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http://guidetotheperplexed.blogspot.com/
· MAIN POINTS
1 Avigdor Lieberman’s ‘Israel beytenu’ right-of-centre party will probably overtake Labour, as a result of taking votes from Likud, to become Israel’s third largest party.
2 Likud, despite losing seats to Israel beytenu will probably just defeat Kadima, but even if they do not, Likud will almost certainly still head the next government.
3 Ehud Barak’s military tactics in Gaza have won over some in the centre and on the left but have failed to impress the Israeli electorate at large as the strategic costs become apparent.
4 Ehud Barak’s and the Labour Party’s position may become untenable as a result of Barak’s military and political miscalculations causing the Labour party to split, or forcing it into opposition.
5 Bibi Netanyahu will form a centre right government that will render a two-state solution impossible in the short to medium term.
6 The current geographical and political Palestinian divisions mean a two-state solution would be impossible to implement even assuming there was any agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority to do so.
7 Another operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip has become unavoidable.
8 Unless radical improvements can be made on the West Bank within the next few months, or year at the most, another at least attempted intifada is inevitable.
9 Israel’s internal divisions will be set aside should a likely war with Iran and Syria become unavoidable.
· ANALYSIS
· Public interest in the election has grown in the last few days as the electorate have focussed upon Avigdor Lieberman as the natural choice for their protest vote. He satisfies several needs:
1. Many feel the operation in Gaza was too cautious and limited in its execution. They want someone who has the courage to see the next operation through to its logical conclusion: the neutralisation of the military wing of Hamas and all the other terror groups active in the Gaza Strip and the retaking of the ‘Philadelphi (smuggling) Corridor.’
2. There is a strong anti-establishment feeling born of frustration amongst the electorate, who see the same old faces filling the same posts in government, with apparently little to nothing ever changing. The announcement by the police and prosecution service of another investigation into Avigdor Lieberman, despite ten years of investigations without any charges ever having been brought, was seen as a deliberate attempt by the establishment to silence a dissenting voice on the eve of the elections. His poll ratings increased from that moment onwards.
3. Lieberman voices the unexpressed anxieties, frustrations and anger, of many amongst the electorate towards the Arabs in general and Israeli Arabs in particular. Israeli Arab politicians have made it clear they do not support the concept of Israel as either a home for the Jews or a Jewish State. Further, they have openly expressed support for Hamas, Hizb’allah, and Iran, even during the Second Lebanon War, as well as during the latest incursion into Gaza. Israeli Jews feel they are facing a metaphysical threat to the country from Iran and its allies and do not understand how Israeli Arab politicians can so openly voice their support for nations and groups that openly advocate Israel’s destruction.
Lieberman has expressed in unequivocal terms he will not tolerate this open threat and double standard on the part of Israeli Arabs, who, in any other country in the world would be incarcerated or silenced. The threat to Israel is not political, as in British communist support for the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the threat is to Israel’s continued existence. Israelis do not understand why Israel’s minority Arab population is indulged to the extent that it is, and their frustration finds relief in Lieberman’s straightforward no nonsense attitude summed up in his slogan: “Without Loyalty, No Citizenship.”
4. Lieberman’s suggestion that densely populated hostile Israeli-Arab border villages and towns be swapped for Jewish-inhabited settlement blocks around Jerusalem makes political and moral sense to many. The Palestinians insist their state be free of Jews, and, the Arab Israelis consistently express their disapproval of living in a Jewish state. Therefore the swap makes sense from the Israeli perspective: it allows the Arabs to rejoin their clans and families just over the border within a totally Arab Jew-free state, it unburdens Israel of a demographic and political security threat, and it is equitable as it swaps land for land and people for people. Lieberman argues Arabs cannot insist upon a Jew-free land of their own and complain when Jews ask for parity, particularly as the Israeli Arabs concerned have expressed their desire to live in a non-Jewish state, and are openly hostile to the nation they expressly do not wish to live in.
Lieberman also offers an alternative: they can stay with full citizenship rights and pledge allegiance to the state in the same way US citizens do, where, for example, school children pledge allegiance to the flag every day. If they fail to do so they are free to leave Israel or they can stay and renounce both any right to vote and any rights to stand for political office. Those who do pledge allegiance would also no longer be free to avoid their 2 to 3-year national service as almost all Israeli-Arabs are currently permitted to do (other than notably the Druse and some Bedouin).
· It is possible for Kadima to just defeat Likud and become the largest single party and still not head a government. Tzipi Livni will find out very quickly that a lack of political strategic thinking and planning, an inability to make deals, and self-righteousness, are not useful assets when it comes to forming coalition governments in Israel. It is in no one's interest to make a deal with Livni. It is vital for Labour and Likud to undermine Kadima in order to win over their share of Kadima’s centre right and centre left votes. Shas does not like or trust Livni, rightly believing she will not bow to their sometimes excessive demands. And Shas, Likud, and Lieberman, are totally opposed to one of the central tenets of Kadima’s view, which is to unburden Israel of the West Bank as soon as possible even if that includes parts of East Jerusalem. Nor do any of the parties trust Livni to lead Israel during any major confrontation with Iran and Syria, which all parties believe is almost inevitable unless the great powers put Iran in her place.
· Ehud Barak’s position is particularly exposed. His tactics in Gaza have proved fruitless and the operation almost pointless, and that is aside from the diplomatic and economic costs. Rockets continue to land on Israel without any effective reply, Gilad Shalit remains a hostage, and the smuggling of missiles and weapons into Gaza continues apace despite current early efforts by Egypt to halt the flow. His saving of IDF lives appealed to some on the patriotic liberal-left, but his tactics left others disillusioned and frustrated, particularly many younger conscripts who wanted to ‘finish the job.’
He now faces an impossible task: how to join a government led by Bibi Netanyahu that includes Avigdor Lieberman, when many prominent figures in the party have said it is politically untenable. In any case he could only join if he were made Defence Minister, no other post would satisfy him either politically or personally. He could argue to the party that it would be legitimate to try and form a government with Livni or Bibi at its head as long as Lieberman were excluded but this would not appeal to Bibi as it would in effect mean he was to either head, or play second fiddle to, a liberal-left Kadima-Labour dominated coalition, which of course would be politically nonsensical as he could much more easily lead a relatively stable centre-right coalition.
Barak will either have to resign and leave Labour to go into opposition under the leadership of Yitzhak Herzog, or he could risk splitting Labour in an effort to stay as Minister of Defence, which Bibi may not, in the end, be able to offer him in any case.
· Bibi Netanyahu, whether Likud come first or second, will almost certainly head the next government, which will include Lieberman’s Israel beitenu, Shas, and Kadima (effectively representing roughly 76 Knesset seats out of 120). Livni will insist on holding the position of Deputy Prime Minister, despite Bibi saying he would abolish the post, as well as Foreign Minister in charge of peace talks. These of course will be fruitless as there will be nothing to negotiate about and possibly no one to negotiate with. It is inconceivable President Abbas will negotiate about anything other than Palestinian independence, which will not be on the table for Livni to offer in any case.
Livni does not have the mandate from her party, or the courage, to lead Kadima into opposition, and it is possible that after a year or so she may be sidelined to the Ministry of Justice. If Livni does try and take Kadima into opposition it will instantly split, with its right-of-centre members joining Likud.
· The divisions between Fatah and Hamas are so deep and the geographical split so entrenched that reconciliation appears almost impossible. Hamas are currently trying, yet again, to take over the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Fatah’s last bastion of legitimacy. It is recognised throughout the world as the “sole representative of the Palestinian people” and has always been dominated by Fatah. President Abbas, however, does not have Yassir Arafat’s ability to divide and misrule, nor does he have Arafat’s stature, fear inducing abilities, or limitless capacity and funds to bribe everyone to do his bidding. Abbas is isolated, mistrusted, devoid of respect, and powerless. Hamas is divided but has limitless funds, is feared, and is highly determined and motivated.
Abbas may have no choice but to resign or block all attempts at the Hamas takeover of the PLO until he can find a suitable successor. It is unlikely that if he stood for President again he would be elected unless he stood unopposed. Hamas in any case do not recognise his Presidency as of January this year. In any event he would have no reason to stand for President as there would be nothing for him to negotiate with a Bibi-led government. He may hand his succession to former PM Ahmed Qureia, or, failing that, to Marwan Barghouti a Fatah MP currently in an Israeli jail for murder, who, from his prison cell, played an important role in mediating Fatah-Hamas reconciliation talks in February 2007. Barghouti may then call for a new intifada to sabotage any paralysis in the independence talks, and to boost his standing, which in any case remains high.
· In any event, it will be vital for Netanyahu’s government to neutralise Hamas’s military wing if Bibi wants to pursue his policy of entering a slow autonomy process for the West Bank. In order for that to proceed he will have to simultaneously suppress any political upheavals there. It is likely that the neutralisation of any military threat from Gaza is already deemed a prerequisite for imposing a slow autonomy process on the West Bank. This may come at a heavy price particularly if the IDF have to stay in the Gaza Strip for any length of time. Whether it is politically or militarily sustainable will depend on President Obama’s reaction and whether the Israeli security services can suppress any attempts at a new intifada both in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Or, indeed, whether West Bank Palestinians will have any appetite for a third intifada. On the other hand, it could be argued, the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip will have nothing to lose and not much else to do.
· Many of the unavoidable divisions and stresses brought about by the lack of any progress in the peace process both amongst and between Palestinians and Israelis, will be set aside should the main powers not be able to contain Iran’s nuclear weapon’s programme and ambitions. Israel will have to find a way to sabotage Iran’s efforts at some stage and this in turn will lead to an inevitable confrontation between, at the very least, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon on the one hand, and Israel on the other. This, however, would only be the first stage in a series of ongoing Iranian-initiated conflicts that will continue unless, and until, the major powers agree to effectively contain Iran’s geo-strategic ambitions.
However, the major powers have to date shown neither the will nor the ability to do so.
Links:
For the best English language news site on Israel:
http://www.jpost.com/
¨For a vigorous Liberal-Left position of the Israeli daily paper:
http://www.haaretz.com/
¨For a Centre-Left view on Israel, in occasionally appalling English:
http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html
¨For an insight into Arab and Muslim media coverage of the Israel-Palestinian issue, anti-Semitism, and other Middle East issues see:
http://www.memri.org/
¨For an overview of the media coverage of Israel see the BICOM (Britain Israel Research and Communications Centre) site. Below are the sites for -News headlines with links to each site:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/headlines
¨A written summary of the news:news:http://www.bicom.org.uk/news
The main issues behind the news:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/briefings/behind_the_news/
¨Extracts from editorial and article Opinion:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/comment-and-opinion
A small selection of Quotes:
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/quotes
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Friday, 6 February 2009
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