The Lion of Judah: currently led by the nose by donkeys? Israel’s Centre-Left Establishment Collapses Under the Weight of its Own Contradictions –

This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/


· Main Points

1· The Kadima and Labour-led war is bound to fail unless a major change in tactics and strategy are made.

2· The Likud’s support of the government is unsustainable.

3· Hamas will celebrate a great “victory” unless they are defeated on the battlefield.

4· The loss of nerve by the Centre-Left Establishment in Israel could spell the end of liberal and left secular political influence in Israel for the foreseeable future.

· ANALYSIS

· It is clear from the modest efforts of the IDF in Gaza that the IDF and Defence Ministry under the leadership of Ehud Barak and Gabi Ashkenazi no longer have the will to fight a conventional war.

The forces currently available are not appropriate for use in any major campaign. Hamas therefore cannot be defeated. Unless Hamas are defeated they will continue to strike at Israel indefinitely. Therefore the stated aim of the current operation “to stop Hamas from attacking our citizens and soldiers” (Ehud Barak) cannot be achieved, and the idea that this will be fought “until the bitter end” (Barak)” makes no sense.

· The logic of Barak and Ashkenazi is clear. Unless Israel has absolutely no choice but to fight a conventional war it should not do so. Nor should Israel interfere in internal Palestinian or Arab politics. They perceive the two wars fought in Lebanon as failures, and thus any strategic gains made there, such as the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut, were seen as worthless or too high a price to pay.

Therefore, it follows that Israel must never get bogged down again in any Arab lands except when there is absolutely no choice and Israel’s very existence is at stake.

· This thinking is deeply flawed and has already led to the Second Intifada, and the Second Lebanon War. The reasons for the flaws in this reasoning are clear:
it consistently undermines Israel’s deterrence capability and thus emboldens militant groups, and it confirms Arab suspicions that their ultimate goal of wearing down an independent Jewish presence in the region through a series of wars of attrition is succeeding. A succession of catastrophic defeats is the only process that will convince the Arab street that, however justified eliminating an independent Jewish presence may be, it may simply not be worth the effort.

· Barak’s current strategy will fail for the following reasons:

1. Hamas will not bow to petty incursions. At most they will reinstitute a temporary ceasefire if they come under sustained devastating attack.

2. Hamas cannot be defeated unless a major ground war, and the complete retaking of Gaza, is accomplished.

3. This could have been accomplished in a few days but the IDF High Command and Barak have refused to countenance it because of the casualties involved.

4. A prolonged campaign cannot succeed because international pressure will force Israel to concede before some, if any, of its goals can be achieved.

5. Barak has wrongly assumed that the international community will allow, or even want, his slow campaign of attrition to succeed.

6. Barak has wrongly assumed that Israeli society can countenance a prolonged campaign in Gaza in which there is no hope of anything more than partial success.

7. Barak and the IDF High Command have wrongly assumed that Israeli society would not countenance the sacrifices necessary to retake Gaza.

8. This attitude is based on the wrong assumption that the Lebanon campaigns were failures and the sacrifices not worthwhile. The opposite is true. The first Lebanon war led the PLO to accept Israel’s existence and to the Oslo Accords. The Second Lebanon War introduced a significant UNIFIL presence as well as the Lebanese Army to South Lebanon for the first time in 40 years. This meant that for the first time since the 1960s legitimate governments were responsible for Lebanon-Israel security.

· Ehud Barak has proven himself to be a loose canon, both dangerous to Israel and the Jewish people’s vital interests:

1. His precipitate withdrawal from South Lebanon (2000) led directly to the Second Intifada as Yasser Arafat saw that violence paid. It also led to the direct takeover of southern Lebanon by Hizb’allah, which in turn led directly to the 2006 Second Lebanon War.

2. His talks with Hafez al-Assad (senior) were a disaster; he embarrassed President Clinton by reneging on promises and pulling out of commitments in Shepherdstown in 2000.

3. Barak was incapable of leading his coalition in 1999-2000 and wavered whenever public opinion polls appeared to contradict his plans, which in any case frequently changed, and which he often refused to share with anyone else out of mistrust.

4. Barak’s strategic political and military choices have consistently been proven wrong. He has refused to fortify the South with the necessary bunkers and infrastructure despite knowing that a prolonged confrontation with Hamas was inevitable and might lead to a regional conflict in which all of Israel’s population centres would be in danger. This includes a shortage of gas masks, which have not even been redistributed amongst the population after they had been forcibly recalled for repairs and renovation. The population in the North of Israel is totally exposed as no money has been allocated for bunker repairs and renovations by the Ministry of Defence.

· Barak’s plan can only succeed if the international community and soon-to-be President Obama permit it. All the evidence points to their not being willing to countenance a prolonged campaign.

His campaign can also only succeed if each of the IDF’s mini-incursions over the coming weeks and months are 100% successful and cause devastating defeats on Hamas as well as result in few Israeli casualties. The reason for this precarious view of Barak’s strategy is that it will become clear that a major incursion in the summer of 2008 would have ended Hamas rule despite significant IDF casualties, though mitigated by perfect weather conditions for the IAF, which of course is not the case in December 2008 or January-February 2009.

· If Barak manages to sustain a campaign against Hamas over the coming weeks and months he may stand a chance of getting some kind of ceasefire from Hamas only, but not from any other Palestinian group. In effect all his efforts, even if they succeed, will not bring about the strategic changes he set out to achieve. The elections, whether delayed or not, will see the collapse of Israel’s centre-left, Barak’s probable resignation, and the almost certain premature end to Gabi Ashkenazi’s term as Chief-of-Staff. Ashkenazi will be seen as weak when it came to any major combat decisions but an excellent manager of the rehabilitation of the IDF into an institution capable of combat despite not having any senior officers either willing or capable of bringing Israel victory on the battlefield.

· Finally, it is worth noting that if this method of war, by relatively slow attrition without any definitive victory on the battlefield, is allowed to succeed by the international community and Israeli society, then it will likely become the model for many future conflicts. As in Iraq, a combination of political accomodation, counter-insurgency, bribery or economic incentives, and specialist units operations and assassinations, will be seen as the paradigm for containing all future conflicts involving extreme radical organizations, whether Islamist, or otherwise. The conflicts will be considered at an end not when any 'victory' is achieved but when a political accomodation is finally reached with the former terrorist organizations and parties involved. It is interesting to note that the conflict in Northern Ireland has been contained as a result of similar tactics and that it took 38 years to achieve, and even now could break down at any moment. Whether the international community will allow Israel the same luxury as it allowed a tiny conflict on the edge of a tiny island on the furthest periphery of Western Europe is another matter.

Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/¨

For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/¨

For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html¨

For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/¨

For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -

News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/headlines¨

A written summary of the news:
news:http://www.bicom.org.uk/news¨

The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/¨

Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/comment-and-opinion

A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/quotes
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Conflict is inevitable unless President Obama can make the necessary offer to Israel and keep the other big powers onside –

This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/

· Main Points:

1. Likud will win the February 2009 elections and form a national unity government under Bibi Netanyahu.

2. This will likely lead to a stalemate in negotiations with the Palestinians and increase the likelihood of either a major operation in Gaza or a regional war.

3. In such a war Israel will succeed in re-establishing its military deterrence but any military losses inflicted upon its enemies will rapidly be replenished by numerous hostile or interested powers such as Russia, China, North Korea, Libya, etc. and the whole negotiation process will have to be started from scratch.

4. The only way an inevitable upsurge in violence can be stemmed is if Netanyahu is prepared to give up almost all the territories currently occupied. But this is unlikely to happen unless a large NATO or US-led military force was committed to guarding those areas vacated by Israel, and affiliate membership of the EU and NATO were also offered together with sufficient financial restitution. These would be the minimum requirements to induce Netanyahu and most Israelis to give up the Golan, West Bank, and East Jerusalem.

5. This cannot be achieved unless President Obama makes concessions to powers such as Russia and China, and holds an international peace conference.

· ANALYSIS

· Israel’s current government is possibly the most centrist in its recent history. It has managed to maintain a line between the Left’s demand for a quick retreat from the West Bank at almost any cost and the Right’s demand that large swathes of Judea and Samaria remain in Israel’s possession.

It has resisted the Left’s demand that Hamas in Gaza be appeased, and the Right’s demand that it be attacked with full force. It has withstood demands from the Right that Syria be made to pay the price for supporting Hizb’allah, Hamas, and Iran, and demands from the Left that the negotiations to give back the Golan be started come what may.

It has also curbed appeals from the Left to appease the Histadrut and Teacher’s Unions whilst avoiding any major cuts to the welfare and health budgets. Israel’s economy has never been stronger, tourism levels are exceptionally high, and Israel’s cultural life is more vibrant than ever with recent international successes in film and dance and more cultural events than ever partly as a result of celebrations marking Israel’s 60th anniversary.

All of this has been accomplished under the stewardship of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert who also achieved the almost impossible by waging a major war on Israel’s northern border without any negative impact on Israel’s economy and despite the IDF not being able to offer him any serious military options as its senior officer class was in total disarray and its army untrained and unprepared. Despite this Olmert was able to achieve a totally one-sided UN Resolution in Israel’s favour with the onus on Hizb’allah to restrain its activities and the introduction of a very large international force into southern Lebanon. There have been no significant incidents on Israel’s northern borders for over 2 years.

However, this sensitive balancing act has come at a price. The feeling amongst Israelis is one of uncertainty and rudderlessness because of a lack of perceived progress either in the peace process, or against the threat posed by Iran, or in relation to any resolution of the Qassam missile threat from Gaza, whose range and accuracy has visibly increased within the last year with the city of Ashqelon becoming a routine target, as well as the quadrupling of Hizb’allah’s missile arsenal that can now reach all of southern Israel.

· Precisely because Olmert has kept a tight rein on the budget Israel has not made the preparations it needs to cope with a simultaneous missile onslaught from Hizb’allah, Hamas, Syria, and Iran. And because Olmert has refused to be drawn into a conflict in Gaza, and has supported a ceasefire, Hamas have become entrenched, with a sophisticated tunnel and communications network, backed by anti-aircraft and thousands of ground to ground missiles, booby traps, anti-vehicle mines, and kilometres of trenches. In short, maintaining the centre way has come at a cost to Israel on both strategic and psychological levels.

The benefits have been unparalleled good relations with all European countries, which remain Israel’s most important markets, and increased contacts with Muslim and Arab nations, many of whom were present during the Annapolis meetings and in other informal international gatherings where Israeli representatives were present.

· Despite this it has become clear from recent polls conducted on Israel’s Channel 2 TV Station amongst others, that the Israeli public no longer want to follow this centrist path if it means losing the strategic and psychological initiative. This means in practise that a centre right government will be elected 10 February 2009. Recent poll projections for the February 2009 Knesset are:

RIGHTIST PARTIES (seats in Knesset):
33 Likud (centre right and right wing secular and religious nationalist party)
11 Israel Beitenu (centre right and right wing secular nationalist party representing the interests of ex-Soviet Union immigrants)
12 Shas (centre right and right wing sephardi religious quasi-nationalist party)
7 Habayit Hayehudi (right wing religious nationalist party)
4 United Torah Judaism (orthodox non-Zionist religious party)

CENTRE PARTIES (seats in Knesset)
25 Kadima (centre left and centre right mainly secular nationalist party)
6 Labour (centre left and left wing mainly secular nationalist party)

LEFTIST PARTIES
7 Meretz (left wing secular quasi-Zionist party with links to the Fatah faction of the PLO and Palestinian Authority)
4 Green (leftist environmentalist party; presumed Zionist or quasi-Zionist)

ANTI-ZIONIST PARTIES
10 Arab List (includes 3 Arab dominated parties who are either hostile, or at best ambivalent to, Israel’s existence as a Jewish State)

1 seat undecided. The proportional representation system in Israel requires only 2% of the vote to gain a seat for a party or individual. Depending on the residual percentages this seat will be ascribed to whichever party gets closest to this figure.

· The government will be led by Benjamin ‘Bibi’ Netanyahu of the Likud. He has indicated that he wants to form a national unity government in order to push forward with economic reforms and an overall peace settlement that maintains Israeli control of Jerusalem and some major settlement blocs just south and east of the city, as well as an Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley. He also wants a national unity government to deal with the threats from Iran, Hamas, and Hizb’allah, supported by Syria.

· Even were Kadima to win the elections it is highly unlikely that anyone would be prepared to work under Tzipi Livni’s leadership. Her flaws have been exposed including: uneven social and political skills, little to no political acumen, no strategic vision, and little to no tactical political ability. She is earnest, hard working, honest, intelligent, and dry, and has a certain personal magnetism, but she does not have the authority required to command respect. However, Bibi Netanyahu will want her in his government to counter balance the more impractical demands and outbursts from the right wing. He can afford to ignore Labour but if Barak can survive the post election Labour implosion Bibi would rather have him in government than out, again, in order to counter balance the more extreme demands of the right and as an adviser over Iran.

· Netanyahu has attracted many charismatic and respected individuals who will soon stand in primaries to try and get onto the Likud party list from which Knesset party members are chosen if their party accumulates enough votes, they include: Natan Sharansky, Benny Begin, Dan Meridor, General Uzi Dayan, General Moshe Yaalon, and Tal Brody (Maccabi T.A. basketball star), amongst others. Labour, by contrast, has been losing major figures including their number 2 Ami Ayalon in recent weeks, whilst Kadima have attracted some worthy personalities, as Kadima drifts under Livni’s non-leadership. A new threat to remove Olmert and his refusal to budge until indicted has not helped Livni either. Were Olmert to stand down for any reason, Livni as acting Prime Minister may finally come into her own and change the current dynamic, but she is also just as likely to expose her weaknesses to the electorate.

· The makeup of the government will effectively end the peace process as presently constituted and will lead to constant delays and torpor. This in turn will radicalise the Palestinian side that will become more vocal and extreme in their rhetoric and demands. The Palestinians may also seize the opportunity to unite against Netanyahu’s government and paralysis will be guaranteed as Hamas’s presence will end all negotiations with the P.A.. On the other hand if the Palestinians remain divided it will be impossible for President Abbas, even were he to survive into 2009 and win another election, to make a deal on Netanyahu’s terms. So once again stalemate is inevitable.

· If Hamas decide they have nothing to lose by ratcheting up the violence should Netanyahu indicate for any reason he would strike at Hamas, then a large operation against Gaza would be possible. That, in turn, could lead to missiles being fired upon Iran’s orders into Israel from Lebanon. This may eventually, or even quickly, escalate into a full-scale war. Israel’s preparations for such a war would be far more advanced than in the 2006 Second Lebanon War, but nevertheless it is clear that defences would not be at their optimum. That said, it is within Israel’s capability to neutralise the main threats from Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, and even Iran, if absolutely necessary.

· The first stage to halt any inevitable decline in the negotiations and atmosphere in the Israel-Palestine area would be if President Barack Obama steps in very quickly through his emissaries and insists negotiations continue. Very intense pressure will have to be put on Israel’s right wing parties and Netanyahu to not sabotage the negotiation process. This might be just enough to keep them going but it may lead to Hamas violence in any case. This, in turn can only be moderated by intense pressure on Syria and Iran to restrain their subordinate radical organisations. If this fails then some form of conflict is highly likely.

· The only realistic hope for the second stage of Obama’s initiatives to succeed is if he offers a large US or NATO-led force (10-15,000 men) to protect Israel’s borders in exchange for Israeli concessions. These forces would have to be stationed on Palestinian and Syrian territory. Obama would also have to secure for Israel affiliate membership of the EU, as well as affiliate membership of NATO. He would also have to offer a suitable financial and military package to compensate Israel for the risks taken, and to offer restitution to the displaced settlers. No realistic possibility of a peace deal will be accomplished under a Likud-led government without these conditions being met. If President Obama fails to grasp the importance of these measures then conflict is probably inevitable. It would also mean that President Obama would have to get the other major powers onside and this cannot be achieved without including them. Therefore an international peace conference will also be needed as a framework for the process to succeed. This may also be used to facilitate the containment of Iran. If either of these stages fails then the possibility of regional conflict remains very high.

President Obama almost certainly will have to offer the Russians and Chinese sweeteners to prevent their sabotaging the peace agreement and to contain Iran. For example he may have to deny Ukraine and Georgia NATO membership. Or, he may have to encourage China-Taiwan reunification and promise greater access and cooperation to Chinese goods to the US market and support China in World Trade Organisation talks and so on. Syria will also have to be given the requisite financial, political, and military inducements as well.

· Without major territorial concessions the Likud-led government will not be able to bring even President Abbas to the table. This will result in both sides believing that only conflict would be able to break the logjam, preferably in their respective favour. In essence both parties to the conflict will be committed to a fight because both will believe it strategically necessary to ensure their respective political survival. And, they would also both believe they will be stronger post conflict: whether in victory, or defeat, for the Palestinians; and solely in victory for the Israelis of course as defeat is not an option.

· The military wing of Hamas does not believe they can or will be defeated in Gaza. They believe that they are the Palestinians’ strongest fighting force and that they can last the few days or weeks it will take to get the international community to stop Israel’s invasion, and in any case they believe Israel will suffer so many casualties that it will unilaterally pull out effectively defeated. The same thinking applies to Hizb’allah in Lebanon.

· Israel will see the military defeat of Hamas as an essential prerequisite to further negotiations on terms that will not jeopardise Israel’s future security or existence. If the conflict expands it will also be seen as an opportunity to radically diminish Hizb’allah’s missile arsenal and influence. The same will apply to any Syrian and Iranian involvement.

· In reality Russia, China, North Korea, and many other countries will very soon after any major regional conflict take the opportunity to replenish any depleted missile and military stocks incurred by Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hizb’allah, and not long afterward all will be back to square one. The one difference will be that Israel will have once again reasserted its political and military will to survive in the region no matter what trials its enemies set before her. And the whole negotiation process will have to once again start over.

Links:
¨For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/

¨For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/

¨For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html

¨For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/

¨For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -

News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/headlines

A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news

The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/

Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/comment-and-opinion

A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/quotes

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Playing for Time: Israel, Iran, Syria, Hamas, and the P.A.

This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on: http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/

· ANALYSIS

The current political situation is testament to both the fear of President Bush’s intentions in his last few months in power as well as to PM Olmert’s political skills. At the moment Olmert is presiding over talks with Syria in Ankara Turkey; talks with Hamas in Cairo, Egypt; and talks with Hizb’allah via Berlin, Germany. This is despite being under yet another investigation concerning the acceptance of illicit payments that he insists were legal and will be vindicated in the cross-examination of his main accuser on 17 July.

This, in turn, has led to pressure for general elections, and feverish, but so far unavailing, attempts by both Ehud Barak (Defence Minister and Labour Party head), and Tzipi Livni (fellow senior Kadima Party member and Foreign Minister), to force his resignation.

Unfortunately for both of them their respective positions are weak. It is no coincidence they get on well and have the same goals in mind. They both want to delay elections for as long as possible and believe the best way to ensure this is to force Olmert out of office. They both need to reinforce their positions within their respective parties, and prepare them for a difficult election period against the popular opposition Likud Party under Bibi Netanyahu.

Both Barak and Livni have alienated substantial sections of the senior membership of their respective parties, although they both have managed to garner the largest percentage of ordinary members’ votes in various polls of their membership. For example Livni has 39% of Kadima party members’ votes against her nearest Kadima leadership rival Shaul Mofaz with 25%. Nevertheless Olmert remains ahead of both candidates and that is why he is insisting on standing in the forthcoming Kadima party leadership primaries, which Barak insisted were held or he would vote for early elections.

Barak remains unpopular amongst the Israeli public, whilst Livni’s popularity remains consistently high. Both would be comfortable with having the other as a junior partner in either a reorganised present government, devoid of Olmert, or a newly elected one.

Netanyahu’s position remains the strongest, particularly as he has called for a national unity government under his leadership, which is highly appealing to the Israeli electorate at the moment given the threat from Iran and the need to deal with it in a unified manner and in the near future.

Only an indictment of PM Olmert is likely to force him to resign, as he himself has said he will go should any indictment be issued by the Attorney General’s Office. Attorney-General Mazuz is renowned for his caution, so Olmert has good reason to believe his position is not in any immediate danger.

· Syria is currently playing a waiting game. They are engaging in meaningless talks with Israel over the Golan Heights in order to restrain President Bush from doing anything before leaving office, and in order to wrong foot those members of Congress who wish to extend sanctions against them. It is a little more difficult to argue for sanctions when the party you are sanctioning is apparently in the middle of peace negotiations. They also hope their current policy offers an incentive to EU members especially, to curb the investigation into the late Lebanese PM Hariri’s murder, which continues under UN auspices.

· Iran is following the same path as Syria, simply waiting for President Bush to leave office. They have no intention of halting their nuclear weapons programme and wish to negotiate from a position of strength, which means as a member of the elite nuclear weapons club of nations. Sanctions are having little effect as oil and gas price increases have given the regime plenty of room to manoeuvre.

· Hizb’allah have attained all their internal political goals in Lebanon. They now have a veto over all decisions that they do not support and are the only real military power in the country. They are waiting to accomplish the final parts of their political platform, the return of all Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails, in exchange for the bodies of the kidnapped Israeli POWs, as well as the “return” of the disputed Shebaa Farms area to Lebanon, despite the UN insisting it is Syrian territory. Syria has said it no longer considers the area part of its territory, which allows Syria to continue a proxy war against Israel through Hizb’allah, whilst simultaneously strengthening Hizb’allah’s internal position as the only group in Lebanon capable of standing up to Israel.

· Hamas believe that they too are on the verge of getting all their requirements met. They expect the siege to be lifted in exchange for a ceasefire, which in turn will strengthen their position within Gaza as the only serious political party there. President Abbas has agreed to negotiate from a position of weakness in order to reconstitute some sort of P.A. presence there and in anticipation of new elections next year in which he has recently said he hopes to stand. He, too, is waiting for Bush to stand down so that he can attempt to broker a better deal under a new U.S. President, preferably Obama. A prisoner exchange will further strengthen Hamas’s position as the only party capable of getting the Israelis to hand over Palestinian prisoners whilst simultaneously standing up militarily to the IDF and effectively defeating it through outmanoeuvring Israel on the political and humanitarian fronts. Israel has been incapable of bringing Hamas to its knees either militarily, economically, psychologically, or politically.

· The vital lesson learnt so far by Hamas is that as long as it remains intransigent like its paymasters Iran and Syria it will achieve all its most important immediate political goals because Israel is simply not willing to make the sacrifices necessary to prevent it from doing so. However, there will come a point in time when this will not be sustainable. Once Iran is on the verge of becoming a nuclear power, or soon after it announces it has achieved its goal, its facilities will, in all probability, be attacked. This in turn will result in a sustained missile bombardment upon Israel from Hizb’allah and Hamas, which in turn will lead to a necessary military response. It will be at this stage that a military (not political, that is not possible) defeat of Hamas and Hizb’allah will be an absolute necessity.

· Iran might take a leaf out of Israel’s book and simply not announce, or ever admit, it is a nuclear power. But even then it is doubtful any Israeli government could tolerate such a permanent explicit threat to its survival. So, Israel, too, is also playing for time, waiting for the appropriate anti-missile missile technologies to be developed that will be able to cope with possibly the brunt of future mortar and missile bombardments.

A sophisticated and intelligent Iranian regime would stop just short of accomplishing nuclear weapons capability. The world would know that if necessary it could, within a very short period of time, become nuclear weapons capable, and would not want to provoke it. In this way Iran would benefit from the vast incentives offered by China, Russia, the EU and others, and be, to all intents and purposes a nuclear power as well. So far, however, there is no evidence that this is the current Iranian regime’s strategy. The 2009 Iranian Presidential election result will nevertheless be a good indicator as to the likelihood of war.

It is worth noting that were Russia to indicate to Iran that it would not stand in the way of an Israeli or U.S. attack the regime’s position might well change, the same would apply if China threatened to cease purchasing Iranian gas and oil. The likelihood of either scenario remains low at the moment.

· It is also possible that if international pressure is sustained and united against Iran, Israel will not feel it necessary to engage in any pre-emptive action, particularly if its restraint was sufficiently rewarded. There are no signs at present that this will be the case.

Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/

For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/

For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html

For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/

For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -

News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news

A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/media-summary/cessation-of-hostilities-between-israel-and-hamas-begins-thursday-morning

The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/news-archive

Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/comment-and-opinion

A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/quotes

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Barak forced to put Gaza op on hold

• Analysis

It appears a large-scale operation against Hamas and the various other missile-capable militant groups in Gaza is on hold. Several reasons for restraint have been added to those of the previous post (see 13 February 2008).

This brake, however, will only hold if there are no major civilian losses in Israel or abroad, or another major breach in the border with Egypt is avoided.

Further reasons for restraint are:

1. Egypt has finally become serious about restricting smuggling into Gaza. Several tunnels have been destroyed, and the US is actively cooperating with, financing, training, and equipping Egyptian border forces. Egypt has also expressed genuine concern about Iran’s increasing presence within her sphere of influence and is finally beginning to appreciate what a danger this may mean to the regime’s future hold on power. Iran is actively backing the Egyptian regime’s main rivals for power the Muslim Brotherhood.

2. Israel has finally acquiesced to Egypt’s request to allow over and above the 700 troops permitted under the Camp David Agreement up to the Egypt-Israel border.

3. There still remains a possibility that IDF soldier Gilad Shalit might be released if a period of calm can be established. Egypt has increased its pressure on Hamas by arresting and torturing its members in Sinai and by closing several tunnels as part of her efforts to get Hamas to impose a period of calm.

4. There is a strong possibility that any operation could easily spread to Syria and Lebanon, and include Iranian forces. Israel’s civilian population will be vulnerable and there is no system in place to protect them at present. Little to no work has been done on Israel’s shelters due to budgetary constraints and lack of will and leadership. Also, US forces in Iraq remain vulnerable to Iranian-controlled Shia militia attack. Israel does not want to jeopardise an already delicate situation there.

5. PM Olmert is not interested in any confrontation in Gaza. He sees no political or military advantage for either himself or Israel. His relations with President Bush are good and he sees no reason to upset them other than under exceptional circumstances.

6. Chief-of-Staff Gabi Ashkenazi is adamant no major operation or assassination is to take place unless there is a clear military or political strategy in place that advances Israel’s security interests and does not endanger kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit’s life.

7. Barak does not have the support of the Left of his Labour Party for any major offensive in Gaza. In fact anything that may bolster Barak’s political standing is anathema to former Labour Defence Minister Amir Peretz who still hopes to displace Barak.

8. Talks with Syria are still possible and Barak supports this avenue of the peace process more than the Palestinian one as he sees it as more advantageous as well as productive. If Syria can be engaged the threat from Iran recedes and the Palestinian track becomes more amenable to peace.

9. November 2008 is a convenient period for both Olmert and Barak to declare their respective political decisions for going to the country (i.e. February/March 2009 elections). Olmert will be presenting a peace package that he will have agreed with Abbas and will be canvassing for a mandate to implement it. Barak will be making a similar case but will insist that only he can be trusted to implement it without endangering Israel’s security. November 4 will see the results of local municipal elections that also free government funds to parties for elections. Labour is bankrupt and needs this cash to boost its general election effort. They will also be fighting any Spring 2009 election knowing the identity of the new US President and will be able to modulate their campaigns accordingly.


There are severe problems that arise from maintaining restraint:

• Hamas and all the other militant groups will continue to restock their arsenals, dig tunnels, and lay roadside bombs across the Gaza Strip. They will also extend the range and capability (explosive warhead load) of their Qassam and Grad missiles.

• The Iranian and Al Qaeda forces in Gaza will have time to train and prepare their forces for any future confrontation.

• Militant groups throughout Gaza can deploy anti-aircraft missiles as the smuggling can only be reduced not ended.


The advantages to Israel are:
a) More time is acquired to prepare the IDF and Home Front for any future confrontation should one arise.

b) A new government with a clearer mandate to halt or pursue the peace process will be in power.

c) A new US President with at least 4 years residency will be in place to support any new Israeli government decision or strategy.

d) The Iron Dome anti-missile defence system will be closer to deployment.

e) Both Iran and Syria will have come under increasing pressure in relation to the UN investigations into their nuclear weapons programmes and assassination of Lebanese officials respectively.


Prognosis:
There will be no major offensive in Gaza unless a major attack on Israel or abroad results in severe loss of life. Smaller limited operations will almost certainly continue.
However, one miscalculation by any Iranian or Syrian security apparatus cell, or group, or any of their Palestinian proxies, could result in a larger scale confrontation.
Should a major operation be considered it is clear that Israel is ready to fight on several fronts simultaneously and will improvise its civil defence. Israel still has the capacity to destroy both Syria and Lebanon’s infrastructures and armed forces should it be considered necessary.
Such a war will resolve nothing other than temporarily re-establishing Israel’s deterrence capability until the almost inevitable subsequent military confrontations that will probably involve both Iran and Al Qaeda.

Key articles:
Israel Buying Time In Gaza:
http://www.ynetnews.com/Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrintPreview/1,2506,L-3525042,00.html

Politics: Time for a Change in Personnel
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1207238154718&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter

Source General (updated daily):
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news

Barak Finally Decides -

● Analysis

Defence Minister Ehud Barak has finally decided that Gaza will be invaded in a significant operation. His intentions and their potential scope were made in testimony to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee 11 February 2008.

The strategy towards Gaza is:

1. Short term and ongoing aim -
To block and disrupt the firing of missiles into Israel from Gaza. This is the goal of the current daily operations within the Gaza Strip. These consist of:

a) targeting Qassam missile cells before, during, and after launchings.
b) targeted killings of those responsible for organising, ordering, and planning Qassam missile launches.
c) intelligence gathering operations, including arrests.
d) border clearance operations that include exposing tunnels some of which lead into Israel, and Qassam launch pad sites.
e) targeting of Qassam manufacturing sites, and sites containing materials used in their construction.
f) to weaken Hamas through a process of attrition.

2. Medium term aim –
To severely reduce the launchings of Qassam missiles against civilian targets within Israel.
To severely reduce the arms smuggling capacity of Hamas into Gaza.
To severely undermine Hamas’ control over the Gaza Strip itself.

3. Longer term aim -
To topple Hamas from power.
To disengage completely from the Gaza Strip.

• The Defence Minister and Labour Party leader also made it clear that should a significant operation go ahead it could lead to war. It is clear from his references to Hizb’allah that Israel may need to prepare to fight on several fronts simultaneously. He made it clear that Hizb’allah’s arsenal of missiles is not only three times larger than it was in 2006 (i.e. from 12,000 to currently 36,000 short to medium range missiles) but that its missiles were more accurate and had a longer range. Tel Aviv is well within the Hizb’allah’s Iranian-supplied missiles’ range but their numbers are relatively few (60-120 rough estimate; these figures will have to be revised upwards as attempts to smuggle long range missiles into S Lebanon have been successful - March 2008; latest figures put the number of missiles of 300km range (i.e. can easily hit Tel Aviv and possibly Be'er Sheva) at 10,000; These figures appear high; if they are at all accurate they indicate a catastrophic failure of the UN and Israel to prevent Iranian rearmament of Hizb'allah via Syria - 27 March).

• His aim is clearly to deter Hizb’allah over the coming months. This means deterring Iran and Syria. It is possible, though not at all certain, that the recent assassination of Hizb’allah’s number two, and head of its military wing, Imad Mughniyeh, was a message to Hassan Nasrallah that should Hizb’allah become involved in any cross border conflict he will pay a personal price.
Addendum: my current belief (14 February) is that the assassination was a joint US intelligence agency operation with possibly some tangential Israeli intelligence input. The assassination serves several purposes, the hallmark of all sophisticated operations: It serves as a warning to both Iran and Syria to stop meddling in Lebanon and Iraq, more importantly, it is related to Syria's collaboration with terror forces in Iraq and Syria's continued support for Korea's attempts at nuclear weapon's proliferation. It is also a warning to Iran that the combination of state terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation will not be tolerated.

• Barak also made it clear (11-12 February) that Israel is not ready for such a large-scale operation or its aftermath. The most likely reasons for this are:

1. The political timing is wrong. Israel is about to celebrate its 60th Anniversary (8 May). Many of the world’s most senior and influential leaders, including President Bush, have been invited. It is incumbent on the Israeli government not to embarrass them and not to face the embarrassment of rejected invitations should Israel become involved in a protracted operation that would inevitably involve civilian casualties.

2. The weather is against it. Aerial cover is vital in such an operation, especially if the confrontation were to expand into Lebanon and Syria, or even involve directly intercepting Iranian aid. Optimum weather conditions arrive in June.

3. Civil defence is weak. No civil defence preparation of the population has been attempted for financial reasons. For example no new gas masks have been distributed, no new shelters have been built, and the government has refused to renovate old shelters. Any renovations have been by the private sector alone, despite recent government pledges of money.

4. Many Reserves units have not been prepared properly. Whilst many Reserve units have received significant new training it has been patchy. These units will not be essential to the Gaza operation, despite their inevitably being used, but they are essential to a two-front war.

5. The costs. If Syria-Iran chose to open a second front the costs will far exceed those of the 2006 war. The Second Lebanon War had a barely noticeable effect on the Israeli economy despite effectively crippling Lebanon’s.

6. Lack of intelligence. A successful operation, particularly one that may involve two fronts, requires exceptional intelligence. Whilst both Israeli military and civilian intelligence organisations are excellent the sheer quantity of data involved in any potential two-front operation is very large, and so far not enough information has been collected to sustain any prolonged campaign.

7. Special Operations limitations. These will play a much larger role in any Gaza campaign, and even more should a second front open with Syria. Again, they are utterly dependent on, to date insufficient, intelligence.

8. Israel’s anti-missile capability is not ready. These include counter anti-tank missiles, as well as anti-medium to long-range missiles that will be fired at Israel’s population centres in very large quantities, particularly if Syria and Iran choose to open a second front.

9. The unexpected (only to Israel’s political and security establishment), destruction of Gaza’s security fence. This has led to an infusion into Gaza of large amounts of anti-air and anti-tank missiles and explosives along with highly motivated and trained commanders from Iran and Syria, as well as Al Qaeda allied individuals who wish to carry out suicide missions. These additional forces will pose specific problems to IDF planners and operations chiefs, and the necessary preparations to counter each additional threat will have to be made.

Despite these restraining factors, it is well within the IDF’s capability to mount a significant operation in Gaza.

Ehud Barak’s reasons for acting this summer are complex.

• The strategic threat to Israel is absolutely clear. Hamas, if it chose to, could hit two of Israel’s largest cities, Ashqelon and Ashdod, with ease, using its latest Iran-supplied missiles. This has major implications for the West Bank, because if the precedent of allowing Palestinian militant forces to indiscriminately shell Israel’s cities goes unanswered, then Tel Aviv and Israel’s main population, airport, and energy centres would be vulnerable.

• The residents of Sderot, the city adjacent to the northern Gaza Strip, have reached tipping point. They will leave en masse should there be another major attack and nothing is done (Sderot has lost roughly 20% of its population over the last 7 years of missile attacks).

• Delay is politically unsustainable, particularly for Barak, whose main political competition at the next election is the Likud’s leader Bibi Netanyahu, another elite forces commander and substantial political figure, though with an equally mixed political record. Barak has judged that elections in November 2008, or early 2009, are inevitable and so he has to prove his defence credentials within that time frame. His first duty as Defence Minister is to defend Israel’s citizens from attack, which he has singularly failed to do. It is politically impossible to demand that Israel’s population vote for a leader who has shown himself incapable or unwilling to carry out his most basic civic duty.

• Barak believes he needs to demonstrate how a victory is achieved. He believes that Olmert failed to achieve such a victory in Lebanon in 2006. This, unfortunately for Barak, is a commonly held Israeli delusion. No victory was ever possible in Lebanon in 2006, and none will be achievable in Gaza in 2008. Guerrilla wars, by their nature, are not won or lost on the battlefield. However, it is well within the IDF’s power to severely damage Hamas’ capability. That alone is the most that such an operation can achieve and given Israel’s current strategic position is, in any case, both completely unavoidable, and the minimum that Israel needs to achieve in order to safeguard her security at present. Hamas and her allies demonstrated that they were capable of firing over 50 missiles over one weekend (8-10 February) and they have 1,000s more Qassam missiles in reserve (100 missiles landed between 15-17 January alone; 190 missiles were fired from Gaza in January 2008; and 7, 567 missiles have landed in and around Sderot from Gaza in the last 6 years).

• Barak believes that with a military “victory” under his belt he can squeeze Olmert and his centrist Kadima party into a marginal position that will then force people to choose between him or Netanyahu. This strategy is not without risk because even assuming he wins he will need to work with Olmert or the rump of Kadima as part of his coalition. But, another possibility presents itself. Netanyahu has suggested that should he win convincingly he would be prepared to form a government of national unity. If Barak is offered the Defence Ministry it is possible that Barak would be severely tempted. His Labour Party, however, would find it almost impossible to remain united, and should they split both Kadima and Likud will be strengthened.

• This series of events could just as easily split Kadima, leaving Netanyahu in an apparently invincible position. This, unfortunately for him, cannot last, as any decision on Jerusalem will split and bring down his right of centre coalition government. He will therefore delay any resolution of any negotiations with any Palestinian party willing to talk to him. There cannot therefore be any meaningful progress in any negotiations for the duration of Netanyahu’s predicted premiership. His priority, in any case, will be economic reform and prosperity, which he believes is far more important to Israel’s long-term future than any utopian ideal of a peace treaty with a partner that, in reality, he perceives as neither capable of, nor willing to, deliver peace.