Week 1 August – 8 August 2007

This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with:
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/

· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS

· Main Points:

1· Islamic Jihad were predominantly responsible for the firing of 5 Qassam missiles at Sderot from Northern Gaza this week; 1 stray unexploded Qassam that landed in N Gaza killed 2 Palestinian children when they picked it up. This is half the number of missiles fired at Israel compared to last week and may reflect current tensions between Hamas and Islamic Jihad within the Gaza Strip.
Hamas banned the use or carrying of weapons in public, a ban that has been ignored by both Islamic Jihad and the Army of Islam, an Al Qaeda affiliate and offshoot of the criminal Dagmoush clan who were involved in the kidnappings of both corporal Gilad Schalit from Israel and the BBC’s Alan Johnston. Hamas killed several Islamic Jihad members this week for breaching the ban, and the Dagmoush clan have released video of their members illegally training under the Al Qaeda banner within Gaza. Hamas and Al Qaeda are currently staunch rivals.
Hamas continued to send small teams to plant bombs on the Gaza-Israel border several of whom have been intercepted and killed by the IDF including at both the Karni and Erez border crossings. One two-man suspected terror team managed to penetrate into Israel from Gaza but were apprehended together with two accomplices around Tel Aviv. The IDF also killed 2 Islamic Jihad commanders in Nablus and South Gaza, and maintained their policy of arresting violent militants in the West Bank.
Large quantities of explosives continued to be uncovered by Egypt in Sinai and by Israel in the West Bank. The Egyptian regime renewed its arrests of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’ parent organisation.

2· Both Hamas and Hizb’allah have made statements about prisoner swaps with Israel. Egypt intimated it was prepared to re-enter Gaza as intermediaries for the first time since the Hamas coup to resume talks on swapping 450 Hamas militants for corporal Schalit. Hamas had stated any pressure on them would result in stalemate over the swap. This may have been a response to the closure of 3,000 businesses with the loss of 68,000 jobs due to the ending of normal cross-border traffic into Gaza as a result of continued Hamas attacks.
Hizb’allah said they were not prepared to do the prisoner swap in two stages as suggested by Israel. They want one swap of all prisoners. The Israeli plan’s first stage was to involve the freeing of some Hizb’allah combatants in exchange for proof the two kidnapped Israeli soldiers were alive, followed by their exchange for the rest of the combatants in the second stage. Hizb’allah offered rewards for, and plan to kidnap, Israeli tourists and aid workers in Chechnya, Egypt, Kashmir, Lebanon, Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.
Hizb’allah have always refused to say, even to UN representatives, whether the two kidnapped Israeli soldiers are alive, and in contrast to Israel, have refused the Red Cross/Red Crescent access to assess prisoner welfare and permit communication home.

3· At the end of her visit to the region Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice promised $80 million to help President Abbas establish an effective security force on the West Bank. President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert also held the first leadership meeting inside the Palestinian Authority (Jericho) since the 2000 intifada began. These were preparatory talks for a proposed November 2007 summit in Washington involving any regional partners interested in fostering the peace process; Saudi Arabia expressed an interest in attending. .
Abbas and Olmert attempted to establish an “agreement of principles” based upon the Arab and Quartet (EU, Russia, UN, and US) peace plans, and, the US-brokered “road map” between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. Abbas wanted further prisoner releases, including 20 militants deported in 2002 for their violent takeover and desecration of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Bethlehem. It was agreed that security on the West Bank was vital but the interim PA government said it was incapable of providing it. Greater freedom of movement, and economic development and cooperation were discussed, as was the need to develop Palestinian infrastructure. Olmert stressed that progress was dependent on President Abbas rejecting any re-establishment of the national unity government with Hamas. Abbas continued to hold discreet talks with Hamas but is currently insisting they return Gaza to PA control. Israel’s Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni described the hoped for peace process as “normalisation in stages.”

4· The United Nations Secretary General recommended to the Security Council, at the request of the Lebanese government, that the South Lebanon UNIFIL force mandate due to expire 31 August be extended another year.
Elections to replace two of the assassinated Lebanese government legislators produced an unexpected blow to the government when the opposition Christian party the Free Patriotic Movement defeated the Phalangist Christian Amin Gemayel the father of the assassinated legislator, Pierre, by 418 votes. The result was due to the Armenian Christian vote which went to the opposition FPM, a predominantly Christian opposition party, and not the Phalangist Christians who form part of the ruling coalition. The results from some of the polling stations are being reviewed following objections from Amin Gemayel at alleged forgeries made by Armenian Tashnag party representatives.

5· Prime Minister Olmert stated there would be no confrontation with Syria this summer, though IDF Intelligence did state that Syria remained concerned that war was likely and was making non-offensive preparations. Syria continued to demand that talks on returning the Golan be resumed with US mediation. President Bush refused to enter talks until Syria ceased its support for terrorism in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine.
Syria agreed to Russia’s use of her naval facilities at Latakia port on the eastern Mediterranean in exchange for the cancellation of two-thirds of Syria’s, predominantly arms procurement, debt to Russia.

6· Labour Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s testimony to the Winograd Committee was released for publication. In it he defended his unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon (May 2000), and said he had anticipated the previous successful kidnap of 3 IDF soldiers by Hizb’allah, in October 2000, from the occupied Syrian Shebaa Farms border area, but the IDF failed to prevent it. He refused to attack Lebanon in 2000 saying it was not in Israel’s interest, and he also thought the 3 kidnapped soldiers were probably dead. He did not believe Hizb’allah would "dare" attack Israel proper after the UN had defined the border between Israel and Lebanon as part of the withdrawal process in 2000.
He thought the decision to attack Lebanon in 2006, though it had some international support, was also unwise. He claimed he would have struck hard in immediate response to the kidnap of 2006 but then desisted from any further attacks whilst demanding the return of the kidnapped soldiers. He would then have taken 6 weeks to prepare a military response and to assess the situation but would only have acted further if he felt it was in Israel’s vital security interest. He felt the government had allowed Hizb’allah, Syria, and Iran, to force a second front upon Israel, and criticised the Labour party’s previous leader and former Defence Minister, Amir Peretz, for agreeing to an immediate major military offensive without first having assessed whether the Home Front or the IDF were prepared for it.

7· Finance Minister Ronnie Bar-On presented the largest budget in Israel’s history ($75 billion) to the Cabinet. Two of the government coalition partners, Labour and the ultra-Orthodox Shas, said they would oppose the budget unless their Defence and Industry ministries received more. PM Olmert did finally agree to a $700 million increase in defence spending over two budgets, with $125 million of the increase to apply in 2008, and the outstanding increase of $572 million reserved for the 2009 budget. If the government cannot agree the budget by 31 December 2007 then it will continue to operate under the 2007 budget spending limits. If the new budget is not approved by 31 March 2008 the government falls and early elections are called.

· ANALYSIS - General Picture:

· Hamas continued to arrest Fatah officials they feel pose a threat in Gaza or in response to arrests made in the West Bank of Hamas personnel. IDF Intelligence believe Hamas are already preparing for the next stage in their conflict with Israel. The urgency with which they dealt with Islamic Jihad personnel who breached the weapons ban, and their being prepared to kill those who disobeyed them indicates they will not tolerate any form of opposition. It is clear though from both Islamic Jihad and the Army of Islam’s responses this week that they will be difficult to control. The release of video showing Al Qaeda cells training in Gaza under the Army of Islam umbrella is a direct challenge to Hamas and is further evidence that Al Qaeda has targeted Gaza as a base of operations. This will pose a threat and be a source of instability for both Hamas and Israel.
Egypt has taken a more proactive attitude to the weapons smuggling efforts into Gaza. The reasons are partly domestic, as Hamas’ parent organisation the Muslim Brotherhood remains the regime's biggest threat. But Egypt has been warned by the US that its new 10-year weapons deal is based on Egypt’s being prepared to stop or severely curtail weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip. Another reason for Egypt’s greater activity is the increasing threat from Al Qaeda that has previously targeted Egypt’s tourist industry in Sinai.

· Hamas and Hizb’allah’s statements on their kidnapped Israelis indicate they are currently under political pressure and therefore need to press Israel for action and greater concessions. The pressure on Hamas derives from the total collapse of the economy in Gaza. Hamas expected EU sanctions to crumble by now and believed they could circumvent Israel’s steady military and economic squeeze. Hamas has called upon Egypt to help with the negotiations, as Egypt too starts to put pressure on Hamas by increasing the weapons and smuggling tunnels closures in Sinai. Hamas need to show evidence that there are benefits to its rule now that it has imposed its version of law and order on the Gaza Strip. Hamas continues to focus its energies on controlling every aspect of life in Gaza and on developing more sophisticated and longer-range missiles to be fired at Israel’s city ports of Ashqelon and Ashdod.
Hizb’allah have issued a general kidnap order against all Israelis to increase pressure on Israel to meet its demands for the release of all Lebanese prisoners including convicted terrorists caught in Israel following the murder of Israeli civilians. It is likely that Hizb’allah’s refusal to have a two-stage prisoner release is because at least one of the kidnapped Israelis is dead and they don’t want to give Israel a reason to refuse meeting their maximal demands.
Hizb'allah remains under domestic political scrutiny to justify its militia and incursion into Israel. The release of prisoners held for many years as a result of terror acts in Israel as part of a prisoner swap would, they believe, vindicate their militant position.

· Last week the proposed Washington forum on the Middle East was described as a peace conference to be held in September. The current description is a regional meeting of interested parties to be held in November. It is clear that after consultations with the parties in the region the US has realised that November is the earliest date for a meeting. This will allow time for the UN votes on sanctions against Iran and the international tribunal into the assassination of Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri to be passed in September or October. The final date for the election of a new Christian President in Lebanon, to replace the current Syrian puppet, Lebanese President Lahoud, is 23 November. Also, the Winograd Committee on the Second Lebanon War is supposed to have published its final report at the latest by November, although this may yet be subject to further delay.

· PM Olmert and President Abbas are both facing early elections next year. It has become obvious that even if Olmert survives the findings of the Winograd Committee final report and the consequent splits in his party, he will still not be able to hold a coalition government together. President Abbas by suspending the P.A. Legislature has no choice under the Palestinian Constitution but to hold elections within months.
Progress on the Syrian front for Israel has been halted by the refusal of President Bush to countenance mediation a basic demand of Syria’s. President Abbas’ hope that progress on Israeli withdrawal could be achieved upon the creation of a national unity government has also been halted by the Hamas coup in Gaza.
Both need substantial progress and concessions to be made but neither has the mandate or ability to deliver either. Abbas has had to keep the door open to Hamas in the likelihood that talks with Israel collapse, but Abbas knows he cannot return to a coalition with Hamas unless they are prepared to make substantial concessions over Gaza. PM Olmert has made it clear that should Abbas make a deal with Hamas he will call off the talks.

· Israel has offered a step-by-step approach to improving the general situation on the West Bank, whilst continuing to put pressure on Gaza, until the inevitable elections in 2008. The most pressing issues are:
1. The PA has said categorically it cannot deliver security on the West Bank. It expects Israel to not only take care of its own security but in effect to suppress all opposition to the PA on the West Bank too.
2. Abbas needs more prisoner releases if he is not to look ridiculous when Israel releases the 450 Hamas and other radical prisoners in exchange for the kidnapped corporal Schalit. Were Abbas to achieve fewer prisoner releases violence would once again be seen to pay dividends and moderation would be seen as a sign of weakness that attracts humiliation and exploitation.
3. Economic development is seen as vital by both sides but progress will inevitably be slow and is unlikely to show sufficient progress for either Olmert or Abbas to point to during their respective election campaigns.
4. In Israel it will be difficult to sell any prospective deal with Abbas as he is so obviously incapable of delivering anything agreed upon, cannot deliver security within the West Bank itself, never mind offer any to Israel, and is currently in negotiations with Hamas, a party that has proven not only that it will betray any Palestinian leader that it disagrees with but offers no hope of any compromise with Israel.
The only way out of this impasse is for a future Israeli coalition government to agree to outside economic and security intervention in the West Bank that will allow a stage-by-stage disengagement. Tony Blair’s role in such a process could be decisive. It will be possible to measure the extent of progress achieved at the regional summit in Washington in November by the depth of the negotiations on this process. If foreign intervention is not dealt with on any substantive level then progress will be both marginal and superficial.

· The next three months will be crucial for the future of Lebanon. The UNIFIL mandate will need to be renewed, a new President elected by the Legislature, and the international tribunal into the assassination of President Hariri convened and its preliminary findings heard. In this week’s elections the government coalition lost an important seat that would have helped in the Legislature’s vote for the majority’s preferred Presidential candidate. This was a direct result of the perennial divisions within the Lebanese Christian community. As the Speaker of Parliament is a pro Hizb’allah Shia, and he has already said he would not recognise these recent elections or convene the Legislature to vote for the new President, the likelihood is Lebanon will be ruled by two governments, possibly even with two Presidents.

· President Bush’s refusal to engage with Syria has led to an inevitable void that has quickly been filled by Russia. Syria is currently dependent upon Iran to maintain the regime’s strategic position in relation to the United States, Israel, Turkey, and, to a lesser extent than in the past, Iraq. Syria needs a counter balance to both the US and Iran and Russia’s intervention offers her greater scope for manoeuvre. Syria would prefer US backing as long as it was on her terms, i.e. influence in Lebanon, the return of the Golan, an end to US sanctions, the deletion of Syria from the US’s list of nations that sponsor terror, and US economic, and possibly military, support.
Syria’s fears about a summer 2007 conflagration are more about maintaining tensions in the region so that her position is not ignored, than any real fear of a war with Israel at this time.

· Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s testimony to the Winograd Committee was riddled with inconsistencies:
a) He claimed his unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon saved lives and was strategically wise and yet it was a major factor in the intifada that followed within months of the withdrawal. It gave the signal to Yassir Arafat that he had no need to compromise because Barak, or any future Israeli government, would unilaterally give him what he wanted as long as he killed enough Israelis. Thousands of Israeli civilians lost their lives as a consequence.

b) Barak claimed he anticipated an attack on the Shebaa Farms area in 2000 yet made no effort to hand it over to the UN, failed to ensure an attack happened, and failed to prevent the kidnapping of 3 IDF soldiers. He made no military response to the kidnappings despite previously stating that he would respond “harshly” to any incursions. Despite this he again made no connection between this pliant response and the message it sent to Hizb’allah, i.e. that there would be a restrained if nonexistent response to any future kidnappings.

c) He further claimed that Hizb’allah would not “dare” cross Israel’s border, and that was one of the reasons for the unilateral withdrawal with UN demarcation of the border. Yet that is exactly what Hizb’allah did in July 2006. In fact several Hizb’allah tunnels into Israel were discovered after the war.

d) He criticised the government for allowing Hizb’allah, Syria, and Iran, to open a second front but this was after the fact. 4,000 missiles landed on Israel from south Lebanon, proof positive a second front was already in situ, it was simply a case of what excuse they would make to use it.

e) He claimed he had prepared the North for any eventuality after the unilateral withdrawal but that everything changed drastically after he left office. Yet there was neither infrastructure to protect the civilian population in place nor any organisation. His plans, whatever they may have been, only existed on paper not in reality. The most important strategic threat to the North was the threat posed by Katyusha missiles, yet Barak focussed his strategic investments in long-range aircraft capable of hitting Iran rather than in an effective anti-missile missile system that would have offered protection to the North, the South, and Central Israel should he have decided to withdraw from the West Bank. He insists now that such a system is essential and that withdrawal from the West Bank, whether or not it was part of a peace agreement, would be too dangerous unless it was in position.
Yet he criticised his predecessor for his military inexperience and limited strategic understanding despite the fact it was this civilian, former Defence Minister Amir Peretz, who understood immediately the strategic threat posed by missiles and insisted the anti-missile defence system be made a top priority almost as soon as he took office in early 2006. The two previous greatest military minds and Prime Ministers, Arik Sharon and Barak himself, had failed to grasp the basic reality that there is only so long a civilian population can tolerate missiles landing on its towns and cities without any response from the government.

f) Barak stated he would have made an immediate harsh response and then stopped to take 6 weeks to reassess the situation and prepare the army. But Hizb’allah was already responding with barrages of Katyusha missiles within hours of the IDF’s initial response. Hizb’allah had already done what he had said they would never do, and invaded Israel proper. A 6 week lull in the fighting would have simply given Hizb’allah more time to resupply, reorganise, and plan the next phase of the campaign. They would have posed a far more deadly threat to any invading force had Barak’s plan been followed. This would have led to the worst possible scenario, either no response, just as happened under Barak in October 2000, or a belated response that would have led to mass casualties against an even better prepared enemy. If Barak had decided the risk was not worth it, as he had in 2000, Hizb’allah would then have been ensconced within sovereign Israeli territory just beyond the border fence with their tunnels intact, their strategic missile capability untouched, and nothing to bargain with to release the kidnapped soldiers.

g) Finally, Barak ignores the most obvious point of all. PM Olmert and Amir Peretz, the two inexperienced civilians, achieved what no previous Prime Minister, with exceptional military experience or not, had done:
In 40 days they had reversed a 40-year inability of the sovereign government of Lebanon to place its own army on its own southern border. Not only was this now achieved but so was a bolstered and substantial UNIFIL presence, a demand that every Israeli government had made since the 1978 incursion into South Lebanon to clear Palestinian terrorists from Israel’s northern border. All tunnels into Israel were found and destroyed, all bunkers in Israeli sovereign territory just beyond the fence were blown up, and no Hizb’allah fighters are able to openly carry arms. Bunkers are still being discovered and destroyed by both UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army. It is now a mandatory legal requirement of the UN that Hizb’allah be disarmed and not be resupplied. Syria and Iran are both in breach of this mandatory UN Resolution and are vulnerable to further sanctions. Hizb’allah have also probably had to move all its strategic missiles north of the Litani River outside of the zone currently occupied by UNIFIL forces. Israel’s northern border, at least for the last calendar year, has been quieter than in the last 40 years.
Hizb’allah’s whole infrastructure, its strategic plans, methods of communication, training, tactics, supplies and logistics, intelligence capability, have all been exposed and assessed by all western military forces, and continue to be so as result of the western-led UNIFIL presence.

· At the moment it looks likely the 2007 budget will be approved, particularly as the money has been found for Labour Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s pet project, the anti-missile missile system named “Iron Dome.” Nevertheless, a spring 2008 election should not be ruled out due to promises Barak made to Labour Party stalwarts. Ehud Olmert, should he survive the Winograd Committee’s final report, is unlikely to keep his coalition government going, even if he replaced Labour with the United Torah Judaism Party, to further than autumn 2008.

Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/

For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/

For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html

For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/

For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -

News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/

A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/

The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/

Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/

A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/

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