Israel’s options: Containment – Conflict Management

• ANALYSIS

Now that Annapolis is over, and the NIE report has ended any prospect of military action against Iran’s potential nuclear weapons programme, a clearer picture of Israel’s options has appeared.

It is clear from Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s behaviour and statements that he considers a major military operation in Gaza inevitable. He has been repeatedly described as depressed and distracted and the reasons have now become clear.
In order to contain the military threat from Gaza the IDF have to act. As soon as they do the peace talks will either be over, or at the very least postponed for an indefinite period. This in turn will produce two distinctly negative consequences for Barak as leader of the Labour Party and Defence Minister. The prospect of being the figure seen to have scuppered the latest peace efforts is depressing enough, but Barak will also have to face a major internal challenge from within his own party. On the domestic political front he will find it increasingly hard, if it ever were possible, to lead a peace coalition that would finally enable a two-state solution.

In effect Barak is standing astride a potentially collapsing Labour party and about to collapse peace effort, with a major operation involving substantial IDF casualties with no possible victory at the end of it as backdrop. This leaves him with very few options. His previous plan was to watch Kadima implode and pick up the electoral pieces, leading a centre-left government after elections. That prospect has receded as the weakness of his own position has made him more dependent upon Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Kadima for political survival.

But, whereas the remnant post-election Kadima could still become part of a centre-right coalition, this is not possible for Labour, as it will lead to yet another internal collapse. Barak knows, therefore, that his and Labour’s future, at the moment, lies in Kadima’s hands. He, along with most others, does not see Kadima holding its ground or increasing its representation, at the next elections, but as the operation in Gaza will lead to the collapse of the peace talks he, and the Labour Party, will have nothing to offer the electorate either. Barak is therefore faced with a difficult choice, one that is at the moment causing him deep inner conflict. His defence instinct, together with all his partners and colleagues at the Defence Ministry and in the IDF, are telling him to mount a devastating operation in Gaza. His political instincts, and many of his political colleagues, are telling him he needs to leave Gaza alone, despite the security risks, and fight tooth and nail for a political accommodation with the rival Palestinian groupings. Barak’s maxim of peace and security looks untenable. He has to choose one or the other with the most likely prospect of achieving neither.

Ehud Olmert is in a similar position but it is clear his instinct is to hold off any operation in Gaza, until such a position becomes politically untenable. He will leave containment of the deteriorating security position in Gaza to Barak, who he can blame, if necessary, for any failures. His position remains as fragile as Barak’s however. The more progress he achieves with President Abbas the more attacks will emanate from Gaza, as has been the pattern so far, and the more weak he will appear if he does nothing to respond.

This leaves Likud leader Bibi Netanyahu in an extraordinarily strong position. As the inevitable demise of the peace process unfolds in slow motion over the next few months, and the military option in Gaza is seen to fail, he can blame both Olmert for the political collapse, and Barak for the military failure. In elections Likud should be able to win both the North and the South of Israel comfortably as both areas become increasingly insecure about their future. Netanyahu can argue that the reason both the peace and the military options have failed is because of the weakness of Kadima and Labour towards the Palestinians and that only he, and his coalition, will be able to address both fronts to Israel’s advantage.

At the moment both Kadima and Labour look extraordinarily weak. Israel’s centre ground will shift to Likud over the coming months as both the political and military options are seen to fail.

This leaves Iran. It is clear Likud will be able to argue that they alone, by presenting an uncompromising position on security against, Hamas, Fatah, Hizb’allah, and Syria, will deter Iran from an attack. In reality post the NIE report, whatever Israeli coalition government is in power, will have no option but to go down the containment route alongside the next, probably Democrat, President of the United States. The only factor that could change this scenario is clear intelligence that Iran has become a nuclear weapons power and that she is preparing to attack Israel at some point in the future.

Latest figures - Mortar attacks from Gaza (2007): May 85; June 120; July 140; August 175; September 210; October 220; November 235.
Population loss from the Israeli Negev development city of Sderot: 25% over 5 years (conservative figs).