirut destroyed.
· It is clear from PM Olmert’s refusal to increase the Defence budget that he is preparing the ground for elections, and also genuinely believes the IDF must completely reform itself financially as well as militarily. The renowned wastefulness and inefficiency of the IDF has been highlighted by a series of reports and Olmert hopes to embarrass Labour’s Defence Minister Ehud Barak into implementing the difficult but necessary reforms. He will use criticisms of the IDF by Winograd to support his case for not giving the Army more money. That will allow him to promise major financial support for the education, health, welfare, and research and development sectors. The issue of how to finance Israel’s ever-expanding defence needs remains central to the future of Israel’s security. PM Olmert has so far hinted that he thinks total protection of the civilian population financially unrealistic. He has also yet to give his support for the latest protective anti-missile technologies, or even to supply bunkers or shelters for civilians in the most vulnerable areas. Unfortunately for Olmert the High Court is not concerned with budgetary constraints; its main focus is on the rights of individuals to expect certain minimum protection from the state, and Olmert’s government has clearly failed in that regard.
· It is once again clear from Haim Ramon’s testimony to the Winograd Committee on the Second Lebanon War that PM Olmert was one of the few individuals within the Cabinet who had a rational and realistic appraisal of the situation in southern Lebanon and the capacity of the IDF to deal with it at that time. All previous testimony has shown a total lack of understanding of the IDF’s preparedness, or of the need to put pressure on the UN negotiations at the right time, or the advantages of ensuring a boosted UNIFIL presence and the return of the Lebanese Armed Forces to the border, or an appreciation the damage to Saniora’s government, and hence also to UN support, the destruction of Lebanon’s infrastructure would cause.
PM Olmert’s handling of the war in Lebanon was sound, but the problem remains, should he have agreed to initiate a response or not? Most observers within Israel felt he had no choice at the time due to the perceived collapse in Israel’s deterrent capability. It is clear, however, that neither the IDF, nor the Home Front Command, were prepared for such a conflict, despite the damage inflicted on Hizb’allah. It has also become clear that few, if any, within the Cabinet had Olmert’s overarching political-strategic grasp of the situation.
· The determination to ensure Ethiopian Jewry’s “return” to Israel highlights Israel’s uniqueness. Israel has very large minority populations, far greater than any European nation, at 20-25%. But, it also has a majority population that speaks 33 languages and originates from over 70 countries across all continents. The supreme irony of calling the most diverse, racially mixed, and only democratic and bi-national nation in the Middle East “racist”, or “apartheid”, could not be at greater variance with the facts. The Israel-born Jewish population also has one of the highest rates of inter-racial marriages in the world.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________ ____________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 12 Qassam missiles were fired from Gaza by Hamas and Islamic Jihad into Israel this week, over double last week’s tally. Several failed attempts were made to attack Israeli forces on the Gaza border. The IDF continued to mount small operations against Qassam missile cells killing the head of Islamic Jihad’s military wing in Gaza City.
Bedouin smugglers clashed with Egyptian security forces as they attempted to destroy buildings on the border that camouflaged weapons smuggling tunnels from Egypt’s Sinai desert into the southern Gaza Strip. Egypt continued to keep the border closed but allowed Israel to process for re-entry 6,000 mainly Fatah-supporting Gazans who had escaped last month’s clashes and had become trapped on Egypt’s side of the border. Hamas objected to being excluded from this procedure and to Israel’s participation in it.
Hamas has now taken responsibility for paying PA government and security officials in Gaza, who are mostly Hamas loyalists. Hamas also announced the formation of its own intelligence service, to be called the Internal Security Apparatus, which will replace the previous Fatah-dominated Preventive Security Force in Gaza.
2· Hamas and Fatah continued to arrest each other’s members and confiscate arms in Gaza and the West Bank respectively. Hamas produced documents proving late President Yassir Arafat used Palestinian Authority funds to pay for extravagant expenses of Fatah members. Fatah accused Hamas of an assassination attempt on President Abbas after gunshots were fired at his Residence near Ramallah, and, of attempting to set up an illegal militia on the West Bank.
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert suggested President Abbas use Jordanian Army forces to establish order and security on the West Bank, and allowed the delivery of several thousand automatic rifles to PA security forces, in addition to the 1,000 sent a few weeks ago.
President Abbas met President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, he confirmed Abbas was the legitimate leader of the Palestinian people and offered to mediate between him and Hamas as Palestinian unity was essential. Abbas stated Hamas’ actions in Gaza were a coup, and that should things return to the status quo ante he would be prepared to talk.
3· PA Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad’s aides announced Fayyad is likely to lead his own Independent party in the expected Palestinian elections, despite death threats and being labelled a “traitor” by the Palestinian Resistance Committee based in Gaza, a coalition of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades radicals who were responsible for the kidnapping of Gilad Schalit from southern Israel last year.
Fayyad had declared his government manifesto this week in which he refused to support armed struggle and denounced the use of violence and destruction in the name of Islam. Other elements of Fayyad’s manifesto included the return of Israel to the 1967 borders, Jerusalem as Palestine’s capital, the respect of all previous agreements made by the PLO including with Israel, and the resolution of the refugee issue based on Arab League and UN resolutions.
4· Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Defence Secretary Robert Gates visited the Middle East to discuss the forthcoming proposed peace conference in the autumn and the series of planned arms deals to “moderate” states in the region. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are to receive a $20 billion deal, which will include smart missiles. Egypt and Israel are scheduled to receive $13 billion and $30 billion respectively in military aid over the next 10 years. This effectively increases Israel’s military aid by 25% from $2.4 billion to $3 billion per year.
Rice also met the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman in Sharm e-Sheikh (Egypt), to urge their participation in the proposed autumn peace conference. Rice also reiterated President Bush’s position that Arab League member states should end the fiction that Israel did not exist, end all official media incitement against Israel, and send cabinet level ministers to Israel for talks.
5· The Arab League met in Cairo to discuss:
1. The results of the meeting in Israel in which the Jordanian and Egyptian delegation had been sent to represent the League’s views.
2. The Arab committee’s progress on trying to restore the situation in Gaza to the status quo ante.
3. PA Prime Minister Fayyad’s proposals for the Palestinian territories and the current state of talks with Israel.
4. Whether the Arab League should be represented at the proposed autumn peace conference.
Its Secretary General Amr Moussa stated Syria needed to be included in the talks, and that the conference should also include all areas of dispute between Israel and her neighbours. The US made it clear Syria is unfit to attend because of her continued support for terrorism in Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine, and her destabilising relationship with Iran.
Syria’s envoy left the Arab League meeting in Cairo in protest at the discussion of the US peace conference proposals. The Syrian position is that no discussions should be held until Hamas and Fatah are reconciled, Hamas returned to its Legislative Assembly majority in the West Bank, and Syria’s demands over the Golan Heights be met, namely that Israel should publicly state in advance of the negotiations that she will return all of the Golan to Syria.
6· The head of Hizb’allah, Hassan Nasrallah, stated there would be no deal to release the kidnapped Israeli soldiers held since last year until all Lebanese in Israeli jails were freed; that Hizb’allah was now ready to hit Israel at any time; and that Hizb’allah’s attack last year had made a shambles of US plans for the region. A Hizb’allah officer admitted that had the Second Lebanon War continued for another 10 days all his men would have had to surrender due to lack of provisions and ammunition.
7· Despite 5% economic growth for 4 years running, Prime Minister Olmert and Defence Minister Ehud Barak argued over cuts in the Defence budget. PM Olmert wanted to cut the defence budget and to set its levels for the next three years. Barak was concerned Israel’s commitment to the “Iron Dome” anti-missile system ($300 million), and the “Trophy” tank protection anti-missile system, as well as Army reform, would all be threatened if the budget was not increased. This coincided with a report by State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss in which he castigated the head of the Home Front Major General Yitzhak Gershon for failing to map out bomb shelter locations (both for army and resident information), failed to assess how many more were needed to protect the population, and did not understand the chain of command.
8· Former Justice Minister and current Vice Premier Haim Ramon testified to the Winograd Committee into the Second Lebanon War (2006), that he was for destroying Lebanon’s infrastructure by aerial bombing but against the ground invasion towards the end of the war. He stated PM Olmert disagreed with him and refused to order the destruction of Lebanon’s infrastructure, and, the reason Olmert had refused to send in ground forces at the beginning of the war was because the IDF High Command had said there was no need, and had, in any case, not called up the Reserves.
9· It was announced the last remnant of Ethiopian Jewry would be transported to Israel by the summer of 2008. These last Jews, known as the Falash Mura, are the remnant of clans forcibly baptised in the late 19th century, but who have since returned to Judaism. This final wave of 5,000 immigrants would bring to an end a 30-year campaign by pro-Ethiopian Jewish groups to bring Ethiopia’s remnant Jewish communities to Israel. There will thus be 100,000 Israelis of Jewish-Ethiopian descent by the end of 2008.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· The increase in Qassam fire was almost certainly connected to the importance of the killing of the head of Islamic Jihad, Gaza City district. Hamas is also testing the military limits with an increase in attempts at striking at IDF forces on the border. The IDF strategy is to continue a very limited campaign of attrition to keep Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine militias on the defensive.
Hamas’ main effort is on establishing its rule over Gaza. Law and order have apparently been established, and Hamas now has control over the court and jail systems, internal security, and administration. The economy remains in ruins but Hamas is still receiving funds from Iran as it has just paid the wages of all public sector workers. Nevertheless its failed attempt to impress the foreign media with how beneficent its rule is indicates its concern for the medium term future.
· President Abbas’ strategy remains the establishment of Fatah control over the West Bank, new elections when he deems the circumstances are in his favour, and a separate peace deal with Israel. He has shown no sign that he is able or willing to reform Fatah, or the corrupt practises endemic within both it and the PA. Prime Minister Fayyad’s attempt to control the centre ground through a new party only complicates matters for President Abbas because it will further split the secular vote.
It does not appear in Abbas’ interest to hold elections for many months. He will need to achieve major concessions from the proposed peace conference in the autumn before he will feel able to act. There remains a strong possibility that he will not stand for re-election.
· Condoleeza Rice and Robert Gates’ visit to the Middle East is President Bush’s final effort at finding some kind of agreement over Palestine before his term ends. The strategy is to isolate Syria and force it to choose between the return of the Golan Heights, good economic and diplomatic relations with the US, and a productive connection with Lebanon, or its continued support for Hizb’allah, Iran, and Hamas. The same applies to Hamas, it can agree to the three conditions of inclusion, namely recognition of Israel, meeting previous Palestinian treaty obligations made with Israel, and ceasing violence, or, remain excluded. But, this plan can easily founder or be delayed if not enough concessions are made by Israel, or the findings of the Winograd Committee report, due out in the autumn, forces the government to collapse resulting in early elections.
· The Gulf States and the Arab League face severe risks should they accept to attend the US proposed peace conference. Should it fail, or be delayed, for instance by Israel being plunged into a protracted election campaign and coalition government formation process, the Arab leaders who had risked recognition of Israel and progress in the peace talks would be left isolated and with nothing to show for their efforts. They have far more to lose than President Bush. They also risk splitting the Arab League by isolating Syria and forcing other Arab states to choose which side to commit themselves to. The only basis upon which they would be prepared to take such risks is if Israel makes deep concessions. But, a commitment of that kind could easily split Israel's government coalition and force new elections, again, putting the whole process on hold. It is also likely that if Hamas, or Syria, are excluded they could attempt to sabotage the talks by firing missiles at Israel, or attacking UNIFIL in Lebanon. Iran would probably also increase its attacks upon coalition forces in Iraq.
· The most likely method for any withdrawal process to succeed, whilst still maintaining any Israeli coalition government, is through a series of incremental withdrawals from the West Bank, in which Jordanian, UN, US, EU, and possibly Arab League and Russian forces would be involved. It is unlikely that such a withdrawal could be completed before the end of President Bush’s second term.
· President Bush needs to maintain pressure on Syria because this September sees:
1) The election of a new President in Lebanon;
2) UN discussions over increased sanctions against Iran, and;
3) The next stage in the International Tribunal over the allegedly Syrian-organised assassination of Lebanese PM Hariri.
If President Bush eases the pressure on Syria the calculation is they will impose, once again, a pro-Syrian Christian President who can sabotage the wishes of the current Saniora government, and, they will attempt to delay or sabotage the Tribunal’s proceedings. If Syria attempts to do either the Bush administration will probably demand an increase in US sanctions and call for UN sanctions as well. The intention is to force the Syrian government to stop its interference in Lebanon and to provide a disincentive to its radical policies. Syria, however, still expects the US to guarantee the return of the Golan Heights first, before it is prepared to countenance damaging its strategic alliance with Iran. The Syrian regime’s primary concern is the same as Iran’s, to maintain itself in power.
· Hizb’allah’s current agenda is to maintain pressure on Israel to counter any perceived threat of an imminent attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran believes that an attack is likely this summer and wants to counter this threat by using Hizb’allah against Israel. The strategic threat from Hizb’allah is unsustainable despite their complete rearmament. The IDF is prepared to invade Lebanon and inflict far more damage on the organisation than was achieved in the last war, which saw Hizb’allah within 10 days of complete surrender in the South of Lebanon, and their base in South Beirut destroyed.
· It is clear from PM Olmert’s refusal to increase the Defence budget that he is preparing the ground for elections, and also genuinely believes the IDF must completely reform itself financially as well as militarily. The renowned wastefulness and inefficiency of the IDF has been highlighted by a series of reports and Olmert hopes to embarrass Labour’s Defence Minister Ehud Barak into implementing the difficult but necessary reforms. He will use criticisms of the IDF by Winograd to support his case for not giving the Army more money. That will allow him to promise major financial support for the education, health, welfare, and research and development sectors. The issue of how to finance Israel’s ever-expanding defence needs remains central to the future of Israel’s security. PM Olmert has so far hinted that he thinks total protection of the civilian population financially unrealistic. He has also yet to give his support for the latest protective anti-missile technologies, or even to supply bunkers or shelters for civilians in the most vulnerable areas. Unfortunately for Olmert the High Court is not concerned with budgetary constraints; its main focus is on the rights of individuals to expect certain minimum protection from the state, and Olmert’s government has clearly failed in that regard.
· It is once again clear from Haim Ramon’s testimony to the Winograd Committee on the Second Lebanon War that PM Olmert was one of the few individuals within the Cabinet who had a rational and realistic appraisal of the situation in southern Lebanon and the capacity of the IDF to deal with it at that time. All previous testimony has shown a total lack of understanding of the IDF’s preparedness, or of the need to put pressure on the UN negotiations at the right time, or the advantages of ensuring a boosted UNIFIL presence and the return of the Lebanese Armed Forces to the border, or an appreciation the damage to Saniora’s government, and hence also to UN support, the destruction of Lebanon’s infrastructure would cause.
PM Olmert’s handling of the war in Lebanon was sound, but the problem remains, should he have agreed to initiate a response or not? Most observers within Israel felt he had no choice at the time due to the perceived collapse in Israel’s deterrent capability. It is clear, however, that neither the IDF, nor the Home Front Command, were prepared for such a conflict, despite the damage inflicted on Hizb’allah. It has also become clear that few, if any, within the Cabinet had Olmert’s overarching political-strategic grasp of the situation.
· The determination to ensure Ethiopian Jewry’s “return” to Israel highlights Israel’s uniqueness. Israel has very large minority populations, far greater than any European nation, at 20-25%. But, it also has a majority population that speaks 33 languages and originates from over 70 countries across all continents. The supreme irony of calling the most diverse, racially mixed, and only democratic and bi-national nation in the Middle East “racist”, or “apartheid”, could not be at greater variance with the facts. The Israel-born Jewish population also has one of the highest rates of inter-racial marriages in the world.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________ ____________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
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