This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 12 Qassam missiles were fired from Gaza by Hamas and Islamic Jihad into Israel this week, over double last week’s tally. Several failed attempts were made to attack Israeli forces on the Gaza border. The IDF continued to mount small operations against Qassam missile cells killing the head of Islamic Jihad’s military wing in Gaza City.
Bedouin smugglers clashed with Egyptian security forces as they attempted to destroy buildings on the border that camouflaged weapons smuggling tunnels from Egypt’s Sinai desert into the southern Gaza Strip. Egypt continued to keep the border closed but allowed Israel to process for re-entry 6,000 mainly Fatah-supporting Gazans who had escaped last month’s clashes and had become trapped on Egypt’s side of the border. Hamas objected to being excluded from this procedure and to Israel’s participation in it.
Hamas has now taken responsibility for paying PA government and security officials in Gaza, who are mostly Hamas loyalists. Hamas also announced the formation of its own intelligence service, to be called the Internal Security Apparatus, which will replace the previous Fatah-dominated Preventive Security Force in Gaza.
2· Hamas and Fatah continued to arrest each other’s members and confiscate arms in Gaza and the West Bank respectively. Hamas produced documents proving late President Yassir Arafat used Palestinian Authority funds to pay for extravagant expenses of Fatah members. Fatah accused Hamas of an assassination attempt on President Abbas after gunshots were fired at his Residence near Ramallah, and, of attempting to set up an illegal militia on the West Bank.
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert suggested President Abbas use Jordanian Army forces to establish order and security on the West Bank, and allowed the delivery of several thousand automatic rifles to PA security forces, in addition to the 1,000 sent a few weeks ago.
President Abbas met President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, he confirmed Abbas was the legitimate leader of the Palestinian people and offered to mediate between him and Hamas as Palestinian unity was essential. Abbas stated Hamas’ actions in Gaza were a coup, and that should things return to the status quo ante he would be prepared to talk.
3· PA Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad’s aides announced Fayyad is likely to lead his own Independent party in the expected Palestinian elections, despite death threats and being labelled a “traitor” by the Palestinian Resistance Committee based in Gaza, a coalition of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades radicals who were responsible for the kidnapping of Gilad Schalit from southern Israel last year.
Fayyad had declared his government manifesto this week in which he refused to support armed struggle and denounced the use of violence and destruction in the name of Islam. Other elements of Fayyad’s manifesto included the return of Israel to the 1967 borders, Jerusalem as Palestine’s capital, the respect of all previous agreements made by the PLO including with Israel, and the resolution of the refugee issue based on Arab League and UN resolutions.
4· Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Defence Secretary Robert Gates visited the Middle East to discuss the forthcoming proposed peace conference in the autumn and the series of planned arms deals to “moderate” states in the region. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are to receive a $20 billion deal, which will include smart missiles. Egypt and Israel are scheduled to receive $13 billion and $30 billion respectively in military aid over the next 10 years. This effectively increases Israel’s military aid by 25% from $2.4 billion to $3 billion per year.
Rice also met the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman in Sharm e-Sheikh (Egypt), to urge their participation in the proposed autumn peace conference. Rice also reiterated President Bush’s position that Arab League member states should end the fiction that Israel did not exist, end all official media incitement against Israel, and send cabinet level ministers to Israel for talks.
5· The Arab League met in Cairo to discuss:
1. The results of the meeting in Israel in which the Jordanian and Egyptian delegation had been sent to represent the League’s views.
2. The Arab committee’s progress on trying to restore the situation in Gaza to the status quo ante.
3. PA Prime Minister Fayyad’s proposals for the Palestinian territories and the current state of talks with Israel.
4. Whether the Arab League should be represented at the proposed autumn peace conference.
Its Secretary General Amr Moussa stated Syria needed to be included in the talks, and that the conference should also include all areas of dispute between Israel and her neighbours. The US made it clear Syria is unfit to attend because of her continued support for terrorism in Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine, and her destabilising relationship with Iran.
Syria’s envoy left the Arab League meeting in Cairo in protest at the discussion of the US peace conference proposals. The Syrian position is that no discussions should be held until Hamas and Fatah are reconciled, Hamas returned to its Legislative Assembly majority in the West Bank, and Syria’s demands over the Golan Heights be met, namely that Israel should publicly state in advance of the negotiations that she will return all of the Golan to Syria.
6· The head of Hizb’allah, Hassan Nasrallah, stated there would be no deal to release the kidnapped Israeli soldiers held since last year until all Lebanese in Israeli jails were freed; that Hizb’allah was now ready to hit Israel at any time; and that Hizb’allah’s attack last year had made a shambles of US plans for the region. A Hizb’allah officer admitted that had the Second Lebanon War continued for another 10 days all his men would have had to surrender due to lack of provisions and ammunition.
7· Despite 5% economic growth for 4 years running, Prime Minister Olmert and Defence Minister Ehud Barak argued over cuts in the Defence budget. PM Olmert wanted to cut the defence budget and to set its levels for the next three years. Barak was concerned Israel’s commitment to the “Iron Dome” anti-missile system ($300 million), and the “Trophy” tank protection anti-missile system, as well as Army reform, would all be threatened if the budget was not increased. This coincided with a report by State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss in which he castigated the head of the Home Front Major General Yitzhak Gershon for failing to map out bomb shelter locations (both for army and resident information), failed to assess how many more were needed to protect the population, and did not understand the chain of command.
8· Former Justice Minister and current Vice Premier Haim Ramon testified to the Winograd Committee into the Second Lebanon War (2006), that he was for destroying Lebanon’s infrastructure by aerial bombing but against the ground invasion towards the end of the war. He stated PM Olmert disagreed with him and refused to order the destruction of Lebanon’s infrastructure, and, the reason Olmert had refused to send in ground forces at the beginning of the war was because the IDF High Command had said there was no need, and had, in any case, not called up the Reserves.
9· It was announced the last remnant of Ethiopian Jewry would be transported to Israel by the summer of 2008. These last Jews, known as the Falash Mura, are the remnant of clans forcibly baptised in the late 19th century, but who have since returned to Judaism. This final wave of 5,000 immigrants would bring to an end a 30-year campaign by pro-Ethiopian Jewish groups to bring Ethiopia’s remnant Jewish communities to Israel. There will thus be 100,000 Israelis of Jewish-Ethiopian descent by the end of 2008.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· The increase in Qassam fire was almost certainly connected to the importance of the killing of the head of Islamic Jihad, Gaza City district. Hamas is also testing the military limits with an increase in attempts at striking at IDF forces on the border. The IDF strategy is to continue a very limited campaign of attrition to keep Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine militias on the defensive.
Hamas’ main effort is on establishing its rule over Gaza. Law and order have apparently been established, and Hamas now has control over the court and jail systems, internal security, and administration. The economy remains in ruins but Hamas is still receiving funds from Iran as it has just paid the wages of all public sector workers. Nevertheless its failed attempt to impress the foreign media with how beneficent its rule is indicates its concern for the medium term future.
· President Abbas’ strategy remains the establishment of Fatah control over the West Bank, new elections when he deems the circumstances are in his favour, and a separate peace deal with Israel. He has shown no sign that he is able or willing to reform Fatah, or the corrupt practises endemic within both it and the PA. Prime Minister Fayyad’s attempt to control the centre ground through a new party only complicates matters for President Abbas because it will further split the secular vote.
It does not appear in Abbas’ interest to hold elections for many months. He will need to achieve major concessions from the proposed peace conference in the autumn before he will feel able to act. There remains a strong possibility that he will not stand for re-election.
· Condoleeza Rice and Robert Gates’ visit to the Middle East is President Bush’s final effort at finding some kind of agreement over Palestine before his term ends. The strategy is to isolate Syria and force it to choose between the return of the Golan Heights, good economic and diplomatic relations with the US, and a productive connection with Lebanon, or its continued support for Hizb’allah, Iran, and Hamas. The same applies to Hamas, it can agree to the three conditions of inclusion, namely recognition of Israel, meeting previous Palestinian treaty obligations made with Israel, and ceasing violence, or, remain excluded. But, this plan can easily founder or be delayed if not enough concessions are made by Israel, or the findings of the Winograd Committee report, due out in the autumn, forces the government to collapse resulting in early elections.
· The Gulf States and the Arab League face severe risks should they accept to attend the US proposed peace conference. Should it fail, or be delayed, for instance by Israel being plunged into a protracted election campaign and coalition government formation process, the Arab leaders who had risked recognition of Israel and progress in the peace talks would be left isolated and with nothing to show for their efforts. They have far more to lose than President Bush. They also risk splitting the Arab League by isolating Syria and forcing other Arab states to choose which side to commit themselves to. The only basis upon which they would be prepared to take such risks is if Israel makes deep concessions. But, a commitment of that kind could easily split Israel's government coalition and force new elections, again, putting the whole process on hold. It is also likely that if Hamas, or Syria, are excluded they could attempt to sabotage the talks by firing missiles at Israel, or attacking UNIFIL in Lebanon. Iran would probably also increase its attacks upon coalition forces in Iraq.
· The most likely method for any withdrawal process to succeed, whilst still maintaining any Israeli coalition government, is through a series of incremental withdrawals from the West Bank, in which Jordanian, UN, US, EU, and possibly Arab League and Russian forces would be involved. It is unlikely that such a withdrawal could be completed before the end of President Bush’s second term.
· President Bush needs to maintain pressure on Syria because this September sees:
1) The election of a new President in Lebanon;
2) UN discussions over increased sanctions against Iran, and;
3) The next stage in the International Tribunal over the allegedly Syrian-organised assassination of Lebanese PM Hariri.
If President Bush eases the pressure on Syria the calculation is they will impose, once again, a pro-Syrian Christian President who can sabotage the wishes of the current Saniora government, and, they will attempt to delay or sabotage the Tribunal’s proceedings. If Syria attempts to do either the Bush administration will probably demand an increase in US sanctions and call for UN sanctions as well. The intention is to force the Syrian government to stop its interference in Lebanon and to provide a disincentive to its radical policies. Syria, however, still expects the US to guarantee the return of the Golan Heights first, before it is prepared to countenance damaging its strategic alliance with Iran. The Syrian regime’s primary concern is the same as Iran’s, to maintain itself in power.
· Hizb’allah’s current agenda is to maintain pressure on Israel to counter any perceived threat of an imminent attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran believes that an attack is likely this summer and wants to counter this threat by using Hizb’allah against Israel. The strategic threat from Hizb’allah is unsustainable despite their complete rearmament. The IDF is prepared to invade Lebanon and inflict far more damage on the organisation than was achieved in the last war, which saw Hizb’allah within 10 days of complete surrender in the South of Lebanon, and their base in South Beirut destroyed.
· It is clear from PM Olmert’s refusal to increase the Defence budget that he is preparing the ground for elections, and also genuinely believes the IDF must completely reform itself financially as well as militarily. The renowned wastefulness and inefficiency of the IDF has been highlighted by a series of reports and Olmert hopes to embarrass Labour’s Defence Minister Ehud Barak into implementing the difficult but necessary reforms. He will use criticisms of the IDF by Winograd to support his case for not giving the Army more money. That will allow him to promise major financial support for the education, health, welfare, and research and development sectors. The issue of how to finance Israel’s ever-expanding defence needs remains central to the future of Israel’s security. PM Olmert has so far hinted that he thinks total protection of the civilian population financially unrealistic. He has also yet to give his support for the latest protective anti-missile technologies, or even to supply bunkers or shelters for civilians in the most vulnerable areas. Unfortunately for Olmert the High Court is not concerned with budgetary constraints; its main focus is on the rights of individuals to expect certain minimum protection from the state, and Olmert’s government has clearly failed in that regard.
· It is once again clear from Haim Ramon’s testimony to the Winograd Committee on the Second Lebanon War that PM Olmert was one of the few individuals within the Cabinet who had a rational and realistic appraisal of the situation in southern Lebanon and the capacity of the IDF to deal with it at that time. All previous testimony has shown a total lack of understanding of the IDF’s preparedness, or of the need to put pressure on the UN negotiations at the right time, or the advantages of ensuring a boosted UNIFIL presence and the return of the Lebanese Armed Forces to the border, or an appreciation the damage to Saniora’s government, and hence also to UN support, the destruction of Lebanon’s infrastructure would cause.
PM Olmert’s handling of the war in Lebanon was sound, but the problem remains, should he have agreed to initiate a response or not? Most observers within Israel felt he had no choice at the time due to the perceived collapse in Israel’s deterrent capability. It is clear, however, that neither the IDF, nor the Home Front Command, were prepared for such a conflict, despite the damage inflicted on Hizb’allah. It has also become clear that few, if any, within the Cabinet had Olmert’s overarching political-strategic grasp of the situation.
· The determination to ensure Ethiopian Jewry’s “return” to Israel highlights Israel’s uniqueness. Israel has very large minority populations, far greater than any European nation, at 20-25%. But, it also has a majority population that speaks 33 languages and originates from over 70 countries across all continents. The supreme irony of calling the most diverse, racially mixed, and only democratic and bi-national nation in the Middle East “racist”, or “apartheid”, could not be at greater variance with the facts. The Israel-born Jewish population also has one of the highest rates of inter-racial marriages in the world.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
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