NO PLAN NO PALESTINE

1. THE PLAN
2. ANALYSIS - THE PLAN IN CONTEXT

If Palestine is to be created on 22% of U.N. mandated territory[1] then the international community will have to enact a bold plan very soon, assuming it is genuinely interested in a “two state solution.” Future conflicts might destroy any hope of an independent Palestine. An international plan will require promptness, vision, and serious commitment and funding.

THE PLAN
Any plan would have to look similar to the one below. If it does not Israel and Palestine can be sure the international community is not serious:

1. A Financial Guarantors Coalition: core members - USA, E.U., Japan, Gulf Arab states, to guarantee financial support to Palestine for 20 years. Its remit to include:

a) compensating refugees

b) resettling refugees

c) building 4 new cities for the resettled

d) building bullet train for Hajj pilgrims from East Jerusalem to Medina that will be connected to an international airport on the Jordan-Palestine border

e) building broadband infrastructure on South Korean model

f) developing East Jerusalem to accommodate Muslim pilgrims

g) self-sustaining water, power, and transport infrastructure projects

And, if Hamas agrees to abide by the 3 Quartet principles[2]
h) a Gazan container port and an international airport on the Egypt-Gaza border as well as a connecting road and rail tunnel link to the West Bank

2. For Palestinians: freedom to work in, and travel to, the Gulf states, open borders with Jordan and Egypt, security guarantees from NATO, the U.N. and Russia, recognition of East Jerusalem as Palestine's capital.

3. For Israelis: freedom to work and reside in the E.U. on 4-year renewable work visas, preferential E.U. status, NATO membership or affiliation and security guarantees including unilateral measures in extremis, financial support for all additional security measures, and international recognition of West Jerusalem and the Kottel area of East Jerusalem as Israel's capital.

4. The freedom to coordinate unilateral acts of withdrawal between Israel and Palestine to be used at both nations' mutually agreed discretion.

5. For China, Russia, South Korea, and Turkey: involvement in building and infrastructure projects including engineering, manpower, organisation, energy supply, building materials.

An international conference in 2011 to declare, allocate, and establish these responsibilities.

ANALYSIS - THE PLAN IN CONTEXT
Inauspicious Background
The Obama Administration has so far done the peace process no favours. The reality speaks for itself: at no point since Oslo in 1993 has there been such a protracted break in talks and so little progress on any substantive issue. Obama's Cairo speech was only the first blunder.

By making settlements a central issue where they had never been before, by deliberately omitting Jewry's historic ties to the region, and, by emphasising the Holocaust as the main basis for Israel's existence, it played perfectly into the rejectionists' hands whilst simultaneously alienating Israel's political centre. Worse, it forced President Abbas into a corner, as Abbas could not appear more moderate than a U.S. President who insisted that all building beyond the disputed 1967 borders was illegal and unacceptable. Even Yasir Arafat had become resigned to at best getting East Jerusalem, and certainly not the residential suburbs built both north and south of the city beyond the disputed 1967 lines.

But, these mistakes did not change the insurmountable problems and irreconcilable differences that exist between the parties. Put baldly it is not in Israel's interest to have a two state 'solution' unless all her security needs are addressed in a systematic, detailed, and credible way, and nor is it in the Palestinian interest to have a two state outcome unless the most pressing and divisive issue of refugee resettlement is similarly addressed.

There has at no point been a realistic or credible case put by the international community for resolving either issue. One of the main reasons for this is the substantial financial cost of resettling refugees and meeting Israel's basic security needs. The other reason is political, no one is prepared to face up to the inevitable need of having to both bolster Israel's separation measures many times over as well as to divide East Jerusalem up into walled separate enclaves for Jew and Arab, a model of separation that would make Derry and Belfast look positively prosaic by comparison.

Whilst Palestinians despair of any resolution or genuine progress towards the creation of a state, Israelis have come to the conclusion that their neighbours only want one thing: their liquidation. This is not the result of a paranoiac mindset on behalf of the average Israeli, it is the only logical conclusion a rational person can come to in Israel's circumstances. The Israeli case is simple:

'We left Lebanon, there was war within six years, with the north living in bomb shelters, mass civilian evacuations, and missiles landing only miles from Tel Aviv; We left Gaza, and more missiles rained down on us than ever before. Gaza is now an Islamic dictatorship, a centre for terrorist activity with missiles capable of hitting Tel Aviv, and is a proxy of Iran whose Islamic regime has publicly stated its goal is to wipe us off the map. And, there is not a single classroom in any part of Palestine that has a map of Israel anywhere on its walls.'

Worse still, the West Bank, the only realistic location for Palestinian resettlement, is neither willing, nor prepared, either structurally or psychologically, to receive the immigrant Palestinians it would need to in any final settlement. Hard on the heels of national independence will be the need to radically rethink Palestinian identity, society, economy, relations with its neighbours, and status, as well as cope with the impact of absorbing large numbers of refugees and/or returnees.

Few Israelis believe that given these circumstances a Palestinian state would not, within months or a few years, be at war with Israel. How soon upon withdrawal would Abbas and Fayyad be replaced by a radical leadership bent on war? Why, when war with Iran is seemingly inevitable, should Israel withdraw from its eastern front that is currently quiet and peaceable as a result of IDF actions, and turn it into yet another hostile border from which Israel will have to defend itself? But worst of all, the West Bank is within a few miles, or in some cases a few metres, of almost all Israel's major conurbations, airports, and power generating facilities. No sane person would voluntarily withdraw from hilltops that overlook downtown Tel Aviv, Netanya, Herzliya, Ben Gurion airport and the rest.

The international community is simply not serious about a “two state solution”
Despite endless rhetoric about the Israel-Palestine conflict being a vital national interest to the U.S. and Europe, there is no evidence of any serious effort being made to address it. On the contrary, all the evidence points to the international community wanting to manage the issue at the least cost to itself, rather than resolve it.

What signs of serious intent are required?

First, there would have to be an acknowledgement of an independent Palestine's extraordinary challenges. These would include the ability to absorb large numbers of refugees and returnees, regional economic integration, modern means of transport and freedom of movement, large infrastructure projects, and a plan to make Palestine economically viable.

Second, there would have to be long term financial support for the fledgling state.

Third, there would have to be political agreements with the international community that would guarantee Palestine's political and economic independence and security.

Fourth, there would have to be a package of financial, security, and political incentives to both Israel and Palestine to help them overcome the total lack of belief that a two state outcome would not be a recipe for either chaos and/or war.

The Plan
Any plan would have to look similar to the one below. If it does not Israel and Palestine can be sure the international community is not serious:

1. A Financial Guarantors Coalition: core members - USA, E.U., Japan, Gulf Arab states, to guarantee financial support to Palestine for 20 years. Its remit to include:

a) compensating refugees

b) resettling refugees

c) building 4 new cities for the resettled

d) building bullet train for Hajj pilgrims from East Jerusalem to Medina that will be connected to an international airport on the Jordan-Palestine border

e) building broadband infrastructure on South Korean model

f) developing East Jerusalem to accommodate Muslim pilgrims

g) self-sustaining water, power, and transport infrastructure projects

And, if Hamas agrees to abide by the 3 Quartet principles[2]
h) a Gazan container port and an international airport on the Egypt-Gaza border as well as a connecting road and rail tunnel link to the West Bank

2. For Palestinians: freedom to work in, and travel to, the Gulf states, open borders with Jordan and Egypt, security guarantees from NATO, the U.N. and Russia, recognition of East Jerusalem as Palestine's capital.

3. For Israelis: freedom to work and reside in the E.U. on 4-year renewable work visas, preferential E.U. status, NATO membership or affiliation and security guarantees including unilateral measures in extremis, financial support for all additional security measures, and international recognition of West Jerusalem and the Kottel area of East Jerusalem as Israel's capital.

4. The freedom to coordinate unilateral acts of withdrawal between Israel and Palestine to be used at both nations' mutually agreed discretion.

5. For China, Russia, South Korea, and Turkey: involvement in building and infrastructure projects including engineering, manpower, organisation, energy supply, building materials.

An international conference in 2011 to declare, allocate, and establish these responsibilities.

The need for, and advantages of, such a plan
It is clear that the international community is not serious about a two state outcome otherwise a plan similar to the one above would have begun to be put into effect within months of Obama coming to power.

The advantage of such a plan is that each of the participants in the Financial Guarantor group would be supporting each other in implementing their individual and collective efforts. Were a party to withdraw it would not only be an international embarrassment but evidence of lack of support for a two state outcome. It would also anchor the Gulf states into the process, something that until now, for many reasons, they have been reluctant to do. Finally the plan would ensure that the West Bank had a realistic chance of becoming part of a stable, prosperous, and successful state, as opposed to yet another potential threat to Israel.

It offers incentives to both Israel and Palestine to overcome their genuine doubts about a two state solution, instead of being trapped in an endless cycle of either having pressure put upon them or endeavouring to create pressure on the other party. Direct exposure to the advantages of the plan to the respective populations would also undermine the propensity of the political leaderships to veto progress in talks. Two other potential benefits to Israel and Palestine would be product and technology transfer via Palestinian economic zones to the Gulf States, and a portion of the Muslim pilgrim tourism to East Jerusalem crossing into Israel.

China would play a vital part in creating the new cities required to absorb the new returnee and refugee populations. China's proven ability to build and complete large projects on time would add credibility to the project.

South Korean involvement in supplying broadband to the new cities would help ensure that they would not become instant backwater dumping grounds for their populations but had a modern urban infrastructure ready and fit for development. U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon's influence would be particularly productive in this effort.

Japan's proven success with its high speed rail networks will give credibility to the bullet train project from East Jerusalem to Medina and will be only the first stage in a regional effort to link Istanbul and Damascus in the north with Jordan in the east and Medina and the Gulf states to the south. At the centre of it all would be the international airport on the Jordan-Palestine border which would act as a hub for tourists and pilgrims to go directly by train to East Jerusalem, to Jordan's main tourist sites, to the Red Sea, and beyond. A major highway and rail network would also help integrate Palestine into the regional economy.

Turkey's vital contribution, beyond supplying materials and engineering and manpower skills, would be to extend the network north via Syria into Anatolia. Turkey, having built the original railway linking Damascus to Medina, would not only see the project as a matter of national pride but of economic self-interest, as the network will link Arabia to Turkey and on to Europe.

Russian engagement and involvement in the creation and construction of Palestine has self-evident advantages, and delegating to Russia construction projects, the supply of energy and materials, and security guarantees to Palestine will reinforce Russia's role, satisfy her aspiration to great power status, and undermine the rejectionist camp.

The plan can work with or without Syrian, Iranian, Hizb'allah and Hamas participation and/or veto but it can also be part of a wider comprehensive peace process. Successful investment in the West Bank by the Financial Guarantor powers will act as an incentive to Palestinians in Gaza to get involved and will undermine the rejectionist camp. The plan could also assuage Israel's concern that no progress can occur in relation to a two state outcome until the threat from Iran is dealt with.

If this or a similar plan is not enacted:
1. Unilateral moves by both Israel and Palestine will leave all the main issues unresolved: refugees, Jerusalem, borders, economic and political integration, security, and legitimacy.

2. Radical Islamic forces and the rejectionist camp led by Iran will be strengthened, undermining moderate Arab regimes, and would be further bolstered should there be a military strike against Iran's nuclear weapons facilities.

3. The losses that Israel expects to endure following a strike upon Iran will make her even less likely to compromise on security.

4. Palestine, as an independent, economically viable nation state, will be increasingly difficult to either create or sustain, and will certainly comprise far less than 22% of Mandate Palestine. Non-violent Palestinian resistance will slowly be replaced by more radical forces, particularly post President Abbas's tenure.

5. The region will remain a centre of political instability and violence for the foreseeable future.

The 5 points above describe, in any event, the most likely future based upon current trends.

[1] 22% of U.N. mandated Palestine constitutes the West Bank and Gaza territories based upon the disputed 1967 borders.
[2] 1) Unconditional recognition of Israel; 2) Abide by all previous Israel-PLO-P.A. agreements; 3) Renunciate violence.