As Call My Bluff Takes Over The Middle East Unilateralism Remains Odds-On Favourite To Win

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· Main Points

1 Abbas’s climb-down over the Goldstone Report and his taking President Obama’s assertions over settlements at face-value have painted him into a corner. His declaration that he will not stand again for President of the P.A. is only part bluff. But Abbas’s bluff will also soon be called by all parties on the West Bank over his refusal to countenance violent resistance. This position is untenable and a campaign of occasionally violent civil disobedience is currently being both planned and put into action. Abbas may yet also call the West’s bluff, particularly if he cannot form a unity government on his terms with Hamas, and attempt to run the West Bank separately under Salam Fayyad as PM of a non-elected P.A. technocracy. Meanwhile Abbas will remain both P.A. President and the senior representative of the Palestinian people under the aegis of the PLO, of which he remains head.

2 President Obama’s bluff on a total settlement freeze has been successfully called by P.M. Netanyahu. But, Obama remains unconvinced the current Israeli government can deliver the concessions needed for peace. Only an agreed strategy by the President, the Senate, and Congress, to implement a, if necessary, unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank with the backing of 12,000 US and international forces, would alter the current stalemate. Trying to implement such a strategy after yet another intifada will be extremely problematic. The current relative calm needs to be taken advantage of. The troops will be needed to ensure a smooth transition and to maintain pressure on Israel to accomodate a Palestinian state presence in Jerusalem.

3 Israel and the US have called Russia’s bluff over its illegal arms supplies to Hizb’allah via Syria and Iran with their involvement in both the Arctic Sea ‘hijacking’ fiasco and the exposure of regular visits by a Russian specialist in nuclear warhead design to Tehran.

4 Iran’s bluff over its nuclear programme has been called with the revelation of its secret nuclear weapons reprocessing plant outside Qom. No serious observers believe Iran is not within a year of enriching enough uranium for a nuclear-armed warhead. Iran’s illegal arms supplies to Hizb’allah have also been exposed after the interception and opening of the ‘Francop’ cargo ship’s Iranian-owned containers that hid 550 tons of weaponry.

5 The West’s bluff has been called both over any long-term commitment to Afghanistan or to preventing Iran’s nuclear weapons programme from coming to fruition. President Obama will only reinforce US forces in Afghanistan because of the instability in nuclear-armed Pakistan, and, then, only temporarily. Nor is he prepared to use military force to stop Iran’s programme as long as US troops remain vulnerable to Iranian-backed attack in either Iraq or Afghanistan.

6 President Obama’s bluff over his commitment to non-proliferation has also been cruelly exposed. He will preside over the greatest proliferation of nuclear-armed states in history unless he permits Israel to severely damage Iran’s nuclear arms programme, which he is not remotely inclined or able to do at the moment. New detailed intelligence on Iran’s nuclear weapons capacity and a specific hostile intent is the only factor that may lead to a change in his current position.

7 A potentially complex legal game of bluff is being played over the Goldstone report. Israel is currently trying to call the west and international communities’ bluff over its claims that war crimes were committed by Israel fighting local terrorism, this, as the global communities’ efforts to fight local and global terrorism remain untouched by any similar such claims despite the total disregard for human rights exhibited by all parties involved in the global conflict. The West is particularly vulnerable to this charge as it is fighting an unpopular counter-terror war thousands of miles from its own territory without a single missile having breached its borders, whereas Israeli sovereignty and borders are breached on an almost daily basis.

8 Shaul Mofaz, Kadima’s deputy head, has called Tzipi Livni’s bluff over any ostensible leadership ambitions she has either for her party, or for the country. His plan to evacuate 60% of the West Bank is the only serious plan currently available to all parties involved in the peace process. It will now be up to Livni to produce a measure that has as much cogency or as realistic a chance of success.

9 Labour leader Ehud Barak is involved in a complex and risky game of bluff involving not only the Palestinians, but PM Netanyahu, and Barak’s own party. He has to prove to the Labour party and supporters that he is in the government in order to advance the peace process when in reality he is there to pursue his own personal ambitions and to oversee a vital two-year anti-missile system project to its conclusion. He can only theoretically square the circle by leaving the government within the next year or two, as there is absolutely no chance of any progress in the peace process being made under the premiership of Netanyahu.

10 Prime Minister Netanyahu is involved in a fruitless game of bluff with his own Likud party, his coalition partners, Iran, and the Palestinians. He has no mandate from his own Likud party, never mind any other coalition partner (the Labour party has in reality split in two), to reach any peace agreement worthy of the name. He has no desire to attack Iran without the express permission of the US. His only political option is to cling on to power having prevented any substantive progress over the Golan Heights or the West Bank and Jerusalem, whilst managing and strengthening Israel’s economy and infrastructure through the recession.

· ANALYSIS

· President Abbas’s strategy to wait for the Obama Administration to bludgeon PM Netanyahu’s coalition into surrender or dissolution within 2 years has failed spectacularly. This was compounded by his refusal to insist the Goldstone report was put to the UN General Assembly vote to be brought before the UN Security Council. Abbas’s reluctance to initiate support for Goldstone was predicated on the false assumption that the US would support his refusal to talk until all building, including in Jerusalem, was frozen.

Abbas subsequently felt totally betrayed not only by the US’s refusal to fully support his strategy on ‘settlements’, when Hillary Clinton praised Netanyahu’s concessions on building, but also by the impossible position they had put him in concerning Goldstone with their insistence he could not talk peace with Israel whilst simultaneously supporting the process of taking peace-committed politicians such as Tzipi Livni and Ehud Barak before the International Criminal Court charged with ‘war crimes.’

· The total collapse of his strategy came very suddenly upon the heals of his triumph at the Fatah Conference where he was unanimously re-elected its head. Abbas had to quickly build a new strategy as he realised without US pressure on Netanyahu’s coalition he could not get the capitulation he needed in order to sell any deal to his constituency. He and Saeb Erekat decided to link P.A. PM Salam Fayyad’s idea of creating the infrastructure for a Palestinian state within 2 years in preparation for the implementation of a two-state solution, to a unilateral declaration of Palestine within 2 years. Unfortunately this idea collapsed almost as soon as it was announced as both the US and the EU refused to support it. Their reasoning was that it would undermine the legal agreements so far in place and the whole peace process could be put in jeopardy.

· Abbas was then forced to announce his resignation as he quite rightly saw there was no point in carrying on a process that would never lead to an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital. Not only was the current Israeli government set against the partition of Jerusalem the US Senate and Congress made it plain over the summer period they would not countenance the division of Jerusalem either, particularly in the current global climate of increasing Islamist radicalism and with such a weak Palestinian leadership that was not unambiguously committed to the western democratic cause, and that had so readily and recently capitulated to radical Islam in Gaza.

This has left Abbas with few choices. He could support a unification government under his terms with Hamas, or, he could resign from the P.A., as under the P.A. constitution elections were no longer feasible without Hamas’s consent. He could then leave Fayyad in charge of daily government, and continue to lead as head of the PLO, the sole internationally recognised representative organisation of the Palestinian people. His current position is to remain as nominal head of the P.A. until elections are called with Hamas's consent, and to use his leadership of the PLO as another powerbase from which he can bargain.

This then allows the PA to continue to receive international assistance whilst Abbas would be free to negotiate with Hamas from a position of strength as head of the PLO. Hamas have never had voting rights or seats within the PLO and have always sought them. The framework for a new Palestinian unity government could be forged under the auspices of the PLO, with Hamas even joining the organisation, thus automatically gaining the status that comes with its membership as it continues to be internationally recognised as 'the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.'

Even if Hamas PLO membership has no appeal to Abbas there still remains the possibility of a summer or autumn election with more hard-line Presidential candidates, and a greater likelihood of a national unity government within the P.A., with a previously agreed clear division of power between Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank. This of course would end any chance of negotiations with the Likud-led government, but as no meaningful progress was ever possible with it anyway, it makes no difference. The pattern for the future is clear: a new intifada led by more radical leaders ending in a series of unilateral decisions by all the parties.

· Abbas will do all in his power to prevent the intifada from descending into extreme violence, and at first it is unlikely that any targets within Israel’s 1967 borders will be attacked. But all attacks within Jerusalem’s north, east, and southern suburbs will be considered legitimate, as will all attacks on settlements and settlers within the West Bank. It will start by constant rock attacks on civilians and property, and increase in severity from then on.

· President Obama was easily outmanoeuvred by Bibi Netanyahu, partly because he was extremely badly advised by Rahm Emanuel his Jewish Chief of Staff who had appointed himself the task of bringing Bibi to heel. Unfortunately Emanuel knows little to nothing about Israeli and Jewish politics and has all the subtlety and sophistication of a bull in a china shop, as well as having a personal animus towards Bibi. Fortunately the veteran diplomat Dennis Ross has been brought back in to consult more closely on all major policy issues despite also being a special National Security Council adviser for the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia including Iran.

Obama and Emanuel made a basic error in both underestimating Bibi’s political skills and the support of the Senate and Congress for most of his positions, as well as having no understanding of the impact the statements on settlements would have on the talks. However, Bibi’s position will become more difficult with each month and year due to the volatility of Israeli politics and the settlements issue will continue to be used to highlight the contradictory nature of the current Israeli government position: what is the point of building settlements if you really want a two state solution?

· The reality is unless President Obama, the Senate and the Congress, agree to help implement the Mofaz plan to, unilaterally if necessary, withdraw from 60% of the West Bank and officially recognise it as Palestine within the next 18 months, no progress will be made. The intifada will increase in scope and Israel will be forced to unilaterally withdraw to borders of its own choosing and seal off Jerusalem. The US need to offer both the Palestinians and Israel a vision of a two-state solution and commit troops to its implementation, at the very least manning one of the border crossings with Jordan. A crossing into an Arab state without Israeli intervention would give hope that a free Palestine was both possible and imminent.

· Israel felt it necessary to risk upsetting Russia by highlighting both illegal arms shipments to the Middle East and the regular visits to Iran by a Russian specialist in nuclear warhead design. Israel and the US believe that Russia’s role in containing Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions is vital and some sort of counter pressure was needed to get them to focus more carefully on the issue. Concurrently Obama offered Russia the removal of prospective anti-missile systems from the Czech Republic and Poland, agreed not to push for Ukrainian accession to NATO and the EU, as well as to leave Georgia’s sovereignty issues to international forums to decide. This classic carrot and stick approach is working because all parties are benefitting at the moment.

The ‘Arctic Sea’ having been at sea for three and a half months was only allowed to dock at its port of registry Valletta (Malta) on 29 October 2009, having left Kaliningrad with its alleged illegal cargo on 17 July 2009. The remaining crew, including the captain, were only allowed home from Malta on 2 November. All the Russian crew are under a gag order not to speak and face 7 years in prison in Russia should they break it. The alleged hijackers are all facing lengthy prison sentences.

The most plausible explanation for the episode is that Mossad warned the Russian authorities of an illegal arms cargo, and the Russian secret service set up the hijack scenario. They allowed the ship to get out of the media spotlight before unloading the illegal cargo at Cape Verde an East Atlantic island off the western coast of central Africa. The cargo was most likely similar to that found on the ‘Francop’ but far smaller and Israel’s main concern would have been any handheld anti-aircraft missiles destined for Hizb’allah in Lebanon. Defence Minister Barak has repeatedly said should Hizb’allah gain access to certain types of technology he describes as “game changing” then the IDF’s relatively passive stance re Lebanon would change. These particular types of missiles would have merited such a high-risk high-profile intervention on Mossad’s part, and would also explain the reports of a Lebanese businessman with Syrian connections being behind the original arms request in the Kaliningrad enclave.

The reason the Russians used the hijack scenario was to not alert the smugglers they knew an illegal arms shipment was in progress, to not embarrass any senior government official involved in the shipment, to hide any evidence that arms were involved, and to ensure deniability. Had the arms been unloaded in Russia or Europe none of the above would have been guaranteed.

· Another example of Obama’s inclusive and multilateral approach is his handling of the secret nuclear arms facility at Qom. He ensured all the major EU leaders were involved in the announcement of its exposure at the 25 September G-20 Pittsburgh Summit. He has offered Iran high-level talks in order to expose their true position, or to see who in the regime actually has the authority to make any decisions.

The same applied to the joint US-NATO-Israeli interception of Iran’s illegal arms ‘Francop’ shipment to Syria and Lebanon. Once again Obama highlighted his preference for joint and multilateral action. The U.S. and NATO supplied supporting intelligence to the IDF and Israel’s Navy completed the operation. Israel is also involved in NATO exercises despite Turkey’s recent rebuff, and the joint US-Israel one month long Juniper-Cobra anti-missile operation across Israel was considered a success, as well as the most complex exercise of its type ever held anywhere.

Incessant meetings have taken place between Israel’s Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi and many of the senior commanders of NATO over the last few months. The purpose of this cooperation and coordination was not only practical it was to send a clear message to Iran that any attack on Israel would result in some form of response from NATO, even, as with Iraq during the 1980-8 Gulf War, if it is only endless supplies and intelligence to Iran’s enemy. Another advantage to NATO was to tap into the IDF’s knowledge of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), which has been accumulated from IDF operations in Lebanon (1982-2000; 2006) and Gaza (2008-9), involving Iranian-made and designed devices, similar to those encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan.

· A clear insight into US Administration strategy towards Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and nuclear proliferation came from ex-CIA advisers Bruce Riedel and Kenneth Pollack at the INSS Tel Aviv University talks in conjunction with the Saban Forum. Riedel who advises Obama on Afghanistan said the US could not think about attacking Iran as long as she has troops committed to Afghanistan and Iraq both of which were disastrous expeditions. $30 billion per year more will be spent on additional troops to Afghanistan with no guarantee of success. The main reason for not pulling out of Afghanistan now was the danger of radicals taking over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

Pollack made it clear that containment of a nuclear armed Iran was the US’s only option. Soon, Saudi Arabia would acquire nuclear weapons, whatever happens. The world would just have to get used to a nuclear-armed Middle East, with the focus on containing radical regimes like Iran through military alliances, supporting dissident groups, and targeted sanctions that hit Iranian companies only, and not civilians.

This view will result in the largest proliferation of nuclear weapons in history. An interesting paradox, as Obama is one of the few Presidential candidates to ever explicitly state his commitment to non-proliferation and severely curbing the Great Powers' nuclear arsenals. What these advisers apparently forget is that President Chavez of Venezuela will soon be joining the nuclear-armed club, and the United States for the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis will have a nuclear-armed neighbour. As soon as this prospect becomes clear Obama’s chances of re-election will diminish substantially. Obama will be secretly hoping Israel will do his dirty work for him.

· The White House meeting between Bibi, Barak, Oren and Obama was a constructive one. Both Bibi and Barak seemed extremely pleased with the outcome expressing the view that Obama was sound on Iran. Given that Obama is pursuing a containment strategy against Iran, and hopes to leave both Iraq and Afghanistan as soon as possible the most likely conclusion is that the Israeli side asked him whether he would obstruct Israel from attacking Iran if Israel felt a nuclear strike was imminent or likely, and Obama reaffirmed his belief that all nations have the right to self-defence.

Increased intelligence and technical cooperation with Israel over the Arrow 3 project, Juniper-Cobra exercise, the recent NATO exercises and the inclusion of Israel’s larger Naval vessels in a major NATO exercise for the first time, allied to NATO help intercepting illegal arms shipments destined to Israel’s enemies, confirm reports that Obama has also pledged direct access to US Intelligence systems and live satellite feeds covering Iran. This will give Israel advance warning of terror and smuggling activities, any impending missile launches, a first strike advantage, and an opportunity to warn the Home Front. The quid pro quo is presumably that Obama will be warned in advance by Israel of any attack on Iran.

· Israel is currently prepared to force the western powers to show their hand on the ‘war crimes’ issue. Spain revoked her power to arrest individuals for war crimes unless they involved Spanish citizens as a result of Israel’s appeals. Britain cannot do the same as long as the current Labour party is in power. When Tony Blair was asked to revoke similar legislation he refused because the Left in the Labour party was too strong and it would cause a split in his party. Israel wants the West to provide a coherent legal framework that will stop prosecutions by nations, organisations, or individuals that are hostile to any state defending themselves from radical Islam.

If this policy fails then Israel will simply set up an independent judicial enquiry that will negate any legal right to take Israel or Israeli individuals to the International Criminal Court in the Hague. International law dictates that if there is an authoritative and independent legal Israeli enquiry it has precedence over any other.

· Shaul Mofaz’s plan to leave 60% of the West Bank, unilaterally if necessary, whilst recognising that it constitutes along with the Gaza Strip the nascent state of Palestine is a direct challenge to Tzipi Livni’s leadership. Livni has satisfied herself with sniping from the sidelines whilst offering little vision or alternatives on any substantive issue. Two opposing trends are apparent. Livni’s popularity has remained stable but only as a result of alienated Labour voters whose desertion to Livni-led Kadima has halved Labour’s support-base. A recent poll suggested that the centre-left has lost 7 seats to the right since February alone. The Mofaz plan appeals to the centre right, the current electoral centre, he hopes to place Kadima in a position to join the coalition by continuing to propose pragmatic centre-right policies.

If Livni does not shift to the right soon, or offer some imaginative alternatives, she will leave Kadima in the position of permanent official opposition, as Labour disappears altogether off the political map.

· Ehud Barak’s Houdini escape after the last election has failed to prevent his party losing 20 points in the polls. Only 5% of the electorate agree Barak would make a suitable Prime Minister. Labour would gain 6 seats if an election were held this month. This is not all due to Barak as the endless factionalism within Labour continues to alienate its supporters.

Labour has to hope that Livni is ousted from Kadima’s leadership and that an intifada accompanied by a violent settler response makes Netanyahu’s position untenable. The Israeli electorate are notoriously fickle and Ehud Olmert recovered from a 3% standing in the polls to roughly 33% within months, following good economic figures and the Winograd report exonerating him from the worst aspects of the IDF’s performance during the Second Lebanon War. Barak’s position is somewhat different, as he has no party to speak of, is an expert at alienating people, and has no economic success to his name. If, however, a war breaks out and Israel is noticeably successful all that could change. Ideally Barak needs to leave the coalition sometime in 2011 when it becomes clear that Bibi cannot offer any way forward in the peace process, and with Kadima losing support from both its centre right and centre left supporters. He has already gone down in history as Labour’s least popular and electorally least successful leader.

· Bibi Netanyahu’s position is a lot more fragile than the current polls suggest with his popularity at an all time high (43% approval rating). His economic reforms will meet with ingrained and protracted opposition; and he cannot make any progress with the Palestinians or Syrians because he has nothing to offer them. He does not have the nerve to initiate an attack on Iran, unless irrefutable intelligence forces his hand, and should he be forced to attack, having achieved nothing on the Palestine front, the combined deterioration in the economic, political, and military situation would be severe.

Nevertheless he could survive until 2012 if he manages to successfully contain the next intifada, and if Iran fails to succeed in building an effective nuclear weapon. However, at some stage he will have to decide where Israel’s borders lie as governing the West Bank will slowly become impossibly costly in terms of loss of resources and increasing divisions within and amongst the Israeli population (minor insurrections in the IDF are increasing as the prospect of evacuating settlers draws closer), alongside the radicalisation of Israeli Arabs. The neglect of the Negev and Galilee will be seen as a strategic mistake and the need to populate these areas with a settler-like population of highly motivated pioneer-minded citizens will increasingly be seen as a national priority.

· It is clear Bibi has nothing to offer the Palestinians and they have nothing to offer in return. A staged unilateral withdrawal over several years is the most likely outcome to the current impasse. The probability remains strong that Israel will have withdrawn from most of the West Bank by 2016-17, sooner if a major war with Iran, Lebanon, and Syria breaks out, and a major peace conference follows. A national unity government will have had to be formed to cope with a war with Iran, and the Mofaz plan, or an almost total withdrawal, will have to be considered in its aftermath.

· The issue of Jerusalem will remain irresolvable. The most likely outcome is that Israel will seal the capital off from the West Bank. The following few years (2010-12) will be seen as the last period of time Israel and the Palestinians will have had to create a peaceful Palestine on the West Bank with an undivided and open Jerusalem. But, there is not sufficient leadership or vision on either side to achieve this. Only the highly active participation of the international community in the development of the West Bank will prevent it descending into chaos, which will in turn lead to a series of operations similar to Operation Cast Lead over the coming decade. Once Jerusalem is sealed off from Palestine a series of security sweeps will be regularly used to suppress insurrections in the Old City, and a series of separation walls and fences will be built to separate Jewish and Arab youths from incessant confrontations in the suburbs.

Links:
Kenneth Pollack analysis (Iran and proliferation):
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=2&cid=1258624595999&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

Bruce Riedel analysis (Afghanistan):
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1258489190793&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

Haaretz Poll:
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1127911.html

For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/

For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/

For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html

¨For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/

For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -

News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/headlines

¨A written summary of the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news

The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/

Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/comment-and-opinion

A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/quotes

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Israel’s Main Parties Wobble, Iran’s Sham, and Palestine Presses the Hold Button

This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/


1 All of Israel’s main parties have shown signs of splitting after PM Netanyahu’s recent “two states” speech and Ehud Barak’s insistence upon changes to Labour’s rules.

2 Iran’s election has exposed systematic large-scale vote rigging that originated with Ahmadinejad’s first election victory in June 2005: “We did not have a revolution in order to have democracy” (Ahmadinejad; 18 May 2005).

3 President Abbas and Hamas both reveal their master plan: do nothing, or, failing that, as little as possible. Both hint, should that fail, there’s always another intifada and more rockets.

4 Some of Lebanon’s Christians have second thoughts and vote for Hariri’s coalition. Hizb’allah declare their strategy: no change.

5 President Obama’s strategy is also revealed in his Cairo speech: play it smart, cool, and straight, and do not let anyone off the hook.

6 Netanyahu has been forced to turn down the volume on the hysteria button (marked ‘Iranian threat’) by Kadima’s leader Tzipi Livni, and the head of the CIA Leon Panetta, as Israel readies itself for a regional war on all fronts. However, events may have conspired to postpone an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities until 2012-13.

· ANALYSIS

· P.M. Netanyahu’s speech won overwhelming support from 71% of Israelis as it spelt out some important truths:

1. After the Gaza experience Israel cannot risk a rocket-propelling entity a few miles from all its major urban centres, its main airport, and its main energy producing sites.

There is no guarantee Hamas will not take over the West Bank at any time in the future, so it must be demilitarised and any breaking of this agreement will be a casus belli.

2. Israel was not created as a result of the Holocaust. Israel is the Jewish people’s homeland, and has been connected to the Jewish people for over 3,500 years. To not acknowledge that is proof that the Arabs do not accept the legitimacy of “the right of the Jewish people to a state of their own, in their historic homeland.” This is evidence of a denial by the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular of Jewish history, culture, religion, and civilisation, that form the very foundation of an independent Jewish entity, and therefore at any point they can use their denial of the legitimacy of the Jewish connection to the land as a basis for another conflict. It follows that if they are serious about peace they will publicly recognise “this is the homeland of the Jewish people, this is where our identity was forged.” With official recognition of the Jewish state a demilitarised Palestinian state will be able to live side-by-side in peace and prosperity with Israel.

3. There is no equation between Palestinian suffering and the Holocaust. To equate or conflate the two in any way is to distort and deny both reality and the truth and is a deliberate assault on the memory of the lost six million and upon the survivors’ sensibilities towards that loss. This is not the mark of someone who wants peace.

4. If the United States is serious in believing that this conflict can be resolved quickly because to do so would suit American interests, namely their total dependence on Arab oil, they had better find the solutions to these Arab prejudices otherwise there can be no peace within their preferred timeframe. The ball is in the Arab and American court and that includes getting recognition of Israel and its right to exist, and the issue of settling the “refugees” in Arab lands. Israeli Prime Ministers have always been prepared to meet their enemies’ leaders, not the other way around. Israelis want peace, the Arab states want only to perpetuate the conflict. If it were otherwise they would simply repeat Sadat’s visit to Israel, or, for once, take up Israel's leaders’ endless offers to meet.

· Netanyahu’s baptysmal recognition of the possibility of two states opened up potential rifts within both the Kadima and Likud parties. 20 out of 27 Likud members insisted recognition of a two state solution was never part of the Likud’s election platform, the opposite in fact, and they would not vote for the creation of a Palestinian state. 3 Kadima members claimed that since Netanyahu had recognised the principle of the two state solution there was no longer any reason not to join the government of national unity. However none of the individuals who made these claims has as yet forced a split within the party or posed a threat to the leadership despite the fact that Kadima’s no.2 Shaul Mofaz was one of the 3 MKs who were prepared to go public on the pointlessness of Kadima remaining in opposition. Likud are framing legislation that will allow Kadima to split more easily, so that only 7 MKs, or, alternatively, a third of any party, would be required to form another party.

· Labour party rebels are 1 MK short of splitting the party. Knesset rules state a third of a party’s MKs are needed before a split can occur. 4 MKs want to leave Labour because they detest Barak, and do not want to be a part of a Likud-led national unity government. They are also unhappy at proposed new Labour committee rule changes including the neutering of the role of the secretary-general and at Ehud Barak’s removal of Eitan Cabel from that post. Should they finally split, Labour will be left with 8 MKs either in, or in support of, the government. The 5 potential rebels, including Cabel, intend to form part of the opposition under a social democrat party banner, although one may even go over to Kadima.

· Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has made his first major strategic blunder by ordering the selection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for President by blatant vote rigging. His decision has exposed the fact that Ahmedinejad did not in fact win the 2005 Presidential elections as he did not come second in the first round of those 2005 elections and so should never have been in the run-off with Ayatollah Rafsanjani.

· Ayatollahs Khamenei and Rafsanjani are long time associates and rivals who have diametrically opposed views of the future of the revolution. Both have no compunction about assassinating their opponents (Rafsanjani is wanted by Interpol for his part in the bombing of the Buenos Aires Jewish Community Centre in which 87 died), and both are totally committed to the revolution, but Khamenei is obsessively concerned with both anti-Americanism and Iranian self-sufficiency. He believes confronting both the US and the current structure of international institutions like the UN, as well as clamping down on any manifestation of pro-western dress or culture, strengthens the regime and revolution.

Rafsanjani believes the regime is more likely to survive if it allows freedoms to both youth culture and women, and should compromise where necessary with the US. This he believes also strengthens his own agenda, increasing his political and financial base within the Islamic regime. Khamenei has a more austere view of revolutionary Islam and is not interested in accumulating wealth, in contrast to Rafsanjani, who is on the Forbes list as one of the richest men in the world.

Finally, and most importantly, Khamenei is determined to acquire nuclear weapons technology as soon as possible to safeguard the revolution whilst simultaneously confronting the US. Rafsanjani believes nuclear weapons can be acquired over a longer time span and to confront the US is counterproductive particularly for the economy.

· After Rafsanjani’s 2005 defeat as a result of Khamenei’s orders, Rafsanjani
committed himself to removing Ahmadinejad and if possible weakening Khamenei. Rafsanjani backed Ahmadinejad’s opponents who won a series of local elections in Tehran beating Ahmadinejad’s supporters by a margin of 2:1 (2006). Rafsanjani had also got himself elected to the Assembly of Experts and then to its Chair (2006-7), a body that in theory can deselect the Supreme Leader. Khamenei was determined to stop this threat to his position and arranged for what he believed to be the weakest team to face Ahmadinejad in the 2009 Presidential elections whilst Rafsanjani supported both of the main opposition figures Mousavi and Karrubi.

· In the 2005 first round of the Presidential race Ahmadinejad could only have come in second place by having votes taken from the other 6 candidates. The three candidates they took most votes from were Rafsanjani, who the Interior Ministry still allowed to win the first round on 21%, Mehdi Karrubi, on 17%, a moderate cleric and politician who supported dialogue with the United States and increased freedoms and protection for individuals, women, and minorities, and Dr Mostafa Moeen, on 14%, a popular reformist associate of Mousavi, who that year had been coerced into not running. Ahmadinejad was most likely between third and fifth position on 12% of the vote but because he was fighting 6 other candidates only a small percentage manipulation of the vote won him second place on 19%. Thereafter in the second round the vote was rigged even further to give Ahmadinejad a 2:1 win against Rafsanjani.

We can be almost certain of this because the other reformist candidates made up at least 56% of the first round vote, which in any case had been rigged to ensure Ahmadinejad came second. This meant that the Interior Ministry had to hand over roughly 33% of the total vote to Ahmadinejad in the second round run-off.

· Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei felt so threatened by the opposition “reformists” in 2009 that he ordered the Interior Ministry declare an outright decisive win in the first round for Ahmadinejad having picked fewer, and he assumed weaker, opposition candidates. Unfortunately for Khamenei, unlike the first round in 2005, this required a massive manipulation of the national vote and it is this blatant manipulation that not only exposed the 2009 election for a sham but also exposed how they manipulated the 2005 election as well. As Ahmadinejad put it during the 2005 campaign: “We did not have a revolution in order to have democracy (17-18 May 2005).” Ahmadinejad even won Tehran in 2009 despite his allies having lost by a 2:1 margin almost all elections there since 2006.

The 2009 fraud followed the same pattern of 2005. If a leaked Interior Ministry document is to believed, the largest percentage of the vote was once again deducted from Karrubi who instead of winning 34% of the vote won 2%, losing his own Lorestan region where in previous elections he had comfortably received 50% of the vote. This time he received 5% and Ahmadinejad 71%.

Mousavi, as the strongest candidate, had only 15% of his vote deducted, echoing what happened to Rafsanjani in the first round of 2005. This meant a total deduction of 47-48% of the national vote from the opposition to Ahmadinajad. The result: a 63% “victory” to Ahmadinejad over Mousavi’s 34%, a mirror image of the rigged 2005 second round win over Rafsanjani. The crudity of the vote manipulation was made far worse by the unexpected turnout of 80-85% and the massive vote for both Mousavi and Karrubi, requiring a crude and alarming last minute large-scale ballot stuffing process that could not escape notice. For example in Mazandarin province the number of votes cast exceeded eligible voters by 4,500.

The fraud was further confirmed by Khamenei breaking electoral rules and refusing to wait the three days necessary should any queries arise before announcing any result. He simply announced Ahmadinejad’s victory very soon after the Interior Ministry, which had announced the result 2 hours after the polls closed. The only poll that stated Ahmadinejad was leading the election by a 2:1 margin was of 1,001 people by telephone taken between 11-20 May, before the campaign got going, before the opposition were allowed access to state media, and with 27% expressing no preference. As one Iranian young woman put it: “In Iran there is an expression that the walls have mice and the mice have ears.” To express a dissenting view in a police state to a pollster on an open telephone line is a hazardous business.

· The regime has lost all legitimacy in the eyes of the vast majority of Iranians because its embodiment, The Supreme Leader Khamenei, has effectively declared ordinary Iranians’ wishes are irrelevant to the regime. And although the constitution allows the Supreme Leader to cancel “un-Islamic” election results the strategic blunder lies with the popular focus being moved from an unpopular personality to an unpopular regime. Nevertheless, despite this major blunder the regime has enormous resources at its disposal, including the Basij paramilitaries, the Revolutionary Guards, the moral police (whose Chief was arrested last year in a brothel with 6 prostitutes attending to him), the vast security apparatus, and below that elements of the army and police who would not hesitate to suppress any insurgency.

Nevertheless, the regime’s standing in the eyes of much of the free world will be diminished as the realisation dawns that this regime has no popular mandate whatsoever.

· President Abbas told the Washington Post that he would wait until PM Netanyahu and Hamas came round to his way of thinking: "I will wait ("It will take a couple of years") for Hamas to accept international commitments. I will wait for Israel to freeze settlements….Until then, in the West Bank we have a good reality . . . the people are living a normal life." Abbas’s response to why he refused Olmert’s concessions over Jerusalem, refugee resettlement, 97% of the land, and the removal of settlements was: "The gaps were wide." In the meantime other Fatah officials hinted that perhaps an intifada might move things along to their advantage.

Abbas, even by his own calculations, is up for re-election in January 2010. The assumption must be that he will stand unopposed, or will stand down. If Abbas allows Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh to stand against him he might have to rig the ballot to win.

If Fatah choose another intifada the Israelis will say Abbas has no control over the West Bank and Israel cannot make any concessions during an insurgency. Abbas’s calculation is that Obama will pressure Netanyahu’s government to give him more than Olmert offered: "They can use their weight with anyone around the world. Two years ago they used their weight on us. Now they should tell the Israelis, 'You have to comply with the conditions.' " Abbas's assumption is Israel will not be able to do so thus his calculation that within 2 years the Likud-dominated government will be replaced by Tzipi Livni. Somehow, according to his plan, she will manage to offer even more than Olmert did. This, needless to say, is pure delusion.

Even if Livni replaces Bibi, which is far from certain, she will not be able to form a government that would accept such concessions. Another opportunity will be lost, and the Palestinians will simply retort that Obama was a great disappointment or was always in the pocket of the Jews. Abbas has concocted a recipe for stalemate, and future conflict.

· The Christians, in opposition Christian leader Michel Aoun’s sector of central Lebanon, who were expected to vote for him, voted for the government’s "14 March Alliance" instead. This allowed the pro-Western coalition government of Christian and Sunni groups to retain its majority (71 of 128 seats) despite advantageous constituency changes made at the Doha Peace Conference (Qatar) to aid the opposition "8 March Alliance" comprising the Shia Hizb’allah and Amal parties and Aoun's Christian "Free Patriotic Movement" .

The election result on balance favours short-term stability in Lebanon as long as the Shia Hizb’allah party do not have to give up the independence of their militia and are allowed to continue to build their state within a state. This will change if Iran demands an attack on Israel. Israel has stated that if Hizb’allah remains part of the government, and cannot be controlled, any subsequent attack will be considered as a declaration of war by Lebanon against Israel, in which case all Lebanon’s infrastructure will be at risk from any counter-attack.

· Despite the mildly hysterical reaction in Israel to President Obama’s speech in Cairo (4 June 2009) and his demand to halt all settlement activity, his position towards violence and the Arab players was crystal clear:

1. “Hamas must put an end to violence, recognize past agreements, and recognize Israel's right to exist.”

2. “The Arab States must recognize that the Arab Peace Initiative was an important beginning, but not the end of their responsibilities. The Arab-Israeli conflict should no longer be used to distract the people of Arab nations from other problems. Instead, it must be a cause for action to help the Palestinian people develop the institutions that will sustain their state; to recognize Israel's legitimacy; and to choose progress over a self-defeating focus on the past.”

3. “Palestinians must abandon violence. Resistance through violence and killing is wrong and does not succeed…violence is a dead end. It is a sign of neither courage nor power to shoot rockets at sleeping children, or to blow up old women on a bus. That is not how moral authority is claimed; that is how it is surrendered…Now is the time for Palestinians to focus on what they can build. The Palestinian Authority must develop its capacity to govern, with institutions that serve the needs of its people.”

Strikingly, the Israelis took the President’s comments on settlements and the two-state solution to heart. The Palestinians and Arab states have failed to even recognise his expectations of them, precisely the opposite in fact, they have cravenly ignored them.

Obama must know that only sustained pressure on all the parties will move the process forward. He will not tolerate Israeli procrastination but nor will he ignore a Palestinian return to violence, or President Abbas’s desire to do nothing for the next 2 years. Other than moral and public pressure there is little Obama can do to move the peace process forward when both parties, the Palestinians in particular, are so resolutely unwilling to accept their responsibilities.

If Obama shows leadership over the nuclear crisis in North Korea, and manages to get open or tacit Chinese and Russian support to impose and apply sanctions, and U.N. resolutions against both North Korean exports of arms, and the proliferation of nuclear related materials, progress on peace could also be made. Should China and Russia be successfully brought in to deal with N. Korea then they will have less restraint on bringing their influnce to bear on Iran, Syria, and the Palestinians. Otherwise we can expect stalemate and a countdown to another conflict whether local or regional. Russia, Ehud Barak, and the Arab states have all been advocating a regional peace conference as the next step.

· The head of the CIA visited Israel secretly (late April, early May) to discuss Israel's attitude to bombing Iran and argue for proper consultation on the issue. He advised the consequences would be so grave that Israel would need the support of its allies. He also said that the constant declarations concerning Iran’s metaphysical threat to Israel were counterproductive to US efforts to engage Iran in dialogue and was creating unnecessary tension throughout the region.

Tzipi Livni also criticised Netanyahu for creating an unnecessary sense of alarm amongst the Israeli public over the threat posed by Iran’s development of nuclear weapons. If there really was a threat he should act, and if otherwise, keep his peace.

These two interventions are symptomatic of a reassessment of Israel’s position in relation to Iran’s nuclear weapons programme. Mossad head Meir Dagan has said (16 June) Iran will not be able to launch a nuclear missile until 2014, despite having sufficient enriched uranium for several nuclear devices by 2010. Other senior intelligence chiefs and advisers have stated the case for not attacking Iran until a discernible threat appears and the United States approve an attack. It has also become clear that President Obama is prepared to give Iran several months of face-to-face engagement before calling for very severe sanctions should the talks fail, and that he believes those sanctions will need to be applied for years before they have any effect.

This means that unless there is a substantial change in the balance of power, such as delivery of Russia’s S-300 anti-aircraft system, Israel could postpone a pre-emptive strike until 2012-2013.

· If Obama can push the peace process forward, and the Iranian regime continues to implode and/or agrees to develop only civil nuclear power, the prognosis is good. If, however, things continue as they are, with Iran becoming more paranoid and belligerent, and the Palestinians and Arabs offering no serious compromises, then a regional conflict is inevitable. Israel is preparing itself for a war on all fronts but will not be truly ready for such a conflict for another year or two, and Israel's anti-missile systems will not be fully operational for at least another 2 to 3 years. This means that Israel's optimum time for a pre-emptive strike will be sometime in 2012 but pretty much any scenario can present itself between now and then, as Israel is not only more than capable of fighting a war on all fronts, but Iran, Syria, and the Palestinians, are more than capable of provoking one.


Links:
Articles on Iran:
2005 election - http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Aug/gasiorowskiAug05.asp

2009 election -
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/16/iran.election.questions/index.html

Khamenei profile -
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/sadjadpour_iran_final2.pdf

Washington Post Abbas interview:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/28/AR2009052803614.html

For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/

For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper: http://www.haaretz.com/

For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html

For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/

For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/headlines

A written summary of the news:
news:http://www.bicom.org.uk/news

The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/

Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/comment-and-opinion

A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/quotes
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Lieberman is the weakest link – Barak triumphant until his next act of sabotage

This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/


· MAIN POINTS

1 Lieberman holds the key to the current government’s duration. He may be indicted within months. If his party loses the Foreign Ministry he will withdraw it from the government forcing new elections, or, more likely, new government alignments.

2 Barak will betray Netanyahu at the first opportunity but his aim is to stay as Minister of Defence for at least the next 2 years. Attempts will be made to oust him by the Labour Left within 14 months but he will almost certainly successfully rebuff them.

3 Livni’s political future will depend upon how long Netanyahu can stay in power, as her party may begin to split within the first year or two of opposition.

4 Israel will attempt to neutralise Iran’s nuclear weapons programme within 2 years. There will be no attempt to neutralise Iran’s nuclear weapons programme in 2009 unless Russia expedites the sale of the S-300 missile defence system.

5 President Ahmadinejad and Hizb’allah will doubtless be triumphant in the upcoming summer elections in Iran and Lebanon respectively, further increasing the probability of an Israeli effort to neutralise Iran’s nuclear weapons project.

· ANALYSIS

· Lieberman has promised to keep his government in the coalition even if he is indicted on money laundering, fraud, and bribery charges, which should be within the next 2-3 months according to National Fraud Unit officials’ estimates. However, Likud have threatened to give his Foreign Ministry post to Silvan Shalom, Bibi Netanyahu’s biggest Likud rival, in order to placate him and his supporters who feel they were treated disrespectfully by PM Netanyahu. The likeliest outcome is that another Israel Beitenu MK will replace Lieberman, possibly ex Foreign Ministry advisor and official, Danny Ayalon, the current Deputy Foreign Minister.

Were Bibi to be foolish enough to try and give the Foreign Ministry to a non-Israel Beitenu MK, then Lieberman would enforce his threat to withdraw his party from the coalition, which would lead to elections.

· Defence Minister and Labour Party leader Ehud Barak has only one year, according to Labour Party rules, before he has to face a leadership campaign because he lost the general election. Although there is a theoretical possibility he could be ousted, the Left in the Labour Party have shown themselves impotent against Barak’s supreme ability to manipulate the Labour Party central committee vote. Barak should have been dead and buried politically after his party’s dreadful showing in the election, the worst in Labour’s history. Yet, he outwitted Tzipi Livni, Bibi Netanyahu, and the Left of the Labour Party and gained the Defence Ministry for himself, and the Industry, Welfare, Agriculture, and Minorities, Ministries for Labour.

This is an unquestionable triumph under the circumstances but the subsequent price to be paid may be very high as a third of all Labour voters now say they will not support Labour as long as Barak remains its leader. However, this only matters if a new election is called soon as the Israeli electorate are notoriously volatile in their attitudes towards senior politicians. Ehud Olmert, for example, went from 3% to 33% approval ratings within several months (2006-7).

· The Barak-Bibi relationship is based upon shared experience within the elite commando unit Sayeret Matkal, as well as political necessity. Bibi needs Barak as a counter weight to both his own right wing within the Likud as well as the government coalition, and to any pressure from the United States. They also both need to gain votes from the centre Kadima party that attracted, and is mostly based upon, traditional Labour and Likud voters. If Barak and Bibi can squeeze Kadima then both of their parties will gain.

They are also both in broad agreement about the threat from Iran. Both believe that action against Iran may be necessary at any time, but also agree that they should give the United States some time to get an agreement from Iran not to pursue its nuclear weapons programme any further, if necessary through the implementation of sanctions.

They also believe that there is not likely to be any progress on peace talks, on either the Syrian or Palestinian front, as long as Iran remains an active and effective participant or player. Neither believe that a comprehensive peace is likely within the next few years. They do, however, disagree vehemently over the sacrifices needed for peace. Barak would give up the Golan Heights and the West Bank, and even parts of East Jerusalem, whereas Bibi believes the most the Palestinians can in practice be offered is a form of limited autonomy that would enable them to create a prosperous and stable society and economy, and that the Golan Heights could only be given back to Syria in certain extreme circumstances such as a total rejection of violence by Syria and a token Syrian civilian presence. Fortunately for their alliance there is no prospect either the Syrians or the Palestinians are prepared to make the concessions necessary for either Bibi or Barak to believe it politically expedient to abandon the other.

· However, Barak is by nature conspiratorial and controlling, and if he sees any advantage to be gained by sabotaging the coalition he will do so just as he did with Ehud Olmert. This can arise if he sees splits in Kadima, or the right wing coalition, and, of course, he will do all in his power to provoke such splits. In the meantime, if necessary for the next four years, he will do everything he can to bolster Labour’s narrow interests. His main priority as Defence Minister is to implement the ‘Iron Dome’ and ‘David’s Sling’ anti-missile systems that are, in theory, capable of intercepting Qassam, Katyusha, Grad, and Fajr, short and medium range incoming missiles. Parts of the defence shield will be deployed by 2010, but the system should be in place nationwide sometime in 2011 or early 2012. In the meantime his other priority is to sabotage Iran’s nuclear weapons programme.

· It is clear that Tzipi Livni is now in the most vulnerable position. She has been out-thought, out-manoeuvred, and out-witted by Ehud Barak, who should have been forced into political retirement by now but instead is currently in charge of all the key Ministries Labour has traditionally been associated with (Welfare, Agriculture, Minorities, and Industry). Livni has once again shown she has no strategic political vision, and believes principles lie at the heart of politics rather than the ability to gain and wield power, which in turn allows you the possibility to implement the policies that your principles dictate. Livni has not only put the cart before the horse she has also managed to bolt the proverbial gate locking herself and her party outside.

Kadima is a coalition of centre-left and centre-right personalities and policies, that was created and designed by ex-PM Ariel Sharon to hold the centre ground in any conceivable combination of government coalition. Its members joined precisely because they believed they were guaranteed, as the centre political party in a highly representative system of proportional representation, to be permanently in power. It is Livni’s genius that she has managed for the first time in Israel’s history to deny the political centre any representation in government. She has also rendered to Barak’s Labour Party the position of indispensable party of the centre. Her greatest task therefore will be to hold her party together. The longer the government coalition lasts the more difficult this will be. The government and Kadima are now in a race as to who will fragment first.

· Any imminent attack on Iran’s nuclear weapons facilities and programme will depend on whether Russia decides it is in her interests to supply Iran with the S-300 anti-air missile defence system. Russia sees herself in a win-win situation. If Israel attacks Iran then the price for Russian oil and gas and the demand for Russian military and nuclear technologies will increase along with Russia’s revenues. At the same time the United States as an ally of Israel will be harmed diplomatically and economically further undermining her position as a superpower. It will also bolster Russia’s argument that an anti missile system is not needed in the Czech Republic or Poland. If it was so easy to destroy Iran’s nuclear weapons programmes and systems how could Iran pose a serious threat to the United States or Western Europe?

If Israel does not attack then both her and the United States’ bluff will have been called and Russia can continue to supply nuclear technology and arms to whomsoever she chooses. This also undermines the US position as superpower, and allows Russia to compete on the world stage. Russia can then control Iran’s desire to gain nuclear weapons in her own inimitable style by threatening to withdraw all technological and military aid leaving Iran exposed to all comers.

· Ehud Barak and Bibi Netanyahu remain confident that they can control all threats, whether an intifada on the West Bank, missiles from Gaza, or terror attacks from Lebanon, on a case-by-case basis. Iran may feel the need to attack Israeli and Jewish interests through acts of global terror in order to bring pressure to bear and to make Israel overreact, thus putting Israel on the defensive again, and allowing Iran to get on with her nuclear programme unhindered. But it is clear Barak and Bibi are content to slowly build up Israel’s defences until such time they feel the need to destroy Iran’s facilities. Unless, that is, the global community decides to take the Iranian threat seriously.

President Barack Obama has just stated that he is “determined to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.” This comes in the context of North Korea firing a ballistic rocket over Japan, Iran’s recent firing of an inter-continental rocket into space, and Pakistan, the only Muslim nuclear power, imploding into civil war. No sane senior western politician wants to repeat this scenario with Iran, particularly as President Ahmadinejad’s victory in June’s general election is all but guaranteed by Ayatollah Khamenei’s support. The ball is now in the international community’s court but based on past behaviour nothing will happen. So we can expect a strike by Israel within two to three years, less if the S-300 is delivered.

· As for progress with the Palestinians, unless Hamas and Fatah can reconcile, Hamas recognises Israel, a courageous Palestinian leader arises who is prepared to compromise over Jerusalem and refugees, and renounce all violence and can deliver his people to that commitment, there can and will be no substantial progress. Israel has had enough of European cowardice, United States inactivity, Palestinian intransigence, Syrian Orwellian double-speak, and Iranian calls for her liquidation. Most of Israel’s current political elite understands that Iran holds the key to progress and that only her effective removal from the political process will result in any substantive development.

The Palestinians will not accept this situation and will increase their resistance accordingly as existing settlements expand and with little to nothing being done about any illegal ones. All offers by Netanyahu to help develop the West Bank’s economy without political concessions will be rejected. Stalemate amidst increasing and continued unrest will characterise the next year or two on the West Bank. This, in turn, will probably result in President Abbas’ resignation by the end of the year leaving the field free for a more radical Fatah Presidential candidate in January 2010.


Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/

For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/

For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html

For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/

For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/headlines

A written summary of the news:
news:http://www.bicom.org.uk/news

The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/

Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/comment-and-opinion

A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/quotes
______________________________________________
______________________________________________
______________________________________________
____________________________________
__________________________

Lieberman To Win The Protest Vote and The Two-State Solution To Be Put On Hold -

This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/

· MAIN POINTS

1 Avigdor Lieberman’s ‘Israel beytenu’ right-of-centre party will probably overtake Labour, as a result of taking votes from Likud, to become Israel’s third largest party.

2 Likud, despite losing seats to Israel beytenu will probably just defeat Kadima, but even if they do not, Likud will almost certainly still head the next government.

3 Ehud Barak’s military tactics in Gaza have won over some in the centre and on the left but have failed to impress the Israeli electorate at large as the strategic costs become apparent.

4 Ehud Barak’s and the Labour Party’s position may become untenable as a result of Barak’s military and political miscalculations causing the Labour party to split, or forcing it into opposition.

5 Bibi Netanyahu will form a centre right government that will render a two-state solution impossible in the short to medium term.

6 The current geographical and political Palestinian divisions mean a two-state solution would be impossible to implement even assuming there was any agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority to do so.

7 Another operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip has become unavoidable.

8 Unless radical improvements can be made on the West Bank within the next few months, or year at the most, another at least attempted intifada is inevitable.

9 Israel’s internal divisions will be set aside should a likely war with Iran and Syria become unavoidable.

· ANALYSIS

· Public interest in the election has grown in the last few days as the electorate have focussed upon Avigdor Lieberman as the natural choice for their protest vote. He satisfies several needs:

1. Many feel the operation in Gaza was too cautious and limited in its execution. They want someone who has the courage to see the next operation through to its logical conclusion: the neutralisation of the military wing of Hamas and all the other terror groups active in the Gaza Strip and the retaking of the ‘Philadelphi (smuggling) Corridor.’

2. There is a strong anti-establishment feeling born of frustration amongst the electorate, who see the same old faces filling the same posts in government, with apparently little to nothing ever changing. The announcement by the police and prosecution service of another investigation into Avigdor Lieberman, despite ten years of investigations without any charges ever having been brought, was seen as a deliberate attempt by the establishment to silence a dissenting voice on the eve of the elections. His poll ratings increased from that moment onwards.

3. Lieberman voices the unexpressed anxieties, frustrations and anger, of many amongst the electorate towards the Arabs in general and Israeli Arabs in particular. Israeli Arab politicians have made it clear they do not support the concept of Israel as either a home for the Jews or a Jewish State. Further, they have openly expressed support for Hamas, Hizb’allah, and Iran, even during the Second Lebanon War, as well as during the latest incursion into Gaza. Israeli Jews feel they are facing a metaphysical threat to the country from Iran and its allies and do not understand how Israeli Arab politicians can so openly voice their support for nations and groups that openly advocate Israel’s destruction.

Lieberman has expressed in unequivocal terms he will not tolerate this open threat and double standard on the part of Israeli Arabs, who, in any other country in the world would be incarcerated or silenced. The threat to Israel is not political, as in British communist support for the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the threat is to Israel’s continued existence. Israelis do not understand why Israel’s minority Arab population is indulged to the extent that it is, and their frustration finds relief in Lieberman’s straightforward no nonsense attitude summed up in his slogan: “Without Loyalty, No Citizenship.”

4. Lieberman’s suggestion that densely populated hostile Israeli-Arab border villages and towns be swapped for Jewish-inhabited settlement blocks around Jerusalem makes political and moral sense to many. The Palestinians insist their state be free of Jews, and, the Arab Israelis consistently express their disapproval of living in a Jewish state. Therefore the swap makes sense from the Israeli perspective: it allows the Arabs to rejoin their clans and families just over the border within a totally Arab Jew-free state, it unburdens Israel of a demographic and political security threat, and it is equitable as it swaps land for land and people for people. Lieberman argues Arabs cannot insist upon a Jew-free land of their own and complain when Jews ask for parity, particularly as the Israeli Arabs concerned have expressed their desire to live in a non-Jewish state, and are openly hostile to the nation they expressly do not wish to live in.

Lieberman also offers an alternative: they can stay with full citizenship rights and pledge allegiance to the state in the same way US citizens do, where, for example, school children pledge allegiance to the flag every day. If they fail to do so they are free to leave Israel or they can stay and renounce both any right to vote and any rights to stand for political office. Those who do pledge allegiance would also no longer be free to avoid their 2 to 3-year national service as almost all Israeli-Arabs are currently permitted to do (other than notably the Druse and some Bedouin).

· It is possible for Kadima to just defeat Likud and become the largest single party and still not head a government. Tzipi Livni will find out very quickly that a lack of political strategic thinking and planning, an inability to make deals, and self-righteousness, are not useful assets when it comes to forming coalition governments in Israel. It is in no one's interest to make a deal with Livni. It is vital for Labour and Likud to undermine Kadima in order to win over their share of Kadima’s centre right and centre left votes. Shas does not like or trust Livni, rightly believing she will not bow to their sometimes excessive demands. And Shas, Likud, and Lieberman, are totally opposed to one of the central tenets of Kadima’s view, which is to unburden Israel of the West Bank as soon as possible even if that includes parts of East Jerusalem. Nor do any of the parties trust Livni to lead Israel during any major confrontation with Iran and Syria, which all parties believe is almost inevitable unless the great powers put Iran in her place.

· Ehud Barak’s position is particularly exposed. His tactics in Gaza have proved fruitless and the operation almost pointless, and that is aside from the diplomatic and economic costs. Rockets continue to land on Israel without any effective reply, Gilad Shalit remains a hostage, and the smuggling of missiles and weapons into Gaza continues apace despite current early efforts by Egypt to halt the flow. His saving of IDF lives appealed to some on the patriotic liberal-left, but his tactics left others disillusioned and frustrated, particularly many younger conscripts who wanted to ‘finish the job.’

He now faces an impossible task: how to join a government led by Bibi Netanyahu that includes Avigdor Lieberman, when many prominent figures in the party have said it is politically untenable. In any case he could only join if he were made Defence Minister, no other post would satisfy him either politically or personally. He could argue to the party that it would be legitimate to try and form a government with Livni or Bibi at its head as long as Lieberman were excluded but this would not appeal to Bibi as it would in effect mean he was to either head, or play second fiddle to, a liberal-left Kadima-Labour dominated coalition, which of course would be politically nonsensical as he could much more easily lead a relatively stable centre-right coalition.

Barak will either have to resign and leave Labour to go into opposition under the leadership of Yitzhak Herzog, or he could risk splitting Labour in an effort to stay as Minister of Defence, which Bibi may not, in the end, be able to offer him in any case.

· Bibi Netanyahu, whether Likud come first or second, will almost certainly head the next government, which will include Lieberman’s Israel beitenu, Shas, and Kadima (effectively representing roughly 76 Knesset seats out of 120). Livni will insist on holding the position of Deputy Prime Minister, despite Bibi saying he would abolish the post, as well as Foreign Minister in charge of peace talks. These of course will be fruitless as there will be nothing to negotiate about and possibly no one to negotiate with. It is inconceivable President Abbas will negotiate about anything other than Palestinian independence, which will not be on the table for Livni to offer in any case.

Livni does not have the mandate from her party, or the courage, to lead Kadima into opposition, and it is possible that after a year or so she may be sidelined to the Ministry of Justice. If Livni does try and take Kadima into opposition it will instantly split, with its right-of-centre members joining Likud.

· The divisions between Fatah and Hamas are so deep and the geographical split so entrenched that reconciliation appears almost impossible. Hamas are currently trying, yet again, to take over the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Fatah’s last bastion of legitimacy. It is recognised throughout the world as the “sole representative of the Palestinian people” and has always been dominated by Fatah. President Abbas, however, does not have Yassir Arafat’s ability to divide and misrule, nor does he have Arafat’s stature, fear inducing abilities, or limitless capacity and funds to bribe everyone to do his bidding. Abbas is isolated, mistrusted, devoid of respect, and powerless. Hamas is divided but has limitless funds, is feared, and is highly determined and motivated.

Abbas may have no choice but to resign or block all attempts at the Hamas takeover of the PLO until he can find a suitable successor. It is unlikely that if he stood for President again he would be elected unless he stood unopposed. Hamas in any case do not recognise his Presidency as of January this year. In any event he would have no reason to stand for President as there would be nothing for him to negotiate with a Bibi-led government. He may hand his succession to former PM Ahmed Qureia, or, failing that, to Marwan Barghouti a Fatah MP currently in an Israeli jail for murder, who, from his prison cell, played an important role in mediating Fatah-Hamas reconciliation talks in February 2007. Barghouti may then call for a new intifada to sabotage any paralysis in the independence talks, and to boost his standing, which in any case remains high.

· In any event, it will be vital for Netanyahu’s government to neutralise Hamas’s military wing if Bibi wants to pursue his policy of entering a slow autonomy process for the West Bank. In order for that to proceed he will have to simultaneously suppress any political upheavals there. It is likely that the neutralisation of any military threat from Gaza is already deemed a prerequisite for imposing a slow autonomy process on the West Bank. This may come at a heavy price particularly if the IDF have to stay in the Gaza Strip for any length of time. Whether it is politically or militarily sustainable will depend on President Obama’s reaction and whether the Israeli security services can suppress any attempts at a new intifada both in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Or, indeed, whether West Bank Palestinians will have any appetite for a third intifada. On the other hand, it could be argued, the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip will have nothing to lose and not much else to do.

· Many of the unavoidable divisions and stresses brought about by the lack of any progress in the peace process both amongst and between Palestinians and Israelis, will be set aside should the main powers not be able to contain Iran’s nuclear weapon’s programme and ambitions. Israel will have to find a way to sabotage Iran’s efforts at some stage and this in turn will lead to an inevitable confrontation between, at the very least, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon on the one hand, and Israel on the other. This, however, would only be the first stage in a series of ongoing Iranian-initiated conflicts that will continue unless, and until, the major powers agree to effectively contain Iran’s geo-strategic ambitions.

However, the major powers have to date shown neither the will nor the ability to do so.


Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/

¨For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/

¨For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html

¨For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/

¨For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/headlines

¨A written summary of the news:news:http://www.bicom.org.uk/news

The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/

¨Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/comment-and-opinion

A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/quotes
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Are the leaders of Egypt, Israel, and Hamas, about to be hoisted by their own petards?

This site is unconnected to the award winning blog concerned with: "Reflections on human rights and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for that site please click on:
http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/


MAIN POINTS

1 Egypt’s ability and willingness to end the smuggling into Gaza will decide the duration of the current campaign.

2 Hamas’s political and military posturing may have sealed the fate of its military wing.

3 Ehud Barak’s choice of military strategy in Gaza has left him politically both more popular and more exposed than ever.

4 Livni’s wholly inadequate grasp of military and political strategy has left her politically vulnerable as Kadima are squeezed from the political left and right.

5 Bibi Netanyahu’s political and military assessment has been vindicated and his political position appears insurmountable.

6 If Egypt cannot deliver Hamas eventually Israel may be forced into a three week operation of attrition-like fighting followed by several weeks of clearing out bunkers alongside manhunts of senior Hamas operatives and the dismantling of scores of various terror cells.

7 Despite this prospect at the moment Israel looks as though it will declare a unilateral ceasefire within days.

· ANALYSIS

· Egypt holds the key to the current conflict in Gaza. At the moment Egypt is both unwilling and unable to control the smuggling of arms and provisions into Gaza.

Egypt was never willing or able to control the smuggling for several reasons:

1. Allowing smuggling into Gaza has several benefits to Egypt –

a) It allows Egypt to have some control over Hamas. If Hamas displeases Egypt she can threaten to close or hamper the quantity and content of the smuggling. This allows Egypt a certain amount of leverage on Hamas, despite it being a crude and risky method of applying pressure.

b) It allows Egypt to maintain some leverage over Israel. If Israel displeases Egypt in some way, she can relax the control of smuggling into the Gaza Strip to increase the pressure on Israel to reverse any position Egypt feels runs counter to her interests. Egypt felt for a long period that the Qassam fire on Israel was a useful means to get Israel to make concessions in its talks over the West Bank but in particular in relation to Egypt’s demand that she be allowed to considerably increase her forces in the Sinai.

c) This year’s income from smuggling through the tunnels for Egyptian merchants, Hamas, local Gazan merchants, Egyptian border police, and the tunnel owners, is estimated by a Gazan research institute at $650 million. Before Hamas took power 18 months ago there were 20 tunnels currently there are between 500 to a 1,000. This income is particularly important to the Egyptian border police as they are poorly paid, work in harsh conditions, and face threats from Hamas and Bedouin gunmen who also bribe them to help ensure the smooth maintenance of the smuggling process.

The benefits to the Egyptian authorities of these bribes is that they do not need to find extra funding for their officers and men to ensure they remain in post, and they are a useful supplementary income for government officials. It also increases prosperity within the Sinai Peninsula thereby decreasing long-standing tensions between the regime and the local Bedouin population.

2. Egypt has always had difficulty patrolling and controlling smuggling into the Sinai Peninsula. There are over 320 miles of coastline to patrol and most of Hamas’s current missiles and funds have come from Sudan via traditional sea routes and are dropped off, sometimes quite openly, at various ports along the southern Sinai coast. They are mostly medium to long range Grad and Fajr missiles made in China and Iran respectively. The Bedouin have been increasingly pushed out of their traditional grazing lands as tourism has developed in the Peninsula and have resorted more and more to smuggling, which is in any case a traditional enterprise. Bribery of local officials has also been a useful source of income for the low paid non-Bedouin immigrant Egyptians as well and has meant there is little incentive to interfere in the process.

3. Egypt needs foreign help if it is to stop this trade but this in turn poses the regime difficult political problems. It raises difficult issues of sovereignty, competence, administration, and control. The reality is that, as in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Egyptian government is not in control of its borders, corruption is rampant, and administration both incompetent and extremely bureaucratic. To admit help is needed exposes this reality to the world and therefore finding a solution to the smuggling of arms into the Sinai and onto Gaza, that does not expose the Egyptian regime to unwanted scrutiny, will be both complex, expensive, and time consuming.

4. Egypt considers the answer to most of these problems is a substantial increase in its forces into Sinai. Previous Prime Minister Ariel Sharon agreed in principle to allow a substantial increase in their forces from 750 to several thousand along the Gazan border but this was vetoed by the cabinet he headed because it was seen as an invitation to further increases in the future, and, in any case, most security advice was that if only the Egyptian border police performed their duties properly no increase would be needed. This failed to take into account the internal difficulties Egypt had in finding either the funds or the right calibre of men necessary to carry out a dangerous and uninviting job in one of the poorest and least developed parts of their country.

· The Israeli Cabinet agreed today that the operation in Gaza should continue. Ehud Barak’s strategy of a war of attrition in order to maintain low casualties has led him into an untenable position. He now has to rely totally on the Egyptians to extricate himself from the logic of his own strategy, which requires the IDF fight for weeks or months in order to bring about an end to rocket fire from Gaza. Simultaneously, each day that passes brings greater economic, diplomatic, and political pressures. If Barak cannot get the Egyptians to convince Hamas to stop the rocket fire he is faced with two unhappy alternatives: either the war continues for weeks in which case casualties will rise and his whole strategy will be seen to have failed, or, he fails to achieve an end to the rocket fire, and his strategy will have been proven utterly pointless.

· Tzipi Livni faces similar difficulties. She has learnt nothing from the Second Lebanon War. Livni only achieved UN Resolution 1701 as a result of PM Olmert ordering a final push in south Lebanon. This forced Hizb’allah to accept a ceasefire on Israel’s terms and allowed a greatly increased international force, as well as the Lebanese Army to move to its southern border for the first time in 40 years. Livni improbably claimed she could have achieved the same results within the first week of the war. Again, she has shown that her political goals cannot be achieved by the means she has proposed: a limited but harsh aerial bombardment of Gaza to be followed by a continuous response to each rocket fired. But Hamas are no more impressed by such tactics as Hizb’allah were at first in Lebanon. Only when defeat on the battlefield has become all but complete have Hizb’allah and every other Arab armed force Israel has ever faced in its history, been prepared to negotiate a cessation of violence.

Livni has appeared as something of an irrelevance, unable as she is to get anything substantial or worthwhile out of Egypt, and watching impotently as one by one her allies in Europe desert her. During hostilities Israel has only one ally of any significance: the United States. It remains to be seen whether Livni can keep even President Bush onside for the duration of this operation. This was Livni’s concern during the Second Lebanon War, that she would fail to keep EU and US support. PM Olmert kept his nerve and ordered the troops in on two separate occasions against her wishes. It requires a cool and tough mind to cope with such pressures and Israeli centre-right voters, upon which Kadima depend, have seen Livni does not have the mental strength or the strategic military or political vision to protect Israel’s vital interests at times of acute stress.

· This leaves Bibi Netanyahu of Likud in an unassailable position. His analysis of the disengagement from Gaza as a strategic blunder of the first magnitude will be seen to have been vindicated by much of the political centre and right that he needs to convince in order to gain power. And, his argument that a major military operation should have been carried out against Hamas in Gaza years ago, before it could entrench itself, will be seen as equally valid. Valid to such an extent that Defence Minister Ehud Barak has had to invent an extraordinarily tortuous strategy to safeguard IDF personnel’s lives despite the fact Israel’s very security continues to be breached on a daily basis.

· The electoral success of both Kadima and Labour is now inextricably linked to the success or failure of Ehud Barak’s intricate battle plan, and Egypt’s willingness to deal honestly and efficiently with its own problems in Sinai. However, in the meantime, Israel’s economic and diplomatic interests will simply have to suffer, and the loss of life in Gaza will obviously continue unabated.

· Hamas, too, will have to change their battle plan if their military wing is to survive intact. Their unwillingness to compromise on any issue, including the release of Gilad Shalit, whom they now say they have no concern over (in other words he has almost certainly been murdered), and the continued firing of rockets, will give Israel no choice but to continue Barak’s slow salami slice procedure of dismembering it.

· However, all the signs are that Israel will declare a unilateral ceasefire within days. The difficult task of explaining to the Israeli people what goals the operation has achieved will then fall onto Livni and Barak. Their success or failure at defending their positions will be reflected in the number of seats they win for their respective parties come the election on the 10 February.

Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/

For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:http://www.haaretz.com/

For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English: http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html

For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/

For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/headlines

A written summary of the news:
news:http://www.bicom.org.uk/news

The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/

Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/comment-and-opinion

A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/quotes
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