Barak Finally Decides -

● Analysis

Defence Minister Ehud Barak has finally decided that Gaza will be invaded in a significant operation. His intentions and their potential scope were made in testimony to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee 11 February 2008.

The strategy towards Gaza is:

1. Short term and ongoing aim -
To block and disrupt the firing of missiles into Israel from Gaza. This is the goal of the current daily operations within the Gaza Strip. These consist of:

a) targeting Qassam missile cells before, during, and after launchings.
b) targeted killings of those responsible for organising, ordering, and planning Qassam missile launches.
c) intelligence gathering operations, including arrests.
d) border clearance operations that include exposing tunnels some of which lead into Israel, and Qassam launch pad sites.
e) targeting of Qassam manufacturing sites, and sites containing materials used in their construction.
f) to weaken Hamas through a process of attrition.

2. Medium term aim –
To severely reduce the launchings of Qassam missiles against civilian targets within Israel.
To severely reduce the arms smuggling capacity of Hamas into Gaza.
To severely undermine Hamas’ control over the Gaza Strip itself.

3. Longer term aim -
To topple Hamas from power.
To disengage completely from the Gaza Strip.

• The Defence Minister and Labour Party leader also made it clear that should a significant operation go ahead it could lead to war. It is clear from his references to Hizb’allah that Israel may need to prepare to fight on several fronts simultaneously. He made it clear that Hizb’allah’s arsenal of missiles is not only three times larger than it was in 2006 (i.e. from 12,000 to currently 36,000 short to medium range missiles) but that its missiles were more accurate and had a longer range. Tel Aviv is well within the Hizb’allah’s Iranian-supplied missiles’ range but their numbers are relatively few (60-120 rough estimate; these figures will have to be revised upwards as attempts to smuggle long range missiles into S Lebanon have been successful - March 2008; latest figures put the number of missiles of 300km range (i.e. can easily hit Tel Aviv and possibly Be'er Sheva) at 10,000; These figures appear high; if they are at all accurate they indicate a catastrophic failure of the UN and Israel to prevent Iranian rearmament of Hizb'allah via Syria - 27 March).

• His aim is clearly to deter Hizb’allah over the coming months. This means deterring Iran and Syria. It is possible, though not at all certain, that the recent assassination of Hizb’allah’s number two, and head of its military wing, Imad Mughniyeh, was a message to Hassan Nasrallah that should Hizb’allah become involved in any cross border conflict he will pay a personal price.
Addendum: my current belief (14 February) is that the assassination was a joint US intelligence agency operation with possibly some tangential Israeli intelligence input. The assassination serves several purposes, the hallmark of all sophisticated operations: It serves as a warning to both Iran and Syria to stop meddling in Lebanon and Iraq, more importantly, it is related to Syria's collaboration with terror forces in Iraq and Syria's continued support for Korea's attempts at nuclear weapon's proliferation. It is also a warning to Iran that the combination of state terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation will not be tolerated.

• Barak also made it clear (11-12 February) that Israel is not ready for such a large-scale operation or its aftermath. The most likely reasons for this are:

1. The political timing is wrong. Israel is about to celebrate its 60th Anniversary (8 May). Many of the world’s most senior and influential leaders, including President Bush, have been invited. It is incumbent on the Israeli government not to embarrass them and not to face the embarrassment of rejected invitations should Israel become involved in a protracted operation that would inevitably involve civilian casualties.

2. The weather is against it. Aerial cover is vital in such an operation, especially if the confrontation were to expand into Lebanon and Syria, or even involve directly intercepting Iranian aid. Optimum weather conditions arrive in June.

3. Civil defence is weak. No civil defence preparation of the population has been attempted for financial reasons. For example no new gas masks have been distributed, no new shelters have been built, and the government has refused to renovate old shelters. Any renovations have been by the private sector alone, despite recent government pledges of money.

4. Many Reserves units have not been prepared properly. Whilst many Reserve units have received significant new training it has been patchy. These units will not be essential to the Gaza operation, despite their inevitably being used, but they are essential to a two-front war.

5. The costs. If Syria-Iran chose to open a second front the costs will far exceed those of the 2006 war. The Second Lebanon War had a barely noticeable effect on the Israeli economy despite effectively crippling Lebanon’s.

6. Lack of intelligence. A successful operation, particularly one that may involve two fronts, requires exceptional intelligence. Whilst both Israeli military and civilian intelligence organisations are excellent the sheer quantity of data involved in any potential two-front operation is very large, and so far not enough information has been collected to sustain any prolonged campaign.

7. Special Operations limitations. These will play a much larger role in any Gaza campaign, and even more should a second front open with Syria. Again, they are utterly dependent on, to date insufficient, intelligence.

8. Israel’s anti-missile capability is not ready. These include counter anti-tank missiles, as well as anti-medium to long-range missiles that will be fired at Israel’s population centres in very large quantities, particularly if Syria and Iran choose to open a second front.

9. The unexpected (only to Israel’s political and security establishment), destruction of Gaza’s security fence. This has led to an infusion into Gaza of large amounts of anti-air and anti-tank missiles and explosives along with highly motivated and trained commanders from Iran and Syria, as well as Al Qaeda allied individuals who wish to carry out suicide missions. These additional forces will pose specific problems to IDF planners and operations chiefs, and the necessary preparations to counter each additional threat will have to be made.

Despite these restraining factors, it is well within the IDF’s capability to mount a significant operation in Gaza.

Ehud Barak’s reasons for acting this summer are complex.

• The strategic threat to Israel is absolutely clear. Hamas, if it chose to, could hit two of Israel’s largest cities, Ashqelon and Ashdod, with ease, using its latest Iran-supplied missiles. This has major implications for the West Bank, because if the precedent of allowing Palestinian militant forces to indiscriminately shell Israel’s cities goes unanswered, then Tel Aviv and Israel’s main population, airport, and energy centres would be vulnerable.

• The residents of Sderot, the city adjacent to the northern Gaza Strip, have reached tipping point. They will leave en masse should there be another major attack and nothing is done (Sderot has lost roughly 20% of its population over the last 7 years of missile attacks).

• Delay is politically unsustainable, particularly for Barak, whose main political competition at the next election is the Likud’s leader Bibi Netanyahu, another elite forces commander and substantial political figure, though with an equally mixed political record. Barak has judged that elections in November 2008, or early 2009, are inevitable and so he has to prove his defence credentials within that time frame. His first duty as Defence Minister is to defend Israel’s citizens from attack, which he has singularly failed to do. It is politically impossible to demand that Israel’s population vote for a leader who has shown himself incapable or unwilling to carry out his most basic civic duty.

• Barak believes he needs to demonstrate how a victory is achieved. He believes that Olmert failed to achieve such a victory in Lebanon in 2006. This, unfortunately for Barak, is a commonly held Israeli delusion. No victory was ever possible in Lebanon in 2006, and none will be achievable in Gaza in 2008. Guerrilla wars, by their nature, are not won or lost on the battlefield. However, it is well within the IDF’s power to severely damage Hamas’ capability. That alone is the most that such an operation can achieve and given Israel’s current strategic position is, in any case, both completely unavoidable, and the minimum that Israel needs to achieve in order to safeguard her security at present. Hamas and her allies demonstrated that they were capable of firing over 50 missiles over one weekend (8-10 February) and they have 1,000s more Qassam missiles in reserve (100 missiles landed between 15-17 January alone; 190 missiles were fired from Gaza in January 2008; and 7, 567 missiles have landed in and around Sderot from Gaza in the last 6 years).

• Barak believes that with a military “victory” under his belt he can squeeze Olmert and his centrist Kadima party into a marginal position that will then force people to choose between him or Netanyahu. This strategy is not without risk because even assuming he wins he will need to work with Olmert or the rump of Kadima as part of his coalition. But, another possibility presents itself. Netanyahu has suggested that should he win convincingly he would be prepared to form a government of national unity. If Barak is offered the Defence Ministry it is possible that Barak would be severely tempted. His Labour Party, however, would find it almost impossible to remain united, and should they split both Kadima and Likud will be strengthened.

• This series of events could just as easily split Kadima, leaving Netanyahu in an apparently invincible position. This, unfortunately for him, cannot last, as any decision on Jerusalem will split and bring down his right of centre coalition government. He will therefore delay any resolution of any negotiations with any Palestinian party willing to talk to him. There cannot therefore be any meaningful progress in any negotiations for the duration of Netanyahu’s predicted premiership. His priority, in any case, will be economic reform and prosperity, which he believes is far more important to Israel’s long-term future than any utopian ideal of a peace treaty with a partner that, in reality, he perceives as neither capable of, nor willing to, deliver peace.