Week 5 September – 11 September 2007

This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with:
"Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict"
for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/

In Memoriam Lilian Rosenthal

· EVENTS
· ANALYSIS

· Main Points:

1· 11 Qassam missiles landed on or near Sderot this week, an over 50% reduction on last week. A direct hit on a basic training facility for new recruits at Zikim in Israel (near the north Gaza border) wounded 69 male and female new recruits, 2 seriously. At least 22 mortar rounds fell on border crossing areas between Gaza and Israel, which led to the temporary closure of the Sufa crossing (southeast Gaza). Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for almost all the attacks. Hamas publicly approved the actions.
A joint Islamic Jihad and Fatah Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade operation to breach the Gaza fence and kidnap IDF personnel was thwarted when the truck and car carrying explosives and men were destroyed near the Kissufim crossing, central Gaza, by the IDF. The IDF destroyed 11 Qassam launchers during a regular search and destroy operation.
Confrontations between Fatah supporters and the Hamas Executive Force militia continued throughout Gaza. Hamas continued to use violence to break up all non-Hamas meetings and arrests of PLO officials were carried out for the first time accompanied by anti-PLO rhetoric. All partisan media outlets continued to castigate the other side with Hamas closing down all remaining Fatah media outlets in Gaza. Journalists continued to be routinely threatened by Hamas personnel.
Hamas called on all factions to cease mortar and other attacks on the border crossings during Ramadan. Hamas remained in complete control of Gaza.
In an unconfirmed claim Hamas stated that the leader involved in the kidnapping of corporal Schalit from Israel had been arrested by IDF forces and taken from Gaza to Israel. Hamas remained in talks with EU security officials over Schalit’s release and stated they would consider a first visit by a representative of the Red Cross to Schalit.

2· President Abbas and Palestinian Authority personnel in the West Bank continued to publicly criticise Hamas demanding they apologise for the coup in Gaza and return to the status quo ante. Fatah continued to arrest Hamas personnel, violently break up Hamas functions at West Bank Universities, and beat up journalists. A major anti-Hamas media campaign continued to focus on Hamas violence and extremism labelling the organisation “Shiites” and predicting its inevitable downfall in Gaza.
President Abbas continued to express doubts about the purpose of the proposed November regional summit in Washington. He stated he was concluding the framework for final status issues, a declaration of principles, with Prime Minister Olmert, which would then lead to an international conference during which he hoped to negotiate the details of the final status issues and a permanent peace treaty.
Abbas also visited Saudi Arabia to discuss the proposed US summit, Hamas-Fatah reconciliation, and funding.
P.A. Prime Minister Salam Fayyad said he needed the United States to agree an explicit commitment to a Palestinian state, a binding timetable, and international guarantees concerning implementation.
PA-Israel negotiating teams and joint ministerial committees have been established to facilitate the talks.

3· An alert security guard at a West Bank checkpoint averted a major suicide bombing in Tel Aviv. A young teenager was arrested and the explosives and suicide belt he was carrying on behalf of the suicide cell in Israel were destroyed. Previously security chiefs had testified to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee that Iran and Syria had ordered major terror attacks in order to sabotage the forthcoming November summit. Terror cells from Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Fatah’s Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, and the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine had all received similar instructions and were cooperating in its implementation. It is thought further funds have now been made available to all these organisations to ensure a response to Israel’s purported raid on Syria as well.

4· It was reported that the Israel Air Force bombed a target in northeastern Syria. Reports of a nuclear-related consignment from North Korea being unloaded in the last few months may be related to the dictatorship’s particularly vociferous condemnation of the purported IAF strike.
Iran and Russia expressed concern over increased tension in the region.
No explosions were recorded following the apparent strike and Syria denied anything was destroyed but stated retaliation for the alleged breach to her sovereignty would follow soon.
Turkey demanded Israel explain why empty excess fuel tanks were dumped upon its territory bordering Syria. The area that was allegedly targeted was close to the vital Euphrates-supplied Buhayrat al Assad dam.
The international reaction to the alleged operation was muted particularly as Syria refused to supply any evidence to confirm it.

5· Binyamin Netanyahu’s testimony to the Winograd Committee into the Second Lebanon War was released. He expressed surprise the Reserves were not called up, insisted that the Prime Minister was primarily responsible, not the Defence establishment, for the defence of the state, and that the PM should have relied on the National Security Council, which he had established, to offer alternative advice to that of the Defence establishment including the Minister of Defence. He also stated that only ground forces could deal with a missile threat.

6· All the major Israeli political parties held their pre New Year meetings. Labour discussed their bankruptcy and concerns over Ehud Barak’s style of leadership. Likud attempted to cover up its internal divisions with the infiltration of an extreme right-wing bloc led by Moshe Feiglin. Kadima had a large upbeat meeting focussing on the future and the expansion of its party membership.

7· It was proposed that Ami Ayalon Labour MK and former leadership candidate and ex Navy chief and Internal Security Agency (Shin Bet) head join the government as Minister Without Portfolio. He will be a member of the inner security cabinet, chair the Knesset State Control Committee, and oversee and manage the Winograd Committee’s recommendations for the Home Front made in response to the Second Lebanon War.

8· The Cabinet rejected a large-scale operation into Gaza to end the Qassam missile attacks. Defence Minister Ehud Barak stated a large-scale operation was inevitable at some stage if the attacks continued. The reasons given for not engaging the terror cells on any significant scale were:
1. The Chief of Staff did not want any large-scale operation in the south as long as the northern front remained tense.
2. Hamas, and by inference Iran and Syria, would gain politically from any such attack.
3. Nothing should be done at this stage to endanger or complicate the proposed November summit conference in Washington.
4. Everything should be done to avoid confrontation over the Holy Day period from Rosh HaShana (13 September) to Simchat Torah (5 October), which also includes Yom Kippur and Sukkot. The security forces are always at full stretch during this time as major terrorist attacks often coincide with Jewish festivals.

· ANALYSIS - General Picture:

· The reduction in Qassam launches and the increasingly frantic media and street clashes in Gaza indicate Hamas are coming under increased pressure. Their call to halt attacks on the border crossings also indicate the economic situation is deteriorating within the Strip. Their willingness to hold talks with EU security officials and even the Red Cross about the general situation and prisoner releases is also a sign of their increased insecurity, as are their arrests of PLO members associated with Fatah, and their repeated calls for reconciliation talks in Saudi Arabia.
There is no sign they will not be able to deal with any internal threats for the foreseeable future but they are not comfortable with the increasingly sophisticated and far-reaching raids the IDF are now mounting within Gaza.
The fact they are using Islamic Jihad, the Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, and the Popular Resistance Committees as proxies for all offensive actions this week indicates they remain fearful of Israeli targeted killings of their senior membership.
Despite being on the defensive they remain securely in control in the Gaza Strip.

· The Egyptian regime is currently having problems with the Muslim Brotherhood and does not want the Brotherhood's affiliate, Hamas, to have any political successes at the moment. It is therefore not enthusiastic about releasing Schalit in a major prisoner swap, as this would give Hamas a major political boost just when it is coming under severe pressure and extracting concessions might be possible. It would rather put Hamas on the defensive leading up to the proposed November regional summit in Washington, and especially during September and October, as United Nations Security Council pressure builds on both Syria and Iran over the Hariri assassination and the breaches of UN Resolutions concerning Iran’s nuclear weapons programme. UNSC resolutions are expected on increasing sanctions against Iran, and on the next step in prosecuting the Syrian organised assassination of Lebanese PM Hariri.

· Fatah has become increasingly assertive in its rhetoric against Hamas. It has gone on the political offensive in Gaza, initiating confrontations with Hamas, and has continued to arrest and marginalize Hamas representatives in the West Bank. It is unlikely such a proactive stance would have been taken unless the PA and Israeli security forces were not working closely together in the West Bank to minimise Hamas operations there.
President Abbas’ refusal to stand for re-election has freed him to take a slightly more assertive stance against Hamas, but he knows that anything agreed in Washington this November cannot be implemented in Gaza without a Fatah-Hamas reconciliation. He may have been buoyed by recent polls, which show a marked deterioration in Hamas’ popularity even in the Gaza Strip.
Tony Blair’s personal encouragement and support for President Abbas should not be excluded from the equation, from September he will be a semi-permanent fixture in Jerusalem, and his sole focus will be on creating a Palestinian state.

· Prime Minister Fayyad’s insistence on a binding timetable and international guarantees of successful implementation of any agreement indicate a profound lack of confidence in the proposed summit. The Palestinian position is that nothing has changed since Oslo and that only severe pressure on Israel can deliver a state.
The position of Israel, the United States, and almost certainly the United Kingdom, is that a gradual process of confidence building, particularly through massive economic investment in the West Bank, managed by an efficient administration rather than patronage and cronyism will deliver a viable state.
No state will be possible without a large international force of 15-25,000 men within its borders for the foreseeable future, accompanied by the complete withdrawal of IDF forces to positions behind a realigned security barrier. An obvious indication of future failure will be the absence of an international force in any final talks.
The best that could be achieved at the proposed November summit is the first stage of a process that cannot be less than 3-5 years in duration assuming all goes well.

· The arrest of the young teenage terrorist at one of the West Bank’s checkpoints indicates how vital they are to Israel’s security. It was only one of dozens of attempts that have been foiled in the last few weeks by Hamas, Fatah’s Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, Islamic Jihad, and the quasi-Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, with Syrian and Iranian instruction and funding, to carry out attacks inside Israel.
The original motive was to sabotage the proposed November summit, but a marked increase in attempts will probably occur following the alleged IDF operation within Syrian air space. Iran will want to ensure that Israel pays a heavy price for such an incursion in order to bolster deterrence from attack of its own nuclear sites.
If Israel’s security forces are unable to deal with this new wave of attacks a much tighter clampdown on Hamas, and all other radical groups in the West Bank, will inevitably follow. A useful indicator of progress in Israel-PA cooperation will be how successful they are in stemming the tide of attempted attacks.
If frustrated, Iran and Syria will be tempted to hit Israel-related targets all over the world, but this will then expose them to the scrutiny of all anti-extremist intelligence services and any evidence they collect will be used to enforce further sanctions against the Iranian regime, and Syria’s regime will in its turn come under even greater scrutiny. It should not be forgotten that Iran and Syria played vital roles in the destruction of the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie Scotland in December 1988. Iran funded it and Syria supplied the logistical support and the PFLP-GC bomb maker before it was passed to Libya to be planted.

· It remains unclear what the target of Israel’s probable foray into Syria was. The speculation has been wild so far but assuming Israel penetrated deep into Syrian air space we can conclude:
1. Israel’s Air Force is capable of bombing targets deep inside Syria, in this case the area on the central northern border with Turkey.
2. Israel has successfully tested some of Syria’s Russian and Iranian supplied air defences and no aircraft were lost.
3. Israel gained valuable logistics and intelligence data.
4. Its pilots and all communications and technical systems personnel gained invaluable data and experience.
5. Clear political and military messages were sent to Syria and Iran:
a) If a weapons of mass destruction facility was bombed, of which there is no proof so far, then the message is that Israel will not tolerate such a facility on Syrian soil.
b) Israel can attack whatever facility she deems a threat.
c) Israel can and will penetrate whatever defence systems the Russians, Iranians, or North Koreans put up.
d) There are, and will be, costs to attacking Israel; whether directly or through proxies whether they be Hizb’allah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Fatah Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, Fatah al Islam, or the ever-reliable Syrian-Palestinian PFLP-General Command.
e) Syrian and Iranian strategic facilities are also vulnerable. The main focus of the flights appears to have been areas adjacent to Syria’s main dam.
Note that this has all been done in the past and has had no effect. 34 years of peace on the Golan was only achieved after Israel’s artillery was within range of Damascus’ suburbs in October 1973.
Thanks to the negligence and short sightedness of successive Israeli governments and Chiefs of Staff Israel cannot offer its civilian population protection from missile barrages, but, it can destroy Syria’s infrastructure if it needs to.

· The stupidity and short-sightedness of the IDF and Defence Ministry was exposed this week after 69 young IDF recruits were wounded inside a basic training base situated within range of Qassam missile fire from Gaza.
The IDF and Defence Ministry were aware of the pointless danger their most precious assets, their young men and women conscripts, were put in because last year exactly the same thing happened but with fewer casualties.
Nothing was done, no lessons were learnt, no one took responsibility, and no leadership or decisiveness was shown. A clearer example of incompetence, moral cowardice, inertia, lack of initiative, indifference and callousness could not be made and it represents a true picture of the IDF’s and Defence Ministry’s mindset.
This callousness was particularly evident during the war by the Home Front Command and will no doubt be addressed by the Winograd Committee’s final report into the Second Lebanon War.

· Binyamin Netanyahu’s testimony to the Winograd Committee was blatantly self-serving and entirely missed the point. The IDF was not prepared for a large-scale ground incursion at the beginning of the war. There was no defence against short and medium range missiles. No Prime Minister can expect to be lied to by his Chief of Staff who had, in his turn, been lied to by the men under his command.
Prime Minister Olmert did seek advice from innumerable security and military sources and they all told him the same thing: Israel’s deterrence had to be restored immediately.
They just forgot to tell him, or did not know, that they did not have the means to carry out such a policy. If a large ground force had been used at an early stage of the war mass casualties would have resulted because, for political and budgetary reasons, and due to systemic IDF High Command failures, there had been insufficient training to execute it properly.
Even with the keenest minds inhabiting the finest National Security Council Prime Minister Olmert would still have been faced with exactly the same problems. The facts are simple: Olmert achieved more in 40 days than any Israeli had in 40 years of dealing with the dysfunctional entity known as Lebanon, he fought the war in a way that barely impinged on Israel’s economy, and he scared Hizb’allah and Iran into behaving with caution.
But, precisely because Olmert had to make it up as he went along, having been misled and let down by a hopelessly inept Northern Command, and because he was too free with the occasional hyperbolic statement, and failed to grasp the importance of the Home Front or the true psychological effect of the incessant shelling, he lost the trust of the Israeli public, which at the best of times are critical and distrustful of their politicians.

· PM Olmert remains in a surprisingly strong position at the moment mainly due to the weakness of his coalition partners and the opposition. Labour and Likud are profoundly divided because of internal ideological and personality differences. The acceptance of Labour’s Ami Ayalon into the Cabinet is a major victory for both Olmert and Ehud Barak. Ayalon had previously insisted Olmert resign and that he would never serve under him. Ayalon’s connections with moderate Palestinians, his knowledge of Israel’s security needs, and his integrity will be powerful assets. But it remains to be seen if he can work with Barak. They are similar in many ways, headstrong, highly intelligent, controlling, planners who are not good with people, experts in all facets of security, and exceptionally brave risk takers. They both lack Olmert’s Machiavellian political skills however. This means that if Olmert can ride out the post-Winograd final report storm he may survive until late 2008 or longer. Assuming he is not charged with embezzlement or corruption in the meantime.

· Ami Ayalon’s input will be sorely needed as Israel tries to find a way to deal with the Qassam missile threat without enfeebling the northern front or central command both of which have their hands full at the moment. Central Command will have to cope with an intense effort to infiltrate suicide bombers into Tel Aviv and adjacent urban centres to the West Bank such as Netanya, Petakh Tikva, Kfar Saba and Afula.
He will also have to deal with the criminal neglect of the people of Sderot as chief implementer of Winograd’s Home Front recommendations.
It is not in Israel’s interest to respond with a large-scale ground incursion for the present. Israel is still interested in making a deal with Hamas to free Schalit. It is also the height of the holiday season in which all security forces are stretched to the limit and are on high alert.
Hamas will be let off the hook in Gaza if Israel were to mount a substantial attack. The Palestinian factions will all instinctively unite and President Abbas will be put in an impossible position having to condemn Israel’s behaviour whilst attempting to negotiate a peace deal.
The negotiations in Washington would be effectively sabotaged.
Israel has no option at the moment, assuming any negotiation process is to proceed, but to offer Sderot substantially more anti-Qassam missile shelters, protection, financial support and subsidies, as well as political and moral support.
This will have to be combined with ever more inventive methods of undermining Hamas politically and militarily. Military operations will have to penetrate deeper into Hamas and Islamic Jihad territory and cause significant psychological and structural damage, but the main emphasis will have to be on preventing successful Qassam missile and other terror attacks.


Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/

For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/

For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html

For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/

For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -

News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/headlines/

A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/

The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/

Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/comment_and_opinion/

A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/quote_of_the_day/

__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________