Week 9 August – 14 August 2007

This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with:
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/

· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS

· Main Points:

1· 8 Qassam missiles were fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel this week, a small increase on last. The IDF continued to target Islamic Jihad militant commanders but have increased their focus on Hamas commanders following a series of attempts to mine the border by its operatives in the last few weeks, and the discovery of a network of tunnels aimed at Israeli territory similar to those used to enter Israel and kidnap corporal Schalit in June 2006.
Hamas have banned all demonstrations without 48-hour prior notice following an anti-Hamas demonstration this week, as well as the use of firearms and fireworks during wedding celebrations. Six Fatah weddings were violently disrupted for breaking this rule and singing Fatah songs. Hamas also beat the demonstrators and observing media and confiscated their photographic equipment, later raiding media outlets in order to prevent any broadcasts of the demonstration or the Hamas reaction.
Hamas also lost two men in clashes with the Al Qaeda-affiliated criminal Dogmoush clan in west Gaza City; 20 others were wounded.

2· Unofficial Hamas-Fatah talks continued this week. President Abbas is coming under pressure, particularly from Arab League countries, to resume the national unity government before talks in Washington in November. Russia and EU countries have all expressed the hope that Fatah and Hamas will settle their differences. The United States and Israel both stated that any Fatah-Hamas rapprochement would lead to the end of talks unless Hamas recognise Israel, adhere to previous peace deals, and cease terrorism. President Abbas stated privately that he intends to hold Legislative and Presidential elections within the next six months whether or not Hamas cooperate in Gaza. He also stated Hamas needed to apologise for, and reverse, the coup in Gaza before he would reconsider reconvening a national unity government.
Palestinian Authority Police are now operating in Area B of the West Bank (rural areas not near the border with Jordan), for the first time since Hamas won the January 2006 elections. Also, for the first time since the intifada in 2000, Israel and the PA jointly signed in Jerusalem the six-monthly mandate of the international monitoring force in Hebron, in situ since 1997.

3· Dr. Ashraf al-Kurdi, Arafat's personal physician for 18 years up until a few months before his death, claimed on Al Jazeera that Arafat had HIV in his blood before he died; Al Jazeera terminated the interview. Later, he claimed the HIV virus was put into Arafat's blood in an effort to blur traces of poisoning, which he claimed was the "real" cause of death. Another Arafat aid, Bassam Abu Sharif formerly of the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, had earlier reaffirmed his claim that agents of Israel had poisoned Arafat. Hamas have also often claimed that close aides of Arafat were conspiring to kill him. No evidence was given to substantiate any of the claims. Arafat died in Paris where his doctors stated he died of intestinal inflammation, jaundice, and the blood condition disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC), having previously been in a coma. His widow Suha Arafat refused to have an autopsy and refused to make public the comprehensive medical report of the French doctors, as was her right under French law.
Suha Arafat had her Tunisian citizenship revoked this week and was asked to leave; she is currently in Malta with her brother Jubran Tawil, who is PA ambassador there, and her mother, the Paris-based radical Palestinian journalist Raymonda. Several, unconfirmed, reasons were reported for her sudden de facto deportation: she had secretly married the President’s brother-in-law, which Suha has denied; or, she had got involved in questionable financial and business dealings that could have embarrassed the President or his entourage. Suha Arafat is reported to receive anything from $22 million a year to a lump sum of $14 million plus $1.6 million per annum from the PA since Arafat’s death in November 2004. Suha did not respond to the HIV claims, nor has any connection been made between the claims and her hurried expulsion from Tunisia.

4· An investigation was launched into how the Palestinian Authority transferred thousands of dollars into the bank accounts of Hamas paramilitary Executive Force members in Gaza. A senior PA official within the finance department is currently under investigation and the bank accounts have been frozen. 1,000 militia members managed to withdraw salaries before the transfers were discovered. The money transferred was previously held back tax revenues, which Israel had expressly forbidden be handed over to Hamas.

5· Defence Minister Ehud Barak refused to allow the distribution of new gas masks for fear the Syrian regime would see it as a clear sign of impending war. He also refused to give towns and cities hit by hundreds of missiles during the Second Lebanon War (2006) the status of front line communities because they were not on the immediate border.
Barak denied reports that he did not believe peace was possible with either Fatah or Hamas and that he would not withdraw Israeli forces from the West Bank until Israel had complete anti-missile cover, which was only possible in 3 to 5 years time.
He claimed that the $116 million cut in funds allocated to the construction of the security fence would further delay its completion.
Several amnestied Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades (Fatah) members caught smuggling ammunition at checkpoints, and firing at IDF forces over the last week, were immediately released in order to avoid embarrassing President Abbas, despite the clear violation of their amnesty terms.

6· IDF Intelligence continued to send out confused assessments concerning whether President Assad of Syria is prepared to initiate a conflict with Israel should his demands over the Golan not be met, or in order to sabotage the international community’s attempts to bring the killers of President Hariri of Lebanon to justice. The IDF also assessed that Assad is convinced PM Olmert wants a war in order to escape and reverse the anticipated conclusion of the final Winograd report that he totally failed during the Second Lebanon War. The IDF warned that this Syrian assumption combined with separate Iranian and international pressures on the regime may result in a miscalculation on their part that could escalate into war.
The Vice President of Syria Farouq al-Shara stated Syria was not interested in war but is ready to repel any Israeli aggression. Syria has nearly completed the redeployment of its latest 500-kilogram payload Scud D missiles that can severely damage entire blocks of city buildings. It has also almost completed its deployment of anti-tank commando units in the northern and southern Golan, as well as its new anti-aircraft missiles designed to protect the ground-to-ground missile deployment.
Hizb’allah have purchased large areas of hilltop-forested land from Christian and Druze farmers at exceptional prices just north of the UNIFIL monitored area in southern Lebanon. They have stockpiled their new missiles just 16 kilometres from Israel’s border in anticipation of a new war.

7· Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated Israel was not interested in war and neither were the Syrians. He visited Northern Command Headquarters and was briefed on the current situation.
Police are to investigate allegations that PM Olmert interfered to help friends gain an advantage when as Finance Minister he supervised the government sale of the controlling interest of Bank Leumi. None of his friends were involved in the final sale but a breach in “conflict of interest” codes remains an issue.
PM Olmert narrowly came top in a poll of Kadima members, followed by Avi Dichter the Public Security Minister, Finance Minister Ronny Bar-On, Transport Minister Shaul Mofaz, and Minister of Interior Meir Sheetrit respectively. Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who is popular with the public, came sixth.
The Cabinet approved the Winograd-proposed National Security Council crisis centre be attached to PM Olmert’s office but available for relevant senior minister’s use in emergencies.

8· Binyamin Netanyahu won the Likud Leadership Primary by 73.2% of the vote. His closest rival extreme right-winger Moshe Feiglin won 23.4% of the vote. The voter turnout of 40% was higher than expected for a summer campaign and compared favourably with previous primary votes.

· ANALYSIS - General Picture:

· Hamas continue to try and impose their brand of rule in Gaza but as of last week are encountering their first real opposition. Hamas’ response has been uncompromising and crude but their willingness to confront the Al Qaeda-affiliated crime-associated Dagmoush clan proves they feel strong enough to do so and that there is no love lost at present between the two extremist groups. Although Al Qaeda is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood their methodology is different. The emphasis in Al Qaeda is conflict on all fronts and violent global jihad whereas the Muslim Brotherhood emphasise reform through Islamisation of the Islamic nations including Israel-Palestine, and only then pursuing global jihad at a pace of their choosing. The destruction of Israel, starting with Israel’s access to Jerusalem, is the most important gauge of their success together with the replacement of the current regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Syria-Lebanon, and Palestine-Israel. Only then will they consider it appropriate to expand into global jihad, though spreading their theology globally remains a vital activity in the meantime.

· The increase in activity on Gaza’s borders indicates Hamas is already evolving the next step in its military-political strategy. The first priority is to enable further kidnappings and attacks on Israel through a network of tunnels from the Gaza Strip into Israel. This network will be part of the greater smuggling network connected to Sinai which will allow re-supply of both arms and finances from Iran. The breakdown of the economy and border closures will make Gaza’s residents dependent on Hamas for survival and increase their opportunities for military and religious recruitment. The next step, which has been pursued in some areas of Gaza already, is the creation of a network of bunkers that will criss-cross the border areas in the hope of creating an impenetrable barrier to IDF forces. This allied to the increase in range of the missiles now available to Islamic Jihad and Hamas will give strategic depth and offensive capability. This capability will increasingly be coordinated with Hizb’allah, Syria, and Iran, based upon the protocol on defence cooperation signed in Damascus on 10 March 2007.
The IDF will continue to attempt to sabotage these efforts through a series of cross border operations. The main purpose will be to force Hamas to use its resources on defensive rather than offensive measures until a political resolution to the conflict is reached.

· President Abbas is coming under severe pressure to begin talks with Hamas from all Arab League members and Russia. The progress made by the PA and Israel with their recent confidence building measures will be by their nature slow, and will not compensate for the vacuum created by the Fatah-Hamas divide. Egypt and Jordan for domestic political and strategic reasons need to establish a united Fatah-Hamas government in order to enable genuine progress in the creation of a Palestinian state, which they both believe will undermine the influence of the Syria-Iran axis and will also relieve domestic political pressure on their respective governments.
Egypt and Jordan have decided that the murky circumstances of Yassir Arafat’s death and its aftermath are a useful way to put pressure on Abbas to reengage in talks with Hamas. Abbas and Suha Arafat came to an agreement upon Arafat’s death that the medical records would remain a secret and that Suha would receive $22 million per annum from Arafat’s personal portfolio of worldwide accounts estimated at $800 million. The remainder would pass to the control of the PA, whose reserve accounts total roughly $3-4 billion. Other reports put Suha's inheritance at $14 million lump sum plus $1.6 million annually for 9 years then $600,000 per annum until her death.

· The reassertion of unconfirmable rumours concerning Arafat’s death, such as he had the HIV virus, he was poisoned, his personal physician had been prevented access and not been consulted, together with claims of Suha’s and Abbas’ involvement in an apparent cover up put immense pressure on them. It is possible that Suha Arafat’s loss of Tunisian citizenship is partly due to the authorities not wanting to be dragged into any potential scandal, and may have been used as an excuse to disembarrass the Tunisian government of a personality that attracted unsavoury comment.

· Egypt continues to pressure Hamas by maintaining its closure of the borders with Gaza, by refusing to reopen its consular buildings there, and by delaying talks over the release of Hamas prisoners, which Hamas sees as a potential symbol of success for their policy of armed resistance against Israel. Egypt is also slowly closing some of the smuggling tunnels that supply Hamas with Iranian arms and cash to run Gaza. Egypt does not want to close the tunnels completely because they are a useful source of income and intelligence for local commanders, and can be used to pressure Hamas by the threat of closure. Their non-closure can also be used to pressure Israel for concessions.

· The freeing of amnestied Al Aqsa Martyr's Brigades members after they were caught at road blocks smuggling weapons, and even firing at IDF forces, confirms their account of only having given in one of several of their personal weapons last week as a gesture towards President Abbas and the amnesty agreement. In reality they continue to use their remaining weapons as and when they please.

· The release of funds from the PA to pay Hamas militia salaries was probably a successful Hamas operation designed to embarrass President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad. The funds used were under the direct supervision of PM Fayyad and were part of the withheld tax revenues Israel had freed to the PA as part of confidence building measures and on condition they would not find their way to Hamas or any other terrorist organisation.

· Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s refusal to continue distribution of the new generation of gas masks in order not to disturb Syrian sensibilities, and his refusal to grant front line status to northern communities entitled to additional funding in order to save the Defence Ministry budget, are examples of the difficult decisions that he has had to face since taking office.
These decisions indicate that the IDF do not really believe a conflict in the North is either imminent or desirable.
The view of IDF intelligence that Assad might start a war because PM Olmert is seen as so weak he is bound to initiate a conflict is disingenuous, and can be seen as a crude attempt by the IDF to shift some of the blame for the current sense of insecurity onto the political echelon.
The reality is that the current Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, a no nonsense combat veteran, has been deeply shocked by the degeneration that 6 years of negligence has created within the conventional combat reserve force. The IDF has focussed almost exclusively on specialist counter-terror operations within the Occupied Territories and rather than tackle the extraordinary waste within the service in order to maintain its conventional army reserves in combat readiness it has used the budget cuts and strategic shift to specialist operations as an excuse to do nothing.
At the heart of the apathy lies a refusal by the public and political establishment to face the need for high defence expenditure allied to vigorous reform within the IDF and Defence Ministry.
The Israeli public has to understand that its desire for increased expenditure on health, welfare, and education comes at a price, and that the only solution is extraordinary financial discipline and institutional reform. Some aspects of this institutional failure will be analysed by the Winograd Committee in its final report into the Second Lebanon War.

· The budget cuts to the security fence, the inability of Israel to defend its most densely populated areas from short-range missiles following a withdrawal from the West Bank and the complete failure of President Abbas to offer leadership or provide security to either his own people or Israel mean a withdrawal is unlikely to occur soon. Barak cannot apply his mistaken unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon to the West Bank even if he wanted to, and Likud’s Bibi Netanyahu is likely to prevaricate for years before instituting a withdrawal. The only realistic option for Israel, the Arab League, and the West, is for a gradual withdrawal involving substantial international forces to provide security on the periphery of the West Bank. If the Quartet is prepared to allow Tony Blair to initiate this process there may be a chance of success within 3 to 5 years assuming he is prepared to endure that long as their representative.

· Binyamin Netanyahu comfortably won the Likud Leadership Primary but will face quite a struggle to evict extreme right-winger Moshe Feiglin from the party. He may cause a further splintering of the right were he to do so. He will also face a strong challenge at the next general election from other right of centre parties such as Arcadi Gaydamak’s new Social Justice Party, and Avigdor Lieberman’s Israel Beitenu Party. All these parties along with the National Religious and National Union Party coalition will join a right of centre government assuming Kadima collapses as the latest polls indicate.

· Kadima is in the unfortunate position of having solid policies and insecure and unpopular leadership, and not just with Prime Minister Olmert whose current public support stands at 5%. The most popular Kadima figure, Foreign Minister and Vice Premier Tzipi Livni, is not popular amongst the party faithful, and their second choice, Avi Dichter is not currently interested in taking on the leadership. This leaves Shaul Mofaz, a politically inexperienced ex Chief of Staff who has shown a genius for making bad political decisions and who oversaw the neglect of IDF conventional combat readiness during his military career. Even if Olmert survives the Winograd Committee’s findings it is difficult to see how his party can survive an election, even if Olmert stands down and there is a smooth transfer of power.
Kadima did have one significant success, the Cabinet passed the budget by 21 votes to 5. Only the ultra-orthodox Shas Party and Shaul Mofaz voted against. It therefore stands a good chance of getting Knesset approval, which would nullify an automatic spring 2008 election that comes into force should the coalition government not get the requisite Knesset majority.


additional source The Independent:
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2866781.ece

Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/

For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/

For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html

For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/

For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -

News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/

A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/

The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/

Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/

A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/

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