This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with:
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS
· Main Points:
1· 24 Qassam missiles landed in and around Sderot this week a 70% increase on last. Another kindergarten was hit 12 infants were taken to hospital suffering from shock. Islamic Jihad again claimed responsibility and confirmed that they are operating with Hamas approval and coordination. They stated the increase in firings was to mark the beginning of the school year in Israel.
Hamas organised a demonstration against Egypt’s closure of the border crossing at Rafah (S Gaza) but shot a demonstrator dead by accident, 10 more were wounded in the ensuing panic.
Fatah continued to demonstrate against Hamas rule, which led to such gatherings and all street prayer meetings being outlawed. Fatah also claimed responsibility for five bombings of Hamas targets no injuries were caused.
The Palestine Authority in the West Bank also ordered Gaza’s 900-strong fire fighting force to strike as Hamas were taking over their buildings and assets.
Egypt uncovered 2.7 tons of explosives and several dozen Katyusha rockets in the Gifgafa area of northwest Sinai destined for Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip.
EU secret service officers held talks in Gaza with Hamas in order to clarify their future plans.
2· President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert continued their meetings.
Abbas nominated Adnan Husseini as his special adviser on Jerusalem.
President Abbas also stated that the November meeting in Washington would be a “waste of time”, a “failure”, and “merely a statement” unless the following points were addressed:
1. The release and amnesty of 139 prisoners preferably before Ramadan (13 September), including the 39 exiled to Gaza and abroad for the siege and desecration of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem in 2002.
2. The removal of checkpoints across the West Bank to ease trade and civilian travel.
3. Ending the smuggling of money and arms via tunnels on Egypt’s border to Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
4. The speedy implementation of US General Keith Dayton’s plan to train and deploy a 5 Battalion-strong (3-5,000 men) pro-Abbas force in the West Bank.
5. The reopening of Orient House in northeast Jerusalem as a Palestine Authority and Palestine Liberation Organisation centre enabling the official flying of the flag of Palestine there for the first time since August 2001.
6. The inclusion of core issues in talks, namely, borders, refugees, and Jerusalem as the capital of a future state of Palestine.
7. A clear internationally supervised timetable for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.
3· President Abbas changed the electoral system so that it was no longer detrimental to Fatah candidates and advantageous to Hamas. His aides admitted, however, that until Hamas gave up power in Gaza he would be unable to hold the proposed Presidential and Legislative elections.
Imprisoned Fatah leader, and Presidential hopeful, Marwan Barghouti, issued a statement from jail in Israel calling on Fatah to reform before the elections and criticised Hamas for not approving them, and for their “bloody coup”, as well as the blow they dealt to Palestine’s “nascent democratic experience” by their monopoly of rule in Gaza.
Jibril Rajoub ex Palestinian Authority Security Minister indicated he might be a candidate for the Presidency in the forthcoming elections. He has maintained good relations with Hamas and continues to hold reconciliation talks with them on President Abbas’ behalf. He told Israeli representatives that Hamas and Islamic Jihad would accept Israel once she had withdrawn to the 1967 borders and the state of Palestine had been established.
Latest estimates are that 80,000 arms are currently in the hands of unofficial or illegal militias in the West Bank, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
4· Home Front Commander Major General Yitzhak Gershon gave testimony twice this week to the Knesset State Control Committee on Home Front security effectiveness both during the Second Lebanon War and as it currently stands.
He claimed that he was not allowed to call up any reserves by Chief of Staff Dan Halutz during the war. As a result he did not have enough men. But, it would have made no difference anyway because what made people feel secure was stopping attacks which the IDF was unable to do.
He claimed there were a surplus of shelters in Sderot (164), and a further 200 in the surrounding area and that the majority of Sderot’s kindergartens had been fortified.
He rejected any responsibility for any deficiencies in Home Front performance during the Second Lebanon War as alleged by the State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss.
Minister of Defence Ehud Barak was forced to declare a state of emergency in Sderot and the surrounding area following the barrage of Qassams that greeted children on their first two days at school.
5· The Winograd Committee agreed before the High Court to allow those most harshly criticised in the forthcoming final report on the Second Lebanon War to defend themselves and to call witnesses in their defence. This was a complete reversal of their previous stance.
6· Presidents Bush and Sarkozy (France) both made speeches condemning Iran’s attempts to gain nuclear weapons capability. Bush claimed the Middle East was now under the “shadow of a nuclear Holocaust”, and Sarkozy stated that if sanctions were not tightened the world would be faced with the catastrophe of “the Iranian bomb or the bombing of Iran.”
Iran’s President Ahmadinejad responded by saying that the target of 3,000 working centrifuges had now been met. The IAEA claimed this statement was unlikely to be true. If the claim was true, and Iran was able to run them successfully, then she would have a nuclear device in approximately one year’s time.
Ahmadinejad’s statement followed the signing of an agreement with the IAEA granting them greater access to Iran’s nuclear facilities.
7· Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi approved the first 5-year spending and procurement plan for the IDF. He announced he was unable to stretch his budget to include constructing a fence on the Egyptian border despite the fact it was porous; and, that the separation fence against suicide bombers from the West Bank remained the priority despite Ehud Barak’s claim that it was unlikely to be completed for several years. He also announced the proposed sale of IDF real estate and efficiency measures to further help finance the procurement plan.
The Cabinet is expected to accept the plan in January 2008.
The main procurement items were:
a) 25 US-made F-35 stealth-capable fighter planes, due in 2013-14 at $50-60 million each.
b) 2 newly-developed US-made multi-purpose shallow-hulled Littoral Combat Ships at $250 million each; delivery date unspecified.
c) The currently under development Israel-produced “Trophy” anti-missile protection system for armoured vehicles, delivery date unspecified.
d) The currently under development Israel-produced “Iron Dome” defence system against short range Qassam and Katyusha missiles; delivery due 2010-12.
e) The Israel-made “Barak” defence system against anti-ship missiles.
f) Mass production of the Israel-made “Namer” reinforced personnel carrying vehicle.
g) Substantial purchase of the US-made “Stryker” 8-wheel multi-purpose carrier vehicle.
h) Continued development of the joint Israel-US Arrow 3 defence system against long-range missiles.
· ANALYSIS - General Picture:
· The increase of Islamic Jihad missiles fired at Sderot highlight Hamas’ continued frustration at the lack of progress in opening the borders with both Egypt and Israel, with the prisoner exchange talks via Egypt with Israel, and most of all the unity talks with Fatah and its representative President Abbas. Hamas’ grip on Gaza is secure but the increase in Fatah activity is also giving it some concern.
Hamas remains surprised at Europe’s continued boycott but is as yet unwilling to make any compromises. This is due to the pressure exerted by its Damascus-based exiled leader Khaled Meshaal and its own military wing. Hamas remain dependent upon Iran and Syria for funds and military equipment and training. Neither nation is in any mood to compromise until the issues of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and Syria’s involvement in the assassination of Lebanon’s PM Hariri are resolved in the United Nations Security Council this month. It is also their intention to sabotage any agreement reached in Washington this November.
· President Abbas’ list of demands (above) indicates just how difficult his and Prime Minister Olmert’s positions are. Abbas does not feel that there is any real chance of significant progress in Washington and that the main aim for both Israel and the Bush Administration is to get Saudi Arabia to pledge itself to the peace process and full recognition of Israel. Saudi Arabia, no friend of Abbas, Fatah, or the PLO, will only oblige if it is presented with a detailed withdrawal plan by Israel to the 1967 borders. This is politically impossible for PM Olmert to sell to his coalition partners, and it is unlikely Olmert would acquiesce to it in any case.
· President Abbas’ position becomes more untenable by the day. He has done everything in his power to ensure a Fatah victory at the next elections in which he has already pledged he will not stand. As a result he can no longer credibly talk on behalf of the Palestinian people. He cannot even get himself electorally replaced because without Hamas acquiescence in Gaza he cannot hold national elections anyway. No one in Fatah sees him as a credible leader and most are positioning themselves for the post-Abbas era, nor does he command the loyalty of any armed group. He will not be able to implement any contentious agreement made in Washington in November. His list of demands indicates that without total compliance by Israel his position is in any case untenable.
· Major General Yitzhak Gershon’s testimony to the Knesset State Control Committee highlighted the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of far too many within the IDF High Command.
He refused to accept responsibility for any failures, he refused to fulfil his duty to the people under his care, he refused to take the concerns of civilians who have been the victim of 6 consecutive years of shelling seriously, he refused to stand up for himself or those under his command when the Chief of Staff indicated he disagreed with him. Finally, he had absolutely no conception of the practical difficulties faced by the civilian population of Sderot when actually under fire.
They have 15 seconds from the sound of the alarm to get to a bombproof area. Few, if any, public shelters are designed to accommodate dozens or more civilians running, often with screaming babies in their arms, into a narrow entranced room. Nor are there enough Home Front forces available to help.
His refusal to insist that Home Front reserves be called up during the Second Lebanon War was either evidence of a clear dereliction of duty and moral cowardice, or, an extraordinary insensitivity and callousness towards those he was duty-bound to protect.
· The Winograd Committee’s 180 degree about turn in the face of legal pressure to allow those facing serious criticism to defend themselves against the final report’s accusations has probably ended any possibility of its publication into the Second Lebanon War’s failures in November. It may also delay a possible revolt against PM Olmert by those within his own Kadima party, as well as any direct pressure on him to resign as a result of publication. This helps Labour leader Ehud Barak who remains keen to stay in the Defence Ministry post for as long as possible. The Labour Party is bankrupt and Barak needs to be seen to have done something at Defence before presenting himself to the electorate.
· The statements by Presidents Bush and Sarkozy of France were clearly coordinated following Sarkozy’s recent visit to the US including to President Bush’s ranch in Texas. The aim was to put as much pressure on members of the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency to increase sanctions on Iran to make her comply with UNSC Resolutions, just before the latest sanctions vote later this month. The IAEA are in the embarrassing position of either having to say President Ahmadinejad is lying about having 3,000 centrifuges in use to enrich uranium or admit they were wrong about their recent estimates of Iran having 1,968 centrifuges in operation at the Nantaz enrichment facility.
President Ahmadinejad’s tactics remain spectacularly predictable: at the first sign of pressure up the ante and terrify everyone into submission. This was the advice given to Revolutionary Guards' representatives from the General in charge of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Whenever anyone attempted to pressure Pakistan to slow or end its nuclear programme they threatened war with India and everyone backed off.
·Ehud Barak and Gabi Ashkenazi’s 5-year plan for the IDF clearly has the threat from Iran as a major factor in their purchasing decisions. The F-35 is an excellent platform from which to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities. The “Littoral Combat Ships” and the “Stryker” all-purpose vehicles can be used to mount ground operations, as well as against chemical and biological threats, as Stryker can be converted into a chemical and biological reconnaissance vehicle and detector.
There will be a large increase in heavily armoured ground forces vehicles, which will have protective systems to repel anti-tank/armoured vehicle missiles.
The refusal to attack Gaza in strength is partly due to budgetary constraints, as well as the desire to not get embroiled in a campaign of Hamas’ choosing. There appears to be little, if anything, that can be done against Qassam missile fire on Sderot. The inability, and political refusal, to defend Sderot’s population is a strategic mistake due wholly to political and military negligence and shortsightedness. It is not, however, something that can be ignored for much longer by the cocooned political and military elites.
The Winograd report may be an important catalyst to a more active and considered policy in the future. However, strategic thinking has historically never been one of Israel’s strengths, and, post Winograd or not, that is unlikely to change.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -
News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/
A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/
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